Deepsleuth
io.github.DeepSleuthv1.0.3更新於 Oct 6, 2026
Deterministic, no-LLM security scanner for MCP servers, plus an inline proxy gate.
概覽
一個確定性、不使用 LLM 的 MCP 伺服器安全掃描器,可稽核清單、原始碼、執行時回應與安裝鉤子,並能作為內嵌代理閘道。
- 功能
- Deepsleuth 在不使用 LLM 的情況下掃描 MCP 伺服器的安全問題,相同輸入會產生逐位元組一致的發現結果。它提供兩種前端:內嵌 MCP 閘道/代理,在啟動時稽核工具描述、在每次 tools/call 前執行閘門,並在回傳前掃描回應;以及批次/沙箱掃描器,在 Docker 中啟動伺服器,用合成呼叫與植入的金絲雀主動誘發行為。它暴露 MCP 工具 list_detectors、check_listing 與 scan_target,涵蓋的證據位置包括描述、原始碼、執行時回應、多次呼叫狀態、伺服器身分與安裝時指令碼。
- 適用情境
- 當你希望在信任某個 MCP 伺服器之前先行審查,或希望在助理呼叫的伺服器前加一道執行時閘門時使用。它面向 MCP 伺服器的安全審查,而非通用掃描。
- 執行需求
- 需要 Python 3.11+ 與 PyPI 套件 deepsleuth,或原始碼儲存庫;沒有必要的第三方相依套件。動態層與 proxy-eval 需要 Docker CLI 與守護程序;沒有 Docker 時靜態與清單偵測器仍會執行,並會回報被略過的動態涵蓋範圍。透過 stdio 在本機執行;未宣告驗證或環境變數。
安裝
在 SourceWeft 中
- 開啟 儀表板中的 Deepsleuth,將其新增到工作區。
- 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。
Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。
其他 MCP 客戶端
參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。
README
Deepsleuth — read the fine print
Deepsleuth is a deterministic, no-LLM security scanner for MCP servers. It audits what a server says — and, more importantly, what it does.
Most MCP scanners read only the declared manifest (tools/list names,
descriptions, schemas). They never launch the server, never call a tool, never
read a response, never read the implementation source, and never reason across
calls — so whole classes of attack are structurally invisible to them.
Deepsleuth sees those. It is a single frontend-agnostic detection core with two frontends:
- Frontend A — inline MCP gateway / proxy (the headline artifact). A
transparent proxy that is an MCP server to the agent and an MCP client to one
downstream server. It audits tool descriptions at startup, enforces a gate
before every
tools/call, and scans every response before returning it. Includes a headlessproxy-evalmode for offline scoring. - Frontend B — batch / sandbox scanner. A pre-flight auditor that launches a server in a Docker sandbox, actively elicits behavior with synthesized calls + planted canaries, and produces findings. Also the offline scoring harness.
Both frontends run the same detectors over the same Context — a detector is
written once and works in both.
No LLM. Ever.
Fully deterministic: parsing, static AST + taint/dataflow, normalized regex/token heuristics, unicode/encoding/entropy analysis, structural diffing, and sandboxed dynamic execution with instrumentation. Same input → byte-identical findings. Offline (no network egress except to the Docker daemon). No threat feeds.
Install
Python 3.11+. No required third-party packages — the scanner speaks MCP over stdio itself, so it installs in externally-managed (PEP 668) environments.
Deepsleuth is itself an MCP server, so agents can scan with it directly:
Tools: list_detectors, check_listing, scan_target.
Install as an agent plugin
The repo is a valid Agent Plugins package
(plugin.json + mcp.json, spec 1.0.0): any compatible client can install it
directly from the repository and gets the deepsleuth MCP server plus the
audit-mcp-server skill. The stdio entry (bin/deepsleuth-mcp) needs only
python3.11+ — the scanner has zero third-party requirements:
For the dynamic layer (Frontend B and proxy-eval) you need the Docker CLI +
daemon. Without Docker the scanner degrades gracefully: static/manifest
detectors still run and the skipped dynamic coverage is reported (never a crash).
Run
<target> can be a server directory (with mcp.json and/or source), an
mcp.json launch spec, or a raw stdio launch command (e.g.
"python3 server.py"). scan exits 0 when clean and non-zero once a finding
reaches --fail-severity (default high).
--allow-unsandboxed runs the dynamic layer without Docker — use it only
for your own trusted fixtures, never on untrusted servers.
--reference-listing tools.json supplies another server's tool list (a JSON
array of {name, description, inputSchema} entries, or an object with a
tools key) so the cross-server name comparison runs against it without
launching a second server. The same comparison also runs automatically across
several entries in one mcp.json and across several server entry modules
found in one directory.
Wire the proxy into an agent
Point your MCP client at the proxy instead of the real server; the proxy launches the real one downstream:
Try it on the bundled fixtures
What it covers
Evidence locations — deepsleuth detects across all eight, with special strength on the five a manifest-only scanner misses:
Mechanism categories: tool-poisoning, agent-config-poisoning,
tool-shadowing, prompt-injection, credential-exposure, command-injection,
path-traversal, ssrf, data-exfiltration, confused-deputy,
auth-misconfiguration, denial-of-service, excessive-privilege,
supply-chain, information-disclosure, client-side-vulnerability, other.
Every finding validates against the fixed finding schema, carries a top-level
evidence_location and confidence, and (from the proxy) records its gate
decision on raw.gate_decision. See DETECTORS.md for one entry per detector
including its known blind spots, and ARCHITECTURE.md for how the layers fit
and how to add a detector.
Known limitations (v1)
- Source analysis is Python-first. Node/TS servers get manifest + install-hook
- dynamic coverage, but source taint is Python-only in v1 (JS is regex-lite).
- Taint is intra-procedural. Flows through helper functions/classes across the module are approximated, not fully tracked.
- The proxy fronts exactly one downstream server (v1 scope; multi-server namespacing is structured for but not built).
- The live proxy's elicitation round-trip and forwarding of downstream-initiated
requests are best-effort. All gate/audit/diff/response logic is fully exercised
by
proxy-eval, which is what the offline evaluator scores. - Without Docker, dynamic detectors are skipped (reported, not silent).
Getting involved
Contributions welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.md. Found a security issue? Please follow SECURITY.md.
Listed in the official MCP Registry:
mcp-name: io.github.DeepSleuth/deepsleuth
來源:README.md,提交 a73c55c
工具
0版本歷史
1- v1.0.3最新Oct 6, 2026


