
Cisco Meraki / Catalyst / ACI & Multi-vendor Controller AIops
io.github.AIops-tools由 GitHub 帳號 AIops-tools 發布v0.15.1更新於 Nov 8, 2026
Governed Cisco Meraki/Catalyst/ACI, Arista CVP & UniFi ops — 37 MCP tools with audit.
發布方自己的服務:Fabric
概覽
針對 Cisco Meraki、Catalyst Center、Arista CVP、UniFi 與 ACI 網路架構的受治理 AI 維運 MCP 伺服器,提供 37 個具稽核的讀寫工具。
- 可以做什麼
- 讀取整體概覽、組織、網路、裝置、用戶端與告警,涵蓋 Meraki、Catalyst Center、CVP 與 UniFi
- 執行招牌分析:上行鏈路封包遺失與延遲根因分析、可解釋的網路健康分數、設定範本漂移
- 從 APIC 追蹤 ACI 端點與 EPG 網段,並列出架構故障
- 執行受控寫入:重新開機、認領或移除裝置、綁定範本、更新裝置與 VLAN、閃爍指示燈
- 以 dry_run 預覽寫入,列出已記錄的復原項目並套用復原
- 每次呼叫都會寫入稽核紀錄,附帶風險等級與失控呼叫保護
- 適用情境
- 適合讓助理排查或操作由控制器管理的網路架構:排序劣化的 WAN 上行鏈路、評估站點健康、找出範本漂移、追蹤 ACI 端點,或進行可稽核、可復原的設定變更。
- 執行需求
- 以 Python 套件在本機透過 stdio 執行(uv tool install 或 pipx);需要各平台的控制器位址與密鑰(Meraki API key、Catalyst Center 或 APIC 的 username:password、CVP 服務帳號權杖、UniFi API key)。密鑰存於加密儲存區,由 FABRIC_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD 或互動式提示解鎖;需能連線至控制器。
安裝
在 SourceWeft 中
- 開啟 儀表板中的 Cisco Meraki / Catalyst / ACI & Multi-vendor Controller AIops,將其新增到工作區。
- 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。
Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。
其他 MCP 客戶端
參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。
README
Fabric AIops
Audit availability: Real writes require a committed
pendingaudit row and stop before contacting the platform if storage is unavailable. Reads and previews may continue with a warning; new audit rows store outcome summaries rather than full responses.
Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project. Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Cisco, Meraki, Arista, Ubiquiti, or any network-controller vendor. "Cisco", "Meraki", "Catalyst", "DNA Center", "Arista", "CloudVision", "Ubiquiti", "UniFi", "ACI", "APIC" and all product/trademark names belong to their respective owners. MIT licensed.
Governed AI-ops for network fabrics managed through a controller — the
Cisco Meraki Dashboard API (the reference platform, full read + write),
Cisco Catalyst Center (formerly DNA Center; read subset), Arista
CloudVision Portal (CVP) (read subset), and UniFi Network (self-hosted
controller or UniFi OS console; read subset + device restart), plus read-only
Cisco ACI (APIC) endpoint path reconstruction and faults — with a
built-in governance
harness: unified audit log, token/runaway budget guard,
undo-token recording, and descriptive risk tiers. Multi-platform by
construction: a registry keyed by platform maps every canonical operation
onto each controller's REST API (path templates + response adapters), so adding
a controller is a registry entry, never new ops/CLI/MCP surface. An operation a
platform doesn't map returns a clear teaching error ("not supported on X yet —
open an issue"), never a silent no-op. No platform has yet been exercised
against a live controller by this tool; the ACI reads are the one part built
from real controller responses (anonymized APIC payloads a production user
supplied) — see docs/VERIFICATION.md.
What it does
Three flagship signature analyses, plus the guarded reads and writes around them:
- Uplink loss & latency RCA — pull MX WAN uplink loss + latency across an org, rank the worst uplinks by a composite of average loss and latency, and map each degraded uplink to a likely cause + recommended action. Every ranking carries its numbers, not a black-box verdict.
- Network health score — a composite 0-100 score per network from device online %, uplink health %, and an alert-severity penalty (weighted 0.5/0.3/0.2), with every component returned so the number is explainable.
