AppSec Toolbox MCP

io.github.ai-ronin-systems由 GitHub 帳號 ai-ronin-systems 發布v0.3.0更新於 Oct 26, 2026

Passive AppSec scanners as eight parameterless MCP tools; the audited repository is data.

已驗證STDIO僅桌面開發者工具安全與監控

概覽

AI 產生的概覽

在強化容器中執行十款固定版本的安全掃描器,以八個無參數 MCP 工具對不受信任的程式碼儲存庫進行被動稽核。

可以做什麼
  • 執行完整稽核包或單項掃描:含抑制清單的 SAST、密鑰掃描、相依性與 OSV 檢查、儲存庫與 IaC 掃描、語言專項分析以及 SBOM 產生
  • 取得各掃描器的原生報告,以及把每份報告 SHA-256 與被掃描目錄指紋綁定的執行清單
  • 檢視目標中發現的抑制標記清單,以及每次工具呼叫的稽核日誌
  • 當檔案無法讀取時記錄涵蓋範圍限制,而不是讓整次執行失敗或給出虛假的乾淨結果
適用情境
當需要讓助理稽核你不信任的程式碼儲存庫,並希望取得證據而非結論,同時不提供 shell、不讓它選擇目標路徑、也不執行儲存庫的建置或程式碼時使用。適合需要可重現、帶指紋掃描輸出的安全審查流程。
執行需求
以 stdio 本機程序方式從 OCI 映像(ghcr.io/ai-ronin-systems/appsec-toolbox-mcp:0.3.0)透過 Docker 執行,僅限桌面端。操作者需將一個儲存庫以唯讀方式掛載到 /runner/target,並將一個可寫目錄掛載到 /runner/output。選用環境變數 APPSEC_LANGS 用於選擇語言設定檔(auto、none 或 python,node 之類的清單)。離線模式需事先取得規則與公告資料。
安裝前請注意
被稽核的儲存庫被視為攻擊者,讀取其報告的助理也可能被其引導;容器是安全邊界,掃描器解析器漏洞不在防護範圍內。部分掃描器的行內忽略註解只會被記錄,不會被阻擋。線上模式下遭入侵的掃描器可能外洩資料,離線模式則不連網。執行清單未簽章,能寫入輸出目錄的人可竄改它。助理無法選擇目標,也無法執行八項掃描以外的任何操作。

安裝

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 開啟 儀表板中的 AppSec Toolbox MCP,將其新增到工作區。
  2. 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。

Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。

其他 MCP 客戶端

參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。

README

appsec-toolbox-mcp

[CI] [Release] [License]

Let an AI agent audit code you do not trust, without giving it a shell, a path to choose, or the repository's code to run.

Ten pinned security scanners behind eight parameterless MCP tools, in one hardened container. The audited repository is treated as the attacker. The agent only ever collects evidence.

[An agent connects over MCP, is refused a maintenance target, audits a deliberately vulnerable repository, and reads the findings, run manifest, and audit log]

Recorded from examples/agent_demo.py against examples/vulnerable-sample. Waiting time is shortened; the real scan time is in the last line.

In 30 seconds

  • What it is. Semgrep, Gitleaks, OSV-Scanner, Trivy, Checkov, Syft, and language specialists (Bandit, FindSecBugs, njsscan, gosec) exposed to any MCP client as fixed capabilities: security.sast, security.secrets, security.dependencies, and so on.
  • The threat model. The repository under audit is hostile: it controls every file the scanners parse and every string the agent reads back. So the agent gets nothing to steer: no arguments, no target path, no shell, no way to run the repository's build or code.
  • What you get. Native scanner reports, a run manifest that ties each report's SHA-256 to a recomputable fingerprint of the scanned tree, and an audit log of every tool call.

Engineering highlights

Each claim links to the code or test that proves it.

