Mcp Config Auditor

io.github.GuardBee由 GitHub 帳號 GuardBee 發布v0.9.0更新於 Nov 3, 2026

Scans Cursor/Claude/Windsurf/VS Code MCP configs for unpinned versions, secrets, typosquats

已驗證STDIO僅桌面開發者工具安全與監控

概覽

AI 產生的概覽

稽核本機上的 MCP 用戶端設定與 agent SKILL.md 檔案,檢查未固定版本、金鑰外洩、仿冒套件、萬用字元自動核准與影子 MCP 伺服器。

可以做什麼
  • 掃描 MCP 用戶端設定文字或單一設定檔,檢查未固定版本、金鑰、仿冒套件、萬用字元自動核准與未驗證的遠端端點
  • 掃描 agent SKILL.md 檔案,檢查無限制的 allowed-tools、指令覆寫、讀取憑證檔案與明文金鑰
  • 掃描目錄中的 mcp.json、mcp_config.json、claude_desktop_config.json 與 SKILL.md,並比對技能名稱衝突
  • 比對傳入的工具清單,偵測跨伺服器工具遮蔽、易混淆名稱與重新導向
  • 在常見主機設定路徑中找出已安裝的伺服器,並標示不在組織允許清單中的伺服器
  • 列出所檢查的主機設定路徑,以及附有 OWASP MCP Top 10 標籤的檢查規則
適用情境
適合在信任一台開發機或一批裝置的 MCP 環境之前先做審查:檢查設定中風險較高的啟動方式、內嵌憑證或過寬的自動核准,稽核 agent 技能,或找出組織允許清單之外的伺服器。
執行需求
以 stdio 在本機執行,通常透過 npx 使用已發佈的 npm 套件。掃描本身不需要帳號、API 金鑰或環境變數。選用的上傳功能需要 GuardBee 儀表板工作區金鑰 GUARDBEE_API_KEY,影子 MCP 探索需要允許清單檔案。下載 MCP Index 需要網路,除非使用離線快取。
安裝前請注意
掃描為唯讀且不會啟動伺服器,但選用的上傳會把清單送到 GuardBee 儀表板,其中包含主機名稱、作業系統與系統使用者名稱,除非排除使用者資訊。遙測預設關閉,可用 GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY 開啟,屆時會傳送工具名稱、耗時與檔案路徑等短參數值。設定與技能檔可能含憑證;報告中的比對結果會去識別化,但仍應確認哪些資料離開本機。

安裝

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 開啟 儀表板中的 Mcp Config Auditor,將其新增到工作區。
  2. 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。

Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。

其他 MCP 客戶端

參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。

README

@guardbee/mcp-config-auditor

🇬🇧 English | 🇹🇷 Türkçe | 🇨🇳 中文 | 🇯🇵 日本語 | 🇰🇷 한국어 | 🇧🇷 Português | 🇪🇸 Español | 🇩🇪 Deutsch

[npm version] [npm downloads] [License: MIT]

An MCP server that audits the MCP client config on a machine: Cursor mcp.json, Claude Desktop claude_desktop_config.json, Windsurf mcp_config.json, and VS Code mcp.json.

mcp-server-auditor reads an MCP server's source. This package reads the config that decides which servers an agent will run. It does not start those servers and it does not send the config anywhere.

Telemetry is off by default. With GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1 it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields like content, token or password are replaced with a placeholder. See @guardbee/mcp-telemetry.

Claude ──► mcp-config-auditor ──► mcp.json  (or host-wide discover)              │              ├─ Unpinned package     (npx -y pkg, @latest)              ├─ Typosquat            (one edit from a known server package)              ├─ Secret in env/args              ├─ autoApprove "*"              ├─ Remote HTTP without auth              ├─ Cross-server shadowing (when you pass a tool inventory)              ├─ Agent SKILL.md (allowed-tools, body, lookalike names)              └─ Shadow MCP discover  (OWASP MCP09 — host paths + org allowlist)

