
Cisco Meraki
io.github.wyre-technology由 GitHub 账号 wyre-technology 发布v1.1.3更新于 Oct 24, 2026
MCP server for the Cisco Meraki Dashboard: networks, devices, wireless, switch, appliance.
概览
让 AI 助手以结构化方式访问 Cisco Meraki Dashboard 的 MCP 服务器,涵盖组织、网络、设备、客户端、无线、交换机和防火墙设备。
- 可以做什么
- 列出并查看组织、网络、设备和客户端,包括客户端策略与库存
- 读取无线 SSID 与射频配置、交换机端口及端口状态
- 查看防火墙设备的第三层防火墙规则和 VPN 状态
- 更新网络、客户端策略、SSID、交换机端口和防火墙规则,重启或移除设备,删除网络
- 对未收录的任意 Meraki v1 端点发送原始请求
- 发现可用工具,并检查连通性与已配置的组织
- 适用场景
- 适合让助手回答 Meraki 管理网络的问题,或在无需手动打开控制台的情况下做受控的配置变更,例如查看防火墙规则、SSID 或交换机端口。
- 运行要求
- 以本地进程通过 stdio 运行(Docker 镜像,或用 Node.js 从源码构建)。需要 Meraki Dashboard API 密钥,放在 MERAKI_API_KEY 中;MERAKI_ORG_ID 和 MERAKI_BASE_URL 可选。HTTP 模式还需 CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET,或使用网关模式由每个请求携带 API 密钥。
安装
在 SourceWeft 中
- 打开 控制台中的 Cisco Meraki,将其添加到工作区。
- 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。
Desktop only,通过 STDIO。 STDIO 服务会启动本地进程,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面宿主。
其他 MCP 客户端
参照 仓库 中的启动说明。
README
Meraki MCP Server
[Build Status] [License] [Node.js]
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides AI assistants with structured access to the Cisco Meraki Dashboard — organizations, networks, devices, clients, wireless, switching, and appliance operations.
Note: This project is maintained by Wyre Technology.
Quick Start
Claude Code (CLI):
See Installation for Docker and from-source methods.
Features
- 🔌 MCP Protocol Compliance: Full support for MCP tools over stdio and HTTP transports
- 🌐 Network Coverage: Tools spanning organizations, networks, devices, clients, wireless, switching, and appliance (MX) operations
- 🔍 Flattened Navigation:
meraki_navigateandmeraki_statusare stateless discovery aids — every tool is callable at any time - 🛟 Safety by Default: Read-only mode is ON by default; writes are gated and destructive actions require explicit confirmation
- 🖼️ Interactive Device Card (MCP Apps):
meraki_devices_getrenders as a read-only interactive card in MCP Apps hosts (SEP-1865) — neutral by default, brandable viawindow.__BRAND__injection orMCP_BRAND_*env vars - 🧰 Long-Tail Escape Hatch:
meraki_raw_requestreaches any Meraki v1 endpoint not covered by a curated tool - 🐳 Docker Ready: Containerized deployment with HTTP transport and health checks
- 📊 Structured Logging: Configurable log levels
Installation
Option 1: Docker
The image listens on 0.0.0.0 inside the container and sets AUTH_MODE=gateway. Publish the port on loopback and pass the service-to-service secret. In gateway mode the API key arrives on each request as X-Meraki-Api-Key.
Option 2: From Source
Configuration
The legacy
READ_ONLYvariable is also honored;READ_ONLY_MODEtakes precedence.
HTTP authentication
MCP_TRANSPORT=http requires CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET. Startup logs an error and exits non-zero when that variable is empty or a known placeholder (changeme, change-me, placeholder, secret, example, replace-me, s2s-secret, your-secret, your-s2s-secret, replace-with-a-real-secret). The process never writes the secret to logs. MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV=1 starts without a secret, logs a warning, skips X-Gateway-S2S, and listens on 127.0.0.1 only — a wider MCP_HTTP_HOST such as 0.0.0.0 is ignored and the override is logged. A placeholder secret is still refused when that flag is set.