ProblemApproachProof
A prompt-injected agent with a shell can do anything.The agent's whole surface is eight parameterless tasks, governed by Makefile MCP. Maintenance targets exist but are refused..makefile-mcp.yaml, the demo
Scanning untrusted code usually runs it: setup.py, postinstall, Gradle plugins, Go toolchain downloads, scanner plug-ins.Strictly passive analysis: no build, install, or dependency resolution; Go runs with GOPROXY=off and GOTOOLCHAIN=local. An adversarial review found that a planted .checkov.yaml could make Checkov import the repository's Python; that path is closed and regression-tested.examples/hostile-sample, tests/image.sh
A hostile repository can silence its own findings with .semgrepignore, .gitleaksignore, # nosec, # nosemgrep...Every scanner runs on toolbox-owned configuration. Inline suppressions are disabled where the scanner allows it, and every marker found is inventoried for the reviewer either way.settings table, output/suppressions.json
Evidence is only worth something if it is tied to what was scanned.The manifest fingerprints the tree exactly like find . -type f -print0 | LC_ALL=C sort -z | xargs -0 sha256sum | sha256sum, including file names that are not UTF-8 or that sha256sum escapes, and records each report's digest, tool versions, and data sources.scripts/write-manifest.py, tests/unit/test_manifest.py
One malformed file should not let the target stop the audit.Input a scanner cannot read because of the target (an unloadable Go package, a corrupt lockfile) becomes a recorded coverage limit: not a failed bundle, and not a fake clean result.scripts/run-language-profiles.py, scripts/run-osv.sh
Results should be reproducible, and a compromised scanner should have nowhere to send the code.Offline mode: fetch rule and advisory data once, then scan under --network none. The manifest records the data's age and digest.Offline mode
A security tool is a supply-chain target.Every downloaded binary is checked against its published SHA-256 per architecture; the base image is pinned by digest; Actions are pinned by commit; release jobs that run project code hold no write token; images carry signed build provenance.Dockerfile, release.yml

Verification in layers. Unit tests cover the scripts. A smoke test drives the Makefile through Makefile MCP with fake scanners whose stubs fail if any hardening flag is missing. The image test runs the real scanners against a known-vulnerable sample, a hostile sample that tries every attack above, and offline mode, under the documented resource limits. Independent adversarial reviews attacked the image; every confirmed finding was fixed with a regression test, and what remains is written down in the threat model.

Quick start

bash
IMAGE=ghcr.io/ai-ronin-systems/appsec-toolbox-mcp:0.3.0docker pull "$IMAGE"gh attestation verify "oci://$IMAGE" --owner ai-ronin-systems

Offline mode, the resource limits, and the target-settings hardening are on main and ship in the next release. To use them now: docker build -t appsec-toolbox-mcp:dev . and IMAGE=appsec-toolbox-mcp:dev.

Run it as an MCP stdio server against one repository:

bash
docker run --rm -i \  --read-only --cap-drop=ALL --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true \  --tmpfs /tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,size=3g --memory=6g --pids-limit=512 \  --user "$(id -u):$(id -g)" \  -v "$PWD/my-project:/runner/target:ro" \  -v "$PWD/appsec-output:/runner/output:rw" \  "$IMAGE"

Register the same command as a stdio server in any MCP client:

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "appsec-toolbox": {      "command": "docker",      "args": ["run", "--rm", "-i", "--read-only", "--cap-drop=ALL",               "--security-opt=no-new-privileges:true",               "--tmpfs", "/tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,size=3g", "--memory=6g", "--pids-limit=512",               "-v", "/abs/path/my-project:/runner/target:ro",               "-v", "/abs/path/appsec-output:/runner/output:rw",               "ghcr.io/ai-ronin-systems/appsec-toolbox-mcp:0.3.0"]    }  }}

Compose, offline mode, language selection, and every evidence file are in Usage.

