LinkedIn Content Planner

app.theona由 theona.app 發布官方發布者v0.1.0更新於 Nov 2, 2026

Draft, revise and review LinkedIn posts; a human approves each one before it goes live.

已驗證Streamable HTTP可網頁執行效率與工作流溝通與協作

概覽

AI 產生的概覽

面向 LinkedIn 內容流程的遠端 MCP 伺服器:助理可起草、修改並提交貼文,經人工審核後才發布。

可以做什麼
  • 建立、列出、讀取、編輯、改期、刪除貼文並變更其狀態
  • 檢視版本歷程、比較差異並回復到舊版本
  • 提交貼文進入審核流程並列出審核紀錄
  • 新增、列出與解決審核留言
  • 以內嵌 base64 或簽章上傳票據附加檔案,並列出附件
  • 產生預覽,並管理貼文生命週期事件的 Webhook
適用情境
適合讓代理依排程或在對話中起草並反覆修改 LinkedIn 貼文,再由人在網頁介面審閱、留言並核准或要求修改後才發布,流程類似合併前的程式碼審查。
執行需求
遠端 Streamable HTTP 端點 /mcp;需要 OAuth 2.1(PKCE 與動態用戶端註冊)。無法執行 OAuth 的用戶端可由已登入使用者建立長效存取金鑰,並以 Authorization Bearer 標頭送出。清單未宣告任何環境變數或標頭。
安裝前請注意
伺服器會寫入與刪除工作區中的貼文、留言與 Webhook,工具呼叫會改動已存內容。存取金鑰長期有效、僅顯示一次,並以建立者身分存取單一工作區,需謹慎保存與撤銷。附件上限為單檔 25 MB、單一工作區 250 MB。發布仍取決於網頁介面中的人工核准。

安裝

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 開啟 儀表板中的 LinkedIn Content Planner,將其新增到工作區。
  2. 連接 所需的 憑證。它們會被私密儲存,絕不會在公開頁面上展示。
  3. 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。

Web executable,透過 Streamable HTTP。 遠端服務在工作區中設定後即可從網頁執行環境執行。

交給代理程式安裝

把這段提示詞貼上到 Claude Code、Codex、Cursor 等代理程式,或 SourceWeft 對話中。代理程式會讀取該伺服器的安裝指南,先向你展示發布者、端點和登入方式,經你同意後再把它新增到你的客戶端。金鑰不會寫進任何命令。

閱讀 https://sourceweft.com/mcp/app.theona%2Flinkedin-content-planner/install.md,並按其中說明把這個 MCP 伺服器接入我的客戶端。修改任何設定之前,先告訴我它的發布者、端點和登入方式,等我確認。不要把 API 金鑰寫進命令或我會提交的檔案;問我金鑰應從哪裡取得。

檢視代理程式所依據的安裝指南

其他 MCP 客戶端

把它新增到你客戶端的 mcpServers 設定中。 客戶端會在首次連接時完成 OAuth 登入。

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "linkedin-content-planner": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://linkedin-mcp.theona.app/mcp"
    }
  }
}

README

LinkedIn Content Planner (MCP)

A LinkedIn content pipeline built for AI agents, not humans typing into a text box. Your agent (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, or any MCP-compatible client, on whatever schedule you run it — cron, an agent loop, a chat session) drafts, formats, and moves posts through a review pipeline by calling MCP tools directly: create_post, update_post_content, submit_review, and more. A human just reviews, comments, and approves/requests changes from the web UI before anything goes live — the same shape as reviewing a PR before merge, not manually operating a scheduling tool.

Multi-tenant and OAuth-secured out of the box: agents authenticate against the planner's own OAuth 2.1 authorization server (PKCE, dynamic client registration) and every MCP call is scoped to the caller's workspace.

See PLAN.md and ARCHITECTURE.md for the full design.

Local development

Requirements: Node 20+, pnpm, a Postgres 16 instance (via infra/docker-compose.yml or a local install).

bash
# 1. Start Postgresdocker compose -f infra/docker-compose.yml up -d# (or point DATABASE_URL at any local Postgres 16 instance)
# 2. Install dependenciespnpm install
# 3. Configure envcp apps/server/.env.example apps/server/.env# edit DATABASE_URL if not using the default docker-compose credentials
# 4. Generate + run migrations, seed default workspacepnpm --filter @linkedin-planner/db generateDATABASE_URL=postgres://linkedin_planner:linkedin_planner@localhost:5432/linkedin_planner_dev pnpm --filter @linkedin-planner/db migrateDATABASE_URL=postgres://linkedin_planner:linkedin_planner@localhost:5432/linkedin_planner_dev pnpm --filter @linkedin-planner/db seed
# 5. Run the serverpnpm dev:server

MCP tool surface

Posts: create_post, list_posts, get_post, update_post_content, str_replace_post_content, set_post_state, set_post_date, delete_post. Versions: list_versions, get_version_diff, revert_to_version. Review: submit_review, list_reviews. Comments: add_comment, list_comments, resolve_comment. Attachments: prepare_attachment_upload, attach_file, list_attachments. Preview: render_preview. Webhooks (subscribe to post lifecycle events): create_webhook, list_webhooks, update_webhook, delete_webhook, list_webhook_deliveries. Full tool schemas are served at the /mcp endpoint itself; see PLAN.md for the design rationale behind each.

