
anon.li
io.github.anondotli由 GitHub 帳號 anondotli 發布v1.0.0更新於 Oct 30, 2026
Manage anon.li email aliases, recipients and encrypted file drop metadata over OAuth.
概覽
anon.li 遠端 MCP 伺服器,讓助理透過 OAuth 管理電子郵件別名、收件人與加密檔案投遞的中繼資料。
- 可以做什麼
- 管理電子郵件別名:建立與設定用來保護真實收件匣的轉寄別名
- 管理收件人:維護轉寄收件人及其個別選項,例如 PGP 加密
- 管理加密檔案投遞中繼資料:處理端對端加密的檔案分享及其到期時間、下載次數限制與密碼保護
- 搭配別名與投遞功能處理加密表單的中繼資料
- 適用情境
- 適合想讓助理代為建立與整理一次性電子郵件別名和轉寄收件人,或在對話中追蹤加密檔案分享狀態的人。對已在使用 anon.li、希望以對話方式完成別名與投遞管理的使用者最有價值。
- 執行需求
- 需連線至 anon.li 的遠端 streamable HTTP 端點,不必在本機安裝套件或執行環境。必須透過 OAuth 授權,因此需要 anon.li 帳號。別名轉寄本身依賴 anon.li 獨立的郵件傳輸服務。
安裝
在 SourceWeft 中
- 開啟 儀表板中的 anon.li,將其新增到工作區。
- 連接 所需的 憑證。它們會被私密儲存,絕不會在公開頁面上展示。
- 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。
Web executable,透過 Streamable HTTP。 遠端服務在工作區中設定後即可從網頁執行環境執行。
交給代理程式安裝
把這段提示詞貼上到 Claude Code、Codex、Cursor 等代理程式,或 SourceWeft 對話中。代理程式會讀取該伺服器的安裝指南,先向你展示發布者、端點和登入方式,經你同意後再把它新增到你的客戶端。金鑰不會寫進任何命令。
閱讀 https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.anondotli%2Fanon-li/install.md,並按其中說明把這個 MCP 伺服器接入我的客戶端。修改任何設定之前,先告訴我它的發布者、端點和登入方式,等我確認。不要把 API 金鑰寫進命令或我會提交的檔案;問我金鑰應從哪裡取得。其他 MCP 客戶端
把它新增到你客戶端的 mcpServers 設定中。 客戶端會在首次連接時完成 OAuth 登入。
{
"mcpServers": {
"anon-li": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://anon.li/api/mcp"
}
}
}README
Open-source email aliasing, end-to-end encrypted file sharing, and encrypted forms. Privacy by default.
👋 Welcome! If you prefer a visual tour, check out our 2-minute intro video on YouTube.
[License: AGPL v3] [Source on GitHub]
Why anon.li?
We built anon.li because we were tired of handing our sensitive files and real email addresses to black-box companies.
- Email aliases that protect your real inbox - without switching email providers. Keep using Gmail, Proton, or Fastmail; we just sit in the middle and block the spam.
- AES-256-GCM encrypted file sharing - we can't read your files, by design. Your browser encrypts the file before it ever hits the network. The decryption key lives in the URL fragment, so it is never transmitted to our servers.
- Encrypted forms - collect sensitive responses without putting plaintext in the database. Form answers and attachments are encrypted in the submitter's browser for the form owner or team.
- Open-source web application (AGPL v3) - verify the implementation. Audit the browser cryptography, access controls, REST API, MCP server, and application data model in this repository.
Products
Alias - Anonymous Email Forwarding
Create unique aliases for every service. Reply from your aliases without ever exposing your real identity. Emails pass through our servers for forwarding instead of being stored in a hosted mailbox.
- 10 random + 1 custom alias on Free; unlimited random + 100 custom aliases on Pro
- Anonymous replies via SRS
- Optional PGP encryption per recipient
- Custom domain support on paid plans
- Encrypted labels and notes in your vault
- One-click disable to instantly stop spam
Drop - End-to-End Encrypted File Sharing
Share files securely. Everything is encrypted in your browser using AES-256-GCM.
- Zero-knowledge architecture
- Automatic expiration (1–30 days)
- Download limits and password protection
- File previews count as downloads because they expose full encrypted file bytes
- Up to 250GB per transfer (Pro)
- No account required for the recipient to download
Form - End-to-End Encrypted Data Collection
Build forms whose responses are encrypted in the respondent's browser. The application stores ciphertext and encrypted owner keys; authorized owners decrypt responses locally after unlocking their vault.
- Text, choice, rating, scale, and file-upload fields
- Per-owner and shared-team encryption keys
- Retention and submission limits enforced server-side
- Encrypted CSV/ZIP export in the browser
[!IMPORTANT] This repository contains the Next.js web application and control plane. The production SMTP/Haraka delivery pipeline that receives and forwards alias email is a separate service and is not included here. You can run and develop Alias management locally, but end-to-end email forwarding requires your own compatible mail transport.
