Thalovant MCP

Last Edit: Claude Fable 5.1 - 2026-11-06 - Motive: Say what the 409 skill_unavailable_licensing and memory_limit refusals get as hints (0.7.1).

Thalovant MCP Server

[M8ven Live Monitored]

Public-ready MCP server for Thalovant control-plane and hub runtime APIs.

It uses the official Thalovant Node.js SDK and the production MCP TypeScript SDK over stdio and Streamable HTTP, so it works with local MCP hosts such as Claude Desktop, Codex, Cursor, and remote MCP clients.

What It Includes

• stdio transport for local agents.
• Streamable HTTP transport at /mcp for remote agents.
• OAuth-style protected resource metadata at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource.
• Static bearer tokens for simple/private deployments.
• JWT/JWKS and OAuth token introspection for production remote deployments.
• Per-principal Thalovant credentials and tool policy.
• Chat app tools: connectors, bridges and their status in words, pause and resume, chats, test messages and the plan's allowance. Bot tokens stay in the console.
• Host/origin validation, CORS, rate limiting, body limits, secure headers, and session binding.
• Optional resumability event storage and JSONL audit logs.
• Docker, Compose, Kubernetes, CI, npm package metadata, and MCP registry server.json.

Why TypeScript

Thalovant publishes SDKs for Python, Node.js, Go, and Rust. This server uses Node.js because @thalovant/sdk directly exposes the Thalovant control plane, identity loading, WSS/HTTPS/MQTT runtime clients, memory, analytics, and context helpers, while @modelcontextprotocol/sdk is the best-supported path for cross-agent stdio and Streamable HTTP servers.

Install

Run the published package with npx -y @thalovant/mcp-server, or build it from a checkout:

npm installnpm run build

Node.js 20 or newer is required.

Control-Plane Auth

Public hub discovery does not need Thalovant credentials. Private control-plane tools and runtime hub tools read credentials only from the MCP server environment or server-side principal credential files. Do not pass API tokens or passwords through chat or tool arguments.

The server selects control-plane auth in this order:

1. THALOVANT_API_TOKEN — a scoped Thalovant API token. Recommended.
2. THALOVANT_ACCESS_TOKEN — a pre-issued session access token.
3. THALOVANT_EMAIL + THALOVANT_PASSWORD — interactive-account login fallback.

When a token is set, the server never calls the login endpoint. thalovant_config_status reports the active mode as controlPlaneAuthMode without revealing token values.

With none of these configured, a person can sign the server in through the browser instead: see Device Sign-In. The token that sign-in mints is used only when nothing above is configured.

Device Sign-In

A tool call cannot wait for a person, so the device flow (RFC 8628) is two tools:

1. thalovant_begin_device_login with optional scopes (an empty list, like none, asks for the API's default), clientName and clientId answers loginId, userCode, verificationUri, verificationUriComplete, interval and expiresIn. Show the person the URL and the code. clientId signs in as a registered app, thalovant-home-assistant for Home Assistant: the approval page shows the platform's name for it as verified, and approving it again replaces the token it already holds. An id the API does not know is refused (400 unknown_client).
2. thalovant_poll_device_login with that loginId asks once. outcome is pending (poll again after interval seconds, already five seconds longer for good if the API asked to slow down), approved (with tokenId, scopes and expiresAt), expired or denied.

The device code and the token never reach the model: the server keeps both, bound to the principal that began the sign-in, for the life of the process. Once approved, every control-plane tool for that principal uses the token when no credential is configured. thalovant_revoke_device_login signs out: it revokes that token (a token may always revoke itself, and one already revoked counts as revoked) and forgets it; signing out again answers alreadyRevoked without a request, and configured tokens are never touched. A sign-in reaches only the configured API origin (THALOVANT_API_URL, or the default), since the verification URL it answers with is shown to a person. A Home Assistant link asks for hubs:read, clients:read and clients:write, which is also all a Free plan can approve.

API Tokens (Recommended For AI Agents And CI)

Scoped API tokens are the right credential for AI and automation use: they are minted from the Thalovant dashboard (or through the device flow), carry only the scopes you grant, can be revoked individually, and never involve your account password or MFA. Tokens start with tvpat_.

export THALOVANT_API_TOKEN="tvpat_..."export THALOVANT_API_URL="https://api.thalovant.com"
npm start

Minimum scopes for the full control-plane tool surface:

The hub scopes imply one another: hubs:write grants hubs:read, which grants hubs:inspect and hubs:preview. Minting a token with hubs:read is therefore enough for every discovery tool in the table above.

