
Hs Audit App
io.github.ogasurfproject-jpg由 GitHub 账号 ogasurfproject-jpg 发布v0.1.0更新于 Oct 24, 2026
建設・リフォーム見積もりの誠実性を適正レンジで監査するMCP App(UI付き・出典検証込み)
发布方自己的服务:audit.domains - Domain Valuation
概览
依据公开成本数据核查日本或美国的建筑、装修报价是否合理,并给出带哈希锚定、可验证的价格记录。
- 可以做什么
- 查询建筑与装修工程的合理价格区间、费用类别与数据来源
- 审核以日元报价的工程,判断是否偏高或存在宰客风险,并识别高压销售话术与读价原则
- 检索日本与美国的公开成本数据:明细条目、观测记录、人工费率、地区对比、单价、指数与覆盖范围
- 生成防篡改的合理价格记录与完整性核验结论,并创建 AP2 公平性证明
- 查找通过审核的施工方,并获取用于智能体间发现的 agent card
- 适用场景
- 适合业主或买家想为建筑、装修报价寻求第二意见时使用,也适合助手需要日本或美国建筑工程的有出处成本基准时使用。需要在支付流程中附带可验证公平价格证明的智能体也可考虑。
- 运行要求
- 远程 MCP 端点;未声明需要账号、密钥或环境变量。无法直连远程服务器的客户端需借助 npx mcp-remote 之类的本地桥接。需要能访问提供方的端点。
安装
在 SourceWeft 中
- 打开 控制台中的 Hs Audit App,将其添加到工作区。
- 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。
Web executable,通过 Streamable HTTP。 远程服务在工作区中配置后即可从网页运行时运行。
交给智能体安装
把这段提示词粘贴到 Claude Code、Codex、Cursor 等智能体,或 SourceWeft 对话中。智能体会读取该服务器的安装指南,先向你展示发布者、端点和登录方式,经你同意后再把它添加到你的客户端。密钥不会写进任何命令。
阅读 https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.ogasurfproject-jpg%2Fhs-audit-app/install.md,并按其中说明把这个 MCP 服务器接入我的客户端。修改任何配置之前,先告诉我它的发布者、端点和登录方式,等我确认。不要把 API 密钥写进命令或我会提交的文件;问我密钥应从哪里获取。其他 MCP 客户端
把它添加到你客户端的 mcpServers 配置中。
{
"mcpServers": {
"hs-audit-app": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://hs-audit-app.oga-surf-project.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
}README
🛡️ HORIZON SHIELD
Verifiable construction estimate auditing for AI agents
Don't trust the estimate. Verify it.
An MCP server that lets AI agents check whether a Japanese construction or renovation estimate is fair, against open data, and returns a result anyone can verify against Bitcoin (OpenTimestamps). No account, no key.
[MCP Registry] [Transport: streamable-http] [Open data: JCCDB 526,128 · CC BY 4.0] [Anchored: Bitcoin / OpenTimestamps] [Auth: none] [GitHub stars] [HORIZON SHIELD KIRA on Glama] [Smithery] [A2A Python SDK: our signature vectors merged]
[Verified by Probity] Verified by Probity (github.com/probityai/probity): the A2A conduct walk's RFC 8785 canonicalization passes the agent-evidence-vectors corpus, latest passing run
In one paragraph. JCCDB (Japan Construction Cost Database) is an open dataset of Japanese construction and renovation costs, created by Toshikatsu Oga (大賀俊勝), who has worked on construction sites for 30 years, and published by The HORIZONs Co., Ltd. under CC BY 4.0. Version 5.1 (2026-10-04, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23133068; all versions 10.5281/zenodo.22127751) holds 526,128 records: 95,403 line items and 430,725 observations from 88 Japanese public sources, each observation with its evidence URL. The United States counterpart is USCCDB, the United States Construction Cost Database (DOI 10.5281/zenodo.22979157, 2,849,829 observations). HORIZON SHIELD (https://shield.the-horizons-innovation.com) is the buyer-side service built on JCCDB that checks whether a Japanese renovation estimate is fair.