When MCP_HTTP_HOST is unset, the server binds 127.0.0.1. A configured secret honors MCP_HTTP_HOST, including 0.0.0.0.
With a secret set, every /mcp request must include X-Gateway-S2S. The value is t=<unix seconds>,v1=<hex>. v1 is HMAC-SHA256 of the ASCII string t=<unix seconds>, keyed with CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET, encoded as lowercase hex. Timestamps more than 300 seconds from the server clock are rejected. A missing or invalid header returns 401.
AUTH_MODE=gateway also requires X-Meraki-Api-Key on each /mcp request. X-Meraki-Org-Id is optional. Those headers are the credential source for that request. A missing API key returns 401.
/health stays unauthenticated and does not read vendor credentials. The stdio transport does not use CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET.
Example X-Gateway-S2S value (illustrative; mint it with the real secret):
Safety Model
This server defaults to read-only. Write operations (updates, reboots, deletions) are blocked unless you explicitly set READ_ONLY_MODE=false.
- Read tools (
*_list,*_get) are always available. - High-impact writes (e.g.
meraki_networks_update,meraki_clients_update_policy) are gated by read-only mode. - Confirmation-gated tools additionally require a
confirm_destructive_action: trueargument, even onceREAD_ONLY_MODE=false. The confirmation flag is never forwarded to the Meraki API. Two groups qualify:- Irreversible —
meraki_networks_delete,meraki_devices_remove. - High blast radius —
meraki_appliance_firewall_l3_update,meraki_switch_ports_update,meraki_wireless_ssids_update,meraki_devices_reboot. These are reversible in principle, but each is applied over the same network link the change can break, so an operator can lose the connectivity needed to undo it.meraki_appliance_firewall_l3_updatealso replaces the rule set — any rule not in the payload is deleted — andmeraki_wireless_ssids_updatedrops every client on the SSID when the PSK or auth mode changes.
- Irreversible —
- Confirmation is not an escape hatch from read-only mode: while
READ_ONLY_MODEis on, a confirmed call is still blocked. - The
meraki_raw_requestescape hatch classifies the call by HTTP method:GETis a read;POST/PUT/DELETEare writes;DELETEis destructive.
Domains
All tools are returned upfront. Use meraki_navigate to explore a domain's tools, or meraki_status to check connectivity and the configured organization.
⚠ = high-impact write, gated by read-only mode · ⚠⚠ = additionally requires confirm_destructive_action: true
Docker Deployment
Copy .env.example to .env and set CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET (openssl rand -hex 32). Leave the example file's secret empty.
Compose publishes 127.0.0.1:8080:8080, refuses to start when CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET is unset, and runs AUTH_MODE=gateway. That service has no MERAKI_API_KEY, MERAKI_ORG_ID, or env_file, so a project .env cannot inject static vendor credentials. Compose interpolates CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET from the environment.
Single-tenant HTTP (AUTH_MODE=env) still requires the S2S secret, then uses MERAKI_API_KEY from the environment:
Development
Testing
The test suite covers the safety contract: read-only enforcement, destructive confirmation, and that confirm_destructive_action is never forwarded to the SDK.
License
Apache 2.0 — Copyright WYRE Technology
来源:README.md,提交 d95e09d
工具
0版本历史
1- v1.1.3最新Sep 16, 2026
评分
已满足适用检查项的 40%
该评分衡量此收录条目的完整程度,依据注册中心条目、端点与公开来源计算得出。它不是对服务器本身的评价,也不表示服务器安全或当前可用:可连通性是带日期的检查结果,评分也不包含安装量或用户评价。
- 近 30 天内可连通25 分
请保持端点能够响应 MCP 握手;SourceWeft 每 30 天探测一次。
- 已声明认证方式10 分
请在注册中心条目中声明凭据请求头,或保持端点能够响应探测,以便判定其认证方式。
- 已列出工具15 分
请让服务器在无凭据时响应 tools/list,或发布可在沙箱中无凭据启动的软件包。
- 描述必需15 分
- 图标10 分
- 文档15 分
- 许可证10 分
请在仓库或注册中心条目中声明许可证。