YunoHost MCP

yunohost-mcp

Secure MCP server for YunoHost: Nostr-authenticated, policy-controlled, auditable administration, diagnostics, and _ynh package development for AI clients (Codex, Claude, OpenCode, ChatGPT-compatible MCP clients).

See PLAN.md for the full design and phased roadmap, and PHASE0_INVESTIGATION.md for how it maps onto YunoHost's actual Python API.

Running the server

yunohost-mcp --transport stdio   # local development, fully trusted (no NIP-98 handshake)yunohost-mcp --transport http --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8765   # NIP-98-authenticated, remote-capable

By default fake_yunohost is off (real mode) — set YUNOHOST_MCP_FAKE_YUNOHOST=true to run against canned data on a machine without YunoHost installed. See identity.example.toml for identity.toml's shape (pubkey → role mapping; required before any HTTP request can do anything).

Optional local Polypack memory

The server can act as an authenticated façade for a separately installed Polypack MCP service. Set YUNOHOST_MCP_POLYPACK_URL to that service's loopback /mcp/ endpoint; the URL must resolve to 127.0.0.1, ::1, or localhost, and Polypack remains the sole owner of its database. The YunoHost MCP HTTP endpoint is still the only endpoint agents should expose publicly.

The initial integration exposes bounded memory_get, memory_list_contexts, memory_recall, memory_context, memory_thread, memory_store, and memory_feedback tools. Memory reads, writes, and feedback have separate memory.read, memory.write, and memory.feedback scopes; writes are locked and audited, while content is represented in the audit log only by length and hash. Provenance is added by this server, and user metadata cannot forge its reserved _yunohost_* fields. The integration is optional and core YunoHost tools continue to work when Polypack is not installed or not configured.

Installing the client tools

The recommended client-side path is uvx, which creates an isolated environment for the command without requiring users to manage a Python virtual environment:

uvx --from yunohost-mcp-connect yunohost-mcp-connect --help

For a persistent command-line installation, use:

uv tool install yunohost-mcp-connect

The package is also installable with python3 -m pip install yunohost-mcp-connect; that path is mainly useful for development or systems where uv is not available.

Agent-assisted setup

The setup wizard is designed to be run by an AI agent on the user's local machine. It generates a fresh client identity, writes the selected MCP client configuration, and prints the one remaining security-sensitive step: granting the generated npub an appropriate role on the YunoHost server.

uvx --from yunohost-mcp-connect yunohost-mcp-connect setup \  --server https://your-yunohost-domain/mcp \  --client codex \  --format json

Supported clients are codex, claude-desktop, claude-code, gemini, hermes, and opencode. Setup is safe to rerun, refuses conflicting server definitions, backs up an existing configuration before changing it, and never prints the private key. Use --print-only when the agent should display configuration without writing it. After granting the npub and restarting the client, diagnose the connection:

uvx --from yunohost-mcp-connect yunohost-mcp-connect doctor \  --server https://your-yunohost-domain/mcp \  --key-file ~/.config/yunohost-mcp/codex.key \  --format json

Connecting a client: yunohost-mcp-connect

Mainstream MCP clients (Claude Desktop, a plain Codex install, etc.) have no way to sign a NIP-98 Authorization header — that's specific to this server. yunohost-mcp-connect bridges the gap: a small local process that speaks plain MCP over stdio to your actual client, and forwards every request to the remote --transport http server, signed with your own Nostr key.

yunohost-mcp-connect --remote-url https://your-yunohost-domain/mcp --key-file ~/.config/yunohost-mcp/key

• --key-file (or $YUNOHOST_MCP_CLIENT_KEY_FILE) points at a file holding a hex or nsec1... private key — preferred over --key/$YUNOHOST_MCP_CLIENT_KEY, which put the key in argv/environment where other processes on the same machine can read it.
• --generate-key PATH writes a fresh private key to PATH (0600; refuses to overwrite an existing file), prints its npub, and exits without connecting anywhere — the way to get a --key-file in the first place. Use a distinct PATH per client; see "Give each client its own key file" below.
• --delegation-file (or $YUNOHOST_MCP_CLIENT_DELEGATION_FILE) presents a delegation event (PLAN.md Phase 11) alongside your own signature, for a disposable agent identity an owner granted a subset of their access to.
• Point your MCP client's config at this command (not the server directly) — tools/list, tools/call, resources/list, and resources/read are forwarded verbatim; authorization, policy, and audit still happen on the remote server.