Peer-reviewed (October 2026). Toshikatsu Oga, "A Demand-Side Benchmark for Consumer-Facing Construction Cost Questions: Price-Figure Span, Output Consistency, and the Case for a Verifiable Reference Layer", Intelligent Infrastructure and Construction 2026, 2(4), 15 (MDPI, open access, CC BY 4.0). DOI 10.3390/iic2040015. Forty Japanese renovation price questions put to frontier LLMs: the going-rate range is a median 2.5x to 3x wide, every price figure inside one answer spans a median 10x, and no answer offered an over-charge threshold. Questions, raw outputs, harnesses and scoring code are public.
Fair-price answers for common buyer questions (Japanese)
Each row is one question a homeowner in Japan asks, the page that answers it with the range from souba-db 2.2.0, and a JSON evidence object with the same numbers, a comparison across variants, steps to check a quote yourself, and the dataset hash anchored in JIDEC entry 42. Index: evidence/index.json.
Independent evidence, as of 2026-10-08
What people who do not work for this project have measured, signed or reproduced. Every row links to something you can fetch and recompute. The last two rows are the counts that are still small, stated as plainly as the rest.
Every night the TSUNAGI board runs these outside implementations again, cloned from their authors' own repositories at their latest commit, against the corpora in this repository, and keeps every disagreement on the board. A reproduction is checked again each day, not only on the day it was made. Add your implementation with one pull request to tools/tsunagi/implementations.json.
Counted every week by tools/adoption/count_adoption.py, last on 2026-11-16. Every number comes from a source you can read; one that could not be read says so instead of counting zero. The whole count: ops/adoption/latest.json.
Open: A NENRIN provenance verifier by a further author, in any language, that reproduces the verdict signatures of interop-v0, interop-v0.1 and interop-v0.2/edge. Two so far, both by kuangmi-bit: workers/hs-ledger/nenrin/interop-v0/INTEROP.md; Point any NENRIN provenance verifier, in any language, at the nine survivors vectors and post the result: npx nenrin-tsunagi run nenrin-interop-v0.3-survivors -- " {in} {out}". The reference takes one command after npm install [email protected] (papers/nenrin-stack/README.md, section Rerun it from outside; replication package doi:10.5281/zenodo.23344510)
One external witness is a start, not a network. The re-verification pool below counts it as one control cluster, and a quorum of two independent controls is not met yet. Issue #27 is the open call for the second.
When every signature verifies: what can still deceive this system
Breaking a parser, a signature or a chain is the attack this repository was built against first. The harder question is the one left when all of that holds: every byte verifies, and the system is still told something false. These are the six ways we know of, what is built against each, how much of it real use has exercised so far, and what no amount of code here can do.
One verifier threads the contract rows together: spine_verify.py reads a contract from what it was agreed to mean (terms_sha256), through who agreed and who did it, to who measured done, in entities, inside a block window. The first three rows share a limit worth naming once: the verifiers exist and are tested against their own attacks, but a verifier nobody's contract invokes proves only that it would work. The next contract that pays for real work is the one that has to state an independence quorum, name its deliverables from a vocabulary and require corroboration. Since 2026-10-02 the contract itself can make that binding: settle v1.8 (requirements.spine) refuses final until every stage is in place, and settle v1.9 (requirements.convergence) adds measurers nobody chose. What is still missing is a signed contract that uses them, and one between two parties neither of which is this project.
All of MUSUBI also installs without a clone: pip install 'nenrin-verify[ca2a]' (0.7.0) carries musubi-v0/ byte for byte, settle v1 to v1.16 and settle core v0 with its 128 vectors included. musubi-verify --settle-core, musubi-verify --pilot51-set2 and musubi-verify --run0002 recompute them; QUICKSTART.md takes five minutes.
One timeline: what each record answers
The layers above are not separate products. Each one answers one question about the same piece of work, in order, and each is a record you can fetch and recompute without trusting us. None of them answers the question of the row below it, and the table says what each one does not prove.
