
kdbx
io.github.yarrasys由 GitHub 账号 yarrasys 发布v0.3.2更新于 Oct 24, 2026
Read-only access to secrets in a local KeePassXC vault. Runs commands with them injected.
概览
一个基于本地 KeePassXC 保险库的只读 MCP 服务器,让助手列出、检查并使用项目密钥而不打印密钥内容。
- 可以做什么
- 列出保险库条目与环境,并检查变量映射是否仍能解析(kdbx_list、kdbx_envs、kdbx_check)。按路径查询条目,只返回是否已设置而不返回值(kdbx_get)。用当前环境的密钥注入子进程并运行命令,捕获的输出中密钥值会被掩码(kdbx_run)。刻意不提供写入、轮换或导出凭据的工具。
- 适用场景
- 当编码助手需要项目凭据来运行测试、构建或工具,而你希望密钥保存在仓库之外的 KeePassXC 保险库中,而不是 .env 文件或对话记录里时使用。适合按项目、按环境划分、由人管理保险库而助手只负责使用的场景。
- 运行要求
- 本地 kdbx 可执行文件(或 ghcr.io 容器镜像)以 stdio 进程启动,以及一个由密钥文件解锁的 KeePassXC KDBX4 保险库。提交到仓库的 .keepassxc.json 指针文件指定项目与环境;KEEPASSXC_DIR 和 KDBX_ENV 可分别覆盖保险库位置和当前环境。
安装
在 SourceWeft 中
- 打开 控制台中的 kdbx,将其添加到工作区。
- 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。
Desktop only,通过 STDIO。 STDIO 服务会启动本地进程,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面宿主。
其他 MCP 客户端
参照 仓库 中的启动说明。
README
kdbx — per-project secrets in KeePassXC vaults, safe to hand an AI agent
[ci] [govulncheck] [release] [openssf scorecard] [go version] [license]
kdbx keeps a project's secrets in a per-project, per-environment KeePassXC vault
(KDBX4, unlocked by a key file only — no master password) and gets them into the tools that
need them without kdbx ever printing them into a transcript, a log file, or your shell
history.
Discovery is automatic: kdbx walks up from your current directory to a committed
.keepassxc.json pointer file, works out which environment is active, and takes it from
there. The headline command is kdbx run -- <cmd>, which resolves that environment's
variable mappings and injects them into a child process' environment. It replaces .env
files as the source of truth; the vault stays outside the repo, so there is nothing secret
to accidentally commit.
Every install method below is live — the curl installer, Homebrew,
go install, theghcr.iocontainer image, and the signed release archives (SHA256SUMS+ cosign, with reproducible builds). The badge above tracks the current version.
Install
Windows: download the _windows_ archive from the
releases page and put kdbx.exe on your PATH.
Building from source needs Go 1.26 or newer. Go 1.25 left support when Go 1.27 shipped,
and current golang.org/x/term releases declare a 1.26 floor. Release binaries are static
and impose no toolchain requirement on users.
Shell completions:
Quick start
1. Commit a pointer file at the repo root. It names the project and its environments; it contains no secrets, so it is safe to check in.
An empty env object is fine — kdbx derives the artifact paths from the project and
environment name: <keepassxc-dir>/demo/dev.kdbx and <keepassxc-dir>/demo/dev.keyx,
where <keepassxc-dir> is $KEEPASSXC_DIR if set, else %LOCALAPPDATA%\keepassxc on
Windows, else $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/keepassxc or ~/.config/keepassxc. Set vault and
keyFile explicitly if you want them somewhere else; both accept a ${KEEPASSXC_DIR}
token and a leading ~.
2. Create the vault and its key file.
3. Store a secret and map it to an environment variable. The value never appears on
the command line — it arrives on stdin, from --from-env, or from an interactive prompt.
--var records the mapping in the pointer file, preserving existing key order so the diff
stays reviewable:
4. Run something with the secrets injected.
The child inherits your environment plus the mapped variables. Its exit code is passed straight back out. Nothing is written to disk, and the value never appears in your shell history.