Scope is not the whole story for provisioning. Every hub and runtime-group write also requires a paid plan, and the API checks scope before the plan, so the two failure modes are ordered:

• A token missing the scope fails 403 Insufficient scopes. Free-plan API tokens are capped at hubs:read, clients:read, and clients:write, so on the free tier provisioning fails with this 403 and never reaches the 402.
• A correctly scoped token on a free plan fails 402 API access requires a paid plan.
• thalovant_install_runtime_group_skill can fail with a second, distinct 402, This skill requires paid marketplace access for the tenant plan., when the plan is paid but does not include access_tier: paid catalog entries.

Discovery is deliberately not paid-gated: a free-tier token can browse the marketplace catalog and set hub ratings, but cannot install skills or provision hubs. Use thalovant_list_runtime_group_marketplace before installing — it reports installable, purchase_required, and access_message per skill, which turns an opaque 402 into a decision you can make up front.

Grant fewer scopes for narrower deployments: a read-only assistant needs only hubs:read and memory:read, and a discovery-only agent that browses skills but never provisions needs hubs:read alone. thalovant_get_analytics_overview with admin: true additionally requires an admin account with admin:analytics, which API tokens for regular use should not carry. Runtime hub tools (thalovant_ask, thalovant_send_action, and friends) use Thalovant client identities, not control-plane tokens.

Hub Etags

thalovant_update_hub and thalovant_delete_hub use optimistic locking and require the hub's current etag, sent as If-Match. The etag is only available in the body of the hub resource — the API sends no ETag response header — so an agent must call thalovant_get_hub first and pass the etag field from that response. A missing or stale value fails 412 ETag mismatch and changes nothing; re-fetch and retry. name, namespace, and domain are immutable after creation, so thalovant_update_hub does not accept them at all; send only the fields you are changing rather than round-tripping a whole hub resource. Runtime-group writes do not use etags.

Hub Skills

thalovant_list_hub_skills, thalovant_install_hub_skill, thalovant_update_hub_skill, and thalovant_remove_hub_skill select a hub's attached runtime group; all hubs sharing it are affected. A hub can start with no skills at all and gain them one at a time; a change applies live on the hub in about 15 seconds with no restart. hubId must be the hub UUID — the authenticated hub routes reject slugs.

thalovant_list_hub_skills returns the whole GET /v1/hubs/{hub_id}/skills envelope: hub_id, runtime_group_id, observed_at, source, the runtime's phase and message, and data, one row per skill (possibly empty) with skill, title, marketplace_skill_id, package_name, source_type, install_source, version, version_pin, installed_version, observed_version, previous_version, latest_version, available_version, update_available, changelog, active, state, the runtime's phase, message and last error, and last_transition_at. state is one of pending, installed, failed, removing, drifted, quarantined, or unmanaged; a change in progress shows as pending.

Each write answers 202 with operation_id, hub_id, runtime_group_id, skill, version (null for a removal), previous_version, and state (installing, updating, or removing); pass wait: true to poll that operation every 2 s until it converges (installed, or removed for a removal; a failed or timed_out operation raises an error carrying its error_message), with a 120 s default timeoutMs, or follow it yourself with thalovant_get_operation. Installing a skill that is already installed at another version performs an update; the same version fails 409 with code skill_version_already_installed. A hub with no runtime group fails 404 with code hub_without_runtime_group (a plain 404 means an unknown hub or a skill that is not installed), and an unresolvable latest or an invalid version fails 422. Errors are RFC 7807 problem bodies; the tool error keeps the short message, which appends the root code in parentheses, for example Thalovant API request failed with HTTP 409: Skill version already installed. (skill_version_already_installed), and then the code and the body's other fields (see Tool Errors). A skill the store does not install for licensing reasons (YouTube, YouTube Music, Spotify, SoundCloud and Bandcamp: the service's terms do not allow a hosted assistant to play its content) fails 409 with code skill_unavailable_licensing and reason: licensing, which thalovant_list_marketplace_skills announces per skill as unavailable_reason and installable; no plan, scope or version changes that.

Listing needs hubs:inspect (implied by hubs:read); the writes need hubs:write and a paid plan, and because scope is checked before plan a free-plan token sees 403, never 402. Hub-restricted tokens (a hub_ids allowlist) are honoured on all four routes. The server uses the published Node SDK hub-skill methods and preserves MCP cancellation checks during polling. A failed status read retains the accepted operation ID; use thalovant_get_operation with that ID instead of submitting the write again. No new poll starts at or after the polling deadline. That deadline does not cancel an HTTP request already in flight.