Settle reads rows 1, 2, 4 and 7 together: it recomputes whether the anchored executions stayed inside the grant, and from v1.8 on a contract can refuse final until independent measurements agree (row 4) and the measurers were drawn rather than chosen. The row no layer can fill is the one the section above ends on: when every independent party tells the same lie, the timeline records exactly who said it, when, and against which terms. Runtime evidence (row 3) and outside observation (row 4) are complementary for that reason: one says what ran inside, the other what was served to everyone else, and a contract can require both.
Price ranges you can recompute
Every get_price_range answer carries a recompute block: the URL and SHA-256 of the souba-db.json bytes it used (the same file is in this repository at data/souba-db.json), the entry id of each row, and the formula: the table value, or the table value times the regional multiplier in the same file, rounded half up. tools/recompute_price_range.py checks an answer end to end with the Python standard library, and fails on any byte or row that differs.
What it shows is that the answer equals the published table. It does not show that the table is right: the values are curated by a named curator against the sources listed in the file, not computed from those sources by a published formula.
NENRIN: tree rings for AI facing services
A tree adds one ring a year. Nobody can paint one in afterwards. NENRIN gives that property to software services.
In the thirty days to 2026-08-14, this server's listing on one MCP directory was shown 93,983 times, by that directory's own dashboard (24 clicks, 421 profile views, and zero tool calls made through the listing). Those are impressions on one directory, not search results across search engines or AI assistants. Calls that reach the server by other routes are a different number, and how many of them came from outside, we cannot say: the usage counter deliberately stores no IP addresses, so it cannot separate our own automated checks from external traffic. An earlier version of this paragraph said the server was invoked 0 times and called the 93,983 AI search results. The zero holds only for calls through that one listing, so the claim for the server as a whole is withdrawn here rather than quietly deleted, and the NENRIN specification's copy of the sentence is corrected by a later ledger entry (seed_entry_nenrin_spec_correction_20261013.json) because the anchored bytes cannot be edited. Discovery is solved. Choice is not. An agent picking between 90,000 servers can only read what each vendor wrote about itself. NENRIN adds the missing layer: records of conduct that the vendor did not author and cannot delete.
How it works, in three lines:
- Open witnessing. Anyone can measure any endpoint and submit the walk to the public ledger under the witness's own name and vantage. The operator holds no veto: acceptance is mechanical schema checking, and the code that enforces this is in this repository.
- Discrepancies are the product. When two witnesses report incompatible observations of the same target, the disagreement itself becomes a permanent, citable record. The founding one is real: NENRIN_DISCREPANCY_0001, two honest witnesses, one target, both correct.
- Rings. Each month the accepted records bundle into a ring that carries the hash of the previous ring, timestamped to Bitcoin. Eighteen months of rings cannot be created in an afternoon, by anyone, including us.
The specification is anchored on the public ledger as entry 19
(sha256 9ccba2e325fd2a555fcdb2dec519b8c6bf7a669064674846aea98ecfff824e3d):
NENRIN_SPEC_v1.md. It names its own prior art (Certificate Transparency, Rekor, in-toto, SLSA, OpenTimestamps), states exactly which combination is claimed as new, and invites refutation into the same ledger.
The witness intake is live. Start here:
We are the first test subject under our own rules. The ledger keeps the record of our gate failing its own test, and the full 522 incident that started all of this. Unflattering records stay.
If a register that cannot delete criticism of its own operator is infrastructure you want to exist, star this repository. Stars are how researchers and agent platforms find it. The rings accumulate either way. They accumulate faster with witnesses.
Task-bound conduct: binding an A2A Task to its evidence
Choice does not end when an agent picks a server. It picks, then it delegates a task. What that delegated task actually did, observed by someone other than the two parties, is the evidence the next agent needs. NENRIN binds it to the A2A Task id itself (a2a.task.id, aligned to A2A issues #1769 and #2103), not to "this server failed once".
The conduct walk already talks to a real agent over A2A and receives a real Task with an id. It now files a signed, content-addressed observation bound to that id: who delegated to whom on task T, and how the walked agent behaved. The witness signs the observation (witness_sig), the requesting party signs the delegation edge (edge_sig), and both keys live inside the did:key identifiers, so anyone verifies with no network and no trust in us.
