
Google Search Console
io.github.ni-c由 GitHub 账号 ni-c 发布v0.3.0更新于 Oct 25, 2026
MCP server for Google Search Console: properties, sitemaps, search analytics and URL inspection
概览
本地运行的 Google Search Console MCP 服务器:管理资源与所有权、站点地图、搜索效果分析和网址检查。
- 可以做什么
- 列出、添加和删除 Search Console 资源,并查看资源缺少哪一步设置
- 获取验证令牌、验证或取消验证所有权、更新所有者列表
- 列出、查看、提交和删除站点地图,单次最多可提交 50 个
- 查询效果报告(点击、展示、点击率、排名),支持维度、筛选和相对时间段
- 检查单个或多个网址的索引状态、规范网址、抓取时间和富媒体搜索结果,并可请求重新索引
- 适用场景
- 适合让助手读取或配置你自有网站的 Search Console 数据:查看索引状态、拉取搜索表现、提交站点地图,或免去手动四步完成域名验证。
- 运行要求
- 需要 Node.js 24 或更新版本,或使用容器镜像。需要 Google 凭据:服务账号密钥(GSC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY 或 GSC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY_FILE)、OAuth2 三项(GSC_CLIENT_ID、GSC_CLIENT_SECRET、GSC_REFRESH_TOKEN),或 GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS。需在 Google Cloud 项目中启用 Search Console API,并另行启用 Site Verification API 和 Indexing API。需要访问 Google 的网络。
安装
在 SourceWeft 中
- 打开 控制台中的 Google Search Console,将其添加到工作区。
- 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。
Desktop only,通过 STDIO。 STDIO 服务会启动本地进程,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面宿主。
其他 MCP 客户端
参照 仓库 中的启动说明。
README
google-search-console-mcp
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A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Google Search Console, the service that tells you how Google sees your site — this reads it and sets it up.
Lets MCP clients like Claude Code, Claude Desktop or Codex create a property and prove ownership of it, submit and refresh sitemaps, ask what any URL's index status is, and query the whole Performance report — with the irreversible operations put to a person first and the write tools switchable off entirely.
21 tools is the ceiling, not the floor: GSC_ALLOW_TOOLS=essential registers a
curated five instead, and a model picks the right tool far more reliably from
five than from 21 — see
choosing which tools load.
What makes it different
It can actually create a working property. Getting one takes four steps in a
fixed order — obtain a verification token, place it in DNS or on the page,
verify ownership, add the property — and nothing in Google's APIs enforces that
order. Calling sites.add first succeeds and leaves a property that appears in
every listing and answers 403 for every piece of data, which looks like a
permissions bug and is not. setup_site reports which step is missing and hands
over the exact DNS record to paste. Servers that expose sites.add alone can
only add properties somebody already verified by hand.
Three APIs, not one. Search Console v1 is ten methods and does not include
ownership. Site Verification is a separate service with its own scope, its own
host and an incompatible way of naming the same site —
sc-domain:example.com there is {type: INET_DOMAIN, identifier: example.com},
and passing the property spelling straight through is accepted and verifies a
domain literally called sc-domain:example.com. The Indexing API is a third.
All three are covered, and the translation between them is in
src/site-identity.ts.
The numbers are right. Search analytics come back as a table with totals where CTR is computed from the totals rather than averaged across rows, and average position is weighted by impressions. Unweighted, a thousand rare queries ranking 80th drag a property's real average of 12 up into the nineties. The result also says plainly that the rows do not sum to the property total when the query dimension is used — Google withholds rare queries for anonymity, commonly a third or more of all impressions, and a total printed without that caveat is a number people will quote.
It knows where these APIs are sharp. The trailing slash on
https://example.com/ is mandatory and its absence is a 403; a domain property
and a URL-prefix property for the same site are different properties with
different data, so a bare hostname is refused rather than guessed at; days are
counted in Pacific Time, so a last7days computed in UTC asks for a day
Google has no data for; the hour dimension silently returns nothing without
dataState: HOURLY_ALL; Google omits empty arrays entirely, so a fresh
credential's property list arrives as {}; and the Indexing API returns 200 for
any owned URL while only acting on JobPosting and BroadcastEvent pages.
Requirements
- Node.js 24 or newer (or the container image)
- A Google credential — a service account key, an OAuth2 refresh token, or application default credentials
- The APIs you intend to use enabled in a Google Cloud project: Search Console API, and separately Site Verification API and Indexing API
Configuration
The server starts without credentials and lists its tools; every call then fails with setup instructions rather than a Google error. That is deliberate, so registries and sandbox inspectors can introspect it.
Credentials are tried in that order — explicit beats ambient. A partial OAuth triple is a startup error rather than a reason to fall through to application default credentials, because that fallback would quietly run the server as whatever account the machine is logged into.
Which credential
A service account is the recommended one: it sees only the properties you
explicitly add it to, and revoking it does not touch anyone's Google account.
Add its client_email under Settings → Users and permissions in Search Console,
or give it ownership with verify_site. Note that the Indexing API requires
owner, not full user.
An OAuth2 refresh token acts as the person who consented and sees everything they see. Its scopes were fixed at consent time and cannot be widened later.