Login Fallback

export THALOVANT_EMAIL="[email protected]"export THALOVANT_PASSWORD="..."
export THALOVANT_PROFILE="prod"export THALOVANT_API_URL="https://api.thalovant.com"
npm start

If neither a token nor email/password is configured, authenticated control-plane tools fail with a clear error naming the supported options.

Configured API tokens and login credentials are bound to the origin of their configured apiUrl or THALOVANT_API_URL (default https://api.thalovant.com). A tool argument cannot redirect those credentials to another origin. Equivalent URL spellings and paths on the same origin are allowed; custom origins must be configured alongside their credentials. Anonymous public discovery may still select a custom API URL.

Link Home Assistant

A home controller such as Home Assistant links to a hub with a connection of its own kind:

1. Sign in, when no token is configured: Device Sign-In.
2. thalovant_create_client_identity with connectionType: "home_assistant". The API must answer with the same kind; one that made an ordinary connection instead has it deleted again and the call fails. The result carries clientId, connectionType and operationId.
3. thalovant_wait_for_admission with that operationId. A hub admits a new connection in about ninety seconds and refuses it until then. outcome is admitted, failed or timeout. A failure on the platform carries the operation's errorCode (and status null); the API refusing the wait itself carries its status, code and detail. A timeout means the connection may still be admitted: call the tool again rather than creating another connection. A 429 is waited out for the time the API names (in its body, else Retry-After, else RateLimit-Reset); one asking for longer than is left is a timeout at once. A token the API refuses (401, 403) and an API out of reach are tool errors of their own, each with a hint, never a failed admission. It reads only, honours cancellation, and never follows a links.self to another origin than the API's.

Each refusal of step 2 names what to do next after the API's own text (see Tool Errors): a kind the API does not know yet, a plan that does not allow the connection, a hub that already holds its one Home Assistant link (with the client_id holding it), or a token the API refused (sign in again). thalovant_delete_client removes a connection (If-Match, reading the etag first when none is given, retrying once on 412, and counting a connection already gone as deleted); it is a destructive tool the operator enables.

Answering the hub's requests afterwards is the integration's own long-lived job, on the data plane; an MCP tool call holds a hub connection only for its own length, so that part of the link is not a tool.

Chat Apps

A hub can answer in a chat network through a chat app: Telegram and Discord are offered, and Matrix, Mattermost and Twitch appear as beta when the API lists them. Each connection of a hub to a chat network is a bridge (/v1/bridges). The person makes the bot in the chat network, then connects it to a hub in the Thalovant console.

Tokens and secrets stay in the console. Creating a bridge and replacing its token or secrets need the bot's credential, and no tool of this server takes a credential as an argument (see Control-Plane Auth), so there is no tool for them. The descriptions and outputs say where to go instead: Connections > Add connection > Chat apps, or the hub's Chat apps tab, and Replace token on the bot. thalovant_update_bridge refuses a setting whose name looks like a token or secret, at any depth, before any request, naming it by its dotted path and never its value.

Each bridge comes back with the API's own members (network, connector, state, allowed, require_mention, session_scope, paused, hold, bot, invite_links, secrets_set by name, etag, timestamps, and operation when the change queued one) and status:

• reason is the API's customer-safe status, and summary says it in words: Setup (no chats chosen yet), Starting, Connected, Paused, Unavailable, TokenMissing and TokenRejected (both send the person to Replace token in the console). A reason this server does not know yet is kept and named.
• phase, ready, and applied: true once the bridge carries the latest change, false while it is on its way, null in setup.
• hold says why the platform paused a bridge: plan_limit (the plan allows fewer running chat apps, after a downgrade; it resumes on its own once there is room) or account_suspended. It is null for the owner's own pause.

The platform's own diagnostic sentence and condition (status.message, status.operator_reason, sent to administrators' tokens) are never included. Outputs are built from the members the API documents rather than passed through, so a member added later does not reach the model unreviewed; settings and operation go through the usual secret redaction.

The write tools take an optional etag (the bridge's etag field; there is no ETag header), sent as If-Match: a stale one fails 412 and changes nothing. Telegram lists chats only while its bridge is paused (409 bridge_running), so the flow is pause, send /start@<bot> in the new group, list, update allowed, resume. A refusal keeps the API's code, sentence and fields (see Tool Errors) and adds a hint by code: the settings a bridge_settings_invalid or bridge_url_* refusal names (names only), the plan's allowance after 402 or 403 plan_limit, the wait after 429, and the console for anything about a token.