Three reads, each a real record you can fetch now:
The first returns the full witness set per delegation hop, with the aggregate verdict computed so a disagreement is preserved and never the favorable one. The second returns the same as a consumable signal that carries counts and verdicts and never a numeric score. The third returns one observation with its anchor status: this evidence sits in NENRIN ledger entry 44, a nenrin-task-witness-batch-v1 bundle timestamped to Bitcoin like every other ring.
What the signatures prove, stated plainly: who asserted the observation and who attested the delegation edge, not that the assertion is true. The ledger attests that the witness is distinct from both hop parties by key (R1); it does not attest operator independence, so a self-witness satisfies R1 and says so in its own record. A genuine third-party observation is the same walk run by someone with no stake, filed to the same live endpoints.
The loop this closes: an agent discovers a server, reads conduct the server did not write, chooses, delegates a task, the task is witnessed, the evidence accumulates bound to the task id, and the next agent chooses on it. The code is in workers/hs-ledger/nenrin/task-delegation-bind-v0 (the ledger faces and the producer) and workers/hs-ledger/nenrin/a2a-conduct-walk (the walk that binds, with --bind-task).
TSUGI: proof of recovery, the second pillar
Verification says whether an endpoint conforms today. It says nothing about what happened when it broke, or whether it is really back. TSUGI (継, from kintsugi: the repair is visible and becomes part of the object's history) is the layer after verification. It does not repair; it proves recovery.
Five record types, hash-linked: drift (a witness measured a public surface and it did or did not match), proposal (one repair from a closed catalog of five primitives, with what it does not establish), authorization (the operator's Ed25519 signature over the proposal hash, expiring), execution (before and after state), verify (the witness measured again). The verifier refuses an execution of a human-approval primitive whose authorization is unsigned, signed by an untrusted key, or expired. The operator's public key is served at https://gate.horizonshield.dev/keys/operator.json, the same way the agreement and witness keys are.
Re-verification witnesses are not chosen by the operator. They are drawn from a public pool with sha256(bitcoin block hash | pool hash | record hash) as the seed, so a third party recomputes who should have been asked. A drawn witness receives only a blind request (no expected values) and returns only a signed observation; nothing it says is executed. This is the July 2026 lesson turned around: unknown agents may observe you, never instruct you.
Two real incidents are recorded in workers/hs-ledger/nenrin/recovery-v0: a raw deploy that bypassed the deploy guard and silently broke the card signature and the OpenAI domain challenge (found by an external verifier, closed with an unsigned chat approval, which the strict verifier flags as such), and a card signature broken by two version bumps deployed without a re-sign (found by the daily witness, closed with a signed authorization, twelve records). The pool of external witnesses was empty on 2026-09-20, and the records say so instead of pretending a quorum. It held one member, babyblueviper1's agent, until 2026-10-22, and the records reported the quorum as short rather than met. Since commit 89305502 it holds two, api.babyblueviper.com and kuangmi-bit's CloudBase host, which the diversity check (witness_diversity v2.3) counts as two control clusters, so a quorum of two can be met. Incident 2 can be recomputed in a browser, hashes and the operator's Ed25519 signature, with no trust in this project: https://shield.the-horizons-innovation.com/tsugi/ Its chain file and record hashes are anchored as JIDEC entry 50 (OpenTimestamps, Bitcoin).
Repository map
The agreement record: the other half of a measurement
A conduct record is one sided. Somebody measured somebody. Nothing in it records the other half of commerce: that two agents agreed on terms, and that both said so.
a2a-agreement-v1.1 is that record. At time T, party A and party B both signed the same canonical
bytes describing terms, and each of them pinned, by sha256, a conduct record about the OTHER party
written by somebody who is neither of them.
What it refuses to be is as load bearing as what it is. No custody. No matching. No editorial step. The recorder must not hold funds, must not decide whether a deal happens, and must not charge a fee that varies with the amount or the outcome. A record whose fee moves with the number is refused by name. Refusal is mechanical, and none of the terms are ever judged by anyone in this layer.