How it works

text
untrusted repository (read-only)          |          v   /runner/target          |          v trusted Makefile + Makefile MCP    |       |       |       |       |       | Semgrep Gitleaks   OSV    Trivy  Checkov   Syft          |          +---- language profile selection ----+                 |       |        |        |               Bandit FindSecBugs njsscan  gosec               Python    Java     Node/JS   Go          |          v    /runner/output   reports, run-manifest.json, suppressions.json, audit log

The operator mounts exactly one repository at /runner/target and one writable directory at /runner/output. The audited path is never an MCP parameter, so the agent has no host-path capability. A trusted Makefile holds every scanner command; Makefile MCP decides which of its targets the agent may call. Language specialists are picked by detection (APPSEC_LANGS=auto) or by the operator, never by the agent.

CapabilityToolEvidence
security.auditeverything belowcomplete bundle
security.sastSemgrep + suppression inventorysemgrep.json, suppressions.json
security.secretsGitleaksgitleaks.json
security.dependenciesOSV-Scannerosv.json
security.repositoryTrivytrivy.json
security.iacCheckovcheckov.json
security.languageBandit, FindSecBugs, njsscan, gosec as applicablelanguage-profile.json + reports
supply_chain.sbomSyftsbom.cdx.json (CycloneDX)

Threat model

The audited repository is the attacker, and the agent reading its reports may be steered by it. Read the threat model: attacker goals, sixteen threats with their controls and residual risks, what is and is not guaranteed, and an operator checklist.

ProtectedNot protected
Target builds, installs, hooks, and Makefiles never run.Scanner parser bugs; the container is the boundary.
Target-owned scanner settings files cannot suppress findings or load code.Inline trivy:ignore and njsscan-ignore comments; Checkov lists its inline skips as skipped_checks. All are inventoried.
The agent cannot pick the target or run anything but the eight scans.An agent that misreports what the reports say.
No credentials in the container; read-only, unprivileged, non-root, resource-capped.Exfiltration by a compromised scanner in online mode. Offline mode runs with no network.
Each run's manifest ties report digests to a fingerprint of the scanned tree.Tampering by anyone who can write output/; the manifest is not signed.

Design choices

  • Evidence, not verdicts. Reports stay in each scanner's native format. The toolbox never grades, deduplicates, or normalizes findings; a consumer does that with the full evidence.
  • One closed set of scanners. Four language profiles, no plug-in framework, no user-defined pipelines. Generic SCA stays with OSV and Trivy; specialists add a different analysis engine, not a duplicate one.
  • Coverage gaps are recorded, never papered over. A source-only Java project gets no FindSecBugs pass, because the toolbox will not compile untrusted code; the manifest says so.
  • Everything pinned. Scanner versions are pinned and updated one at a time against known-positive and hostile fixtures (update policy).

It is not an autonomous auditor, an LLM agent, a DAST engine, a credential manager, a report normalizer, or a shell server.

Part of a larger system

text
appsec-audit-hound (planned)    decides why to scan, correlates evidence, writes findings        | MCPappsec-toolbox-mcp              collects governed, passive evidence   <- this repository        | built onmakefile-mcp                    exposes trusted Make targets to agents, deny-by-default

Makefile MCP is published on PyPI and the official MCP Registry, with its own threat model.

Documentation

DocumentWhat it covers
Threat modelAttacker goals, threats and controls, guarantees, limits, operator checklist
UsageRunning, tools and evidence files, language profiles, offline mode, scanner behaviour, network use, versions, development
ArchitectureTrust boundary, ownership, design rules
ToolingPinned versions, settings each scanner ignores, update policy
Security policySupported versions and private vulnerability reporting
ChangelogReleased and unreleased changes
ContributingHow to add a scanner without widening the boundary

Development

bash
pipx install pytest==8.4.2 && pipx install ruff==0.14.0make test         # ruff, unit tests, smoke testmake imagemake test-image   # the real image: known positives, hostile sample, offline mode

More in Usage.

License

Apache-2.0.

來源:README.md,提交 0bd11d0

工具

0
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版本歷史

1
  1. v0.3.0最新Oct 25, 2026

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