Choosing which tools load
Every visible tool costs context on every request, and a model picks the right one far more reliably from five than from 21. Two variables narrow the list:
essential is list_sites, get_site, list_sitemaps,
query_search_analytics and inspect_url — everything needed to look at a
property, and nothing that changes it.
An entry that matches no tool stops the server with the list of real names.
An ignored typo would otherwise leave a tool missing from tools/list with
nothing pointing at the cause, and nobody traces an absence back to an
environment variable.
If you run several of these servers at once, mcp-hub is
the other answer — its /hub endpoint replaces every server's tools with six
meta-tools.
Narrowing the list also narrows the credential: the OAuth scopes this server requests are derived from the tools that are actually registered, so a server denied the Indexing tools never asks for the Indexing scope.
Installation
Claude Code
Claude Desktop
Codex
Docker
Through mcp-hub
A client that cannot spawn a local process — ChatGPT connectors, Claude on the web,
Cursor, LibreChat — reaches google-search-console-mcp through mcp-hub: one
container serves many stdio MCP servers over Streamable HTTP, with an OAuth 2.1 login
behind a single password and long-lived tokens for the clients that cannot do OAuth. Its
/hub endpoint puts every server behind six meta-tools, so one connector reaches all of
them without N×tool schemas in the model's context, and it speaks both protocol revisions
— a question this server asks travels through it to the person at the far end.
Its /config/mcp.json uses Claude Code's format, so the entry is the one you already
have:
allowTools and denyTools there are the hub's own per-server filter, which is not
the same thing as *_ALLOW_TOOLS in env — the difference, and the mistake it invites,
are in the client guide.
Tools
site_url is optional on every tool that takes it when GSC_SITE_URL is set.
Every tool declares an outputSchema and answers with structuredContent
alongside the text block, so a client can use the result without parsing prose.
query_search_analytics keeps its rendered table in the text block and puts the
rows themselves in the structured half; six tools that answered with a sentence
now answer with fields too.
Every tool that reports Google's data carries untrusted: true and
source: "search-console" as fields. "It is only search data" is exactly the
wrong intuition: a search query is a string a member of the public typed into
Google, and a page title comes from the crawled site. Six tools are without the
marker, because their answer is a property this server was given and a fact it
established: add_site, delete_site, submit_sitemap, submit_sitemaps,
delete_sitemap and unverify_site.
Properties and ownership
Sitemaps
Search analytics and indexing
Not exposed, on purpose
urlTestingTools.mobileFriendlyTest is still in Google's discovery document and
the service behind it was switched off in December 2023. A tool for it could only
ever return an error, so there is not one.
Safety
Four operations ask a person. delete_site, delete_sitemap,
unverify_site and update_site_owners raise a real dialog through MCP
elicitation where the client supports it — one the model cannot answer on its
behalf. Where it does not, they refuse the first call and return a short-lived
token bound to those exact arguments, and say so rather than implying somebody
approved. Either way the approval is bound to the property, so one issued for one
cannot be replayed against another. update_site_owners is in that list because
the list it takes is the complete owner list afterwards — one well-formed call
removes everyone else, and nothing here can put them back.
ELICITATION=false takes the fallback path deliberately; it never removes the
guard. See
Asking a person.
Everything from the APIs is marked untrusted. Search queries are strings the public typed into Google; page titles and crawl diagnostics come from whoever runs the crawled site. Someone who wants a model to act on their instructions can put them in a page title and wait to be crawled. The two sentences of a confirmation prompt are built only from values the server derived; a sitemap URL or an owner list is quoted below them as data.
The allowlist has no exemptions. GSC_ALLOWED_SITES is enforced wherever a
tool names a property, and separately on the two shapes that do not name one: the
Indexing API tools match the page URL against the list the way Search Console
scopes a property, and the verification tools resolve their opaque resource id to
a property before acting on it. Both listings filter to the allowlist and say how
many entries they withheld.
Read-only goes below the tool layer. GSC_READ_ONLY=true does not register
the write tools and requests webmasters.readonly instead of webmasters, so
a write is impossible even if a tool tried.
Credentials never leak into output. They are deleted from the environment
after start-up, never sent to a redirect target, and a rejected value is
described rather than echoed — including when it is a key pasted into
GSC_ALLOW_TOOLS, GSC_SITE_URL or ELICITATION by mistake, and including the
access token itself, which is checked before it becomes a header.
What Google sends is held to a shape. The status of a response is decided
before its body is read, every field a result promises is checked at the
boundary — a row that is not an object is dropped, a null site block is not a
site, an empty 200 is an empty record — and text is stripped of control
characters on the way out. Results are budgeted in both channels, caller strings
have ceilings, and a batch call stops after two minutes and says how far it got.
See Security.
Documentation
The full guide, tool reference and security notes live at
google-search-console-mcp.ni-c.de (source in docs/).
Development
See CONTRIBUTING.md.
Releasing
Update CHANGELOG.md, bump the version in package.json and server.json, then
push a signed tag:
release.yml runs the suite, publishes to npm with provenance through a trusted
publisher, pushes the multi-arch image to GHCR and updates the MCP registry entry.
Contributing
Issues, discussions and pull requests are welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.md. For vulnerabilities please use private reporting rather than a public issue; the policy is in SECURITY.md.
License
MIT © Willi Thiel
来源:README.md,提交 b8a39ab
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0版本历史
1- v0.3.0最新Sep 16, 2026
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