Ramen: self-hosted MCP for teams

io.github.bkraad47v0.6.21更新於 Oct 5, 2026

Self-hosted MCP for teams: deploy your own tools from git, control who uses them, audit every call.

已驗證Streamable HTTP可網頁執行Developer ToolsCloud & InfrastructureSecurity & Monitoring

概覽

AI 產生的概覽

自架 MCP 平台,把 git 儲存庫中的 Python 工具部署成多區域 MCP 工作節點,支援群組金鑰、OAuth 與稽核日誌。

功能
Ramen 把包含工具、資源與提示詞的 git 儲存庫部署成一組位於雲端負載平衡器之後的 MCP 工作節點。每個工作節點由一個 Rust MCP 節點(Streamable HTTP 與 gRPC、Bearer 驗證、IP 允許清單、健康檢查、日誌)搭配一個 Python 3.14 執行環境,後者以 pip 安裝並執行你的程式碼。主控台可管理群組、環境、區域、密鑰、金絲雀部署、再平衡、IP 規則、日誌、稽核與備份。用戶端透過 POST /mcp 的 Streamable HTTP 或 stdio 橋接連線。
適用情境
當團隊想從 git 自行託管 MCP 工具、控管呼叫權限,並為每次呼叫留下稽核紀錄時使用。它適合需要在 GCP 或 AWS Kubernetes 上執行多區域、金絲雀部署的 MCP 工作節點,而非每個工具一個容器的組織。
執行需求
遠端端點位於 Docker(compose v2)、uv、git 與 make。雲端部署面向 GCP(GKE、Firestore、GCS、Secret Manager、Cloud Armor)或 AWS(EKS、DynamoDB、S3、Secrets Manager、WAF)。用戶端需送出 Authorization Bearer 憑證(rmk_ MCP 金鑰或 OAuth 權杖)以及 ramen-group 與 ramen-zone 標頭。
安裝前請注意
Authorization 標頭攜帶群組 MCP 金鑰或 OAuth 權杖;rmk_ MCP 金鑰與 rmn_ API 金鑰不可互換。群組的程式碼執行在持有該群組密鑰的行程中,群組之間的隔離依賴 Pod、命名空間與各區域的身分。來源允許清單預設為空,IP 規則在設定前預設允許全部。部署會以一般呼叫方式冒煙測試 tools/list,因此 IP 鎖定必須包含主控台自身的網段。

安裝

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 開啟 儀表板中的 Ramen: self-hosted MCP for teams,將其新增到工作區。
  2. 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。

Web executable,透過 Streamable HTTP。 遠端服務在工作區中設定後即可從網頁執行環境執行。

其他 MCP 客戶端

把它新增到你客戶端的 mcpServers 設定中。

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "ramen": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://{ramen_edge}/mcp"
    }
  }
}

README

[Project Ramen]

Multizone, highly available, enterprise-grade MCP server for GCP and AWS Kubernetes.
Rust MCP node + Python 3.14 runtime workers, Streamable HTTP at the edge and gRPC inside, managed from a FastAPI console.

[release] [ci] [docs] [license] [MCP]

Docs: https://bkraad47.github.io/ramen/ · Get started · The MCP repo · Connect a client with OAuth · How it works · Deploy on GCP · Deploy on AWS · Contracts · Releases

Streamable HTTP is the front door. Every worker serves POST /mcp — a URL and a bearer header, nothing to install — next to the gRPC service it has had since 0.3.1, on the same port, through the same guards. Phones, browsers and hosted agent platforms connect directly; the stdio bridge stays for clients that only speak stdio. Per-user access through OAuth (the console is the authorization server), live-verified on GKE since 0.5.1.

What is true today, before the pitch. Current release 0.6.23. The local stack and CI prove both transports on real node processes on Linux and Windows. One GKE cluster has proved the gRPC path end to end (0.3.2, 0.4.0) and the HTTP path with OAuth through the same load balancer (0.5.1, with a publicly trusted certificate since 0.5.5). The AWS path has been applied to a real account since 0.5.6, and the published bridge was server-tested against it in 0.5.8. 0.6.1 itself was deployed on both, two zones each, on 2026-10-04/05: canary deploys (the stable track waits for the canary), POST /mcp over HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 through the load balancer, per-token throttling shared across zones through Redis, OAuth sign-in through the bridge, the base URI, and zone teardown. Everything below is written so those lines stay findable.