Each connector starts its local MCP endpoint independently of the remote YunoHost handshake. If one configured YunoHost instance is offline, that connector stays alive, reports no discovered tools until the instance returns, and retries on later requests; other configured MCP servers can still start and remain usable.

Incident introspection

The server includes bounded, read-only diagnostics for intermittent outages:

• web_logs parses Nginx access/error logs, including HTTP and upstream status.
• journal_query reads allowlisted service, SSH, firewall, kernel, OOM, and systemd journals.
• system_snapshot, service_history, ssh_diagnose, and network_snapshot expose host, restart, access-control, and socket state.
• http_probe tests an HTTP(S) endpoint, while incident_snapshot collects the main evidence for a time window.

Log paths, output limits, command timeouts, and whether private HTTP targets are permitted are configurable with YUNOHOST_MCP_* settings. All of these tools are read-only and enforce bounded output.

Connecting Claude Desktop or Codex

Both point at yunohost-mcp-connect, not at the server directly — the bridge is what signs each request with your Nostr key. Use the full path to yunohost-mcp-connect in whatever environment you installed yunohost-mcp into (e.g. ~/.local/pipx/venvs/yunohost-mcp/bin/yunohost-mcp-connect, or a venv's bin/ directory — which yunohost-mcp-connect after activating it will tell you).

Give each client its own key file. YUNOHOST_MCP_CLIENT_KEY_FILE is the identity — whichever key signs a request determines its role and scopes on the server, nothing else. Point two different clients (or two different config files for the same client — a project-local .codex/config.toml shadows ~/.codex/config.toml) at the same key file and the second one silently authenticates as the first, with its exact permissions - no error, nothing to notice. Generate a fresh key per client rather than copying one that already works:

yunohost-mcp-connect --generate-key ~/.config/yunohost-mcp/claude-desktop.keyyunohost-mcp-connect --generate-key ~/.config/yunohost-mcp/codex.key

Each prints the new key's npub - grant it whatever role is appropriate for that specific client (see "Granting a disposable agent identity access" below, or identity.toml directly), not the role you already gave a different one. --generate-key refuses to overwrite a file that already exists.

Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json — Settings → Developer → Edit Config):

{  "mcpServers": {    "yunohost-mcp": {      "command": "/full/path/to/yunohost-mcp-connect",      "env": {        "YUNOHOST_MCP_CLIENT_REMOTE_URL": "https://your-yunohost-domain/mcp",        "YUNOHOST_MCP_CLIENT_KEY_FILE": "/home/you/.config/yunohost-mcp/claude-desktop.key"      }    }  }}

Codex CLI (~/.codex/config.toml):

[mcp_servers.yunohost-mcp]command = "/full/path/to/yunohost-mcp-connect"
[mcp_servers.yunohost-mcp.env]YUNOHOST_MCP_CLIENT_REMOTE_URL = "https://your-yunohost-domain/mcp"YUNOHOST_MCP_CLIENT_KEY_FILE = "/home/you/.config/yunohost-mcp/codex.key"

Run yunohost-mcp-connect --key-file <path> once per new key to see its npub (yunohost-mcp-connect: signing as npub1...), then grant that npub whatever role is actually appropriate for that client in identity.toml - not the role you already gave a different one.

For a delegated (disposable) identity instead of your own key, add YUNOHOST_MCP_CLIENT_DELEGATION_FILE pointing at the file yunohost-mcp-delegate produced (see below). Restart the client after editing its config — both read this file once, at startup.

