Mailwarden

mailwarden

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A reliable, native Gmail MCP server — full mailbox triage for AI assistants, with the feature no other Gmail MCP server ships: mailbox-side snooze.

Highlights

• Snooze — the only mailbox-side snooze in a Gmail MCP server. Archive a thread now, have it resurface in the inbox on a date. Built on dated labels + a sweep, so it works from any client, is visible in Gmail itself, and survives restarts. (Where another server offers a "snooze", it is a local reminder list — the mail never leaves or re-enters the inbox.)
• Search you can trust. Gmail's threads.list — the call any thread search goes through — can answer is:unread from a stale thread-level read state: measured in one real mailbox, 86% of the threads it returned held no unread message at all; in a second mailbox, no drift whatsoever. You cannot tell which mailbox you are in without looking, so search re-verifies every hit against its live labels. Paginated via pageToken/nextPageToken. (the measurements)
• Sender authentication, not sender spelling. get_thread reports the SPF/DKIM/DMARC results the receiving server recorded, so "is this really from my bank?" is answered from the message's own headers instead of from how the domain looks. It reads Gmail's own report only — the one written under the id mx.google.com; a message can carry forged ones of its own — says whether a passing DKIM signature belongs to the From domain, and says unchecked when nobody checked, because a missing check is not a passing one.
• Bulk operations that scale. bulk_modify archives/labels everything matching a query at 1000 messages per API request — with per-chunk partial-success reporting instead of all-or-nothing. The snooze sweep uses the same batch path.
• Structured outputs. Every tool declares an outputSchema and returns validated structuredContent alongside fenced JSON text — no parsing guesswork for clients. Failures are structured as well: a code and a retryable flag, so a client can tell "try again later" from "re-authorize" without reading prose.
• Small attack surface. No send tools (no exfiltration path for prompt-injected mail), optional read-only mode, no telemetry, no open ports by default, symlink-safe download fencing, injection-fenced output. And no code path that could send: every Gmail request passes an egress checkpoint that refuses messages.send, drafts.send, permanent deletion and forwarding settings, whatever a compromised or careless caller asks for — and every other draft endpoint too, unless you switch on the opt-in drafts tier, which saves drafts for you to send yourself. One deliberate exception: unsubscribe / bulk_unsubscribe (manage tier) contact the opt-out endpoint named in a message's own header — the only non-Google host mailwarden ever reaches, and a read-tier deployment makes no outbound request at all. Details under Security & privacy and Unsubscribing.
• Correct with real-world mail. RFC 2047 headers decoded (=?UTF-8?B?…?= → readable text), bodies decoded by their bytes and their declared charset (text Gmail already converted to UTF-8 is read as UTF-8 whatever the header says, anything else in the charset it names; no mojibake for ISO-8859-1/Shift_JIS mail), 429/5xx retried with exponential backoff.

Why

Connectors that sync or cache your mailbox can lag behind it — and even Gmail's own search index is sometimes loose (see below). mailwarden talks straight to the live Gmail API (no cached snapshot) and re-verifies what the index returns, so what you see is what's actually there. It's a generic Gmail capability layer — keep your own rules/logic in your AI client, not in the server.

search goes one step further than the raw API: Gmail's threads.list index can answer read-state operators from a stale copy of that state, so is:unread returns threads you finished reading weeks ago — in one measured mailbox, the large majority of what came back. Since every hit is fetched live anyway, search re-checks the unambiguous predicates (is:unread/is:read/is:starred/in:inbox/category:…, with negation) against each thread's true labels and drops the index's false positives.

Compared to other Gmail MCP servers

Most Gmail MCP servers cover the same read/label/send surface. Two capabilities are still unique to mailwarden as far as we have looked (mailbox-side snooze, search re-verification), and one deliberate omission is a security feature, not a gap. A third, sender authentication, was unique when it shipped and no longer is: @agentcomms/gmail-mcp has read Authentication-Results since 18 September 2026, trusting only the report whose authserv-id is mx.google.com. It has its own column below since 13 October 2026. Google's own server is also narrower than it looks: draft-only, and no trash, filters or unsubscribe.