Reads need hubs:read, except thalovant_list_bridge_chats: it changes nothing, but it asks the chat network on the bot's behalf, so it needs hubs:write, the hub's owner or a workspace manager, and a paid plan, like the writes. Writes need the same, except pausing and deleting, which always work on any plan. THALOVANT_MCP_READONLY keeps the four reads a hubs:read token can call and leaves thalovant_list_bridge_chats out.

Local Stdio

The server speaks MCP over stdio and does not write logs to stdout.

Runtime hub tools load local identities in this order:

1. identityFile tool argument.
2. configPath or profile tool argument.
3. Thalovant SDK environment identity variables.
4. The default Thalovant SDK config profile.

Keep Thalovant identity files secret. The SDK expects protected config files such as ~/.config/thalovant/config.yaml with mode 0600.

Streamable HTTP

Remote mode uses MCP Streamable HTTP at /mcp and requires bearer authentication by default.

export MCP_TRANSPORT="http"export MCP_HTTP_HOST="127.0.0.1"export MCP_HTTP_PORT="3000"export MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"export MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS="127.0.0.1:3000,localhost:3000"
npm run start:http

Clients connect to:

http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcpAuthorization: Bearer <token>

Health checks are available at /healthz and /readyz.

For public deployments, set the public URL and exact host/origin allowlists:

export MCP_HTTP_HOST="0.0.0.0"export MCP_HTTP_PORT="3000"export MCP_PUBLIC_URL="https://mcp.example.com"export MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS="mcp.example.com"export MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS="https://agent.example.com"

Remote Auth

Use static bearer tokens only for local, private, or single-tenant deployments:

export MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"# orexport MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKENS="token-a,token-b"

Use JWT/JWKS for production resource-server validation:

export MCP_HTTP_AUTH_MODE="jwt"export MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER="https://auth.example.com/"export MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URL="https://auth.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json"export MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE="https://mcp.example.com/mcp"export MCP_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_SERVERS="https://auth.example.com/"export MCP_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES="mcp:thalovant"

Use introspection when your authorization server issues opaque tokens:

export MCP_HTTP_AUTH_MODE="introspection"export MCP_OAUTH_INTROSPECTION_URL="https://auth.example.com/oauth2/introspect"export MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID="mcp-server-client"export MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET="..."export MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE="https://mcp.example.com/mcp"export MCP_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_SERVERS="https://auth.example.com/"export MCP_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES="mcp:thalovant"

The server publishes protected resource metadata at:

https://mcp.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource

401 responses include WWW-Authenticate with a resource_metadata pointer for MCP clients that support OAuth discovery.

Principal Credentials

For multi-user remote deployments, do not share one Thalovant access token across all MCP users. Map each authenticated MCP principal to its own Thalovant control-plane token, runtime identity, and tool policy.

Single file:

export THALOVANT_PRINCIPAL_CREDENTIALS_FILE="/run/secrets/thalovant-principals.json"

Directory mode:

export THALOVANT_PRINCIPAL_CREDENTIALS_DIR="/run/secrets/thalovant-principals"

Directory files are named <sha256(principal-id)>.json. The server checks the OAuth subject, principal id, and client id. See examples/principal-credentials.sample.json.

Keep this disabled for multi-user deployments unless you intentionally want every remote principal to use the server environment's Thalovant credentials:

export THALOVANT_ALLOW_SHARED_CREDENTIALS="false"

Runtime identityFile, configPath, profile, and fromEnv tool arguments are disabled for remote principals by default. Set MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_CLIENT_CREDENTIAL_PATHS=true only for trusted private deployments.

Policy, Audit, And Resumability

Global tool policy:

export MCP_TOOL_ALLOWLIST="thalovant_*"export MCP_TOOL_DENYLIST="thalovant_delete_memory_item"

Per-principal credential files may also include allowedTools and deniedTools.

Both are call-time filters, and an empty allowlist means "allow everything". They cannot make a tool default-off or hide it from tools/list, which is why the two destructive control-plane tools are gated separately by THALOVANT_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS. See Destructive Tools.

Audit logs:

export MCP_AUDIT_LOG="stderr" # off, stderr, file, or bothexport MCP_AUDIT_LOG_FILE="/var/log/thalovant-mcp/audit.jsonl"export MCP_AUDIT_INCLUDE_ARGS="false"

Audit entries are JSONL and credential-shaped fields are redacted.