- Config template drift — for networks bound to a config template, list the settings that have drifted from the template (expected vs actual).
What works
- CLI (
fabric-aiops ...):init,overview,org,network,device,client,health,aci,remediate,secret,doctor,mcp. - MCP server (
fabric-aiops mcporfabric-aiops-mcp): 37 tools (28 read, 9 write), every one wrapped with the bundled@governed_toolharness. - Encrypted credentials: the controller secret (Meraki API key / Catalyst Center or APIC
username:password/ CVP service-account token / UniFi API key) lives in an encrypted store~/.fabric-aiops/secrets.enc(Fernet + scrypt) — never plaintext on disk. Unlock with a master password fromFABRIC_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD(MCP/CI) or an interactive prompt (CLI). - Reversibility: mutating writes fetch the real before-state first and record a faithful inverse (
update_device/update_network_vlanrestore prior values;claim↔remove;bind↔unbind/rebind). Irreversible ops (reboot_device,blink_device_leds) record the prior state for audit but declare no undo. - Safety: every state-changing CLI op supports
--dry-runand requires double confirmation; every write MCP tool takes adry_runpreview.
Capability matrix (37 MCP tools)
network_health_score and config_template_drift are injected-only (they score
data you already hold); uplink_loss_and_latency_rca accepts injected records
for offline analysis or pulls live from a configured target. Device models carry
a product-type prefix: MX appliance, MS switch, MR wireless AP, MV
camera, MG cellular gateway.
Platform support matrix
One tool, five controller platforms. For the four in the table below the
ops/CLI/MCP surface is identical everywhere; each platform maps the canonical
operations it supports and raises a teaching error for the rest ("not supported
on <platform> yet — open an issue or PR"). ACI maps none of these — see
Cisco ACI below.
Concept mapping: canonical organizations/networks are Catalyst Center
sites, CVP containers, and UniFi sites (the canonical id is the
site's short name — the /api/s/{site}/ path segment); all have one global
tree, so the org scope does not filter their lists. On unifi, device-scoped
calls (device get / switch_ports / reboot) fill the site from the
target's default org_id — set it in config.yaml (or the init wizard). Writes
are Meraki-only except UniFi device restart — Catalyst Center and CVP
change models (task/configlet workflows) don't map cleanly onto these
canonical writes, so each write fails fast with a teaching error before any
controller call (never a silent no-op). CVP config-drift surfaces through
device_inventory (complianceCode/complianceIndication per device) and
network_alerts (events); configlet-content retrieval and deep pagination on
catalyst/cvp/unifi are known deferrals.
Cisco ACI (APIC)
ACI has two axes — tenant → VRF → bridge domain → EPG, and pod → node →
interface — and neither is an organization → network → device tree. Rather than
make every network_id mean something different per call, an aci target
answers the canonical tools with a teaching error and gets three read-only
ACI-native tools that take ACI references (MAC/IP, tenant/app/EPG names, DNs):
How to read them:
- A static reconstruction, not a reachability test.
staticPathResolved: truemeans the fabric is configured to carry the endpoint, not that traffic flows. Nothing is written to the APIC and no troubleshooting session is created. - Links follow the relation APIC resolved (
tDn), so cross-tenant links intocommonare followed; a relation that is notformedis a finding with its state. - Related faults are candidates matched by DN (the EPG, the attachment interface, the leaf's deployed copy of the EPG's policy) — proximity, not cause.
- Fault rows are records, not incidents: a
delegatedrecord mirrors a fault on another object. A cleared fault keeps the description it had when raised. - Not evaluated (listed in every result as
notChecked): vzAny contracts, taboo contracts, imported contract interfaces, preferred-group peers, service graphs / L3Out.
Leaf/spine inventory and interface state (fabricNode, topSystem, l1PhysIf)
are not in this release — they will be built once real responses for those
classes are available, as the ones above were.
Per-platform auth
fabric-aiops init walks through the platform choice and stores the right kind
of secret; fabric-aiops doctor probes each target with the canonical
top-of-hierarchy read (organizations / sites / containers / UniFi sites; on an
APIC, the tenant count), exercising the full auth flow.
