Cloud Pathfinder

io.github.Baneado98由 GitHub 帳號 Baneado98 發布v0.1.0更新於 Oct 24, 2026

IaC attack-path auditor: finds internet-to-crown-jewel chains in Terraform/CFN/K8s.

已驗證Streamable HTTP可網頁執行雲端與基礎設施開發者工具安全與監控

概覽

AI 產生的概覽

託管的 IaC 攻擊路徑稽核服務,讓助理在 Terraform、CloudFormation、Kubernetes 等範本中追蹤從公網到核心資產的鏈路。

可以做什麼
稽核基礎設施即程式碼:提交檔案對應或單一原始碼區塊,取得 BREACHABLE / EXPOSED / HARDENED 判定、風險評分,以及攻擊路徑、核心資產與錯誤設定的數量;格式依檔案自動辨識並一起分析,涵蓋 AWS、GCP、Azure 資源與 Kubernetes 清單。比較兩種狀態:比對變更前後的目錄樹,查看該變更引入、消除或加劇了哪些公網到核心資產的鏈路,並給出閘門判定。要求 SARIF 2.1.0 輸出以供 GitHub 程式碼掃描使用,程式碼流程會錨定到檔案與行號。付費後的深度結果會補充完整多跳鏈路、逐跳 file:line 證據與 IAM 提權可達性分析。
適用情境
當你審查基礎設施即程式碼,想確認某份宣告的設定是否真的把公網連接到資料儲存、密鑰或管理員角色,而不只是標出單一設定錯誤的資源時使用。它適合用於拉取請求閘門,以及對 Terraform、CloudFormation、Kubernetes、CDK、Pulumi 或 Bicep 變更的合併前審查。
執行需求
遠端 MCP 端點;README 也記錄了一個 npm 用戶端,但它只是輕量 HTTP 呼叫端,因此分析一律在託管服務上執行,離線無法使用。免費層不需金鑰,但限制為每 IP 每小時 30 次請求。深度分析需主動開啟並付費:預付金鑰透過 Authorization Bearer 標頭或 CLOUD_PATHFINDER_KEY 變數傳送,或透過 x402 按次以 USDC 付款。
安裝前請注意
你的基礎設施即程式碼文字會傳送到第三方託管服務;README 稱其在記憶體中處理、不儲存也不記錄日誌,但資料確實會離開你的機器。深度鏈路、證據與修復建議需要付費,可用預付金鑰或透過 Base 結算的按次 USDC 付款,費用可能累積。結果是對宣告範本的啟發式靜態分析,並非對即時雲端環境的評估,應視為線索而非保證。

安裝

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 開啟 儀表板中的 Cloud Pathfinder,將其新增到工作區。
  2. 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。

Web executable,透過 Streamable HTTP。 遠端服務在工作區中設定後即可從網頁執行環境執行。

交給代理程式安裝

把這段提示詞貼上到 Claude Code、Codex、Cursor 等代理程式,或 SourceWeft 對話中。代理程式會讀取該伺服器的安裝指南,先向你展示發布者、端點和登入方式,經你同意後再把它新增到你的客戶端。金鑰不會寫進任何命令。

閱讀 https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.Baneado98%2Fcloud-pathfinder/install.md,並按其中說明把這個 MCP 伺服器接入我的客戶端。修改任何設定之前,先告訴我它的發布者、端點和登入方式,等我確認。不要把 API 金鑰寫進命令或我會提交的檔案;問我金鑰應從哪裡取得。

檢視代理程式所依據的安裝指南

其他 MCP 客戶端

把它新增到你客戶端的 mcpServers 設定中。

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "cloud-pathfinder": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp"
    }
  }
}

README

cloud-pathfinder 🛰️

[License: MIT] [MCP Registry] [npm] [Pay] [SARIF]

Attack-path auditor for Infrastructure-as-Code — Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, CDK, Pulumi, Bicep/ARM. Not a linter. It parses your IaC into a resource graph, resolves cross-resource (and cross-file) relationships, and searches for the multi-hop chains from the public internet to your crown jewels (data stores, secrets, admin). It returns a BREACHABLE / EXPOSED / HARDENED verdict and the concrete route an attacker would walk.

Example chain it finds: open security group (SSH 0.0.0.0/0) → EC2 instance-profile role → iam:PassRole privilege escalation to admin → S3 exfiltration

Available as an MCP server (Claude, Cursor, any MCP agent) and a pay-per-call x402 API (autonomous AI agents with a wallet).