Quick Start
anon.li is an integration-backed application and deliberately fails fast when required infrastructure is missing. Local development requires Bun >= 1.4.3, Node.js 24, and credentials for the services below.
PostgreSQL, an S3-compatible stand-in for R2, and an Upstash-compatible Redis REST endpoint can run locally with docker compose up -d (or podman compose); see the local development guide for the matching .env values, Turnstile test keys, Stripe CLI webhooks, and current limitations.
Open http://localhost:3000. Blank optional provider variables are normalized as disabled; required variables are validated at startup. Use independent generated values for AUTH_SECRET, CRON_SECRET, IP_HASH_PEPPER, REPORT_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and DKIM_ENCRYPTION_KEY as documented in .env.example.
When you change prisma/schema.prisma, create a migration with bun run db:migrate --name concise_migration_name and commit it. Avoid bun run db:push except on a throwaway database: it skips objects that exist only in migration SQL (such as the partial unique index domains_domain_verified_key) and leaves no migration history, so db:migrate:deploy can no longer be applied to that database.
Before opening a pull request, run the same checks enforced by CI:
Production deployment
Production databases must be updated with the committed Prisma migrations. Do not use prisma db push in production; it bypasses the reviewed migration history.
Set every required variable documented in .env.example in the deployment platform, back up the database before applying migrations, and run bun run db:migrate:deploy once per release before starting the new application version. The build command regenerates the Prisma client automatically. Use HTTPS for every public service origin; plain HTTP is accepted only for loopback development endpoints.
Vercel deployments also require CRON_SECRET and Upstash Redis. The production schedules are intentionally limited to Hobby-compatible daily/weekly expressions; see the cron operations runbook for the schedule, rollout checks, and failure handling.
Client-IP rate limits trust one edge only. Vercel is detected automatically. On a self-hosted origin behind Cloudflare, set TRUSTED_PROXY_PROVIDER=cloudflare and restrict direct origin traffic to Cloudflare's network; otherwise forwarding headers are spoofable.
One-time Cloudflare R2 setup
anon.li Drop uploads and downloads blob data directly between the browser and R2 via S3 presigned URLs, avoiding server-side relay bottlenecks. Download URLs are short-lived; multipart upload URLs are bound to an upload ID, part number, and exact encrypted byte length and last up to seven days so very large transfers can complete.
- Create an R2 bucket and keep it private. Disable its public
r2.devURL and do not attach a public custom domain. Public object access would bypass Drop expiry, revocation, recipient, and download-limit checks. - Create R2 API credentials with object read/write access to that bucket, then set
R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID,R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY,R2_BUCKET_NAME, and the account S3 API endpoint (R2_ENDPOINT=https://<account_id>.r2.cloudflarestorage.com) in.env. - Configure the bucket's CORS rules to allow
GET,HEAD, andPUTfrom your application origin and expose theETagresponse header. Browser transfers still go directly to R2; R2 does not charge internet egress fees.
Cloudflare presigned URLs are supported on the S3 API domain, not on custom domains. Treat private-bucket access as a security requirement, not only a deployment preference.
Architecture and trust boundaries
- Drop and Form content is encrypted with Web Crypto in the browser. Share-link keys stay in URL fragments, which browsers do not send in HTTP requests.
- The application server is trusted for authentication, authorization, quotas, expiry, download counters, and encrypted-key distribution. It must never receive ordinary Drop/Form plaintext keys.
- R2 must remain private. Clients receive short-lived, operation-specific presigned URLs only after application policy checks.
- PostgreSQL stores account data, policy metadata, ciphertext metadata, and wrapped keys. Redis is availability- and abuse-sensitive, so security-critical limits fail closed when it is unavailable.
- Alias forwarding is not zero-knowledge: a compatible mail transport necessarily handles message content while forwarding it. See the security documentation for the production retention model.
Tech Stack
Next.js 16 (App Router) · React 19 · PostgreSQL + Prisma · Better Auth (magic links, email/password, TOTP 2FA) · Cloudflare R2 · Stripe · Upstash Redis · Resend · Tailwind CSS + shadcn/ui
Links
- Live site: anon.li
- Security architecture: anon.li/security
- API docs: anon.li/docs/api
- Service status: status.anon.li
- Contributing: CONTRIBUTING.md
- Source code: github.com/anondotli/anon.li
- Report vulnerabilities: [email protected]
Legal & License
Jurisdiction: Liechtenstein · Privacy Policy · Terms · AUP · DMCA
GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 - Copyright © 2026 anon.li.
來源:README.md,提交 4e187f6
工具
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1- v1.0.0最新Oct 22, 2026
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