agent-bom

io.github.koda-ai-studio由 GitHub 账号 koda-ai-studio 发布v0.113.2更新于 Nov 5, 2026

AI supply-chain BOM: agents, MCP servers, packages and recorded reach. Scan and investigate via MCP.

已验证Streamable HTTP可网页运行开发者工具安全与监控AI 与机器学习

概览

AI 生成的概览

扫描 AI 代理与 MCP 服务器配置,生成 AI-BOM、检查软件包 CVE,并给出修复与合规报告。

可以做什么
  • 扫描项目、仓库地址或配置文件,盘点代理、MCP 服务器、工具与依赖包并输出 AI-BOM
  • 在安装前检查指定软件包的已知 CVE,并从本地威胁情报库查询单条公告
  • 为代理环境生成 CycloneDX 或 SPDX 格式的 SBOM,并按策略规则评估扫描结果
  • 输出合规状况与排序后的暴露路径,并生成包含修复命令和凭据收敛建议的修复计划
适用场景
适合使用 Claude Code、Cursor、Codex 等 MCP 客户端的应用安全团队和开发者,用来查看已安装的代理、服务器与软件包、哪些存在漏洞、各自能触达什么。也适合安装前的依赖检查与 CI 安全门禁。
运行要求
可作为远程端点使用,也可通过 uvx 从 PyPI 包 agent-bom 在本地运行。本地扫描无需账号。远程部署需要 OAuth 的 Authorization 持有者令牌,缺少时只有只读的 check 与 intel_lookup 工具可用。可选 NVD_API_KEY 用于提高漏洞信息补全的速率限制。本地项目扫描路径须位于主目录或已配置的工作区根目录内。
安装前请注意
远程端点需要 Authorization 头中的 OAuth 持有者令牌,部署令牌会解锁可写工具,应视为机密。扫描会读取本地项目文件与配置,repo_url 目标会被克隆。部分磁盘侧扫描会创建临时云资源。工具结果包含不可信的外部文本,服务器也提示 JSON 序列化不构成注入防护边界。发现项与控制项映射只是调查参考,并非认证。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 打开 控制台中的 agent-bom,将其添加到工作区。
  2. 连接 所需的 凭据。它们会被私密存储,绝不会在公开页面上展示。
  3. 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Web executable,通过 Streamable HTTP。 远程服务在工作区中配置后即可从网页运行时运行。

交给智能体安装

把这段提示词粘贴到 Claude Code、Codex、Cursor 等智能体,或 SourceWeft 对话中。智能体会读取该服务器的安装指南,先向你展示发布者、端点和登录方式,经你同意后再把它添加到你的客户端。密钥不会写进任何命令。

阅读 https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.koda-ai-studio%2Fagent-bom/install.md,并按其中说明把这个 MCP 服务器接入我的客户端。修改任何配置之前,先告诉我它的发布者、端点和登录方式,等我确认。不要把 API 密钥写进命令或我会提交的文件;问我密钥应从哪里获取。

查看智能体所依据的安装指南

其他 MCP 客户端

把它添加到你客户端的 mcpServers 配置中。 客户端会在首次连接时完成 OAuth 登录。

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "agent-bom": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://agent-bom-mcp.up.railway.app/mcp"
    }
  }
}

README

[agent-bom — AI supply-chain BOM: every agent, MCP server and AI package, and what each one can reach.]

[Build] [PyPI] [Python 3.11 through 3.14]

[Apache-2.0 license] [OpenSSF Scorecard]

AI supply-chain BOM: every agent, MCP server and AI package, and what each one can reach.

For AppSec teams and developers who run Claude Code, Cursor, Codex or any MCP client: see which agents, MCP servers, tools and packages are installed, which are vulnerable, and what each one can reach. Local scans need no account.

Quick start · Try in browser · Laptop → team → org · What you get · Product tour · Docs

Quick start

From the repository you want to inspect, with uv installed:

bash
uvx agent-bom scan . --no-discover -f html -o agent-bom-report.html

Open agent-bom-report.html for inventory, findings and fix guidance. Run the same scan again later and agent-bom prints what changed since the last one. No MCP configuration in the project? Package findings still apply. No project handy? Run uvx agent-bom scan --demo --offline for a bundled sample; Exit 1 is expected there because the sample trips the security gate. A non-zero exit can mean a security gate or incomplete assessment; inspect the report and coverage (exit codes, what a scan does and does not establish, first-run guide).