_{Snapshot as of 13 October 2026 — the oldest of the seven column checks (Google's reference and a-bonus, both last read that day), and so the only date the table as a whole can claim. Each repository column is brought forward by reading the diff against the revision recorded in docs/comparison-sources.json whenever npm run table-sources reports a move. On 25 October 2026 four of them moved at once. aaronsb went to 9c9f8033 (v4.8.0), and two of its cells with it: since 16 October 2026 it applies a label change to everything a query matches, behind a preview that counts the set, keeps the ids on the server and hands back a token valid once for thirty minutes (up to 10,000 messages; the matches are not re-checked), and it creates, updates and deletes filters behind the same kind of preview — forwarding included unless its draft-only policy is set. taylorwilsdon went to fcbf5a2c (v2.2.0); --permissions now also takes a union such as gmail:readonly+send that grants only the named levels, which the least-privilege cell now names. klodr went to e5c080c3 (3.0.0); create_filter now refuses a forwarding action whatever the scopes, and its filter cell says so. agentcomms went to 261cae4f (0.28.0, with per-recipient rules on what it sends); no cell moves. a-bonus has not moved since 13 October 2026. Google's tool reference, last read on 13 October 2026, documents an output schema on every one of its eleven tools; it is still Developer Preview, with no send, trash, filter, snooze, unsubscribe or query-driven tool. — = not offered / not documented. Columns are the servers a reader is most likely to reach for — Google's first-party one, plus the three largest community servers still under maintenance — and klodr, which comes closest to mailwarden's own least-privilege design. agentcomms (@agentcomms/gmail-mcp, read at 01cee751 on 13 October 2026) was added the same day for two reasons: it is the only other server we know of that reads Authentication-Results, and it pins that read to Gmail's own report, which is stricter than what mailwarden did until then and the reason mailwarden now does the same; and its npm reach overtook klodr's within a month of its first release. Its bulk path is per id, not per query, but every change returns an exact per-message undo — the design mailwarden's bulk_modify adopted as undo: true. It sends, behind a per-message approval whose default is a yes in the conversation; its own README says the software cannot tell that yes from the agent's, and offers a terminal confirmation (confirm) or no sending at all (never) instead. gmail-tidy (gmail-tidy-mcp, read at 6df48c69 on 25 October 2026) was added that day because its stated position is the closest to this one: no send tool and no trash, a build test that fails on either, and filters that can neither forward nor trash. It does write drafts, which puts it on the send row next to Google's server rather than next to this one — its own README says plainly that its token could send. It was ahead of mailwarden on one row, and mailwarden has since taken the same design over: it encrypts the token by default, with the key in the OS keystore. Its bulk runs over a query, capped at 5,000 messages, with neither a preview nor a re-check, and it reads SPF/DKIM/DMARC failures from the first Authentication-Results header without asking which server wrote it. Its npm reach matched mailwarden's within ten days of its first release. aaronsb was added on 8 September 2026, and the reason it was missing is worth stating plainly: the selection had been made by capability overlap, so a server an order of magnitude larger than the smallest column sat outside the table while that column stayed in it. It earns its place on the send row rather than on size. It was the first server here besides mailwarden that can be made to refuse sending at all — GWS_SAFETY_POLICY=draft-only-email blocks send, reply, replyAll and forward; agentcomms has since joined it with a never send policy — and the difference that keeps the row honest is where the promise lives: there, sending is the default and the refusal is an operator's environment variable; here, no tool to send was ever written. Its no-delete policy stands in the same relation to this project's trash-only rule. The filter row asks the same question from the other end, and a third project shows why it is one: c0webster/hardened-google-workspace-mcp, a fork of the taylorwilsdon column made for no reason but this one, removes create_gmail_filter and delete_gmail_filter outright because a filter can forward — which is exactly the risk, answered by dropping the capability. mailwarden keeps the capability and removes the risk instead: create_filter has no way to express a forward, and list_filters surfaces the ones that already exist so they can be audited. That fork also shows where a promise of this kind usually leaks, which is why the row above is about the tool surface and the egress guard rather than about scopes: it drops gmail.send but keeps gmail.compose — commented "for draft creation/editing only (NOT sending)" — and gmail.modify. Google documents the first as "Manage drafts and send emails" and the second as "Read, compose, and send emails", so the promise does not rest on one scope too many but on two, and gmail.modify alone would be enough — the same scope this project holds in its own manage tier, which is exactly why the row points at the tool surface. Its token can send; only its tool list cannot. The most installed Gmail server is absent for that reason and not by oversight: GongRzhe/Gmail-MCP-Server is archived, its last commit dating to August 2025, and it still drew 112,163 npm downloads in the month to 29 August 2026. Reach and currency are different questions, and a comparison of what a server does today can only answer the second. Send capability is listed as a security property: mailwarden's lack of it is intentional (see Security & privacy). The encryption row asks who holds the key: mailwarden keeps a random key in the OS keystore by default, as gmail-tidy does, and falls back to a passphrase you set where no keystore is reachable — and to a plaintext file where you set none, which is why the cell names both; taylorwilsdon relies on file permissions locally and on the storage bucket's own CMEK when hosted on GCS — protection against a stolen file in the first case, against a stolen disk in the second. The last row asks who operates the server, not where it happens to run: self-hosting is common ground here, and every community server on this table offers some remote deployment except klodr and gmail-tidy (stdio only) — mailwarden via --http, taylorwilsdon over streamable HTTP with OAuth 2.1, a-bonus on Cloud Run. Running one of them on your own host is not a cloud copy; running it on the vendor's is.}

