Rls Doctor

RLS Doctor

[CI] [npm] [npm downloads]

Don't trust your RLS. Prove it.

[RLS Doctor demo]

Can user A read user B's rows? Row Level Security is one of Postgres's strongest isolation tools, and one of the easiest to leave half-configured. You enable RLS, add a policy, and move on — but policies OR-combine, WITH CHECK silently falls back to USING, table owners bypass RLS entirely, and TRUNCATE is never protected at all.

rls-doctor reads your catalog and tells you what's actually reachable. And with probe, it stops analyzing and just shows you, impersonating your app roles in a transaction it always rolls back.

npx rls-doctor check    # reads DATABASE_URL or SUPABASE_DB_URLnpx rls-doctor demo     # no database needed: disposable Postgres, proven leak

RLS Doctor ReportGenerated: 2026-07-12T00:00:00.000ZSchemas: public
Summary: 1 tables, 0 policies, highest risk HIGHFindings: critical 0, high 1, medium 0, low 0, info 0RLS Score: 90/100
public.orders  RLS disabled; force RLS disabled; 0 policies  [HIGH] RLS-disabled table is reachable by an application role    public.orders has no row-level checks; Application role authenticated and    can exercise SELECT granted to authenticated.    Fix: Enable RLS and add least-privilege policies for each application role.    Suggested SQL:      alter table "public"."orders" enable row level security;

[RLS Doctor terminal preview]

Prove a cross-tenant leak instead of guessing

Most RLS review is reading policies and hoping. probe is behavioral:

rls-doctor probe --connection "$DATABASE_URL" --schema public \  --app-roles authenticated --subjects \  00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001 \  00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002

It sets request.jwt.claims inside the transaction, so auth.uid() resolves to each real Supabase user, then counts whose rows that identity can read.

- [high] probe-cross-owner-read rls_doctor_demo.orders:  Role authenticated reads rows across 2 distinct owner_id values- [high] probe-cross-subject-read rls_doctor_demo.orders:  Role authenticated reads rows belonging to other users

It never mutates anything. probe opens begin ... read only and always rolls back — safe against a production read replica.

Install

npx rls-doctor check              # no installnpm install -g rls-doctor         # global

Requires Node.js 20 or later. Prefer DATABASE_URL or SUPABASE_DB_URL with read-only audit credentials — passing a secret via --connection exposes it in shell history and process listings.

Commands

rls-doctor check --schema public --fail-on highrls-doctor explain public.profilesrls-doctor probe --app-roles authenticated --owner-columns tenant_id

check options

-c, --connection <url>       Postgres connection string-s, --schema <schema...>     Schemas to audit. Default: public--json                       Machine-readable JSON--format <format>            text, json, or sarif. Default: text--fail-on <severity>         info, low, medium, high, critical, none. Default: high--baseline <path>            Compare with a prior JSON report; only new findings fail--update-baseline            Write the current report to --baseline and exit 0--schema-file <path>         Audit a SQL schema or migration file offline; no database--receipt <path>             Write a portable coverage receipt (digest-verified)--receipt-key <path>         Sign the receipt with an Ed25519 private key (PEM)--score                      Print only the RLS Score--badge                      Print a shields.io badge URL for the RLS Score--statement-timeout <ms>     Catalog query timeout. Default: 10000--app-roles <role...>        Extra roles to treat as reachable application identities

On generic Postgres (not Supabase), pass your real roles so grants and memberships through them are analyzed at the same severity as authenticated:

rls-doctor check --connection "$DATABASE_URL" --app-roles app_user web_user --fail-on high

probe options

--app-roles <role...>        Roles to impersonate (required)--subjects <uuid...>         Supabase user ids to simulate via request.jwt.claims--owner-columns <col...>     Owner/tenant columns to compare                             (default: owner_id user_id tenant_id account_id)--sample-limit <n>           Rows sampled per table (default: 1000)

Probe findings: probe-cross-owner-read and probe-cross-subject-read (High), probe-role-unavailable (Medium), probe-error (Low), plus informational probe-reads-rows, probe-subject-reads-own-rows, probe-reads-no-rows, and probe-read-denied.

What it catches

Checks follow PostgreSQL command semantics: SELECT evaluates USING; INSERT evaluates WITH CHECK; DELETE evaluates USING; UPDATE evaluates both. When an UPDATE or ALL policy omits WITH CHECK, Postgres falls back to its USING expression — and rls-doctor analyzes that effective check. ALL is evaluated as each applicable command.