[Recorded agent-bom CLI showing sample findings and remediation guidance; no fix executed]

From laptop to team to org

WhereStart withYou get
On your laptopuvx agent-bom scan . · claude mcp add agent-bom -- uvx agent-bom mcp serverFindings with fixes, a delta on every rescan, and agent-bom as a tool inside your coding agent (MCP server, plugins)
In your teamuses: koda-ai-studio/agent-bom@v0 on pull requests and a weekly schedule:A PR gate with a findings comment and SARIF in code scanning, plus a weekly rescan that catches new CVEs in unchanged code (GitHub Action)
Across your orgagent-bom up locally, then Docker Compose or the Helm chart from oci://ghcr.io/koda-ai-studio/charts/agent-bomRetained scans, one graph of agents, MCP servers, packages and credentials, SSO and audit, in your own infrastructure (self-host)

Why an AI supply-chain BOM

Agents and MCP servers ship without an inventory. A CVE in an AI package, a poisoned tool description or an over-scoped credential matters by what the agent that loads it can reach. A package SBOM stops at packages; agent-bom records the chain and keeps the evidence for every edge.

1. Inventory2. Correlate3. Act
Agents, MCP servers, tools, packages, models, credential references and cloud resources, read-onlyOne graph: agent → MCP server → tool → package → credential → data, each edge with its sourceFix, gate CI, block poisoned tool calls, rescan to verify

[Sample production AI environment: Document Intake Agent uses a document-tools MCP server that depends on pillow 9.0.0, linked to KEV-listed CVE-2023-4863; Support Triage Agent uses a ticketing MCP server that references TICKETING_API_KEY, which can access a customer ticket archive]

Fictional sample estate. Dashed use, credential and access links are configured or modeled, not observed at runtime; path analysis covers the collected snapshot only. The AWS badge describes environment membership; these sample agents have no recorded execution host or model endpoint. Agent, hosting and model context.

Findings map to OWASP LLM Top 10, OWASP Agentic Top 10, OWASP MCP Top 10, MITRE ATLAS, EU AI Act and NIST AI RMF; control mappings are investigation context, not certification.

What you get

Start with the workflow you need. An individual developer can scan, inspect findings and verify fixes without a shared control plane or a compliance workflow. Teams can add retained scans and shared inventory; organizations can add identity, audit review and governance when needed. These are adoption paths, not separate editions or permissions. See the deployment chooser.

OfferingWhat it includesCostStart
CLI, CI and exportsLocal and CI scans; SARIF, CycloneDX, SPDX, JSON and HTML exports; check pre-install gate; GitHub ActionFree, Apache-2.0; no accountFirst run
Self-hosted control planeAPI and dashboard on Compose or Helm with PostgreSQL, SSO/OIDC, roles, tenant isolation, audit chain, lake evidence import and executive briefsFree, Apache-2.0; your infrastructureSelf-host · Helm
MCP server and agent pluginsagent-bom mcp server tool profiles; Claude Code and Codex plugins; OpenClaw and Cortex Code skillsFree; runs locallyMCP server · Plugins
Hosted service and supportNo managed cloud offering today. Community support on GitHub; security reports follow published response targets, not a contractual SLA—Product boundaries · Support model