🔐 Privacy & data model (read this first)

Sending your IaC to a third party is sensitive — so here is exactly what happens:

  • Your IaC is never stored and never logged. Every audit runs in memory on the hosted service and is discarded when the response is sent. No database of your templates, no retention, no analytics on file contents.
  • What is sent: only the IaC text you pass (the files map or source blob). Nothing is read from your machine, your cloud account, or your credentials — cloud-pathfinder never touches a live cloud (see "honest limits" below). There are no cloud keys to provide because it analyzes the declared templates only.
  • Free tier vs deep tier — both run server-side, here's why and what differs:
    • The thin npm client ships zero analysis logic (no graph engine, no IAM privesc knowledge base). It is a pure HTTP caller. So even the free verdict + counts are computed on the hosted service, then your IaC is dropped. This is the honest tradeoff that keeps the moat off your machine — we say so plainly rather than claim a fake "100% local" mode.
    • Deep analysis is strictly opt-in (deep: true, behind payment). Only then are the full chains, file:line evidence and remediation returned. You send the same IaC either way — nothing extra leaves your machine for the deep tier.

Hosted service: https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app — all analysis runs server-side. This npm package is a thin MCP client: it sends the IaC text to the hosted endpoint and renders the verdict. No analysis logic ships to your machine.


⚡ How it works (30 seconds)

  1. Your MCP agent calls audit_iac_attack_paths { files: { "main.tf": "..." } }.
  2. The thin client POSTs the IaC text to https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app.
  3. The hosted engine builds a typed resource graph, runs a BFS from an INTERNET node to every data store / secret / admin sink, and resolves IAM privilege-escalation reachability along each hop — in memory.
  4. The IaC is discarded; nothing is persisted.
  5. The deep tier returns every full chain with per-hop file:line evidence; the free tier returns the verdict, score and counts.

The npm tarball contains only the HTTP caller — so nothing, free or deep, runs offline. Without the server it degrades to a clear network error.


🆚 Why this isn't a linter (and why a local one can't replace it)

A linter flags resources one at a time: "this SG is open", "this role is broad". cloud-pathfinder reasons about how those facts connect — work a per-file local tool structurally cannot do:

CapabilityLocal lintercloud-pathfinder
Flag one open SG / one broad role✅✅
Graph — which SG attaches to which instance, which role it assumes, what it reads❌✅
Reachability BFS internet → crown jewel, full multi-hop chain + file:line❌✅
IAM privilege-escalation KB (20+ primitives: PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion…)❌✅
Multi-cloud — AWS / GCP / Azure in one graph❌✅
Choke-point analysis (the one hop that, fixed, cuts the most paths)❌✅
Diff mode — what a PR INTRODUCES / ELIMINATES / AGGRAVATES❌✅
Kubernetes LB/NodePort → privileged pod → cluster-admin SA → Secret❌✅
SARIF 2.1.0 for GitHub code scanning (inline chains on the Security tab)❌✅
  • 🔗 Graph, not lint. Builds a typed resource graph and resolves the real relationships across files and clouds.
  • 🧭 Reachability search. BFS from INTERNET to every data store / secret / admin sink, returning the full multi-hop chain with per-hop file:line evidence.
  • 👑 IAM privilege-escalation knowledge base. Knows AWS managed-policy permissions and 20+ privilege-escalation primitives (PassRole+RunInstances, CreatePolicyVersion, AttachRolePolicy, SSM SendCommand, UpdateFunctionCode, UpdateAssumeRolePolicy…).
  • ☸️ Kubernetes attack surface. LoadBalancer/NodePort exposure → privileged / hostPath / hostNetwork pods, cluster-admin ServiceAccounts, and mounted Secrets.

Formats are auto-detected per file and analyzed together — mix .tf, CloudFormation .yaml/.json and Kubernetes manifests in one call.


🚀 Quickstart — add it to your MCP client

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "cloud-pathfinder": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "cloud-pathfinder-mcp"] }  }}

No key needed for the free tier. Restart your client and the audit_iac_attack_paths + diff_attack_paths tools appear. (Remote server: https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp.)

Tool: audit_iac_attack_paths

jsonc
{  "files": {    "main.tf": "resource \"aws_security_group\" \"web\" { ingress { ... cidr_blocks = [\"0.0.0.0/0\"] } } ...",    "k8s.yaml": "apiVersion: v1\nkind: Service\n..."  }  // or: "source": "<a single IaC blob>", "filename": "main.tf"}

Example — input → output

audit_iac_attack_paths { "files": { "main.tf": "<SG open to 0.0.0.0/0 on 22 +                          EC2 with instance-profile role that can s3:* + iam:PassRole>" } }
→ FREE:  verdict: BREACHABLE · risk 86/100 · 1 attack path · 1 crown jewel · 3 misconfigs
→ DEEP (deep:true):  verdict: BREACHABLE   PATH #1 (internet → admin):     [1] INTERNET → aws_security_group.web   (main.tf:4  — ingress 22 from 0.0.0.0/0)     [2] → aws_instance.app                  (main.tf:19 — attaches sg web)     [3] → aws_iam_role.app_role             (main.tf:31 — instance profile)     [4] → iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances   (privesc → launch instance as admin role)     [5] → s3:* on aws_s3_bucket.data        (main.tf:52 — exfiltration sink)   CHOKE POINT: tighten main.tf:4 ingress → cuts this entire path.   FIX: restrict ingress CIDR; split the role; add a permissions boundary.