Granting a disposable agent identity access: yunohost-mcp-delegate

An identity.toml entry grants access to one specific pubkey, permanently (until edited). A delegation (PLAN.md Phase 11) is the other way to grant access: an owner signs a short-lived, scoped grant to an agent's own disposable key, without ever adding that key to identity.toml or handing over any private key. yunohost-mcp-delegate is what an owner runs to create one:

yunohost-mcp-delegate --key-file ~/.config/yunohost-mcp/key \  --delegate npub1... \  --remote-url https://your-yunohost-domain/mcp \  --role readonly --ttl 24h \  --out agent-delegation.json

• --delegate is the agent's own pubkey (it must sign its own NIP-98 requests as always — a delegation never replaces that, it only adds standing).
• --remote-url fetches the server's pubkey and this owner's own current scopes automatically — no need to type the server's pubkey by hand, and an over-broad --scope/--role request is flagged (the server can never grant more than the delegator's own current scopes; see auth/delegation.py). Pass --server instead if you'd rather supply the server's pubkey directly.
• --scope/--role (repeatable, combinable) choose what to grant; --ttl (e.g. 24h, 7d) how long — the server rejects anything over 30 days.
• The output is a signed delegation event: a bearer credential once issued. Hand the file to the agent to use with yunohost-mcp-connect --delegation-file agent-delegation.json, over a channel you trust (the same as you'd hand over an API key).
• To take a delegation back before it expires, add its id (printed after signing) to revoked_delegations.toml — this is independent of, and finer-grained than, removing the delegator's own identity.toml entry (which revokes every delegation they've ever issued).

Approving high-risk operations: yunohost-mcp-approve

Some operations (system_upgrade, backup_restore, backup_delete, system_migrate, user_delete, permission changes, firewall changes) require owner co-signature on top of the requester's own confirmation (PLAN.md Phase 13, solo profile - see docs/owner-approval-plan.md in the packaging repo for the full design). The requester's call pauses with a confirmation_id; the configured owner reviews and approves it with yunohost-mcp-approve, signing through their own NIP-46 remote signer app (Amber, nsec.app, ...) - their private key never touches this server or the requesting agent's machine.

DNS publishing, catalogue publication, and package-test lifecycle operations also require owner co-signature. Package-test writes must first use package_test_prepare; the returned short-lived session binds the operation to one requester, candidate source, and app id. Treat package testing as privileged because candidate package scripts execute with YunoHost privileges.

For reverse-proxy deployments, set YUNOHOST_MCP_PUBLIC_BASE_URL to the exact public origin used in NIP-98 signatures (for example https://mcp.example.org). Requests with an unexpected Host header are rejected. Keep the local stdio transport restricted to trusted local clients: it intentionally grants the local process full administrator scope.

Optional NostrHost control-plane bridge

On a NostrHost derivative, the reference FastMCP server can submit registered operations to the local signed control plane instead of executing them in the MCP process. Enable it with YUNOHOST_MCP_NATIVE_CONTROL_PLANE_ENABLED=true, set YUNOHOST_MCP_NATIVE_CONTROL_PLANE_RELAY, and provision a dedicated 64-character hex agent key at YUNOHOST_MCP_NATIVE_CONTROL_PLANE_AGENT_KEY_PATH. The MCP server publishes the signed request only; the control-plane daemon performs scope checks, administrator approval, execution, and audit publication.

For bridged calls, the dedicated bridge key is the signed requester and the authenticated MCP caller's Nostr public key is carried as the signed actor tag on the request, execution, result, and state-snapshot records. This makes agents and human users first-class audit identities while keeping authorization anchored to the key that cryptographically submitted the request.

One-time setup, on whatever device the owner keeps their signer app on:

yunohost-mcp-approve pair --owner-npub <owner-npub>

Prints a nostrconnect:// URI to open in the signer app. This persists a reconnectable session locally so later approvals don't need to re-pair. If the signer app can instead export a bunker:// connection string itself (its own "add a connection" feature), yunohost-mcp-approve pair --owner-npub <owner-npub> --bunker-uri <uri> connects immediately using that instead - no link to open, nothing to wait on. Pairing requires the explicit owner key so a transport endpoint cannot be substituted for the configured owner.

To review and approve a specific pending operation:

yunohost-mcp-approve approve --server https://your-yunohost-domain/mcp --confirmation-id confirm-...