The claim is not a new primitive. It is the combination: two mandatory signatures, the counterparty's measured conduct pinned by sha at the moment of signing, an intake that judges nothing, and an external anchor nobody here operates. Prior art is named in the draft rather than left for a reader to find: AP2, x402, ACP, MPP, Cedulon, the 1F916 Agent Record, and SCITT.
The verifier is written twice. Once in Python, once in JavaScript, by design and not by accident: two implementations that disagree are the exact seam this project measures everywhere else, and building one into this layer on purpose would be a poor joke. 5,286 frozen cases, and the two produce the same report byte for byte, including every refusal code and the English sentence attached to it. Proving that moved the Python once, when the JavaScript disagreed on two cases and the check that settled it was running the Python against its own frozen fixture, where it failed the same two.
Then the rules were broken on purpose, 77 ways in Python and 36 in JavaScript, to find out whether the 5,286 cases could tell. Six breakages survived, and not one was a defect in either implementation. They were holes in the test set. All six are closed.
- The record:
ops/AGREEMENT_EXT_v0_1_DRAFT.md. v0 is anchored as JIDEC entry 39 and does not move. - The verifiers, the adversary and the contract:
workers/hs-ledger/nenrin/agreement-v0 - What an intake may and may not do, written before one existed:
ops/AGREEMENT_INTAKE_v0_BOUNDARY.md; the five open decisions and how they were settled:ops/AGREEMENT_INTAKE_v0_DECISIONS.md; state:ops/AGREEMENT_INTAKE_v0_STATUS.md
The intake exists since 2026-09-16 (agreement_intake.mjs,
wired into the ledger worker): POST /agreement accepts a record only when both signatures verify
against the keys each party serves at its key_url, deduplicates atomically, serves the record by
sha at GET /agreement/{canonical_sha256}, and bundles the accepted pool into a daily anchored
ledger entry. It judges nothing. The first record it accepted, between this project's agent and
babyblueviper1's agent, is in the tree as
first_agreement_record.json.
An earlier version of this paragraph said there was no intake; the code had been written and
deployed but not committed, which this repository noticed on 2026-09-20 and corrected.
The second record between the same two agents was re-signed on 2026-09-28 with "publication": "public"
inside the bytes both parties signed (record-privacy-v1: nothing bilateral is published on one side's say so).
It was accepted the same day with both signing keys matching the keys each domain serves, and each side's
pinned conduct record is filed on the ledger:
5d3e62f1…/report.
The register, as a repository
The same measurements are published as a standalone, machine generated repository: mcp-conduct-register.
Nobody selects the rows there either. A script rebuilds the table from the public API once a day,
and the same run writes a
register.json
snapshot so an agent can read the register without parsing Markdown. It carries a CITATION.cff,
so the register can be cited the way a dataset is cited, and an
llms.txt
that states in plain words what the register is and, more importantly, what it is not.
Three ways in, none of which need us
Since 2026-09-04 the gate can be used without asking anyone at HORIZON SHIELD.
For the server you operate. Put {"allow_tool_call": true} at /.well-known/mcp-conduct.json on your
origin. Only the owner of an origin can place a file there, so the gate takes it as consent, measures
determinism on the public register with it, and writes into every verdict where it read it (gate 0.2.4).
Add a compensation block to your agent card (paid_by, referral_fee, listing_fee; the content is not
judged, only its absence) and POST /watch once. A row can then reach verified with no hand of ours involved.
For your CI. One step measures the server on every push and recomputes the verdict hash on the runner,
so the gate is never trusted:
wedjat-check-action
(uses: ogasurfproject-jpg/wedjat-check-action@v1). It fails the job on a measured failure and leaves
unmeasured conditions unmeasured; require and must_pass decide how strict that is.
For the agent that connects. mcp-conduct on npm
(zero dependencies) reads /is-verified before an MCP client connects and applies a policy you choose:
warn, measured (block only what was measured and did not pass), verified-only, or off.
verified is true or null, never false; not measured is never failed. Source:
mcp-conduct.
Stated plainly: as of 2026-09-05 the register holds our own servers and nobody else's. The doors are open; the first outside row has not walked through yet.