Ramen turns a git repo of tools, resources and prompts into a fleet of MCP workers behind a cloud load balancer. Each worker pairs a Rust MCP node (Streamable HTTP and gRPC, bearer auth, IP allow-lists, health, logs) 1:1 with a Python 3.14 runtime that pip-installs and runs your code. One console manages groups (tenants), environments, zones, secrets, canary deploys, rebalancing, IP rules, logs, audit and backups — in the browser or through an API key.

  • Git → bucket → worker. Deploy syncs the repo to a bucket; workers load by content hash. No git creds on pods.
  • Canary by default. Roll a canary, smoke-test tools/list, then roll stable. Failure leaves stable untouched.
  • Multi-zone from day one. Group → Environment → Zone → Worker; the LB routes on ramen-group / ramen-zone metadata, so one client config works for every zone.
  • Enterprise controls. A role per group (Group Admin, Viewer or MCP User) plus global super admins, rmk_ MCP keys, rmn_ API keys, IP rules (per zone at the node, one Cloud Armor policy per group at the edge), secrets that are never displayed, an audit line for every action.
  • Transport: Streamable HTTP at the edge, gRPC inside. POST /mcp for any client that can make an HTTP request; ramen.v1.Mcp/Call for teams that want gRPC internally. One set of guards serves both — the same functions, spelled 401 / 403 / 429 on one and UNAUTHENTICATED / PERMISSION_DENIED / RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED on the other — so the two paths cannot drift.
  • Cheaper: one Deployment per zone, not one per tool. A worker is one Rust node plus one Python runtime that loads every tool of the group. A team with thirty small tools runs them on one Deployment per zone (two pods with a canary), behind one load balancer. Container-per-MCP-server designs run thirty. Autoscaling adds pods for load, not for tool count.
  • Secure, in one sentence. User code never runs in the process that holds the keys and does the auth: the Rust node checks every call and hands the message to a separate Python process it can kill and respawn.

Built on how organizations work

Groups own tools in git, environments pin a ref and a set of zones, people hold a role per group, agents and clients sign in as themselves, and every deploy is a canary, a smoke test and a rollout. Underneath it is gRPC, JSON-RPC 2.0 and a Rust node; you code in Python. The longer argument is How it works and why.

Start here · the demo group repo ramen-demo-mcp-group (point a group at it and press Deploy) · the stdio bridge ramen-mcp-bridge on PyPI (pip install ramen-mcp-bridge; signs you in with --oauth or carries a group key) · HTTP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop and Cursor need neither: they connect with a group key, and Claude Code can also sign you in with OAuth. Every feature and where it is managed: How it works.

Quickstart (local, 5 commands)

Needs Docker with compose v2, uv, git and make. The first run builds two images and takes three to five minutes.

sh
git clone https://github.com/bkraad47/ramen && cd ramenmake up       # Firestore emulator + console https://localhost:8443 + one worker (localhost:8080: Streamable HTTP + gRPC)make demo     # zone, group `demo` from the demo repo, an rmk_ key, a canary deploy, then a tools/call#   PASS: demo_calculator_tool(2,3,add) -> 5      <- the success lineopen https://localhost:8443    # self-signed cert; login [email protected] / changeme-ramenmake down     # stop and remove volumes

make demo is safe to re-run: an existing zone, group or environment answers "exists" and a fresh key is generated each time. Then connect your own client with an rmk_ MCP key (Groups → demo → Generate key → Deploy). It is a URL and a header — put the key in RAMEN_MCP_KEY and drop this into any mcpServers config:

json
{"mcpServers": {"ramen-demo": {"url": "http://localhost:8080/mcp",  "headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer ${RAMEN_MCP_KEY}", "ramen-group": "demo", "ramen-zone": "local"}}}}