The moat isn't any single row — it's snooze + live re-verification together: an actual inbox-workflow layer that acts on the mailbox's current state, not a cached snapshot. Where others have caught up it's noted honestly above: at-rest encryption (taylorwilsdon; by default and with the key in the OS keystore, agentcomms and gmail-tidy, whose design mailwarden has since taken over), scope-driven tool gating (klodr inversely; taylorwilsdon in our direction, and further than this row said until it was corrected — besides --read-only, which switches the OAuth flow to the read-only scope map, he has had per-service permission levels since 25 February 2026: --permissions gmail:organize builds the requested set from cumulative levels — readonly, organize, drafts, send, full — and his tool registry then disables every tool whose declared scopes fall outside them, deliberately skipping scope-hierarchy expansion so that organize really does exclude gmail.send. What separates that from this row's claim is the direction, not the strength: the level is picked per service rather than derived from the tools you enable, so --tool-tier core --tools gmail still asks for the full Gmail scopes unless a level is named, and neither mode has a guard at the request itself. Our August round read only the tier path and understated him here from 26 August on; re-read in his auth/permissions.py, auth/scopes.py and core/tool_registry.py at 54b1c56 on 7 September 2026 — the day we read, at the revision his repository stood at. The tier half was checked on 26 August 2026 and corrected the same day by csitte.at, who verified it against their own clone rather than taking our word for it), a richer per-message triage heuristic (a-bonus), and bulk organize over a mailbox (the hosted mcpemails.com, which has no snooze either). What none of them do is act on a query and check the mailbox's answer before acting on it — taylorwilsdon's filter apply, aaronsb's previewed modifyMatching and gmail-tidy's organize_emails now do the first half, all over messages.list, and none of them the second.

Running it next to a Workspace server

mailwarden is a Gmail server, not a Workspace suite — if you want Calendar, Drive, Docs and Sheets from one place, a broad server like taylorwilsdon/google_workspace_mcp covers ground this one never will, and the two are not mutually exclusive. Adding both is a reasonable setup, and the reason to is the token, not the tool count: a suite server that can send mail holds a credential that can send mail, for every mailbox it is pointed at. Giving Gmail to mailwarden instead means the mail half of your setup has no compose, reply, forward or send tool at all — or, with the opt-in drafts tier, tools that save drafts and none that send them. Where that promise rests differs by tier, and the distinction matters: on read Google enforces it at the token (gmail.readonly, which the send endpoints reject), while on manage it rests on the tool surface — Gmail does accept gmail.modify for sending, so the scope alone is no guarantee. In both cases the egress guard refuses messages.send and drafts.send in the server itself, and every other draft endpoint unless the drafts tier is on, so an injected message in your inbox has no tool to reach for and no endpoint to reach.