JIDEC: verify this project without trusting it
The verification process behind HORIZON SHIELD's results is published as a Bitcoin anchored, append only public ledger. You do not have to trust us: fetch the anchored bytes, hash them yourself, and check the timestamp.
- Start here: https://ledger.horizonshield.dev/llms.txt
- Ledger index: https://ledger.horizonshield.dev/ledger
- Machine readable catalog (RFC 9727): https://ledger.horizonshield.dev/.well-known/api-catalog
- Read only MCP endpoint: https://jidec.horizonshield.dev/mcp
One line is enough to check any entry:
What this proves and what it does not is stated by the ledger itself at /health under transparency, including that OpenTimestamps has no RFC, ISO or eIDAS standing.
The previous hostnames, hs-ledger.oga-surf-project.workers.dev and hs-jidec-mcp.oga-surf-project.workers.dev, still answer and always will. Records already anchored to Bitcoin cite them, so retiring them would make past receipts unverifiable.
What the MCP server does
A homeowner commissioning construction work cannot reliably judge whether a quote reflects a fair price. This is a textbook credence good problem. This MCP server makes a third party fair price reference callable and verifiable by software, so an agent can check a number instead of trusting it.
- Protocol: Model Context Protocol (MCP)
- Transport: MCP over Streamable HTTP (JSON-RPC 2.0). The legacy SSE transport is not implemented; GET on /sse answers 405 sse_not_supported.
- Endpoint:
https://mcp.horizonshield.dev - Access: read only, no API key required
- Data region: fair-price verdicts for Japan (JPY), built on the open JCCDB dataset (526,128 records: line items and observations); construction cost data for Japan (JCCDB observation layer) and the United States (USCCDB, the United States Construction Cost Database)
- Tools: 30 (15 for fair price, verification and contractors; 15 for construction cost data)
Tools
Construction cost data: Japan (JCCDB) and both countries
Construction cost data: United States (USCCDB)
USCCDB is the United States Construction Cost Database: U.S. public-domain federal data and city open data, one row per observation with source URL, sha256 and licence. The four chain tools compute on request and are not distributed as files. Public-works prices, statistics and estimates are reference data, not renovation quotes.
The same public data, read for a homeowner holding a quote, one question per page with every figure linked to the record it comes from: Guides · Roof replacement cost in Austin, TX · Is my roofing quote too high? · Overhead and profit on a contractor quote · Trades hourly rates in Austin, TX · How many squares is my roof? · Do I need a roof permit in Austin? · Can a roofer waive my deductible in Texas? · Price good only today · How much deposit? · Material prices up: is the quote justified? · Lead paint and RRP certification · Scope of work before quotes. The quote check itself: shield.the-horizons-innovation.com/us/.
Connecting
This is a remote MCP server. Point any MCP client at the endpoint.
If your client supports remote MCP servers directly, use the endpoint URL above.
In Claude, without configuration
The construction cost data server (https://ccdb.horizonshield.dev/mcp, fifteen read-only tools for JCCDB and USCCDB) is listed in the Claude connector directory after Anthropic's automated review: https://claude.ai/directory/connectors/horizon-shield-construction-cost-data . Open the page in Claude and press Connect; no key and no account with us. It is a community connector, which means it passed the automated review and is not verified by Anthropic.
Example
Returns a verdict (for example, overcharge risk), the fair range (min, avg, max), and the gap from the average. verify_fair_price additionally returns a SHA-256 fingerprint of the fair price claim under PTKA (the PTKA declaration is anchored in Bitcoin; the receipt is kept by the issuer, and from 2026-10-19 each day's receipts are listed in one JIDEC ledger entry the next day).
Verify a verdict yourself
Every verify_fair_price call returns a verify_url of the form https://shield.the-horizons-innovation.com/verify/?id=<claim_sha256>. The public verify page recomputes the SHA-256 in your own browser (Web Crypto) and checks it against the receipt. Nothing is sent to any server. The same claim is served back as JSON at https://mcp.horizonshield.dev/ledger/<claim_sha256>. Trust is conferred by recomputation, not assumed in the issuer.