What it covers

AreaWhat you get
AI agents and MCPAgents, MCP servers, tools and credentials from local configs and agent frameworks, linked to what they can reach.
Models and AI platformsSupported OpenAI, Hugging Face, Ollama, MLflow and W&B assets, with available model provenance beside dependencies and agent context.
RuntimeAn MCP proxy and gateway that alert on poisoned tools and injected results, or block them with --injection-mode enforce.
SBOM, AI-BOM and Agent-BOMSoftware SBOMs in CycloneDX or SPDX. CycloneDX AI components carry collected model metadata. Native agent-bom JSON connects agents, MCP servers, tools, credential references and packages.
DependenciesLockfiles and manifests across Python, JavaScript, Go, Java, .NET, Rust and more, matched against OSV, GitHub advisories and NVD with KEV and EPSS.
CodeFindings imported from any SARIF producer, plus native analysis of AI code (prompt-injection sinks, guardrails, tool exposure) and whether your code reaches the vulnerable function.
Containers and IaCImages scanned in bounded memory and time; Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes, Helm and compose risks with exact lines in SARIF.
Cloud and data platformsRead-only collection from AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, Databricks and Snowflake, with provider-specific posture checks and graph context. Per-lane rule counts are generated from code in the capability matrix.
GPU and AI infrastructureAI workloads on CoreWeave, Nebius, Lambda, RunPod, Vast.ai and Crusoe; GPU containers and Kubernetes GPU nodes. Collection depth varies by provider.

Generate a BOM from a project, or inspect an agent inventory with sample data:

bash
agent-bom scan --project . -f cyclonedx -o sbom.cdx.jsonagent-bom scan --project . -f spdx -o sbom.spdx.jsonagent-bom scan --demo --offline -f json -o agent-bom.json

Model metadata appears when the source supplies it. A BOM is an inventory, not proof of safe execution or complete collection.

All supported sources and evidence destinations, by category
AreaIntegrations
AI clients + IDEsClaude, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Windsurf, Cortex Code, Gemini CLI, JetBrains AI, Junie, Amazon Q, Cline, Roo Code, Continue, Zed, Goose, Snowflake CLI, Docker MCP Toolkit, Tabnine, Sourcegraph Cody, Aider, Void, Aide, Trae, Pieces, OpenClaw, mcp-cli
AI platforms + model hubsOpenAI, Hugging Face, Ollama, MLflow, W&B, Langfuse, LangSmith
GPU + neo cloudsCoreWeave, Nebius, Lambda, RunPod, Vast.ai, Crusoe, GPU containers + K8s GPU nodes
Hyperscalers + KubernetesAWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes
Data + vector storesSnowflake, Databricks, Supabase, Pinecone, Qdrant, Weaviate, Chroma, Milvus
Identity + SaaS + devOkta, GitHub Actions, Vercel, Microsoft Entra ID, Jira, ServiceNow, Slack, Jamf
Evidence outClickHouse, BigQuery, S3, GCS, Azure Blob, Jira tickets, Slack alerts, Vanta, Drata, OCSF syslog

Product names and logos are trademarks of their owners, used only to identify supported evidence sources. Their use does not imply endorsement or partnership.

Investigate context and exposure

Which agent uses the vulnerable component? What could it reach? What evidence supports that path? Correlate retained scans by exact, tenant-scoped identities and trace the recorded blast radius from each agent through its MCP servers to packages, findings, credentials and data stores. Each relationship keeps its source and evidence kind. Agent kind, platform, execution host and model links are separate facts: an environment badge does not say where an agent runs.

From agent to verified fix: select Document Intake Agent → inspect CVE-2023-4863 (high, KEV-listed) and the evidence on each arrow → take the proposed remediation → rescan the changed pin and compare snapshots. The comparison verifies the changed input, not a running deployment.

Am I affected by a new CVE? Match it against stored scans, including CVEs only NVD has published. You get affected assets with their patch target, possibly affected distro packages to verify, and the blast radius (walkthrough):

bash
agent-bom db update                                   # refresh OSV, NVD, KEV and EPSSagent-bom db advisory affected CVE-2026-109618        # most recent saved scanagent-bom db advisory affected CVE-2026-109618 --report <scan-report.json> --format json   # a JSON report written by an earlier scan

From an MCP client, the read-only affected_assets tool (graph and full profiles) takes the same advisory_id. In CI, run uvx agent-bom db update before the GitHub Action step (its auto-update-db default only refreshes feeds older than seven days). To explain a finding to your team, create an impact brief with affected assets, source receipts, evidence gaps and the next action.

More sample graphs: package evidence, repository and cloud (3)

One package, three parsed inputs. A repository pin, an image SBOM and a modeled Kubernetes workload resolve to one [email protected]. The image inventory and the deployment occurrence stay separate nodes; the advisory receipt is open.