It follows direct, inherited, and SET ROLE membership paths (including PostgreSQL 16 per-membership options; 15 is normalized), and reports current access separately from default privileges affecting future tables.

Ecosystem study

We statically audited the migrations of 60 public Supabase projects: 63% contain at least one high or critical RLS pattern (median score 38/100), with coverage limitations reported honestly in 57% of them. Aggregate, anonymized, reproducible — read the report and the disclosure policy.

GitHub Action

Findings land in the Security tab.

permissions:  contents: read  security-events: write
steps:  - uses: actions/checkout@v5  - uses: subhajitlucky/[email protected]    with:      connection: ${{ secrets.READONLY_DATABASE_URL }}      schema: public      format: sarif      upload: "true"      fail-on: high      app-roles: authenticated app_user

SARIF results carry logicalLocations (schema.table) and stable partialFingerprints, so code scanning tracks findings across runs even though tables aren't files.

Or run it in CI without the Action

name: RLS Auditon:  pull_request:    branches: [main]
jobs:  rls-audit:    runs-on: ubuntu-latest    steps:      - uses: actions/checkout@v5      - uses: actions/setup-node@v5        with:          node-version: 22.x      - run: npx rls-doctor check --schema public --json --fail-on high        env:          DATABASE_URL: ${{ secrets.READONLY_DATABASE_URL }}

Full guide: docs/guides/github-actions.md

Baselines

Adopt on an existing database without failing on day one:

rls-doctor check --schema public --baseline rls-baseline.json --update-baselinerls-doctor check --schema public --baseline rls-baseline.json --fail-on high

Fingerprints derive from finding id, schema, table, and detail — so a changed predicate or privilege correctly re-reports as new. JSON reports include baseline: { new, unchanged, resolved }.

RLS Score

Every report carries a deterministic score: 100 minus severity penalties — critical 25, high 10, medium 4, low 1, info 0 — clamped to 0–100. Bands: green ≥ 80, yellow ≥ 50, red < 50. The score never replaces the report: inspect the findings before calling a database safe.

rls-doctor check --score    # RLS Score: 34/100rls-doctor check --badge    # https://img.shields.io/badge/RLS%20Score-34%2F100-red

--score and --badge print only the score or badge; exit codes still follow --fail-on. JSON reports always include the score object with its findingPenalty breakdown.

Audit migrations without a database

check --schema-file reconstructs table, policy, RLS, grant, role, and default-privilege state from a SQL file — no connection, no credentials. Unsupported statements become coverage limitations instead of guessed findings, and the RLS Score carries the offline coverage penalty.

rls-doctor check --schema-file supabase/migrations/0001_init.sql --fail-on high

Supported: CREATE SCHEMA/TABLE/ROLE/USER/POLICY, ALTER TABLE RLS and FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY, GRANT/REVOKE on tables, schemas, and roles, ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES, DROP of the same, and unconditional role creation inside DO blocks.

Shadow verification

shadow replays your migration files in a disposable PostgreSQL container, runs the real catalog audit — and probe when seed data is provided — then compares the offline analysis with the database's actual state:

rls-doctor shadow --schema-file supabase/migrations/*.sql --seed seed.sql --fail-on high

• Prints how many findings matched between static and live analysis, and lists any disagreement in either direction — a parser-coverage fact, never a guessed finding.
• The container is always removed; the audited database is never touched.
• --receipt writes a receipt marked scope=shadow and environment: shadow (disposable world).

Formal proof mode

prove decides row-isolation claims from a schema file within a small, sound fragment — no database needed:

rls-doctor prove --schema-file supabase/migrations/0001_init.sql --table orders

For each table, command, and role it returns one of:

• proved — every row the policies admit satisfies owner_col = auth.uid() (or the policies admit no rows at all)
• witness — the policies can admit rows outside the ownership boundary, with the reason stated (using (true), RLS disabled, mismatched columns)
• undecided — outside the decidable fragment (NOT, subqueries, casts, function calls); listed with the reason, never guessed

Exit 1 when any witness exists. --proof <path> writes a canonical JSON artifact with a SHA-256 digest over the claims. See docs/proofs.md.

