Import Guardian

import-guardian 🪝

Catch AI-hallucinated (slopsquatted) npm imports in generated code — before you run npm install.

An LLM just wrote some code. It might import a package that doesn't exist — a name the model confidently hallucinated. Attackers register exactly those names and ship malware. This is slopsquatting, and in 2026 it's one of the fastest-growing supply-chain attacks: code generators have been observed referencing 205,000+ unique non-existent package names, and real hallucinated packages (react-codeshift, a fake huggingface-cli with 30k+ downloads) have already shown up in the wild.

import-guardian reads the generated code, extracts every npm package it imports, and tells you which ones are real — so an agent never installs a name its own model invented.

It's part of the guardian set: npm-guardian audits a package you've already chosen for CVEs and malicious behaviour, license-guardian audits the licenses of your dependencies (GPL/AGPL/BUSL traps) before you ship, and lockfile-guardian audits the resolved package-lock.json for integrity tampering and risky install scripts. import-guardian works one step earlier than all of them, at the moment the code — and its dependency names — are generated.

What it catches

Verdicts: 🟢 CLEAN · 🟠 REVIEW · 🔴 BLOCK.

Use it as an MCP server (free)

{  "mcpServers": {    "import-guardian": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "import-guardian-mcp"] }  }}

Tools:

• scan_code_imports — give it a block of generated JS/TS; it extracts and checks every npm import. Run this on code you just generated, before its install command.
• check_packages — verify an explicit list of package names.
• verify_package — deep-check a single package name (existence, age, versions, repo, weekly downloads, edit distance to popular packages).
• audit_lockfile 🔒 (premium) — the deep one. Give it a lockfile from npm (package-lock.json), yarn (yarn.lock), pnpm (pnpm-lock.yaml), PyPI (requirements.txt / poetry.lock / Pipfile.lock) or Go (go.mod / go.sum) and it resolves the whole transitive tree and audits every package for dependency confusion, transitive typosquats / homoglyph clones, maintainer-takeover fingerprints, nonexistent pins, and install-script risk. See below.

Deep lockfile audit (premium) 🔒

scan_code_imports looks at the handful of imports you can see. audit_lockfile looks at the hundreds you can't — the fully resolved dependency graph in your lockfile — and finds the supply-chain attacks an LLM cannot reason about from source alone:

Seven ecosystems. The same resolved-graph engine runs over npm / yarn / pnpm, PyPI (requirements.txt, poetry.lock, Pipfile.lock), Go modules (go.mod, go.sum), Rust / Cargo (Cargo.lock, Cargo.toml), Java (Maven pom.xml, Gradle build.gradle / .kts / gradle.lockfile) and PHP / Composer (composer.json, composer.lock) — each cross-checked against its own public index (npm registry, PyPI, the Go module proxy, crates.io, Maven Central, Packagist). On crates.io the matcher knows the -/_ equivalence (rustdecimal vs rust_decimal); on Maven an internal groupId:artifactId unclaimed on Central is the dependency-confusion target; on Composer an internal vendor/package unregistered on Packagist while a private repo is merged with the public index is the confusion target, and a Packagist-abandoned package is flagged as a takeover risk. Large lockfiles are bounded: direct + private-source packages are always live-checked first, then transitive up to a cap, so one call never fans out to tens of thousands of requests.

POST /pro/audit   { "lockfile": "<contents of package-lock.json>", "filename": "package-lock.json" }

Pay per call via x402 (USDC on Base) or a prepaid Stripe key. The free POST /audit returns the verdict and issue counts by severity, but withholds which packages are affected and why — that's the paid report. This deep engine runs server-side only and is never shipped in the npm package.

Example

scan_code_imports({ code: 'import shift from "react-codeshift";\nimport React from "react";' })
🟠 REVIEW — 1 referenced package(s) look risky.🟠 react-codeshift  (risk 57/100)    • No source repository linked.    • Only 1 published version.    • Only 3 downloads in the last week despite being 158 days old.🟢 react  (ok) — established package.

Free HTTP API

POST /scan        { "code": "import x from 'reqeusts'\nimport y from 'lodash'" }GET  /verify?name=express

Hosted at https://import-guardian.vercel.app · try /verify?name=express vs /verify?name=reqeusts.

Pay-per-call (x402)

The /pro/* routes are gated by x402. Your agent pays $0.02 USDC per call automatically — no sign-up, no API key. Payment settles on-chain (USDC on Base). The server holds no private key; it only declares a public receiving address.

POST /pro/scan    { "code": "…" }   # 402 → pay → result, no rate limit

How it works (and its limits)

• Existence + freshness come straight from the live npm registry (registry.npmjs.org) and the download-stats API — these are facts, not guesses, which is the moat: an agent can't reliably know on its own whether a name it generated is real and trusted.
• "Did you mean" uses Levenshtein distance against a curated list of high-impact packages attackers impersonate.
• It does not execute or install anything (read-only), and it intentionally errs toward REVIEW rather than silently passing a brand-new lookalike. It is a guardrail, not a guarantee — pair it with npm-guardian for behavioural/CVE auditing of packages you decide to keep.

License

MIT.