Docker Compose Audit

io.github.UnbearableDev由 GitHub 帳號 UnbearableDev 發布v1.0.0更新於 Oct 24, 2026

Security audit for docker-compose.yml — 25 checks: secrets, privileges, network, volumes, images.

發布方自己的服務：audit.domains - Domain Valuation

已驗證Streamable HTTP可網頁執行雲端與基礎設施開發者工具安全與監控

服務詳細資訊

識別碼: io.github.UnbearableDev/docker-compose-audit
傳輸: Streamable HTTP
執行環境: Web executable
信任: Verified
發布於: Sep 16, 2026

安全提示

MCP 服務會接收對話中的工具呼叫請求，並可能執行外部操作。啟用前請先了解該服務能做什麼，並只授予它所需的權限。

註冊中心已驗證此條目所屬的 GitHub 帳號 UnbearableDev。這並不表明該帳號就是產品方。

SourceWeft 的檢查只涵蓋條目是否完整、端點是否回應；不審查伺服器的程式碼，也不審查其工具的行為。

在 README 中新增徽章

向讀者展示該 MCP 服務已收錄於 SourceWeft，徽章連結到本頁。

[![Listed on SourceWeft](https://sourceweft.com/badge/mcp/io.github.UnbearableDev%2Fdocker-compose-audit.svg)](https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.UnbearableDev%2Fdocker-compose-audit?utm_source=readme&utm_medium=badge)

概覽

AI 產生的概覽

一個遠端 MCP 伺服器，用來稽核 docker-compose.yml 的安全設定錯誤，回傳含嚴重等級、修復說明與 YAML 修正片段的報告。

可以做什麼: 對 compose 檔案執行完整安全稽核，回傳結構化報告，包含嚴重等級、受影響服務、問題描述、修復建議與可直接貼上的 YAML 修正片段；輸入可為貼上的 YAML 或公開 HTTPS 網址。依類別個別檢查：權限與能力、網路暴露、磁碟區掛載與檔案系統、密鑰衛生、資源限制、映像固定、健康檢查與重啟策略、日誌、Compose 規格衛生。瀏覽檢查項目錄，可依類別篩選。
適用情境: 適合在部署前請助理審查 docker-compose.yml、排查權限、網路、密鑰或磁碟區相關風險，或為正在編輯的 compose 檔案產生具體修正建議。
執行需求: 遠端 streamable HTTP 端點；需要 Apify API 權杖，透過 Authorization bearer 標頭傳送。稽核接受不超過 1 MB 的貼上 YAML 或公開 HTTPS 網址（抓取逾時 5 秒，最多 3 次重新導向）。工作階段閒置 5 分鐘後逾時。

安裝前請注意

依事件計費：每次稽核或分類檢查呼叫 0.02 美元，目錄查詢 0.005 美元，重複呼叫會產生費用。Apify 權杖屬於憑證，應妥善保密。compose 內容或你提供的網址會傳送到遠端服務。僅做靜態分析，不掃描映像，也不檢查執行中的容器。

安裝

在 SourceWeft 中

開啟儀表板中的 Docker Compose Audit，將其新增到工作區。
連接 Authorization token 憑證。它們會被私密儲存，絕不會在公開頁面上展示。
為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。

Web executable，透過 Streamable HTTP。遠端服務在工作區中設定後即可從網頁執行環境執行。

交給代理程式安裝

把這段提示詞貼上到 Claude Code、Codex、Cursor 等代理程式，或 SourceWeft 對話中。代理程式會讀取該伺服器的安裝指南，先向你展示發布者、端點和登入方式，經你同意後再把它新增到你的客戶端。金鑰不會寫進任何命令。

閱讀 https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.UnbearableDev%2Fdocker-compose-audit/install.md，並按其中說明把這個 MCP 伺服器接入我的客戶端。修改任何設定之前，先告訴我它的發布者、端點和登入方式，等我確認。不要把 API 金鑰寫進命令或我會提交的檔案；問我金鑰應從哪裡取得。

檢視代理程式所依據的安裝指南

其他 MCP 客戶端

把它新增到你客戶端的 mcpServers 設定中。

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "docker-compose-audit": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://unbearable-dev--docker-compose-audit.apify.actor/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "Bearer <YOUR_TOKEN>"
      }
    }
  }
}

README

Docker Compose Security Audit

MCP server that audits docker-compose.yml files for security misconfigurations. Trivy-grade check catalog, designed for AI agents — every finding ships with a severity rating, full remediation text, and a YAML fix snippet you can paste.

Built by Unbearable Labs. Pay-per-event pricing — you only pay when an audit runs.