This fetches the authoritative pending-operation record from the server (never trusts a locally-supplied plan), displays the exact tool, arguments, and operation_hash, and requires typing yes before submitting the signed approval. Once approved, the original requester can retry its call.

Automatic push approval. Once paired, this step usually isn't needed at all: the moment a require_owner_signature operation is requested, the server itself reuses the same paired session to open a live NIP-46 connection and ask your signer app to sign a small, human-readable approval event right then - a real push prompt on your signer app, no command to run. Approving there marks the ticket approved directly; declining, timing out (YUNOHOST_MCP_OWNER_PUSH_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, default 90s), or no session being paired yet just leaves the ticket pending for a manual yunohost-mcp-approve approve as above. Disable entirely with YUNOHOST_MCP_OWNER_PUSH_APPROVAL_ENABLED=false.

Optional Armada announcements

The package-developer role includes communications.armada.write. With the Armada integration enabled, armada_join explicitly accepts the configured Concord invite for the bot by publishing a Guestbook Join. After a successful catalog_publish, call catalog_announce with its JSON result to post to the channel whose name matches the package repository (for example, ditto_ynh). catalog_announcement_status checks durable delivery state.

Announcements are disabled by default and are best-effort. To enable them, provide a root-owned, mode-0600 bot key and invite URL file, then set:

YUNOHOST_MCP_ARMADA_ENABLED=trueYUNOHOST_MCP_ARMADA_BOT_KEY_PATH=/etc/yunohost-mcp/armada-bot.keyYUNOHOST_MCP_ARMADA_COMMUNITY_INVITE_PATH=/etc/yunohost-mcp/armada-community.invite

Set YUNOHOST_MCP_ARMADA_AUTO_ANNOUNCE=true to have catalog_publish attempt the announcement automatically after catalogue success. A failed or unverified Armada operation never changes the catalogue result. The signing identity must already have the required channel key; invite acceptance and role assignment are separate operations.

Per-agent announcement keys. By default every announcement signs with the shared bot key above. An identity.toml entry can instead set armada_key_path to a dedicated, root-owned, mode-0600 key file so that identity's own announcements and armada_join calls use its own Concord identity instead of the shared bot:

[identity."npub1..."]name = "release-bot-a"roles = ["package-developer"]armada_key_path = "/etc/yunohost-mcp/armada-bot-a.key"

That identity must call armada_join itself once its key file is in place - having a distinct key implies nothing about community membership or channel access. This is still a server-held, file-backed credential like the shared bot key, never the identity's own NIP-98 signing key.

Announcing with the agent's own key, no key file at all. An MCP agent connected through yunohost-mcp-connect (bridge.py) already holds its own Nostr key locally to sign every NIP-98 request - it can announce and join under that same key, with zero server-side credential provisioning, using catalog_announce_draft/catalog_announce_submit and armada_join_draft/armada_join_submit instead of the one-shot tools:

1. catalog_announce_draft(source, catalogue_publication) (or armada_join_draft()) does all the routing and channel-key work that needs no secret, and returns an unsigned event plus a short-lived draft_id.
2. The agent signs that exact event locally. The bridge answers this itself via a local-only sign_nostr_event(kind, tags, content, created_at) tool (never forwarded to the remote server, and restricted to Concord seal events) - the private key never leaves the bridge process.
3. catalog_announce_submit(draft_id, signed_event) (or armada_join_submit) verifies the signature matches exactly what was issued and the identity that requested it, then publishes.

The shared bot key / armada_key_path still cover catalog_publish's YUNOHOST_MCP_ARMADA_AUTO_ANNOUNCE hook and any non-interactive/stdio caller, since neither can do this two-step round trip.

Development

uv sync --group devuv run pytest -q

Creating a release tag

Maintainers can run the GitHub Actions Tag release workflow manually from the branch or commit to release, providing a version without the v prefix (for example, 0.1.1). It validates the version, refuses to overwrite an existing tag, runs the full CI checks on Python 3.11 and 3.12, and only then pushes an annotated v<version> tag.