Streamable HTTP resumability defaults to an in-memory event store. Use a file-backed store for single-instance restarts:

export MCP_EVENT_STORE_FILE="/var/lib/thalovant-mcp/events.jsonl"

HTTP Hardening

• Bearer auth is required unless MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=true is explicitly set.
• Host headers are allowlisted to reduce DNS rebinding risk.
• Browser Origin headers are rejected unless they exactly match MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS.
• CORS exposes only MCP session/protocol headers.
• Sessions use cryptographically random ids and are bound to the authenticated principal.
• Request bodies are capped by MCP_HTTP_MAX_BODY_BYTES, defaulting to 1 MiB.
• Fixed-window rate limiting defaults to 120 MCP requests per minute per client address.
• Security headers include nosniff, DENY framing, no referrer, and a restrictive CSP.

Useful HTTP environment variables:

MCP_HTTP_PATH=/mcpMCP_HTTP_RATE_LIMIT_MAX=120MCP_HTTP_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS=60000MCP_HTTP_SESSION_TTL_MS=3600000MCP_HTTP_MAX_BODY_BYTES=1048576MCP_HTTP_ENABLE_JSON_RESPONSE=falseMCP_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY=false

Claude Desktop

Recommended: authenticate with a scoped API token so the MCP config never contains your account password.

{  "mcpServers": {    "thalovant": {      "command": "npx",      "args": ["-y", "@thalovant/mcp-server"],      "env": {        "THALOVANT_API_TOKEN": "tvpat_...",        "THALOVANT_PROFILE": "prod"      }    }  }}

Codex

Use the same stdio command in your MCP client config:

{  "mcpServers": {    "thalovant": {      "command": "npx",      "args": ["-y", "@thalovant/mcp-server"],      "env": {        "THALOVANT_API_TOKEN": "tvpat_...",        "THALOVANT_PROFILE": "prod"      }    }  }}

Tools

Read-only:

• thalovant_config_status
• thalovant_list_public_hubs
• thalovant_get_public_hub
• thalovant_list_hubs
• thalovant_get_hub
• thalovant_get_operation
• thalovant_wait_for_admission
• thalovant_identity_status
• thalovant_healthcheck
• thalovant_intent_inventory
• thalovant_wait_for_event
• thalovant_get_analytics_overview
• thalovant_list_memory_items
• thalovant_get_memory_summary
• thalovant_get_memory_item

Skill and runtime-group discovery (read-only):

• thalovant_list_marketplace_skills
• thalovant_list_runtime_group_marketplace
• thalovant_list_runtime_group_inventory
• thalovant_list_runtime_groups
• thalovant_get_runtime_group
• thalovant_get_runtime_group_config
• thalovant_get_hub_runtime_capabilities

Sign-in (see Device Sign-In):

• thalovant_begin_device_login
• thalovant_poll_device_login
• thalovant_revoke_device_login

Writes or hub events:

• thalovant_create_client_identity
• thalovant_ask
• thalovant_query
• thalovant_send_action
• thalovant_send_code
• thalovant_emit_event
• thalovant_create_memory_item
• thalovant_update_memory_item
• thalovant_delete_memory_item

Hub and runtime-group provisioning:

• thalovant_create_hub
• thalovant_update_hub
• thalovant_release_hub
• thalovant_set_hub_rating
• thalovant_clear_hub_rating
• thalovant_create_runtime_group
• thalovant_update_runtime_group
• thalovant_update_runtime_group_config
• thalovant_release_runtime_group
• thalovant_install_runtime_group_skill
• thalovant_uninstall_runtime_group_skill

Hub skills, acting on the hub’s shared runtime (see Hub Skills; the list tool is read-only):

• thalovant_list_hub_skills
• thalovant_list_hub_skill_history
• thalovant_install_hub_skill
• thalovant_update_hub_skill
• thalovant_remove_hub_skill

Chat apps (see Chat Apps; the first five are read-only, and thalovant_list_bridge_chats needs hubs:write):

• thalovant_list_chat_app_connectors
• thalovant_get_bridge_networks
• thalovant_list_bridges
• thalovant_get_bridge
• thalovant_list_bridge_chats
• thalovant_pause_bridge
• thalovant_resume_bridge
• thalovant_update_bridge
• thalovant_send_bridge_test_message

Destructive, not registered unless explicitly enabled (see Destructive Tools):

• thalovant_delete_hub
• thalovant_delete_runtime_group
• thalovant_delete_client
• thalovant_delete_bridge

Tool outputs redact credential-shaped fields. thalovant_create_client_identity does not return secret identity material; pass savePath when you want the full identity written to a local file with mode 0600. savePath is confined to the server's identity directory (THALOVANT_MCP_IDENTITY_DIR, default <config-dir>/thalovant/identities): pass a plain filename, since absolute paths outside that directory and .. traversal are rejected, so a model cannot drop a credential file into a git working tree or synced folder. thalovant_config_status reports the active identityDir.

