Cork

io.github.WYRE-AI由 GitHub 帳號 WYRE-AI 發布v1.0.1更新於 Oct 27, 2026

MCP server for Cork's cyber-insurance API for MSPs.

概覽

AI 產生的概覽

針對 MSP 的 Cork 網路保險 API 唯讀 MCP 伺服器,讓助理查詢客戶、風險與合規、漏洞、保單與發票資訊。

可以做什麼
  • 列出客戶及其保單狀態、整合租戶與近期 Cork Cyber Score,以及客戶的裝置、電子郵件網域、收件匣與評分歷史
  • 檢視風險與合規:政策違規與風險事件、通知設定、事件類型,以及含 CVSS/EPSS/KEV 詳情的 CVE 或依產品彙整的漏洞
  • 檢視整合:可連接與已連接的整合類型,以及從整合觀測到的裝置、租戶與使用者
  • 查詢保單、帳單發票及其明細項目,以及經銷商管理的合作夥伴子帳戶
  • 查看軟體安裝歷史、可安裝的軟體套件與一次性 RMM 安裝說明,並辨識目前驗證的使用者
適用情境
適合 MSP 或經銷商人員讓助理在不開啟 Cork 管理後台的情況下,回答客戶涵蓋範圍、網路安全評分、合規事件、漏洞曝險與帳務相關問題。它是唯讀的報表查詢入口,不能用來變更 Cork 中的任何內容。
執行需求
以本機 stdio 程序執行(Docker 映像 ghcr.io/wyre-ai/cork-mcp,或從原始碼以 npm 建置)。需要 Cork 管理後台產生的 API 金鑰:env 模式下透過 CORK_API_KEY 環境變數提供,gateway 模式下由每個請求的 X-Cork-Api-Key 標頭傳入。選用設定包括 AUTH_MODE、MCP_TRANSPORT、LOG_LEVEL,以及用於 HTTP sidecar 驗證的 CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET。需要能連線至 Cork 的 API。
安裝前請注意
此 API 金鑰是有效的 bearer 權杖,擁有建立它的 Cork 使用者全部權限;Cork 未提供唯讀金鑰類型,因此金鑰本身很可能也能存取寫入、刪除與回傳憑證的端點,儘管本伺服器從不呼叫它們。請將 CORK_API_KEY 視為敏感機密。回傳資料包含客戶裝置、網域、收件匣、漏洞與發票,並會傳送給助理與模型供應商。僅限桌面本機程序。

安裝

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 開啟 儀表板中的 Cork,將其新增到工作區。
  2. 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。

Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。

其他 MCP 客戶端

參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。

README

Cork MCP Server

MCP server for Cork's cyber-insurance API for MSPs - clients and their warranty/coverage status, Cork Cyber Score history, risk & compliance events, software vulnerabilities (CVE/CVSS/EPSS/KEV), connected integrations, invoices, distributor partners, and software-installer metadata - for AI assistants and the WYRE Conduit gateway.

Authentication

Cork authenticates with a static Bearer API key, generated in Cork's Admin UI (Settings -> API). Cork's OpenAPI spec also documents an OAuth2 flow for their own remote MCP server, but the underlying credential is the same API key - this connector never performs an OAuth dance, it only ever holds a live bearer key, sent as Authorization: Bearer <key> to Cork's API. In gateway mode the key arrives per-request via the X-Cork-Api-Key header; in local/stdio mode it's read once from CORK_API_KEY.

Configuration

Env varDescription
CORK_API_KEYBearer API key issued by Cork's Admin UI.
MCP_TRANSPORTstdio (default) or http.
AUTH_MODEenv (default, reads the var above) or gateway (credential arrives per-request via the X-Cork-Api-Key header, injected by the Conduit gateway).
CONDUIT_S2S_SECRETWhen set, the HTTP transport requires a valid X-Gateway-S2S header (Conduit sidecar auth) on every /mcp request.
LOG_LEVELdebug | info (default) | warn | error.

Request limits

  • HTTP request bodies are capped at 256 KiB (262144 bytes). After the X-Gateway-S2S check (and, in gateway mode, the X-Cork-Api-Key presence check, both 401) passes, a Content-Length above the cap returns 413 with a JSON-RPC error; bodies without Content-Length are capped by the MCP SDK transport. Unauthenticated requests still get 401 first.
  • tools/call arguments are capped at 10,000 elements (every array item and object key at any depth). Larger inputs return an isError tool result and are never dispatched.

These limits address CVE-2026-111768 / GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453 (memory exhaustion during validation) and GHSA-f897-62hf-6gxq (no request body / batch cap).

Tools

Clients

  • cork_get_clients - list clients with warranty status, integration tenants, and recent Cork Cyber Scores.
  • cork_get_client_devices - list devices observed for a client across all connected integrations.
  • cork_get_client_domains - list email domains observed for a client.
  • cork_get_client_inboxes - list email inboxes observed for a client.
  • cork_get_client_score_history - list a client's full Cork Cyber Score history, newest first.