Checks

PatternSeverityOWASPWhat it means
unpinned_packagehighMCP04:2025A launcher (npx, uvx, pnpm, yarn, bunx, pipx) runs a package with no major.minor.patch pin
unpinned_container_imagehighMCP04:2025docker run / podman run starts an image by tag, not by @sha256: digest
typosquat_packagecriticalMCP04:2025The package name is one edit from a known MCP server package
secret_in_envcriticalMCP01:2025A credential-shaped value or a sensitive key with a long literal
secret_in_argscriticalMCP01:2025A token on the command line
auto_approve_wildcardcriticalMCP02:2025autoApprove / alwaysAllow is * or true
cleartext_remotehighMCP07:2025A non-loopback http:// URL
unauthenticated_remotehigh/mediumMCP07:2025A non-loopback URL with no Authorization / API-key header and no token env var
cross_server_tool_shadowhighMCP03:2025The same tool name on two servers
confusable_tool_namecriticalMCP03:2025Homoglyph or one-edit tool names across servers
cross_server_tool_redirecthighMCP03:2025A description tells the model to call another server's tool
skill_unrestricted_shellcriticalMCP02:2025allowed-tools includes bare Bash, shell, or *
skill_unrestricted_writehighMCP02:2025allowed-tools includes Write or Edit with no path limit
skill_instruction_overridecriticalMCP06:2025The skill tells the model to ignore prior instructions
skill_covert_instructioncriticalMCP06:2025The skill tells the model to hide its behavior from the user
skill_secret_file_readcriticalMCP01:2025The skill tells the model to read .ssh, .env, or a similar file
skill_at_secret_refcriticalMCP01:2025An @ reference inlines a credential path
secret_in_skillcriticalMCP01:2025A literal token is written in the skill file
skill_name_shadowhighMCP03:2025Two SKILL.md files use the same name
skill_confusable_namecriticalMCP03:2025Two skill names differ only by a lookalike character
shadow_mcp_serverhighMCP09:2025discover — server installed on the host but not on the org allowlist
allowlist_not_configuredmediumMCP09:2025discover ran without an allowlist
unreviewed_mcp_serverlowMCP09:2025Server seen during discover with no allowlist yet
mcp_server_drift_across_clientsmediumMCP09:2025Same server key maps to different packages/URLs in two clients
mcp_index_grade_below_minimumhigh (F: critical)MCP04:2025--min-grade — the server's GuardBee MCP Index grade is below the minimum

Loopback URLs (localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1) are not remote findings. Placeholder values (${API_KEY}, changeme) are not secrets. Reported secret matches are redacted. Bash(git diff:*) is a command allowlist and is not an unrestricted shell. Read alone is not flagged.

Quick start

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "guardbee-mcp-config-auditor": {      "command": "npx",      "args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-config-auditor"]    }  }}
bash
npx @guardbee/mcp-config-auditor scan .cursor/mcp.json --fail-on=high --format=sarif > results.sarifnpx @guardbee/mcp-config-auditor inventory ./tool-inventory.jsonnpx @guardbee/mcp-config-auditor discover --allowlist=./mcp-allowlist.json --fail-on=high

GuardBee MCP Index grades

--grades (on scan <file> and discover) shows the GuardBee MCP Index grade of every configured server: an A–F trust grade for each server in the official MCP Registry, rebuilt weekly from its published package. The grade comes from the shipped code (the GuardBee scanners), known vulnerabilities and malware (OSV), Sigstore build provenance and maintenance signals; the rubric is public and versioned. --min-grade=C also reports every server graded below C (mcp_index_grade_below_minimum, so --fail-on can gate on it).

bash
npx @guardbee/mcp-config-auditor discover --min-grade=C#   A  filesystem  npm:@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem  graded @modelcontextprotocol/[email protected]#   D  notes       npm:notes-mcp                                graded [email protected] (the config runs the latest version)#   –  internal    local command: not a registry package

The whole index is downloaded (and cached for a day in ~/.guardbee/mcp-index.json) and searched on this machine, so no server or package name is sent anywhere. --offline uses the cache only; --index-url= points at another copy. Local commands, remote URLs and servers outside the official registry have no grade and are never findings.

Shadow MCP discover (MCP09)

Walks well-known Cursor / Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Windsurf / VS Code / Gemini CLI / Cline / Zed paths on this machine and compares every installed server to an organization allowlist. Does not start servers. Claude Code's per-project servers (projects["<path>"].mcpServers in ~/.claude.json) are listed under claude-code:<path>; Zed's context_servers and JSON with comments are understood.

Inventory. --format=json adds an inventory: for every server its client, config path, name, transport, command and arguments, npm/PyPI package with version and whether it is pinned, URL, the names of its env variables and headers, auto-approve, and the findings for it. It never holds a secret: env and header values are left out, argument values after --token/--api-key-style flags, KEY=value pairs, provider tokens and passwords in connection strings are [redacted], and URLs lose their credentials and query values. --format=text prints the same list; --format=sarif the findings.