Proof-carrying repairs

fix generates a canonical repair for an exposed table and verifies it in shadow before writing anything:

rls-doctor fix --schema-file supabase/migrations/0001_init.sql \  --table public.orders --patch fix-orders.sql --receipt fix-orders.json

The patch is written only if verification proves it resolves the target witnesses and introduces no new medium+ findings — statically always, and against a live disposable PostgreSQL when Docker is available. The receipt binds the finding fingerprints to the exact patch hash and the before/after verdicts. The tool never applies the patch; a human or authorized agent does, then reruns check and prove. See docs/repairs.md.

Exit behavior

• 0 — no finding meets the configured threshold
• 1 — a finding meets or exceeds --fail-on, or Commander usage/option-parsing error
• 2 — caught runtime failure: missing credentials, connection/catalog error, invalid action value, requested table not found

--fail-on none always disables finding-based failure. A clean report uses highestSeverity: "none", so --fail-on info still exits 0 when there are no findings.

Coverage receipts

Every audit can emit a portable coverage receipt — what was checked, what was not, the deterministic score, and finding fingerprints — with a SHA-256 digest over the canonical body and an optional Ed25519 signature:

rls-doctor check --receipt receipt.jsonrls-doctor check --schema-file m.sql --receipt receipt.json --receipt-key key.pemrls-doctor verify-receipt receipt.json   # exit 0 valid, 2 tampered

Receipts never contain policy expressions, connection strings, or credentials. See docs/receipts.md.

MCP server

claude mcp add rls-doctor --scope user -- npx -y [email protected] mcp

Read-only tools, each annotated readOnlyHint: true, destructiveHint: false, idempotentHint: true: describe_capabilities (tool contract, approval rules, coverage limits), check_rls, probe_access, explain_table, prove_isolation (offline proofs from SQL files), propose_repair (statically verified repair proposals; never writes files). Failures return structured JSON shaped as { error: { code, message, nextAction } }. Setup for Codex CLI, Gemini CLI, and generic stdio clients is in docs/agents.md.

Exit codes

• 0: the command completed and no finding met the --fail-on threshold.
• 1: the command completed and a finding met the threshold.
• 2: invalid input or an operational failure (connection, parse, IO). Never treat exit 2 as clean.

Commands document extra codes where they apply (for example verify-receipt exits 2 on a tampered receipt).

Agent skill

npx skills add subhajitlucky/rls-doctor

Teaches compatible coding agents when to run the audit, how to use read-only database credentials, and how to avoid leaking connection strings.

Supabase

rls-doctor audits catalog-visible PostgreSQL RLS, grants, and role paths. It does not audit hosted Supabase management settings, views, or functions — review Data API configuration separately. See docs/guides/supabase-rls-patterns.md for unsafe vs. safer policy examples.

Try it in seconds

npx rls-doctor demo starts a disposable PostgreSQL container, applies an intentionally unsafe schema, runs check and probe, proves a cross-tenant read, and removes the container. No configuration, no credentials, nothing written — and when Docker is unavailable it falls back to a recorded run.

demo/ also holds disposable fixtures — unsafe-schema.sql (intentionally risky policies) and safe-schema.sql (a safer reference shape).

npm run demo   # prints local demo steps

Never run demo fixtures against production.

Architecture

CLI command  -> catalog loader  -> audit analyzer  -> text / JSON reporters  -> shell exit code

Deeper notes: docs/architecture.md

Safety and scope

rls-doctor only queries Postgres catalogs. It sanitizes connection credentials from its own errors. Probe transactions are read-only and always rolled back.

It's a focused catalog audit, not a proof or compliance product. It does not:

• prove arbitrary SQL predicate correctness or simulate can-style checks
• audit views, functions, or hosted Supabase management configuration
• automatically execute suggested SQL — suggestions are review templates
• make a compliance claim

It's a security review aid, not a replacement for application-level authorization tests, grant reviews, or a full production security audit.

Dogfooding

CI checks the safe reference schema with RLS Doctor itself, offline:

rls-doctor check --schema-file demo/safe-schema.sql --fail-on high

The safe fixture must stay clean at high severity. The unsafe fixture is expected to fail — it powers demo and the test suite.

Development

npm ci && npm run ci

npm run test:integration starts its own disposable Postgres container, opts into destructive fixtures, runs check/explain, and removes the container. Invoking scripts/run-integration.js directly refuses to run unless RLS_DOCTOR_ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE_TESTS=1 is set — use that guard only with a disposable database.

Roadmap

• Markdown report output
• Policy diffing between branches
• Optional SQL migration suggestions

License

MIT