Anything that can make an HTTP request is a client:

sh
curl -s http://localhost:8080/mcp -H "Authorization: Bearer $RAMEN_MCP_KEY" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -H 'ramen-group: demo' -H 'ramen-zone: local' \  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"demo_calculator_tool","arguments":{"var1":2,"var2":3,"func":"add"}}}'# {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"5"}],"isError":false}}

Clients that only speak stdio use the bridge, which forwards to the same worker over gRPC:

sh
pip install ramen-mcp-bridge                # its own package (github.com/bkraad47/ramen-mcp-bridge); also in the worker imageRAMEN_MCP_KEY=<the key shown once> ramen-mcp-bridge --target localhost:8080 --insecure --group demo --zone local

rmk_ MCP keys go to workers (Authorization: Bearer, on HTTP or as gRPC metadata) and are generated on the group page. rmn_ API keys go to the console (X-Ramen-Api-Key) for automation and are generated on the API keys page. They are not interchangeable. For a token scoped to one person rather than a shared key, register an OAuth client on the Config page: the worker's 401 tells an OAuth-capable client where to sign in. Full walkthrough with the mcp SDK and a raw grpcurl call: Get started (also in deploy/local/README.md).

Screenshots

LoginDashboard, load per zone and group
[login][dashboard]
Group: environments, deploy jobs, zones/workers, MCP keysDeploy job with streamed log
[group][deploy job]
Secrets (names only, values never shown)Logs (one JSON line per MCP call, downloadable)
[secrets][logs]

Transport, and what secures each hop

Workers speak Streamable HTTP (POST /mcp, one JSON-RPC 2.0 message per request, MCP spec 2025-06-18) and gRPC (ramen.v1.Mcp/Call, one message as bytes body) on the same port (contract §16, §11). MCP itself is unchanged — your client and your tools see the standard messages. The two transports share one implementation of every check: the HTTP handler turns the request headers into the same metadata map and calls the same guard and dispatch functions the gRPC service calls, so a check added to one is on both or on neither.

Why the node is Rust. A worker runs two processes with one job each. ramen-node (Rust + tonic) owns what must not be slowed down or broken by user code: the gRPC surface, key checking, source-range checking, the blocked-name filter, concurrency bounds, deadlines, health and the access log. It is a small static binary with no interpreter and no user code in its address space. ramen_runtime (Python 3.14) owns what users write: pip install, validation, secret substitution, the call. They talk over newline-delimited JSON-RPC on stdin/stdout (§2), so there is no extra socket to secure, and the runtime is killed after an idle timeout — a crash or leak in tool code costs one respawn, not the process holding the keys.

HopWhat protects it
client → edge (HTTP)TLS at the load balancer; the credential in Authorization: Bearer (an rmk_ key or a per-user OAuth token); browser origins only from the zone's allowlist; session ids signed and bound to the credential
client → bridge → edge (stdio)a child process on the client's own machine, speaking gRPC to the edge; plaintext unless --tls (--ca <pem> pins the certificate)
edge → nodeTLS ends at the load balancer; h2c to the node unless the node has its own certificate; Cloud Armor (GCP) or WAF (AWS) IP rules, one policy per group
every Mcp/Callconstant-time key compare; source range against the right x-forwarded-for entry; blocked names; 4 MiB and in-flight caps
edge → node, without a keyonly grpc.health.v1.Health; reflection is off on deployed workers
anything else → the podthe worker NetworkPolicy plus a hardened container context
node → runtimestdio inside the pod; no network surface
runtime → bucketthe zone's own cloud identity (GCP service account with Workload Identity, AWS IAM role with IRSA), scoped to the group's prefix and secrets
console → nodecluster-internal, never through the load balancer; Admin/* needs an admin key and an admin CIDR

Five details behind that table matter in practice. The origin allowlist is empty by default, so every browser Origin is refused until you add one. The source-range check reads the x-forwarded-for entry a proxy appended (hop count 2 on GCP, 1 on AWS), and a wrong count denies rather than admits. The allowlist itself defaults to everything until you set IP rules. An IP lock must include the console's own range, because a deploy smoke-tests tools/list as an ordinary call. grpc.health.v1.Health is deliberately unauthenticated so load balancers can probe it, and reports SERVING only once the runtime has loaded the group's code.

What is verified, in four lines.

