Secretguard Mcp

io.github.vladimirbakalov由 GitHub 账号 vladimirbakalov 发布v0.1.4更新于 Oct 24, 2026

Scans code for hardcoded secrets (AWS, Stripe, GitHub, JWTs) before an AI agent commits it.

已验证STDIO仅桌面开发者工具安全与监控

概览

AI 生成的概览

本地 MCP 服务器,扫描代码字符串中的硬编码密钥并返回脱敏结果,让助手在写入或提交前发现凭据。

可以做什么
  • 扫描代码字符串中的硬编码密钥:AWS、Stripe、GitHub、Google、Slack、Shopify、Telegram、OpenAI、Anthropic、npm、SendGrid、Twilio、Azure、Hugging Face、Notion、Postman、Linear、Pulumi 等厂商令牌,以及私钥块、JWT 和含内嵌密码的数据库连接串。
  • 将赋值给类密钥变量名的高熵值标记为较低置信度的通用发现。
  • 按文件名、行号、规则 ID、描述和置信度报告每条发现,并对密钥值做脱敏处理。
  • 扫描无发现时返回“未检测到密钥”的简单结果。
适用场景
适合 Claude Code、Cursor、Windsurf 等会生成或修改代码的 AI 编程助手,在生成阶段就检查凭据,而不必等到 CI 或拉取请求评审。它只做一件事:在代码写入磁盘或提交之前扫描代码字符串。
运行要求
以 stdio 方式在本地运行,仅限桌面端。可通过 npx 从 GitHub 仓库安装,或使用预构建的 .mcpb 包在 Claude Desktop 等兼容 MCPB 的客户端中一键安装。无需 API 密钥、账号或配置项。
安装前请注意
传入的代码字符串会交给本地服务器进程扫描;该服务器不发起任何网络请求,并在结果中对匹配值脱敏。通用置信度的发现本身存在歧义,占位符、哈希和 UUID 都可能触发熵检测,应视为“值得复查”而非已确认的密钥。它只扫描收到的文本,不能替代对提交和拉取请求的 CI 扫描。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 打开 控制台中的 Secretguard Mcp,将其添加到工作区。
  2. 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Desktop only,通过 STDIO。 STDIO 服务会启动本地进程,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面宿主。

其他 MCP 客户端

参照 仓库 中的启动说明。

README

secretguard-mcp

[CI] [Latest release] [License: MIT]

An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that scans a code string for hardcoded secrets — AWS keys, Stripe keys, GitHub tokens, Google API keys and OAuth client secrets, Slack tokens and incoming webhook URLs, Shopify access tokens, Telegram bot tokens, DigitalOcean tokens, Hugging Face tokens, Notion API tokens, Mailchimp API keys, Postman API tokens, Linear API keys, Readme API keys, Clojars API tokens, Pulumi API tokens, OpenAI keys, Anthropic keys, npm access tokens, SendGrid keys, Twilio API keys, Azure Storage account keys, database connection strings with embedded passwords, private key blocks, JWTs, and generic high-entropy credentials — so an AI coding agent (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, ...) can catch a secret before it writes the file or makes the commit, instead of finding out at CI/PR-review time. It exposes exactly one tool, scan_for_secrets, runs entirely locally over stdio, needs no API key, and never returns a raw secret value — every finding comes back redacted.

Why this exists

secret-scan-action already catches these secrets in CI, on every PR. That's necessary but late — by the time it runs, the secret has already been written, committed, and pushed. This project reuses that same detection engine (same rules, same entropy check, same redaction) but puts it in front of the agent as a tool call, so the check can happen at generation time, before the secret ever touches disk or history.

What it does

On a scan_for_secrets call:

  1. Splits the input code string into lines.
  2. Runs the same two-tier ruleset secret-scan-action uses:
    • Pattern rules (high confidence) — distinctive formats that are near-certain secrets when matched: AWS access key IDs (AKIA...) and contextual secret keys, Stripe live keys (sk_live_, rk_live_), GitHub tokens (ghp_, gho_, github_pat_, ...), Google API keys (AIza...), Google OAuth client secrets (GOCSPX-...), Slack tokens (xox[baprs]-...), Slack incoming webhook URLs (hooks.slack.com/services/...), Shopify access tokens (shpat_..., shpca_..., shpss_..., shppa_..., shpua_...), Telegram bot tokens (<bot_id>:A..., 35-char secret), DigitalOcean tokens (dop_v1_..., doo_v1_..., dor_v1_..., 64-char hex), Hugging Face tokens (hf_..., api_org_..., 34-char alpha), Notion API tokens (ntn_..., 11 digits + 35 alphanumeric), OpenAI keys (sk-..., sk-proj-..., sk-svcacct-...), Anthropic keys (sk-ant-...), npm access tokens (npm_...), SendGrid keys (SG....), Twilio API keys (SK...), Azure Storage account keys (contextual AccountKey=...), private key blocks (-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----), and JWTs. One pattern rule — database connection strings with an embedded password (postgres://, mysql://, mongodb(+srv)://, redis(s)://, amqp(s)://) — is deliberately not near-certain even after excluding known placeholder passwords (user, password, changeit, ...) and ${...}-style env-var references, since a real value there could still be a low-stakes tutorial example rather than a live credential; it's returned at generic confidence, same as the entropy rule below. Another pattern rule — Mailchimp API keys (a 32-char hex value followed by a -usNN datacenter suffix) — is also generic confidence: it only fires when a mailchimp-prefixed variable/key name immediately precedes the value, but that keyword gate still doesn't rule out an unrelated hex value that happens to end in the same suffix shape. Postman API tokens (PMAK-..., 24-char hex + - + 34-char hex), Linear API keys (lin_api_..., 40-char alphanumeric), Readme API keys (rdme_..., 70-char lowercase alphanumeric), Clojars API tokens (CLOJARS_..., case-insensitive, 60-char alphanumeric), and Pulumi API tokens (pul-..., 40-char lowercase hex) are high confidence — a fixed prefix and exact length, same as the other provider-token rules.
    • Generic entropy rule — a value assigned to a variable named like secret, token, password/credential, or a *key compound commonly used for real secret material (apiKey, sessionKey, signingKey, clientKey, webhookKey, ...) whose value also has high Shannon entropy (looks random, not like a placeholder or an env-var reference). Deliberately does not match a bare *Key — that would also catch partitionKey, cacheKey, queryKey, and similar non-secret identifiers common in ordinary code.
  3. Returns every finding's filename, line, ruleId, description, confidence ("high" | "generic"), and a redacted line — the raw secret value never leaves the process. If nothing is found, it returns a plain "No secrets detected." result.

