Fidacy Mcp

io.github.lucaslubi由 GitHub 账号 lucaslubi 发布v0.19.0更新于 Oct 24, 2026

AI Agent Firewall. Enforce signed authority before consequential actions. Free API key required.

已验证STDIO仅桌面金融安全与监控

概览

AI 生成的概览

一个本地 MCP 服务器,充当 AI 代理的支付防火墙,依据签名授权对拟议付款进行校验,并返回签名裁决与审计证明。

可以做什么
评估拟议操作(付款、发消息、语音通话、文件声明),从 Fidacy 引擎获取签名信任裁决,并附可验证的证明载荷与签名密钥标识。依据授权校验付款,返回带短期 Ed25519 授权的允许结果,或附带违规规则的拒绝结果。读取授权信封与 Fidacy 公钥。按决策 ID 获取哈希链审计证明。本地运行,默认拒绝,受信任收款方与额度在本地配置文件中设置。
适用场景
当 AI 代理可以发起付款或其他有后果的操作,且你希望在执行器之前设置确定性关卡而非依赖提示词层面的防护时使用。适合需要为每笔付款决策生成可验证、可审计证明的场景。
运行要求
通过 npx 或全局 npm 安装作为本地 stdio 进程运行(需要 Node.js)。调用裁决工具需要 FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY 环境变量,免费密钥需在提供方注册页面获取。可选 FIDACY_MODE=http 指向托管核心。获取裁决需要访问 Fidacy 引擎的网络。
安装前请注意
该服务器涉及付款授权,配置错误可能放行或阻止真实资金流动;它是非托管的,不持有资金。需要 FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY 密钥,README 称其不会被记录或回显。拟议操作与授权会发送至 Fidacy 引擎进行评估。只有当它是代理唯一具备支付能力的工具,且下游执行器强制要求授权时,防护才有效。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 打开 控制台中的 Fidacy Mcp,将其添加到工作区。
  2. 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Desktop only,通过 STDIO。 STDIO 服务会启动本地进程,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面宿主。

其他 MCP 客户端

参照 仓库 中的启动说明。

README

@fidacy/mcp

[fidacy-mcp MCP server]

[Fidacy blocks a BEC lookalike-payee payment, then allows the legit one with a signed Ed25519 grant]

The action firewall for AI agents. A drop-in MCP server that gates payment actions against a cryptographically signed mandate before money can move. Non-custodial: Fidacy authorizes and proves, it never holds funds.

Install once, works in any MCP-compatible agent: Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes, OpenClaw, and anything else that speaks MCP.

[npm] [license] Works with: Claude Code · Claude Desktop · OpenClaw · Hermes · Brex CrabTrap

Your agent could be paying scammers right now. Prompt-injected into the wrong payee, an inflated amount, or the same invoice twice — and your logs aren't evidence. Fidacy blocks it before money moves, and hands back a signed verdict anyone can verify against public keys. You don't trust us — you check the signature.

Quick start (free, local-first, no account)

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "fidacy": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@fidacy/mcp"] }  }}

Runs on your machine, offline, deny-by-default. Add trusted payees + caps in ~/.fidacy/config.json. Verify any verdict yourself against the public keys at /.well-known/jwks.json.

Why

An agent can hallucinate or be prompt-injected into a payment: wrong payee, wrong amount, fabricated invoice. Prompt-level guardrails are probabilistic and bypassable. @fidacy/mcp is a deterministic gate between the agent's intent and the executor: the action is dead on arrival unless it validates against a signed mandate, and every decision lands in an immutable hash-chained audit trail.

Enforcement model

  1. Register @fidacy/mcp as the agent's only payment-capable tool. Do not give the agent a raw payment tool. Tool inventory is the runtime firewall.
  2. The agent calls request_payment. Fidacy checks it against the mandate (payee allowlist, per-tx cap, total cap, currency, time window, revocation).
  3. ALLOW returns a short-lived Ed25519 grant. DENY returns no grant and the violated rule. The downstream executor MUST require the grant, so a denied action cannot proceed.
  4. Every decision is appended to a hash-chained log. get_audit_proof returns the portable, verifiable proof.

One install, two backends

@fidacy/mcp ships two complementary capabilities in a single install:

  • Verdict layer (advisory): assess_action calls the live Fidacy engine and returns a signed trust verdict. It moves no money; it returns a judgment whose proof (riskPayloadJws + signingKeyId) is verifiable by anyone via @fidacy/verify against the engine JWKS at /.well-known/jwks.json.
  • Payment firewall (enforcement): request_payment / verify_mandate / get_audit_proof gate and prove a payment against a signed mandate through the core, returning short-lived Ed25519 grants.

Mental model: assess_action -> engine (signed verdict); request_payment and friends -> core (payment firewall).

Tools

ToolBackendPurpose
assess_actionengineSigned Fidacy trust verdict for a proposed action. Advisory.
request_paymentcoreAuthorize a payment action. ALLOW + grant, or DENY + rule.
verify_mandatecoreRead the mandate envelope + Fidacy public key.
get_audit_proofcoreHash-chained proof for a decision id.

assess_action

Returns a signed Fidacy trust verdict from the live engine for a proposed action. The signed proof is riskPayloadJws + signingKeyId, verifiable by anyone via @fidacy/verify against {engineUrl}/.well-known/jwks.json.

Inputs:

  • kind (optional, default ap2_payment): one of ap2_payment, message_send, voice_call, custom, claim_document.
  • mandate (required): the action/mandate object for that kind.
  • mandateType, spendingMandate, idempotencyKey, a2a.task_id (optional).

Environment:

VarDefaultPurpose
FIDACY_ENGINE_URLhttps://api.fidacy.comBase URL of the Fidacy engine.
FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY(none)An fky_live_ / fky_test_ key with scope assess:write.

The server boots without FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY; the tool is always registered. Only calling assess_action without the key returns a helpful error telling you to set it. The key is never logged, echoed, or attached to any error.

Install

bash
npm install -g @fidacy/mcp   # or run via npx, no install

Claude Code

bash
claude mcp add fidacy -- npx -y @fidacy/mcp

Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json)

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "fidacy": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@fidacy/mcp"] }  }}

Hermes (config.yaml)

yaml
mcp_servers:  fidacy:    command: npx    args: ["-y", "@fidacy/mcp"]

OpenClaw

Add the same server via the Tools panel, or the mcpServers block in your agent config. Any MCP-compatible host uses the same command.

Wiring the real core (production)

The MCP layer talks to your core through one interface (FidacyCore). Your repository stays private. Set FIDACY_MODE=http and implement three endpoints:

  • POST /v1/mandate/get -> Mandate
  • POST /v1/decide -> Decision (runs your Ed25519/AP2 verification + audit append)
  • POST /v1/audit/proof -> AuditProof

No change to the MCP layer is needed.

Dev

bash
npm installnpm run buildnpm start      # stdio server, in-memory demo mandate

来源:README.md,提交 ce42c70

工具

0
SourceWeft 尚未在沙箱中启动过该软件包,因此其工具未知。

版本历史

1
  1. v0.19.0最新Sep 16, 2026

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