Twenty real overcharge diagnoses are also published as tamper evident receipts, each with claim.txt, its SHA-256 digest, and an OpenTimestamps proof:
- Index of the 20 receipts: https://shield.the-horizons-innovation.com/souba/kajou-seikyu-jirei-20/
- The dataset these verdicts belong to is anchored at Bitcoin block 949356.
AP2 bridge
Google's Agent Payments Protocol (AP2) makes what a user authorized verifiable through a signed, tamper evident Mandate. create_ap2_fairness_attestation issues a parallel attestation that makes value verifiable, shaped to attach to an AP2 Cart Mandate before the user signs. Parallel layers, same philosophy: pre transaction, tamper evident, independently recomputable.
Data and academic record
- Fair price data is built on the openly published JCCDB dataset (526,128 records: 95,403 Japanese construction line items and 430,725 source-cited observations, CC BY 4.0): https://github.com/ogasurfproject-jpg/japan-construction-cost-database
- PTKA protocol declaration anchored at Bitcoin block 949356 (2026-05-14); JCCDB Extended paper at block 951871 (2026-06-01)
- JCCDB origin paper: Zenodo 10.5281/zenodo.20019572
- Audit hash and macro correction: SSRN 6738701, mirrored at engrXiv
- VRQ framework and PTKA model: SSRN 6807738
- Reproduction package (buyer side verification gate): GitHub, archived at Zenodo 10.5281/zenodo.20756867 (MIT, runnable:
node test/run_local.mjs)
Author
Toshikatsu Oga (大賀俊勝), The HORIZONs Co., Ltd., Hiratsuka, Japan. A carpenter of thirty years. ORCID 0009-0000-9180-903X.
"Cheapest is not the same as fair."
"Verify, don't trust."
"Thirty years on site taught me the enemy is the middleman, not the craftsman."
Full collection (50 quotes, JSON-LD): TOshi Oga, in his own words
Live diagnostic: https://shield.the-horizons-innovation.com · The Evidence: https://shield.the-horizons-innovation.com/evidence-en/ · The Movement: https://shield.the-horizons-innovation.com/movement-us/
License
Data: JCCDB, CC BY 4.0. Server code: see the LICENSE file in this repository.
来源:README.md,提交 1b45cb6
工具
0版本历史
1- v0.1.0最新Sep 16, 2026
评分
已满足适用检查项的 85%
该评分衡量此收录条目的完整程度,依据注册中心条目、端点与公开来源计算得出。它不是对服务器本身的评价,也不表示服务器安全或当前可用:可连通性是带日期的检查结果,评分也不包含安装量或用户评价。
- 近 30 天内可连通必需25 分
- 已声明认证方式必需10 分
- 已列出工具必需15 分
请让服务器在无凭据时响应 tools/list,或发布可在沙箱中无凭据启动的软件包。
- 描述必需15 分
- 图标10 分
- 文档15 分
- 许可证10 分
其他 Audit 集成
audit.domains - Domain Valuation
domains.audit官方发布者
确定性的域名估值服务:提供公允价值区间、真实可比成交记录、可用性查询,以及经 DNS 验证的待售域名市场。
Revenue Agent — OpenAPI Audit & Change Detection
news.prh官方发布者
一个远程 MCP 端点,用于审计 OpenAPI 规范并检测 API 变更,每次分析通过 Base 上的 x402 收取 0.10 USDC。
SEO Technical Audit
由 GitHub 账号 theharrisontruong-web 发布
远程 MCP 服务器,对单个网页做技术 SEO 审计(索引、meta、robots.txt、站点地图、结构化数据),返回评分与等级。
Security Headers + TLS Audit
由 GitHub 账号 theharrisontruong-web 发布
远程 MCP 服务器,审计任意网站的 security headers 与 TLS 配置,返回 0–100 评分、A–F 等级和主要缺口。
MailAuth Audit (Email Deliverability)
由 GitHub 账号 theharrisontruong-web 发布
通过 DNS-over-HTTPS 审计域名的 SPF、DKIM、DMARC 与 MX 记录,返回 0-100 评分、A-F 等级以及欺骗与送达风险。