  • Both transports through every guard, on real node processes, in CI on Linux and on a Windows runner that builds the node natively (0.5.0).
  • The GCP path live through the Gateway load balancer on a throwaway project every release, most recently 0.6.1 with two zones, OAuth, the Redis throttle and a real teardown.
  • The AWS path applied to a real account in 0.5.6, 0.5.8, 0.6.0 and 0.6.1, each emptied the same day; the published bridge server-tested against it in 0.5.8.
  • Covered by tests only, never on a real load balancer: node TLS, and the size and in-flight caps.
  • By design, a group's code runs in a process that holds that group's secrets. Isolation between groups is the pod, the namespace and the per-zone identity.

Full write-up: Transport and what secures each hop.

Deploy to the cloud

TargetStatusGuide
GCP — GKE Autopilot, Firestore, GCS, Secret Manager, global HTTPS LB (GKE Gateway, header-routed gRPC and Streamable HTTP, gRPC health checks), Cloud Armorverified on a throwaway project every release, most recently 0.6.1: two zones, OAuth, the Redis throttle shared across zones, real zone teardowndocs · deploy/README.md
AWS — EKS, DynamoDB, S3, Secrets Manager, ALB (gRPC and HTTP/1.1 target groups), WAF (Terraform or CloudFormation)applied to a real account since 0.5.6; bridge server-tested in 0.5.8docs
Local — docker composeCI e2e on every pushdeploy/local/README.md

Bring-up on GCP is terraform apply → make push → helm upgrade --install → add a zone and a group in the console → Deploy. About 25 minutes, mostly waiting for GKE and the load balancer. The load balancer gets a publicly-trusted certificate automatically (a free sslip.io hostname derived from the static IP — no domain to buy, since 0.5.5). Clients then use https://<public_hostname>/mcp with Authorization: Bearer rmk_ and the ramen-group / ramen-zone headers (the same address serves the console and, by those headers, every zone); stdio-only clients point the bridge at <public_hostname>:443 --tls — no --ca, nothing to import.

Write your own tools

Full guide with the demo repo, env.yaml and local development: The MCP repo, structure and local development.

A group repo is any git repo with mcp/tools/<name>/<name>.py + <name>.json (and resources/, prompts/, requirements.txt). Start from ramen-demo-mcp-group; the contract is in the MCP repo page. Secrets are referenced as {{$group.NAME}} and substituted by the runtime at call time. Nothing about the transport leaks into tool code.

Repository

DirWhat
console/FastAPI + Jinja2 + HTMX manager UI and /api/v1; gRPC client to workers
node-rs/Rust MCP server node (tonic: ramen.v1.Mcp, ramen.v1.Admin, grpc.health.v1.Health; auth, CIDRs, sidecar supervisor)
runtime-py/Python 3.14 runtime (loads protos, pip installs, runs calls, resolves secrets)
proto/ramen/v1/mcp.proto, admin.proto — the transport contract, single source for Rust and Python stubs
deploy/compose, Helm charts, Terraform (GCP, AWS), CloudFormation
skills/Cloud-ops agent skills: deploy-gcp, deploy-aws, rotate-keys, backup-restore, scale-zone
tests/Black-box conformance (gRPC + bridge), e2e and cloud suites
docs/This site's sources; docs/CONTRACTS.md is binding for every component (§11 = transport)

Architecture: ARCHITECTURE.md · Changes: CHANGELOG.md · Versions: tracker

Develop

sh
make test            # runtime-py and console (pytest, 90% coverage gate) plus node-rs (fmt, clippy, test)make test-harness    # tests/: conformance + e2e (skips without a running stack)make proto           # regenerate Python stubs from proto/ (Rust stubs build via tonic-build)make demo-worker     # node + runtime locally without Dockeruv run --project docs --group docs mkdocs serve   # docs at http://127.0.0.1:8000

Contributing

See CONTRIBUTING.md — use it, fork it, change it, with attribution; renaming it as a new commercial product of your own is not acceptable. Related repositories and which versions go together: Releases.

License

BSD-3-Clause © 2026 Raad. See LICENSE.

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  1. v0.6.21最新Oct 5, 2026