[Repository pin, image inventory and Kubernetes deployment occurrence resolving to one pillow package linked to KEV-listed CVE-2023-4863, with the plain-language relationship evidence open]

Real parsers, modeled infrastructure; a graph path does not prove exploitation.

Repository. Source imports, deployment configuration and CI traced to a published container and its vulnerable packages:

[Sample repository linking source, deployment configuration and a CI job to a container, vulnerable npm and PyPI packages, their advisories and a CI misconfiguration]

Cloud. A public API gateway into a vulnerable workload, its role and a PII bucket:

[Sample cloud account where a public API gateway exposes a workload with a critical advisory that authenticates as a role permitted to read a PII bucket]

Context, correlation and reachability · Run the reference lab · Reproduce these screenshots

Open the sample graph

Try the demo in your browser: a read-only copy of the UI on labelled sample data, with no install and no backend. Scans, settings and sign-in are turned off there. To open the same graph locally:

bash
pip install 'agent-bom[ui]==0.113.2'agent-bom quickstart --run --offline

Run the server command it prints, then open its graph URL. Offline quickstart skips package-CVE lookup, so zero CVEs is not a clean verdict; use the bundled demo for advisory-backed findings or populate the advisory database.

Self-host in your environment

Your infrastructure, identity, database, and audit boundary. Start a local pilot from a published release checkout:

bash
git clone --depth 1 --branch v0.113.2 https://github.com/koda-ai-studio/agent-bom.git && cd agent-bomAGENT_BOM_IMAGE_TAG=0.113.2 docker compose up -d

Open http://localhost:3000, then Connections or New Scan. The pilot binds to loopback and retains state in a Docker volume. For cloud accounts, add a scoped read-only connection, verify access, then start a scan. Before sharing access, move to the authenticated deployment.

  • Scan with CLI or CI; export findings, SBOMs and reports.
  • Centralize inventory, graph evidence, remediation and compliance in your own control plane.
  • Enforce policy on selected live MCP tool calls through the proxy or gateway.
Deployment options (5): CLI, local dashboard, Compose pilot, authenticated host, Helm
DeploymentFirst stepResult and next step
CLI or CI jobagent-bom scan --demo --offline -o report.jsonLabelled sample findings in JSON; scan your own inventory or configure a CI gate.
Local API and dashboardagent-bom quickstart --run --offlineSample report and persisted graph; run the printed loopback server command and open its graph URL.
Docker Compose pilotRelease checkout and docker compose up -d aboveLoopback API/UI with retained state; connect a read-only source and run a scan.
Authenticated single hostPlatform Compose setupLogin-gated API/UI and PostgreSQL; configure TLS, identity, secrets and backups before sharing access.
Kubernetes / EKSHelm deploymentControl plane in your cluster; provision role-separated secrets and storage, then validate authentication and health.
Operating modes (5): scan, fleet inventory, MCP server, runtime proxy, runtime gateway

Modes can be combined:

ModeWhat it doesStart
ScanCollect inventory and findings on demand or in CI; retain reports and graph evidence.First run
Fleet inventoryEndpoints or collectors sync inventory to the control plane; review last-seen evidence.Fleet sync
MCP serveragent-bom mcp server exposes security tools to an MCP client.Tool profiles
Runtime proxyWrap selected local stdio MCP servers to inspect tool calls; verify decisions in the audit trail.Proxy setup
Runtime gatewayRelay selected remote MCP traffic through a shared service; validate client auth, policy and upstream connectivity.Gateway setup
Console terms: Sources, Assets, Findings, Issues
  • Sources describes recorded evidence: local scans, fleet inventory, cluster scans, CI/CD, imported evidence, or mixed sources. It does not select a deployment type or enable runtime enforcement. Demo data marks labelled sample inventory.
  • Assets are inventoried resources; Findings are detections on those resources; Issues group related findings for investigation or remediation.
  • Affected assets counts distinct resources only when that count is available. One finding may belong to several security areas, so area counts must not be summed. Repeated observations across scans are shown separately.

Preview and community deployment paths have separate support boundaries.