Uploading an attachment

attach_file takes base64 inline, which is only practical for small files: a 160 KB image is ~217,000 base64 characters, more context than most agents can spend and more than any of them can retype without a silent corruption. Anything larger goes through a ticket instead:

prepare_attachment_upload(postId, filename, mimeType)  -> { uploadUrl, method: "PUT", expiresAt, maxBytes }
curl -T ./carousel.pdf '<uploadUrl>'     # bytes never enter the conversationlist_attachments(postId)                 # confirm it landed

The URL embeds an HMAC-signed ticket scoped to that one post, valid 15 minutes, and rejected afterwards. Both paths converge on the same attachFile service, so the 25 MB per-file and 250 MB per-workspace caps apply identically. Set ATTACHMENT_UPLOAD_SECRET when running more than one instance — unset, each process signs with its own random key and a ticket minted by one instance will not verify on another.

Access keys

Some MCP clients cannot run the OAuth flow — an Apify Standby Actor, for one, whose Authorization header already carries the caller's Apify token. For those, a signed-in user creates a long-lived access key on the Connect page (/connect?label=Apify prefills the form) and the client sends it as Authorization: Bearer planner_mcp_….

A key opens /mcp for one workspace as the user who created it, and /mcp still re-checks that membership on every request. Only the key's sha256 is stored, so it is shown once and can only be revoked afterwards. When the key store cannot be reached, /mcp answers 503 rather than 401, so a client holding a working key is not told to replace it.

Discovery

Two unauthenticated documents let a client — or an MCP registry — learn what this server is and how to authenticate before it holds any credential:

PathWhat it says
/.well-known/mcp.jsonServer card: name, description, version, source repo, and the streamable-http endpoint at /mcp. Shaped to the MCP registry's server.json schema, so the bytes served here are the bytes submitted when publishing to a registry. The auth scheme rides in _meta under the registry's reverse-DNS key, since server.json has no first-class field for it.
/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcpRFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata: the resource identifier, the authorization server, and the single planner:agents scope. This is what /mcp's 401 WWW-Authenticate header points at, and it stays authoritative — the card only signposts it.

The card is served in every configuration; with AUTH_ENABLED unset it advertises authorization: { type: "none" } and the PRM is not registered at all, because the OAuth authorization server it would name is not mounted either. Both documents are built from APP_PUBLIC_BASE_URL, the same value the token check validates aud against.

The server's name and version live in apps/server/src/mcp/identity.ts and feed both the card and the serverInfo block of the MCP initialize response, so a registry listing cannot drift from what a connected client sees.

Publishing to the registry

Listed in the official MCP registry as app.theona/linkedin-content-planner. The namespace is the reverse DNS of theona.app and is proved by an Ed25519 TXT record on that domain's apex; the private half is MCP_REGISTRY_DNS_KEY and exists nowhere else. Rotation is one new key pair, one edited TXT record, one replaced secret — which is why the key needs no escrow and why any doubt about it should be answered by rotating rather than investigating.

It is an environment secret on mcp-registry, not a repository secret. A repository secret is readable by any workflow that anyone with write access adds; this one is released only to a job that names the environment and clears its rules — a required reviewer, and deployments restricted to v* tags. So pushing a tag does not publish: it opens a run that waits for a human.

Releasing is pushing a v<version> tag once the new version is deployed. The Publish to MCP Registry workflow fetches /.well-known/mcp.json from production and submits those bytes; nothing in this repository restates the card, so there is no second copy to drift. The order matters and the workflow enforces it: a tag whose version does not match what the deployed server reports fails the run rather than publishing the previous release's card under the new version's name. Deploy, then tag.

Monorepo layout

  • apps/server — REST API + MCP server (Streamable HTTP at /mcp), same process, same core logic.
  • apps/web — React UI: backlog, calendar, post review.
  • packages/core — domain types and service layer shared by REST and MCP.
  • packages/formatting — markdown-subset ⇄ LinkedIn Unicode formatting.
  • packages/db — Drizzle ORM schema and migrations.

License

PolyForm Noncommercial License 1.0.0. Source-available, not OSI open source: free to use, modify, and self-host for any noncommercial purpose; any commercial or paid use requires a separate license from Theona, Inc.

來源:README.md,提交 11c5bb5

工具

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版本歷史

1
  1. v0.1.0最新Sep 16, 2026

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