The free tier returns the verdict, risk score, and the counts (how many attack paths, crown jewels and misconfigurations). The deep tier returns every full chain with hops, file:line evidence, privilege-escalation reachability and remediation.

Tool: diff_attack_paths — the CI/CD gate

Give it the IaC before and after a change (a PR's base and head trees) and it reports exactly what the change did to your attack surface: which internet→crown-jewel chains it INTRODUCES, which it ELIMINATES, and which it AGGRAVATES — with an INTRODUCES_BREACH / REDUCES_RISK / NEUTRAL / MIXED verdict.

jsonc
{  "before": { "files": { "main.tf": "...security group admits 10.0.0.0/16..." } },  "after":  { "files": { "main.tf": "...security group admits 0.0.0.0/0..." } }  // deep: true → full introduced/eliminated chains + before→after exploitability + which choke points now matter}

A per-file linter or a single-state scan cannot answer this: it needs the full graph

  • privesc reachability on both states and a semantic cross-state path match. HTTP: POST /diff (free, counts only) / POST /pro/diff (deep).

Free HTTP API

http
POST /auditContent-Type: application/json
{ "files": { "main.tf": "resource \"aws_security_group\" ..." } }

Rate-limited to 30 requests/hour/IP. For unlimited/commercial/deep use, call /pro/audit.

Input formats: Terraform / OpenTofu, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, Helm, Kustomize, Pulumi (TS/JS/Python), Bicep/ARM, and AWS CDK — both the synthesized cdk.out/*.template.json and the un-synthed CDK program (TypeScript + Python), so a CI gate runs on the PR diff before cdk synth.


SARIF 2.1.0 → GitHub code scanning

Add ?format=sarif (or { "format": "sarif" }) to /audit, /pro/audit, /diff or /pro/diff to get SARIF 2.1.0 you can upload to GitHub code scanning — every attack chain shows up inline on the PR's Security tab.

  • Each chain is one SARIF result with a codeFlow (a step-through walk: internet → SG → instance role → privesc → S3), anchored to the IaC file:line, plus security-severity/CVSS so the badge colors correctly.
  • The diff SARIF only fails the check on introduced/aggravated routes (error-level); eliminated/eased land as note.
  • The free tier returns a redacted-but-schema-valid SARIF (counts only — no chains, no code-flows, no route file:line); the full code-flows are premium.
yaml
# .github/workflows/cloud-pathfinder.yml (sketch)- run: curl -s -X POST "$CPF/pro/diff?format=sarif" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \       --data @payload.json -o cloud-pathfinder.sarif- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3  with: { sarif_file: cloud-pathfinder.sarif }

💳 Unlock /pro — two ways to pay (dual-pay)

The deep /pro/audit returns the full attack chains, per-hop evidence, privilege-escalation analysis and remediation. Two payment lanes coexist:

LaneForHow
💳 Card (Stripe)Humans / teamsBuy a prepaid key at /pro/checkout, then send Authorization: Bearer <key> (or set CLOUD_PATHFINDER_KEY).
🪙 x402 (USDC)AI agents with a walletPay $0.30 per call automatically. Settles on Base. No signup, no key.
http
POST /pro/audit          # 402 (shows BOTH lanes) → pay → result

What it catches (selected)

ClassDetail
Public → role → dataOpen SG on a sensitive port (SSH/RDP/DB) → instance role that can read S3/Dynamo/RDS/Secrets → exfiltration
IAM privilege escalationiam:PassRole+ec2:RunInstances, iam:CreatePolicyVersion, iam:AttachRolePolicy, ssm:SendCommand, wildcard * on *, and ~15 more
Public data storespublicly_accessible = true RDS, world-open buckets
KubernetesLoadBalancer/NodePort → privileged pod → cluster-admin ServiceAccount → Secret
CloudFormation!Ref/!GetAtt intrinsics resolved; ManagedPolicyArns/inline policies analyzed

How it stays honest

The premium engine and knowledge base never ship in the npm package — the published client is a thin renderer that calls the hosted analysis service. The free tier is genuinely useful (verdict + counts); the deep chains, evidence and privesc analysis are server-side behind payment.

Heuristic static analysis of declared IaC, not a live cloud assessment. It reasons over what the templates declare (no runtime SCP/permissions-boundary/condition evaluation). Treat findings as prioritized leads, not a guarantee.

MIT · github.com/Baneado98/cloud-pathfinder

來源:README.md,提交 0ab62b7

工具

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版本歷史

1
  1. v0.1.0最新Sep 16, 2026

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