
Valta
io.github.Billionaire664由 GitHub 帳號 Billionaire664 發布v0.1.2更新於 Oct 24, 2026
Financial governance for AI agents — spend gates and audit trail exposed as MCP tools.
發布方自己的服務:Valta
概覽
Valta 是一個本機 MCP 伺服器,包裝 Valta 託管的支出閘門與稽核鏈 API,讓助理查詢錢包餘額、申請或代理支出,並管理錢包與政策。
- 可以做什麼
- 讀取錢包餘額與限額、錢包清單、代理、政策,以及支出決策的雜湊鏈稽核紀錄。申請支出授權、建立含限額的錢包、在自有代理錢包之間轉帳 USDC,以及凍結或解除凍結代理錢包。建立含每日上限與單筆上限的支出政策。執行代理並查詢代理執行狀態。透過支出閘門代理向 Stripe、Serper 或 Polygon 發出真實外部呼叫,並列出代理收據。
- 適用情境
- 當助理需要處理 Valta 針對 AI 代理的財務治理時使用:查看餘額與限額、申請或把關支出、管理錢包與政策,或檢視稽核紀錄。只有代理工具會在程式碼層面強制檢查,且僅限 Valta 已串接的服務。
- 執行需求
- 透過 stdio 在本機執行,通常使用 npx 或全域安裝 npm 套件,因此需要 Node.js。需要 Valta 帳號,以及在 Valta 主控台建立的 API 金鑰,透過環境變數 VALTA_API_KEY 提供。需要連線至 Valta 託管 API 的網路存取。
安裝
在 SourceWeft 中
- 開啟 儀表板中的 Valta,將其新增到工作區。
- 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。
Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。
其他 MCP 客戶端
參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。
README
valta-mcp
An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for Valta — financial governance for AI agents. Exposes Valta's spend gate and audit trail as MCP tools, so any MCP-compatible client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, and others) can call them directly.
What this is — and isn't
This server is a thin wrapper over Valta's real, hosted REST API. It does not implement any spend logic, limits, or hashing itself — every tool call here is a pass-through to https://valta.co/api/v1/..., where the actual enforcement (spend gate, audit chain) happens. This repo is the protocol adapter, not the enforcement engine.
Important, read before relying on this for anything security-sensitive: most of these tools are advisory, not enforcing. A tool description telling a model "call this before spending" is guidance, not a guarantee. valta_request_spend, for example, only governs spend that routes through it — it does not intercept or prevent spending that happens through some other tool, API, or webhook the agent has independent access to.
One tool is different: valta_proxy_request. Instead of asking the model to check in before spending elsewhere, this one is the spend — the agent declares an outbound call's cost and routes the actual call through Valta, which checks it against wallet limits and only makes the real request (using your own stored credential) if approved. If it's blocked, the real provider is never contacted at all. This is a genuine, code-level guarantee, not an honor system — but only for the specific services Valta has wired up for proxying (currently: Stripe, Serper, Polygon). Any spend that happens through a channel other than this proxy — the agent's own separate API key, a webhook, a tool this server doesn't know about — is outside what any of these tools can see or stop. See Design notes below.
Install
Or run directly without installing:
Configuration
Get an API key at valta.co/dashboard → Settings → API Keys → Create key.
Add to your MCP client's config (e.g. Claude Desktop's claude_desktop_config.json):
Tools
Every tool's description in src/index.ts states plainly what it enforces and what it doesn't — read those before wiring this into anything that touches real money.
Design notes
Why there's no "non-bypassable system prompt." An earlier draft of this project considered shipping a system-prompt instruction block claiming to make spend gating "non-bypassable." That claim doesn't hold up, for two reasons:
- MCP servers don't control the host's system prompt. Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, and other hosts each own their own system prompt. An MCP server provides tools and, in some cases, a limited
instructionsfield — it cannot inject a binding, universally-enforced rule into the conversation. - A system prompt is a request to the model, not a code-level constraint. Even where a host does surface server instructions, an agent can still be prompt-injected, jailbroken, or simply routed through a different tool entirely that doesn't call this server at all. Claiming otherwise would be exactly the kind of gap this project exists to close — trusting the model to self-police is the failure mode Valta's spend gate was built to avoid in the first place.
What actually provides a guarantee, and what doesn't. There are now two different levels of enforcement in this server, and it matters which one a given tool gives you:
- Spend authorized by calling
valta_request_spendis genuinely checked against real limits, server-side — but only if the agent chooses to call it first. The gap is spend that happens through some other channel the agent has access to. - Spend routed through
valta_proxy_requestis checked before the real call is made at all — there's no step where the agent could skip the check and still have the payment go through, because the payment-triggering call and the check are the same action. That closes the gap described above, but only for the services this server has wired up for proxying (Stripe, Serper, Polygon as of this writing) — extending it to a new service means adding real credential-handling logic for that provider's specific auth scheme, not flipping a config flag.
If a use case needs a hard guarantee for a service not yet listed above, that service needs to be added to Valta's proxy gate first — open an issue or a PR.
License
MIT.
來源:README.md,提交 fe0b1bd
工具
0版本歷史
1- v0.1.2最新Sep 16, 2026
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