Docker pilot guide · Compose with PostgreSQL · Choose a deployment · Enterprise controls · Connect cloud accounts

Integrations

Claude Code and Codex plugins: ask your coding agent instead of reading a report

In Claude Code:

text
/plugin marketplace add koda-ai-studio/agent-bom/plugin install agent-bom@agent-bom

In Codex, run codex plugin marketplace add koda-ai-studio/agent-bom, then install agent-bom-local from the Plugins Directory. Both plugins run the pinned agent-bom release locally and send nothing to an agent-bom service.

AskSkill
"Is this project safe to ship?"checkup: one verdict and the three fixes that matter most
"Am I affected by CVE-2025-29927?"affected: affected or not found in what was scanned, never "safe"
"What have my agents been doing?"activity: MCP usage, unused servers, risky commands from local session history
"Are my agent settings too permissive?"audit-mcp and audit-skills
"Give me an AI-BOM"bom: CycloneDX or SPDX for this machine, a project, an image or a cloud account

Add /plugin install agent-bom-guard@agent-bom to block malicious and typosquatted package installs before Claude runs them. All skills and their permissions · Guard details

Work with your existing tools

Use CLI or GitHub Action, REST API, or MCP; export SARIF, CycloneDX, SPDX, JSON and HTML. Cloud connectors and fleet sync collect inventory; proxy and gateway deployments add runtime evidence.

For other MCP clients, run agent-bom mcp server. Start with eight focused tools in the default profile. Choose an MCP profile for graph, cloud, runtime or audit work. Try three investigations: affected agents, exposure receipts and a before/after scan comparison. Import existing scanner reports without replacing their source evidence.

Check a dependency before installing it with uvx agent-bom check [email protected] --ecosystem pypi. Add pre-commit and CI setup for repeated checks.

Proxy, gateway and fleet · Integration capability matrix · MCP client setup · Smithery migration

Trust and evidence

Discovery uses read-only access by default. Explicit disk side-scans create temporary cloud resources. Missing evidence stays unavailable or partial; control mappings are not audit certification.

Runtime evidence and MITRE mapping boundaries

Persisted runtime, proxy and gateway activity retains source receipts and bounded time windows in the graph. Exact inventory references can bind records; unresolved identities and collection gaps remain explicit. Recorded activity does not prove execution or grant access. See the runtime evidence boundaries.

MITRE technique associations provide investigation context, not proof of an attack. ATLAS mapping receipts retain the weakness association and source catalog hashes; modeled graph paths do not establish observed execution or effective access.

Measured matcher proof · Product boundaries · Permissions · Threat model · Release verification · Graph data model

Contributing and support

[Open in GitHub Codespaces]

Start with the first PR guide or a good first issue. Ask in GitHub Discussions (or Discord), share feedback, or follow the maintainer path (review owners).

Contributing · Capabilities and roadmap · Support · Report an inaccurate finding · Apache-2.0

Source version: v0.113.2 · Latest release: v0.113.2 · Changelog

来源:README.md,提交 6753a3e

工具

8

scan

Security Scan

Run a full AI supply chain security scan and return an AI-BOM. Point it at a target with one of: • project_path — a local project / repo directory ("scan this repo"; must be inside home or AGENT_BOM_MCP_WORKSPACE_ROOTS) • repo_url — a public git repo URL (cloned + scanned, no checkout) • config_path — a local MCP-config directory • image — a Docker image • sbom_path — an existing CycloneDX/SPDX SBOM • package — a single package or MCP launch command (pair it with ``ecosystem`` when the spec names no launcher) With none of these, it auto-discovers local MCP clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code Copilot, OpenClaw, etc.). It extracts package dependencies, looks up CVEs (online via OSV.dev and advisory sources unless offline mode is requested or configured), assesses config security (credential exposure, tool access), computes blast radius, and returns structured results. Scanning is fully static and read-only — repository and image contents are parsed, never executed. Returns: JSON. By default a bounded summary: counts (packages, agents, findings by severity/category), top findings, affected paths, and a result_id. Page any full-fidelity section with scan(result_id=..., section='findings', offset=0, limit=25). An incomplete scan (e.g. vulnerability source unavailable) is returned as an error result whose body is still JSON.