Reading is deliberately boring:
Operations
Every operation accepts --env NAME. Read operations additionally accept --json.
Operations marked ✦ print the banner ACTIVE ENV: <env> vault=<path> (source: <src>) to
stderr; pure display operations do not.
Integration surfaces:
--json
--json gives read operations a machine-readable stdout. Secret values are never included.
--json with --reveal is rejected (exit 7). On failure, stdout carries
{"error":{"op":"check","exit":5,"kind":"Drift"}} alongside the usual stderr line and exit
code.
Entry paths
An entry path is group/sub/Title[:field]. The field defaults to password. The reserved
field names — title, username, password, url, notes, matched case-insensitively —
map to the KeePass entry's native attributes; anything else becomes a protected custom
property. More than one :, an empty field after :, or an empty / segment is
rejected. Variable names passed to --var must match ^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*$.
Environment selection
--env beats $KDBX_ENV, which beats the pointer's defaultEnv, which defaults to dev.
kdbx envs and the banner report which of the three won. An environment that isn't in the
pointer file is an error (exit 2).
Exit codes
Failures print exactly one stderr line and never a stack trace or a secret. The line carries the stable kind plus kdbx's own message, which is written so that no secret value can ever appear in it:
The text of an underlying third-party error is never shown, since it is not under that
rule. Set KDBX_DEBUG=1 to additionally get the full error chain and stack on stderr.
Environment variables kdbx reads: KDBX_ENV, KEEPASSXC_DIR, XDG_CONFIG_HOME,
LOCALAPPDATA, KDBX_DEBUG.
Roles — agents read, humans write
kdbx is designed to be safe to hand to a coding agent. The rule is:
- Agent-safe:
run,get(masked),list,check,envs,init. - Human-only:
set,delete,mv,import,rekey,export, andget --reveal/get --clip.
An agent can use a credential: kdbx run -- npm test works fine, and kdbx itself never
prints the value.
This is a guardrail, not a boundary, and it is worth being precise about why.
The binary does not enforce the split. Possession of the key file is the real boundary:
anything that can read the key file can open the vault, whoever or whatever it is. The role
split is enforced in harnesses that support hooks, by kdbx guard, and it is advisory
everywhere else.
The child command can be pinned, if you choose to. A committed run.allow list in
.keepassxc.json makes run refuse any argv not exactly on the list (a human can pass
--any; the guard denies it for agents). Be clear-eyed about what that buys: the agent can
still edit the pointer in principle, but the guard blocks the obvious edits and the change
is a visible diff on a tracked file instead of an invisible one-liner. Without a list,
run injects into whatever argv it is handed.
For an environment that deserves ceremony (production, real customer credentials), there is
strict mode: kdbx init --mode strict. Strict requires the allowlist, refuses --any
and --no-mask outright, writes an audit line for every decision (command and variable
names, never values, to a 0600 file next to the vault), and gates injection on a policy
hash blessed into the vault with kdbx policy bless — a human-only, interactive command.
An out-of-band edit to the policy is refused at the next run instead of silently obeyed.
The same rules apply to the MCP server's kdbx_run, which additionally always masks and
has no escape hatches at all. A determined agent with your uid can still defeat all of
this; what strict changes is that quiet tampering becomes loud.
When the output is captured (a pipe, an agent harness, a log), injected values in it are
replaced with *** — so kdbx run -- env shows masks, not values, exactly where the bytes
were headed for a transcript. A terminal gets raw output, and --no-mask (denied to agents
by the guard) restores it for piped human use. Masking matches exact values only: an agent
that encodes a value on the way out defeats it, as does a test script edited to exfiltrate.
kdbx not printing a secret is a property of kdbx, not of the system it runs in.