thalovant_intent_inventory uses the runtime identity and accepts languages, describe, fallback, speakable, sentence, slots, exampleLimit, and a per-query/batch timeoutMs. It returns registered intents and examples, fallback skills, fallbacks_known, listed_in, and may_answer by requested language. listed_in names the hub language each requested language was listed in. A hub lists nothing under a language it did not load, so a language with no sentences is listed in its usual form (en-CA in en-US) or in the closest language the hub loaded, and examples are rendered in that language. When listed_in differs from what was asked, the sentences are in another language, and presentation.notes says so. Fallback skills come from ovos.skills.list, in skill id order, with priority: null: the hub does not say in which order it tries them. A missing or denied fallback-skill query remains unknown, rather than being reported as a known empty list. The optional probe adds at most 1500ms. A silent listing can use engine manifests; disable this with fallback: false. Both new tools are available in read-only mode and respect per-principal policy. thalovant_get_operation reads an operation ID returned by provisioning without replaying the write.

The additive presentation object contains the shared SDK inventory shape: cache_version, hub_id, hub_name, source, generated_at, skills, notes, and languages_present. Skill titles are derived from IDs. Runtime discovery cannot prove catalog locales or hub display metadata, so those fields remain unknown (empty lists/strings), with explanatory notes. Intent language order is explicit and survives JSON key sorting. Each tool call retains its own identity lease; the server does not persist inventory or share a session across callers.

Tool Errors

When the Thalovant API refuses a control-plane call, the tool result is an error whose text starts with the SDK's one-line message (which names the HTTP status and can be shortened) and then says what the API said, in full:

Thalovant API request failed with HTTP 403: Only an administrator can run an image the platform does not release: bus may be one of ghcr.io/thalovant/ovos-messagebus:2026.09.2, ... (platform_image_required)code: platform_image_requireddetail: Only an administrator can run an image the platform does not release: bus may be one of ghcr.io/thalovant/ovos-messagebus:2026.09.2, ghcr.io/thalovant/ovos-messagebus:2026.09.3-alpha.1, ghcr.io/thalovant/ovos-messagebus:2026.08.7; core may be any tag or digest of ghcr.io/thalovant/ovos-core.fields: {"allowed_images":{"bus":[...],"core":[...]},"allowed_repositories":{"core":"ghcr.io/thalovant/ovos-core"},"component":"runtime_group","refused_images":{...}}

• code is the API's machine-readable code, when it sent one.
• detail is the whole sentence, and appears only when the first line had to shorten it.
• fields is every other member of the error body as compact JSON (the Problem+JSON type, title, status and instance are left out), with the same secret redaction as every other tool output. A value a validation error echoes back from the request -- each entry's input in a detail or errors list, whatever its key or shape -- is replaced with "[omitted]" there and never reaches the first line. A plan refusal carries resource, limit, used and plan here. A chat app refusal about settings or secrets carries the API's own fields list here: their names, never their values. Its hint repeats the names.

A hint may follow for statuses that need one. A platform_image_required or plan_limit 403 gets its own hint rather than the general scope hint. A 409 skill_unavailable_licensing says the store refuses the skill for its licensing and where the catalog announces it, instead of the version hint. A memory create or update refused with 409 memory_limit (the plan's remembered items are used up; a Free plan keeps one, limit and upgrade_plan are in the fields) names the delete tool that frees a slot, the update tool that changes the item that exists, and the plan to move to; other memory refusals carry the SDK's message alone.

Request hints, embedded audio, and configuration merging

thalovant_ask accepts sttLang, an ordered pipeline, and location with required city and optional region, country, timezone, latitude, and longitude. Hints apply to the current request. Omit unused hints; an empty pipeline is ignored, and blank language or city strings are rejected.

Ask and Query return language, ordered event metadata, hasAudio and droppedMedia. Embedded hex stays out of text output. Opt into separate MCP audio blocks with includeAudio: true; unknown formats become embedded binary resource blocks. Clip and reply limits are 4 MiB and 16 MiB respectively, checked by the SDK before retention. The client owns playback. No skill-supplied path or URL is fetched. Inventory speakable: true renders examples without changing the raw patterns; slots supplies illustrative slot values, and exampleLimit limits examples per language to 1–20 (default 2).