输入参数imagelimitdetailenrichoffsetpolicyofflinepackagesectionrepo_urlecosystemresult_id另有 12 个

check

Package CVE Check

Check a specific package for known CVEs before installing. Queries OSV.dev for vulnerabilities in the given package. Use this before installing an MCP server or dependency to verify it is safe. Args: package: Package name with optional version, e.g. "[email protected]", "@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected]", or just "requests" (resolves @latest). ecosystem: Package ecosystem — "npm", "pypi", "go", "cargo", "maven", "nuget", "rubygems", "composer", "swift", "pub", "hex", "conda", "deb", "apk", or "rpm". Defaults to "npm". Returns: JSON with package, version, ecosystem, vulnerability count, and vulnerability details (id, severity, cvss, fix version, summary).

输入参数offlinepackage必填versionecosystem

intel_lookup

Threat Intel Advisory Lookup

Look up one advisory from the local threat-intel database.

输入参数advisory_id必填

policy_check

Policy Evaluation

Evaluate a security policy against current scan results. Runs a scan, then evaluates the provided policy rules against the findings. Policies can gate on severity thresholds, CISA KEV status, AI risk flags, credential exposure, and denied packages. Args: policy_json: JSON string containing policy rules. Example: {"rules": [{"id": "no-critical", "severity_gte": "critical", "action": "fail"}, {"id": "no-kev", "kev": true, "action": "fail"}]} Returns: JSON with passed (bool), violations list, failure_count, and warning_count.

输入参数policy_json必填

generate_sbom

Generate SBOM

Generate a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for your AI agent setup. Discovers AI agents and MCP servers, extracts all package dependencies, and generates a standards-compliant SBOM. Args: format: SBOM format — "cyclonedx" (CycloneDX 1.7) or "spdx" (SPDX 3.0). config_path: Path to a specific MCP config directory. If not provided, auto-discovers all local agent configs. Returns: JSON string containing the SBOM in the requested format.

输入参数formatconfig_path

compliance

Compliance Posture

Return compliance posture with its source: the tenant's persisted evidence, or a labelled local scan. With completed scans in the control plane, ``summary`` is exactly ``/v1/compliance/summary``; ``framework`` adds ``/v1/compliance/{framework}`` and ``control`` pages the driving finding ids from ``/v1/findings?framework=&control=``. Otherwise (or with source='local_scan') it scans local MCP configurations and labels that scope.

输入参数imagelimitcursorsourcecontrolframeworktenant_idconfig_path

remediate

Remediation Plan

Generate a remediation plan for vulnerabilities in your AI agent setup. Scans for vulnerabilities, then generates actionable fix commands for each affected package (npm install, pip install), credential scope reduction guidance, and reports on unfixable vulnerabilities. Args: config_path: Path to a specific MCP config directory. If not provided, auto-discovers all local agent configs. image: Docker image reference to scan (e.g. "nginx:1.25"). Returns: JSON with package_fixes (upgrade commands by ecosystem), credential_fixes (scope reduction steps), and unfixable items.

输入参数imageconfig_path

exposure_paths

Exposure Paths

Return the attack-path queue in the dashboard's order, with why each path ranks where it does. Ranking is ``ranking.order`` (evidence tier, KEV, severity, evidence confidence, composite risk, credential count); every path carries ``rank``, ``evidenceTier``, ``isKev``, ``severity``, ``evidenceConfidence`` and ``rankingFactors``. Totals, filters and cursor pages match ``/v1/graph/attack-paths``. With ``result_id`` the paths are that session scan result's, unfiltered and labelled ``session_scan_result``.

输入参数kevviewlimitcursornode_idscan_idmin_riskresult_idtarget_idtenant_idfinding_idsource_type另有 3 个

版本历史

5
  1. v0.113.2最新Nov 4, 2026
  2. v0.113.1Nov 4, 2026
  3. v0.113.0Nov 3, 2026
  4. v0.111.0Oct 29, 2026
  5. v0.110.0Oct 22, 2026

评分

已满足适用检查项的 100%

该评分衡量此收录条目的完整程度,依据注册中心条目、端点与公开来源计算得出。它不是对服务器本身的评价,也不表示服务器安全或当前可用:可连通性是带日期的检查结果,评分也不包含安装量或用户评价。

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