What this tool does, and does not, decide
It delivers network-fabric operations — reads and writes — accurately and efficiently, and records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write is allowed to happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the account you connect it with: give it a Meraki API key whose admin has read-only organization access (or the read-only equivalent on your controller) and the writes fail at the controller — the place that actually owns the permission.
So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure.
The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over
MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in ~/.fabric-aiops/audit.db,
and mutating writes still capture their before-state and record an inverse where
one exists.
Each tool declares a
risk_level, kept in agreement with its[READ]/[WRITE]documentation tag by a test, and carried into the audit row as a descriptive tier — so a reviewer can see at a glance that a row was a high-risk delete. It is a label, not a gate.
Quick start
As a Claude Code plugin
One install gives an agent both the skill and the MCP server:
The MCP server is fetched with uv and pinned to the
package version this plugin declares, so an audit row can be traced back to the
code that wrote it. Credentials are still configured with fabric-aiops init — see below.
As an OpenClaw plugin
The same bundle is published on ClawHub, where one install delivers the skill and its MCP server together:
Restart the OpenClaw gateway afterwards so it loads the plugin. The MCP server is
fetched with uv, pinned to this exact release, so
uvx has to be on PATH — without it the skill still installs but reports
Visible to model: no. Credentials are configured exactly as below.
As a CLI or standalone MCP server
Run as an MCP server (stdio):
Where that password then lives: an exported variable is readable by every process this shell starts and is recorded by shell history. On a shared or long-lived host, prefer the interactive prompt, or inject it from a secret manager for the life of the one command that needs it.
Governance
Every operation — MCP and CLI — passes through the bundled @governed_tool
harness. It records; it does not authorize (see above).
- Audit — every call (params, outcome summary, status, duration, risk tier, and any
operator-supplied approver/rationale) is logged to
~/.fabric-aiops/audit.db(relocatable viaFABRIC_AIOPS_HOME). The CLI writes the same row the MCP path does — there is no unaudited entry point. - Runaway guard — a safety backstop, not an authorization gate: the same
call hammered in a tight loop trips a circuit breaker so a stuck agent can't
burn unbounded calls/time. Disable with
FABRIC_RUNAWAY_MAX=0; optional hard ceilings viaFABRIC_MAX_TOOL_CALLS/FABRIC_MAX_TOOL_SECONDS. - Undo recording — reversible writes record an inverse descriptor built from the fetched before-state.
- Risk tier — a descriptive label on the audit row derived from
risk_level; it gates nothing.
Scope
This is the network-fabric / controller member of the AIops-tools family
(governed AI-ops with audit + budget + undo + risk tiers). Do NOT use it for
OT / industrial edge (Modbus, OPC-UA, PROFINET) — see the separate
industrial-aiops line — nor for device-level CLI/SSH network automation.
Missing a capability?
Coverage is intentionally a curated subset of each controller's API. Missing a call or a device family on Meraki? A ❌ in the support matrix you need on Catalyst Center, CloudVision Portal, or UniFi Network (writes included — e.g. the UniFi cookie-login fallback for pre-9.0 controllers)? Want another controller platform entirely? Open an issue or PR — contributions welcome (a platform is a single descriptor module: path templates + response adapters).
Status
No platform has yet been exercised by this tool against a live Meraki
organization, Catalyst Center appliance, CloudVision Portal instance, UniFi
controller or APIC. The first four platforms' API paths are modelled from the
public API shapes and tested against mocks. The ACI reads are tested against
real, anonymized APIC responses from a production fabric (endpoint, EPG,
bridge domain, VRF, contract, filter entry, faults) and their query mechanics
against Cisco's own SDK — but a live run of this tool against an APIC is still
outstanding. docs/VERIFICATION.md defines the checklist
a live run must cover; fabric-aiops doctor is the fastest live check.
來源:README.md,提交 b6734e8
工具
0版本歷史
7- v0.15.0Oct 30, 2026
- v0.14.0Oct 15, 2026
- v0.13.0Oct 15, 2026
- v0.12.1Oct 13, 2026
- v0.12.0Sep 21, 2026
- v0.11.5Sep 17, 2026
- v0.11.4Sep 16, 2026
評分
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