Configuration updates default to merge: true: GET the revision, deep-merge the caller's delta and PUT with expected_revision. Only HTTP 412 retries, with a fresh read and at most three total attempts. This requires hubs:read, hubs:write, and a paid plan. An older API without revision support fails before writing. There is no unconditional fallback. Supplied personas replace; omitted personas stay unchanged. For an intentional full replacement, pass merge: false, requiring hubs:write, a paid plan, and coordination with other writers. Guarded merges reject integers outside JavaScript's safe integer range in the delta or stored configuration before writing. Store large identifiers as strings or use an SDK that preserves large JSON integers.

Destructive Tools

thalovant_delete_hub, thalovant_delete_runtime_group, thalovant_delete_client and thalovant_delete_bridge are disabled by default. They are not merely blocked when called — they are never registered, so they do not appear in tools/list and a model cannot see or attempt them.

A long-lived control-plane token combined with an always-available delete tool is a categorically different risk from a read or update tool: deleting a hub also deletes its dependent clients and ACLs, and none of it is reversible. So these are opt-in:

export THALOVANT_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS="true"

Accepted true values are 1, true, yes, and on; anything else, including unset, leaves the tools off. The flag is read when a server instance is created. Restart the server process with the updated environment after changing it. thalovant_config_status reports the current state as destructiveToolsEnabled and lists the tools the flag controls.

This is a separate mechanism from the existing tool policy, deliberately. MCP_TOOL_ALLOWLIST / MCP_TOOL_DENYLIST and the per-principal allowedTools / deniedTools are call-time filters where an empty allowlist means "allow everything"; they cannot express a tool that is off until an operator turns it on, and they cannot hide a tool from tools/list. Once THALOVANT_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS is set the delete tools are ordinary tools again and remain subject to that policy, so the two layers compose:

# Register delete tools, then deny their use by every principal.export THALOVANT_ENABLE_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS="true"export MCP_TOOL_DENYLIST="thalovant_delete_hub,thalovant_delete_runtime_group"

The global deny applies to every principal and cannot be overridden by a principal's allowedTools. To restrict only selected principals, leave these tools out of the global denylist and use those principals' deniedTools instead.

Deleting a hub still requires a current etag (412 otherwise), and deleting a runtime group fails with 409 while it is the workspace default or still has hubs attached. Deleting a client cuts off the device or link using it; its etag is read first when none is given. Deleting a chat app bridge removes its stored token, so connecting the bot again means pasting the token in the console; to stop a bridge for now, pause it instead.

Non-Catalog Skill Sources

thalovant_install_runtime_group_skill installs from the vetted marketplace catalog by default. Any other source — notably sourceType: "git" with an arbitrary sourceRef repository URL — pulls code the marketplace never reviewed straight into a production runtime, and the control-plane validator is format-only with no host allowlist. Because the tools are driven by a model holding a long-lived token, non-catalog sources are refused unless an operator opts in:

export THALOVANT_ENABLE_GIT_SKILL_SOURCES="true"

With the flag unset, a call with any sourceType other than catalog fails before any control-plane request is made. Accepted true values are 1, true, yes, and on. thalovant_config_status reports the state as gitSkillSourcesEnabled. The tool is annotated destructiveHint: true.

Read-Only Mode

Set THALOVANT_MCP_READONLY=1 to register only tools annotated readOnlyHint: true (the sign-in tools are not among them; thalovant_wait_for_admission is), less those the API serves only to a write scope: thalovant_list_bridge_chats changes nothing but needs hubs:write, which an observe-only agent's token does not carry. Write and destructive tools are then never registered and never appear in tools/list, so an operator can run an observe-only agent without hand-writing a denylist. Like the other registration-time gates it is read when a server instance is created; thalovant_config_status reports the state as readOnly.

HiveMind Runtime Compatibility

Runtime calls sharing the same hub client identity run sequentially within one MCP process. Use a distinct client identity for each independently running MCP server so the hub can keep their sessions separate.

Version 0.7.1 requires @thalovant/sdk ^0.10.0 (0.10.0 through versions below 0.11.0), which carries the chat app methods and ThalovantApiError.fields. Since 0.5.1 the server enforces secure effective MQTT URLs and carries a single connection deadline through MQTT setup and HTTP failure cleanup. Runtime tools support HiveMind v3 Noise over WSS, HTTPS and MQTT over TLS. thalovant_healthcheck reports readiness only after authentication; a reachable hub or broker alone does not establish a runtime session.

The Zod 4 security migration preserves the 50 default tools and string-keyed record values. Its JSON Schema output inlines repeated records, identifies string property names, and omits additionalProperties: false on stripping objects; unknown input keys are still stripped before handlers receive them. UUID validation now enforces standard version/variant bits (plus nil/max UUIDs), and memory-list offsets must be safe integers. See the security audit for evidence and release gates.