Risk & Compliance

  • cork_get_compliance_events - list policy violations and risk events detected for a client's assets.
  • cork_get_compliance_notification_settings - list notification/alerting rules for compliance events.
  • cork_get_compliance_event_types - list all compliance event types with descriptions and cure periods.
  • cork_get_software_vulnerabilities - list individual CVEs with CVSS/EPSS/KEV details.
  • cork_get_software_vulnerability_summary - get a rollup of CVEs grouped by software product.

Integrations - read-only subset

  • cork_get_available_integrations - list integration types that can be connected to Cork.
  • cork_get_connected_integrations - list integrations connected to Cork.
  • cork_get_integration_devices - list devices observed from an integration.
  • cork_get_integration_tenants - list customer tenants observed from an integration.
  • cork_get_integration_users - list users observed from an integration.

Warranty

  • cork_get_warranties - list active cyber warranty packages.

Invoice

  • cork_get_invoices - list billing invoices.
  • cork_get_invoice_line_items - list billed line items for an invoice.

Distributor - read-only subset

  • cork_get_partners - list partner sub-accounts managed by this distributor.

Software Installer - read-only subset

  • cork_get_installer_history - list past software install attempts.
  • cork_get_software_packages - list software packages available to install.
  • cork_get_installer_setup - get one-time RMM setup instructions for software installs.

Who

  • cork_who_am_i - get information on the authenticated user.

Scope

This is a deliberately narrow, read-only, non-credential-exposing v1 surface, hard-scoped to exactly 23 of Cork's 31 operations (29 documented paths). Every tool is classified isAdmin: true in the Conduit gateway given the sensitivity of insurance/risk/compliance data. Roughly a third of Cork's full API is write- or secret-exposing; none of it is implemented here, by design, not by oversight:

Hard-excluded (credential-exposing) - never implemented:

  • GET /integrations/{uuid}/credentials (get-integration-credentials) - returns the integration's raw stored third-party secrets (credentials: {...}).

Hard-excluded (bulk raw-data exfiltration, excluded out of caution alongside credentials):

  • GET /integrations/{uuid}/raw-data (get-integration-raw-data) - returns a presigned download URL (10-minute expiry) to a client's full raw synced integration data. Not a credential return, but a bulk-data-exfiltration vector gated by "requires distributor privileges" in Cork's own spec. Flagged explicitly for review in the wiring PR rather than silently included.

Hard-excluded (provisioning/mutation) - never implemented:

  • POST /distributor/partners (provision-partner) - provisions a new Partner account.
  • POST /integrations (connect-integration) - connects a new integration and immediately begins syncing data.
  • PATCH /integrations/{uuid} (update-integration) - updates an integration's name and/or credentials.
  • DELETE /integrations/{uuid} (delete-integration) - deletes an integration.
  • POST /integrations/{uuid}/resync (resync-integration) - manually triggers a data refresh.
  • POST /software/installer/install (install-software) - dispatches a real software install to a real managed endpoint through the client's RMM. A genuine remote-software-provisioning action.

They can be added as a follow-up if there's demand, after a deliberate scope decision - not by default.

Credential scope

This connector's own code is read-only by construction — the underlying API key is not. Cork's own documentation states API key permissions are linked to the user who creates them; no read-only or restricted-scope key type is documented. Two separate claims, kept at different confidence levels:

  • Structurally verified (checked directly, stated with full confidence): this connector's own code makes zero write/delete/resync/provisioning calls, and never calls the credentials or raw-data endpoints. Every function in client.ts calls one of the 23 documented read operations above — no wildcard/passthrough call anywhere in src/.
  • Vendor-documented, not independently verified (hedged deliberately): Cork's own docs do not describe any narrower or read-only API key type. A key generated by a full-access Cork user can very likely reach the write/delete/credentials/raw-data operations this connector excludes — this has not been tested against a live key, and WYRE found no vendor-offered way to restrict it further at the credential level.

Do not read this connector, or this README, as having established the underlying API key is itself restricted — only that this connector's own code never attempts anything beyond its 23 read operations.

Development

bash
npm installnpm run buildnpm testnpm run lint   # tsc --noEmit

Docker

bash
docker build -t cork-mcp .docker run -p 8080:8080 -e CORK_API_KEY=... cork-mcp

來源:README.md,提交 3f0372c

工具

0
SourceWeft 曾在隔離沙箱中以無憑證方式啟動該軟體包一次,以列出其工具,但未能完成:該軟體包類型無法在沙箱中執行。

版本歷史

2
  1. v1.0.1最新Oct 22, 2026
  2. v1.0.0Sep 20, 2026

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