What the split actually buys you is that an agent does not stumble into disclosure while doing something else, and cannot author, rotate or export a credential. It does not contain an agent that has decided to read one. If you need that, you need a boundary the agent cannot cross as your user: a separate account, a container, or a broker holding the keys. See issue #11.
kdbx guard reads a PreToolUse payload on stdin and either prints a deny envelope or
nothing at all. It always exits 0 — it fails open, so a guard problem can never wedge
your agent.
It blocks two things: agent-issued human-only operations, and non-kdbx programs reaching
for *.kdbx / *.keyx files or the KeePassXC config directory (so cat ~/.config/keepassxc/…
is denied too). It recognizes kdbx, keepassxc-cli and keepassxc invocations as
legitimate.
kdbx mcp applies the same contract to MCP clients: five tools, all read-only. There is no
write tool, deliberately.
Agent and editor integration
MCP server — add to .mcp.json (Claude Code) or your client's equivalent:
PreToolUse hook — Claude Code settings.json or a plugin's hooks.json:
The kdbx plugin in yarrasys/extensions bundles
both, along with the skill documentation an agent loads to learn the contract. That repository
is archived and read-only as of 2026-07-30 — the plugin still works, but it receives no
updates, issues or PRs. The snippets above are the whole integration; you do not need the
plugin to wire kdbx guard or kdbx mcp into an agent.
Security
- The key file is the only secret. There is no master password. Anyone who can read
<env>.keyxcan open<env>.kdbx. Keep them apart from your repo — the default location (~/.config/keepassxc/<project>/) is deliberately outside it. - Back the key file up, out of band. Losing it makes the vault unrecoverable. There is no recovery path, by design.
- Watch out for cloud sync. A vault or key file under OneDrive, Dropbox, iCloud Drive
or similar is replicated to a third party and to every device on the account.
kdbx initwarns when it detects this, but does not refuse. - Vault, key file and exported dotenv files are written 0600 (owner-only ACL on
Windows), atomically, and vault saves are crash-safe (temp file → rename, with the
previous vault kept as
.bakuntil the rename lands). - Secret values never reach argv, logs, JSON output, or error text. Intake is stdin,
--from-env, or an interactive prompt only. - Accepted limitation: secret strings are not zeroized in memory (same as the Python implementation). A core dump or a sufficiently privileged local process can recover them.
Vulnerabilities: see SECURITY.md. Please do not open a public issue.
Origin
kdbx began as a Python skill in
yarrasys/extensions, a
repository now archived. This binary is the canonical kdbx and the Python skill is retired; the
design spec that governs compatibility lives here, in
docs/kdbx-go-standalone-design.md. Vaults are standard KDBX4
(Argon2, key-file-only), so any vault kdbx writes opens directly in keepassxc-cli and the
KeePassXC desktop app; .keepassxc.json pointers and KeePass XML v2 key files are the
ordinary formats those tools already use.
A few behaviors were chosen deliberately when porting from the original Python skill:
Bugs & feedback
Found a bug or have a feature idea? Please open an
issue. Include kdbx --version, your
platform, and redacted reproduction steps — never paste a real secret, vault path, or key
file; a description of the shape of the problem is enough.
Security vulnerabilities are the one exception: report them privately through GitHub Security Advisories (see SECURITY.md), not as a public issue.
Contributing
Start with CONTRIBUTING.md for setup and the build/test loop.
AGENTS.md (symlinked as CLAUDE.md) carries the repository's rules — the engine boundary,
the secret-hygiene invariants, and the test discipline. Read it before opening a PR. CI runs
the suite on Linux, macOS and Windows plus go vet, gofmt and golangci-lint.
Participation is governed by the Code of Conduct.
License
MIT — see LICENSE. Dependency licenses are inventoried in NOTICE; the dependency tree is MIT / BSD / Apache-2.0 throughout, with no copyleft component.
来源:README.md,提交 d0f2660
工具
0版本历史
2- v0.3.2最新Oct 14, 2026
- v0.3.1Sep 16, 2026
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