Keep the SDK configuration directory persistent and private between server restarts (~/.config/thalovant, or the configured XDG/Windows equivalent). It contains the client Noise key and trusted server pins. An authentication failure preserves those pins; replacing a server key requires an explicit, verified trust change. HTTPS identities must advertise the hub's HTTPS plugin, and MQTT requires the identity's broker credentials and topic prefix.

Runtime tools retain their identity lease through actual cleanup. If the close caller times out, a later tool waits up to six seconds for that cleanup before opening a session. A queued tool that reaches this deadline fails without executing later or releasing the previous session's identity. An actual cleanup failure marks the identity unavailable to later calls instead of risking concurrent sessions. These leases are process-local; separate server processes or replicas need distinct runtime identities or external coordination.

MCP request cancellation applies to queued runtime tools in both stdio and Streamable HTTP mode. A cancelled queued call never constructs a runtime client or executes later. Cancellation also reaches runtime connection setup, Ask, Query and event waits. Action/code sends, raw event publication and inventory queries check cancellation during connection setup, then retain ownership until the admitted SDK operation finishes. Cancelling the MCP request cannot undo an already admitted operation or its effects. The identity remains reserved through that work and actual cleanup; application requests are never automatically replayed. Control-plane tools do not gain runtime cancellation semantics in this release.

For example, an MCP TypeScript client can cancel a runtime query after ten seconds, including time spent waiting for its identity lease:

await mcpClient.callTool({  name: "thalovant_query",  arguments: { identityFile: "/secure/identity.json", text: "What is the weather?", timeoutMs: 30000 },}, undefined, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000) });

Intent inventory retains its connection setup and per-query/batch budgets plus a separate optional fallback probe; it has no single inventory-wide deadline.

Development

npm run typechecknpm testnpm run buildnpm run test:smokenpm run test:httpnpm run benchnpm run bench:httpnpm pack --dry-run

License

MIT. This is the right default for a public integration server: it is permissive, compatible with the MIT Thalovant Node SDK and MCP TypeScript SDK, and does not force downstream agent or enterprise users into a reciprocal licensing model.

Credential-bearing control-plane calls require HTTPS. Explicit loopback HTTP (localhost, 127.0.0.1, [::1]) remains supported for local development. API redirects are rejected so password-login bodies cannot be forwarded. Runtime clients are constructed only after acquiring their identity lease.

thalovant_query sends a routed HiveMind query; the hub may cascade it according to its routing policy. It accepts text, timeoutMs, lang, sessionId, requestId, queryId, context and replySettleMs, plus the runtime identity options, and returns the same normalized reply shape as thalovant_ask. A query may trigger actions, so read-only mode hides it. Conversation workflows use sessionId with ask/query and the existing event-wait tool; MCP does not expose one tool for every SDK conversation or event-listener method.

Shared-runtime skill management

The catalog has 59 default tools, 28 in read-only mode, and 63 with destructive tools enabled.

Hub-addressed skill methods select the runtime group attached to the hub UUID. Every hub sharing that group sees the same skill changes and history. The API requires a restricted token to cover all served hubs. Reads need hubs:inspect (hubs:read implies it); writes need hubs:write, an eligible paid plan and ownership.

The history response contains newest-first event and operation entries, including nullable actor/version fields. Its limit is 1–200 (50 where omitted). An accepted mutation is not proof the skill is ready. Optional waiting polls the operation, with a 120-second default timeout and two-second interval. Polling never repeats an accepted mutation and starts no new read after its deadline; an already-running HTTP request retains its normal request timeout.

Read history with thalovant_list_hub_skill_history (hubId, optional limit). This tool remains available in read-only mode.

Inventory sentence: true implies speakable rendering and capitalizes/punctuates examples using bundled thalovant-languages 0.2.1 rules. Regional locale matching follows OVOS distances; explicit slots override locale sample values. Complete phrases rank first, and exampleLimit counts unique nonempty rendered results. Raw intent definitions remain in the response; unknown locales retain bare text.

The CLI handles SIGTERM and SIGINT in stdio and HTTP modes, including when it runs as the container's PID 1. It closes sessions and HTTP connections before a successful exit, with a ten-second failure deadline for stalled cleanup.

Version 0.5.1 uses Node SDK 0.7.1 with Python 0.7.4-compatible inventory and question detection, including Unicode question marks and omitted-language patterns. With sentence: true, Spanish questions receive their question mark and complete French phrases keep their final period. Undescribed languages remain bare.