Available on

Apify Actor Store — primary, metered usage (PPE)
MCPize — pending submission
MCP.so — pending submission
PulseMCP — pending submission
Smithery — pending submission
Glama — pending submission

Newsletter: Unbearable TechTips Weekly · All Actors: github.com/UnbearableDev

What it does

Point any MCP-capable client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, n8n, Make, Zapier, custom agents) at this server, hand it the contents of a docker-compose.yml, and get back a structured report with:

Severity — high / medium / low / info
Service — which compose service the finding affects
Description — what's wrong and why it matters
Remediation — what to do about it
Fix snippet — YAML you can paste directly into the file

Tools

Tool	Purpose
`audit_compose(compose_yaml? \| compose_url?, min_severity='low')`	Run all checks, return full report
`check_privilege(...)`	Container privilege & capability issues only
`check_network(...)`	Network exposure issues only
`check_filesystem(...)`	Volume mount & filesystem issues only
`check_secrets(...)`	Secret hygiene issues only
`check_resources(...)`	Resource limit issues only
`check_image_hygiene(...)`	Image tag / registry / pinning issues only
`check_runtime_lifecycle(...)`	Healthcheck / restart / init issues only
`check_logging(...)`	Logging driver / rotation issues only
`check_compose_hygiene(...)`	Deprecated fields / Compose-spec hygiene only
`list_checks(category?)`	Browse the full check catalog

All audit-running tools accept the same input:

compose_yaml (string) — paste the YAML content directly, OR
compose_url (string) — public HTTPS URL to fetch (e.g. GitHub raw URL)

Provide exactly one. min_severity defaults to low (drops info findings); set to medium or high to filter further.

Example response (truncated)

json

{  "summary": {    "total_findings": 14,    "by_severity": {"high": 3, "medium": 6, "low": 5, "info": 0},    "by_category": {"privilege": 4, "network": 3, "secrets": 2, "...": 5}  },  "findings": [    {      "id": "DCS-002",      "category": "privilege",      "severity": "high",      "service": "web",      "title": "Privileged mode enabled",      "description": "Service 'web' has `privileged: true`...",      "remediation": "Remove `privileged: true`. If you need specific capabilities...",      "fix_yaml_snippet": "    # remove `privileged: true`; if needed, use cap_add or devices selectively",      "references": ["CIS-Docker-5.4", "NIST-800-190"]    },    ...  ]}

{  "summary": {    "total_findings": 14,    "by_severity": {"high": 3, "medium": 6, "low": 5, "info": 0},    "by_category": {"privilege": 4, "network": 3, "secrets": 2, "...": 5}  },  "findings": [    {      "id": "DCS-002",      "category": "privilege",      "severity": "high",      "service": "web",      "title": "Privileged mode enabled",      "description": "Service 'web' has `privileged: true`...",      "remediation": "Remove `privileged: true`. If you need specific capabilities...",      "fix_yaml_snippet": "    # remove `privileged: true`; if needed, use cap_add or devices selectively",      "references": ["CIS-Docker-5.4", "NIST-800-190"]    },    ...  ]}

Pricing

You pay only when a tool is invoked. No subscription, no monthly minimums.

Check catalog (25 live in v1, growing toward 54)

Category	Live checks
Privilege	Root user (DCS-001), privileged mode (DCS-002), dangerous capabilities (DCS-003), `cap_add: ALL` (DCS-004), `cap_drop: ALL` missing (DCS-005), `no-new-privileges` missing (DCS-006)
Network	`network_mode: host` (DCS-010), port bound to 0.0.0.0 (DCS-011), SSH port exposed (DCS-013), DB port exposed (DCS-014)
Filesystem	`/var/run/docker.sock` mount (DCS-018), host root mount (DCS-019), sensitive host paths (DCS-020)
Secrets	Hardcoded secret in env (DCS-026), secret-pattern env without Docker secrets (DCS-027)
Resources	No memory limit (DCS-032), no CPU limit (DCS-033), no PID limit (DCS-034)
Image hygiene	Unpinned / `:latest` image (DCS-037)
Runtime lifecycle	No healthcheck (DCS-043), no restart policy (DCS-044)
Logging	No log driver (DCS-048), no log rotation (DCS-049)
Compose hygiene	Deprecated `version:` field (DCS-051), `depends_on` without healthcheck condition (DCS-052)

Use list_checks to get the canonical, up-to-date catalog with IDs, severities, and titles.

Connecting from Claude Desktop

Add to your MCP config:

json

{  "mcpServers": {    "compose-audit": {      "transport": "streamable-http",      "url": "https://YOUR-ACTOR-URL.apify.actor/mcp"    }  }}

{  "mcpServers": {    "compose-audit": {      "transport": "streamable-http",      "url": "https://YOUR-ACTOR-URL.apify.actor/mcp"    }  }}

(Replace YOUR-ACTOR-URL with the Standby URL shown on the Apify Store page after you start the Actor.)

Limits

YAML size: 1 MB cap per audit call
URL fetch: 5-second timeout, max 3 redirects, HTTPS only
Session timeout: 5 minutes of inactivity

What's NOT covered (yet)

Pure static analysis of the compose file only. Out of scope for this version:

Image vulnerability scanning (use Trivy / Grype for that)
Live container inspection
Kubernetes / Helm manifests (different surface)
Dockerfile-specific lint (use Hadolint)

The next 29 checks on the v1.x → v2 roadmap include build-context security, additional capability checks, secret-pattern detection in build args, and registry trust verification.