Example output

Calling scan_for_secrets with:

json
{  "code": "const key = \"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\";\nconst greeting = \"hello\";",  "filename": "src/config.ts"}

returns:

json
{  "findings": [    {      "filename": "src/config.ts",      "line": 1,      "ruleId": "aws-access-key-id",      "description": "AWS Access Key ID",      "confidence": "high",      "redactedLine": "const key = \"AKIA************MPLE\";"    }  ],  "summary": "Found 1 potential secret (1 high-confidence, 0 needs-review).\n\n- [high] src/config.ts:1 — AWS Access Key ID (aws-access-key-id)\n  const key = \"AKIA************MPLE\";"}

(The AWS key above is AWS's own public documentation placeholder, not a live credential.) A clean scan — e.g. { "code": "const greeting = \"hello world\";" } — returns { "findings": [], "summary": "No secrets detected." }.

Setup

Not yet published to the npm registry — install directly from GitHub via npx. npm install from a git source runs this package's prepare script automatically, which builds dist/ on the fly, so no separate build step is needed.

Claude Code

Add to your project's .mcp.json (or run claude mcp add):

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "secretguard": {      "command": "npx",      "args": ["-y", "github:vladimirbakalov/secretguard-mcp"]    }  }}

Claude Desktop

Add to claude_desktop_config.json:

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "secretguard": {      "command": "npx",      "args": ["-y", "github:vladimirbakalov/secretguard-mcp"]    }  }}

No API key, no account, no config options — restart Claude Code / Claude Desktop and scan_for_secrets is available. The tool description tells the agent to call it before writing code that could contain a credential, and again before a commit or PR — most of the time you won't need to ask for it explicitly.

Cursor / Windsurf

Both read the same command/args shape from their own MCP settings UI or config file — point them at npx -y github:vladimirbakalov/secretguard-mcp the same way.

Once this package is published to npm, the args above can drop to ["-y", "secretguard-mcp"] instead — that's a follow-up, not a blocker.

One-click install (.mcpb)

A prebuilt MCP Bundle is attached to the v0.1.4-mcpb release — download secretguard-mcp-0.1.4.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop (or any other MCPB-compatible client) for a one-click local install, no npx/Node setup required on the client side. Rebuild it yourself with npm run package:mcpb (see scripts/build-mcpb.sh).

This same .mcpb release asset is what server.json at the repo root points at for the official MCP Registry — secretguard-mcp is published and listed there as io.github.vladimirbakalov/secretguard-mcp, so MCP clients that browse the official registry can discover and install it directly, in addition to the npx/.mcpb paths above. Publishing runs unattended in CI (.github/workflows/publish-mcp.yml) via mcp-publisher login github-oidc on every v*-mcpb tag push — no interactive login step.

Security notes

  • The raw secret value matched by a rule is held in memory only for the duration of a single scan_for_secrets call and is redacted (redactLine/redactSecret) before the tool result is built — it never appears in the returned content, structuredContent, or any log line.
  • The server does no network calls of any kind. It reads stdin, writes stdout (MCP stdio transport), and does nothing else.
  • Generic-tier findings are ambiguous by nature (config placeholders, hashes, and UUIDs can trip the entropy check) — that's expected. Treat confidence: "generic" as "worth a second look," not "confirmed."

Development

bash
npm installnpm run typecheck   # tsc --noEmitnpm test            # vitest runnpm run build       # tsc -p tsconfig.build.json -> dist/

dist/ is not committed — it's built from src/ via the prepare script, which runs both on a git-based npx/npm install and before any future npm publish.

Scope (v1)

One tool, one job: scan a code string, return redacted findings. No allowlist file, no AI triage step, no config options, no persistent state. If this needs any of that later, it'll get added once real usage shows it's needed — not before.

Relationship to secret-scan-action

secretguard-mcp and secret-scan-action share the same detection engine (rules.ts, redact.ts, and the core of scan.ts) but are independent, separately distributed packages: one is a GitHub Action that scans PR diffs in CI, the other is an MCP server that scans arbitrary code strings locally, before a commit exists. Fixing a false positive/negative in the ruleset means updating both.

License

MIT.

来源:README.md,提交 749c696

工具

0
SourceWeft 尚未在沙箱中启动过该软件包,因此其工具未知。

版本历史

1
  1. v0.1.4最新Sep 16, 2026

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