Fleet. FLEET.md has Jamf, Intune, systemd and CI recipes. --allowlist-from-dashboard checks against the organization allowlist admins manage in the dashboard (merged with --allowlist when both are given), and --grades adds MCP Index grades to the uploaded inventory.

Organisation-wide. --upload sends the inventory to the GuardBee dashboard (GUARDBEE_API_KEY, a workspace key with the gateway.write scope), which keeps the latest inventory per machine; run it from your device-management tool or a login script. The machine's host name, OS and OS user name are included — --no-user leaves the user out.

bash
GUARDBEE_API_KEY=gb_… npx @guardbee/mcp-config-auditor discover --allowlist=./mcp-allowlist.json --upload --fail-on=none

Allowlist JSON:

json
{  "names": ["filesystem", "github"],  "packages": ["@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "@guardbee/mcp-secret-scanner"],  "hosts": ["mcp.example.com"]}

Or lines: name:filesystem, package:@scope/pkg, host:mcp.example.com, or a bare server name.

A directory scan opens mcp.json, mcp_config.json, claude_desktop_config.json, and SKILL.md. Pass a file path to scan any other name. A file named SKILL.md is audited as an agent skill. Same-name and lookalike skill findings appear on a directory scan, because one file cannot see the others.

guardbee.yml:

yaml
mcp-config-auditor:  fail-on: high  max-files: 5000  exclude:    - "fixtures/"

Tool inventory shape:

json
{  "servers": [    { "name": "github", "tools": [{ "name": "create_issue", "description": "Open an issue" }] }  ]}

Shadowing needs that inventory because a client config does not list tools. rug-pull-detector can collect a live tools/list; this package compares several of those lists.

Feedback

Questions, ideas, or a false positive? Start a thread in GitHub Discussions or open an issue. If GuardBee is useful to you, a ⭐ on the repository helps others find it.

來源:packages/mcp-config-auditor/README.md,提交 8cc1e03

工具

8

scan_config_text

Scan an MCP client config JSON string (Cursor mcp.json, Claude Desktop, Windsurf, or VS Code) for unpinned packages, secrets, wildcard auto-approve, unauthenticated remote endpoints, and typosquats.

輸入參數labelcontent必填

scan_file

Scan one MCP client config file, or a SKILL.md agent skill when the file has that name.

輸入參數path必填

scan_skill_text

Scan one agent SKILL.md (YAML frontmatter plus body) for unrestricted allowed-tools, instruction override, credential file reads, and literal secrets. Name collisions across skills require a directory scan.

輸入參數labelcontent必填

scan_directory

Find mcp.json, mcp_config.json, claude_desktop_config.json, and SKILL.md under a directory and audit each one. A directory scan also compares skill names. Does not start any MCP server.

輸入參數path必填excludemaxFiles

scan_inventory

Detect cross-server tool shadowing from an inventory of tool catalogs. Pass the tool names and descriptions already collected from each installed server. This tool does not connect to those servers.

輸入參數inventory必填

discover_shadow_mcp

OWASP MCP09:2025 — discover MCP client configs in well-known host paths (Cursor, Claude Desktop, Windsurf, VS Code, Claude Code) and flag servers that are not on an organization allowlist (Shadow MCP). Does not start any MCP server.

輸入參數homeallowlistincludeContentAudit

list_host_config_paths

List the well-known MCP client config paths this auditor checks during shadow (MCP09) discovery on the current OS.

輸入參數home

list_patterns

List the MCP config, agent skill, shadow-MCP discovery, and cross-server shadowing checks, with their OWASP MCP Top 10 tags.

無需輸入參數。

版本歷史

6
  1. v0.9.0最新Nov 1, 2026
  2. v0.8.1Oct 30, 2026
  3. v0.7.0Oct 29, 2026
  4. v0.6.2Oct 22, 2026
  5. v0.6.1Oct 22, 2026
  6. v0.5.0Oct 14, 2026

評分

已滿足適用檢查項的 90%

該評分衡量此收錄條目的完整程度,依據註冊中心條目、端點與公開來源計算得出。它不是對伺服器本身的評價,也不表示伺服器安全或目前可用:可連通性是帶日期的檢查結果,評分也不包含安裝量或使用者評價。

  • 近 30 天內可連通25 分
  • 已宣告認證方式10 分

    請在註冊中心條目中宣告憑證請求標頭,或保持端點能夠回應探測,以便判定其認證方式。

  • 已列出工具必需15 分
  • 描述必需15 分
  • 圖示10 分
  • 文件15 分
  • 授權條款10 分