Practical shape: point the suite server at the services you want and disable its Gmail tools (--disabled-tools, or a tier that omits them), and run mailwarden alongside for mail. Keep the tier rule in mind — at most one mailbox per client config should carry writing tiers.

Why re-verification matters — a concrete case

Ask an assistant to "archive the unread promotional mail that's already skipped my inbox" and it will reach for the obvious query, category:updates is:unread -in:inbox. A server that trusts Gmail's index now archives threads you had already read — mail you never meant to touch, gone in a bulk action you can't easily reverse.

Measured, not asserted. In one real mailbox (~70,000 messages), category:updates is:unread returned 131 threads through threads.list, and only 17 of them held an unread message — 87% stale. The same query, same mailbox, same minute, asked through messages.list instead: 19 messages, none stale. So this is not "Gmail search is unreliable" — the thread view of read state lags while the per-message view does not, and search goes through threads.list. A second mailbox, measured identically on the same day, drifted not at all.

Method, all three queries, the controls, and what the finding is not (it is not the index dropping the predicate, and not a quirk of exotic operator combinations): Gmail's thread index can answer is:unread from a stale read state — a standalone report, every figure traced to a recorded measurement.

Which is the whole point: a server cannot know which kind of mailbox it is in. Re-verification costs nothing where nothing drifts, and saves you where it does — in the measurement above, every thread search dropped was genuinely read, and it discarded no genuinely unread mail.

Where it is not free: the bulk tools. search re-verifies because it fetches every hit anyway; bulk_modify (and create_filter's applyToExisting sweep) is sized in thousands of messages, where one fetch per hit is a different order of cost. Both act on what the index returns — and bulk_modify reports unverifiedPredicates, the conditions from your query that were taken on the index's word (+UNREAD, -INBOX, …). Empty means there was nothing to distrust. Non-empty and the result has to be read-state-precise? Resolve the set with search first and act on those thread ids. A dryRun does not close this gap: it re-reads the same index, so it confirms how big the set is, never whether it is right. What its previewToken does close is the other gap, between showing a set and changing one: without it, the write runs the query again and changes whatever matches by then.

The filter sweep does not report that field, deliberately. Its query is not yours — create_filter builds one from the criteria, parenthesising a query criterion and double-quoting every from/to/subject value, and both of those switch the predicate derivation off. The list would come back empty for every filter you can define, and an empty list here would read as "nothing to distrust" when it means "could not tell". So the caveat stays in prose, where it holds without exception: treat a sweep as acting on the index's answer, whatever it matched. Use verify: true to learn what the sweep actually changed, and search when the set has to be right before anything is written.

A cheaper half-measure, honestly labelled. bulk_modify also takes crossCheck: true, which asks Gmail the same question a second way before writing: every derived predicate is re-run as a label filter (labelIds) rather than as a query operator, and any message the two routes disagree about is left untouched and reported. The cost is one extra list call per predicate — flat, independent of how many messages match — where re-verification costs one fetch per hit. What it buys is bounded and worth stating plainly: a disagreement is real evidence, agreement is none at all, because both routes read the same index and an index can be consistently wrong. So unverifiedPredicates still reports what it always did, cross-check or not, and only search re-checks against the mailbox itself. Whether the two routes ever diverge in practice is unmeasured — node scripts/probe-crosscheck.mjs measures exactly that in your own mailbox, read-only and ids only.

mailwarden fetches every hit live anyway, so search re-checks the unambiguous predicates (is:unread, is:read, in:inbox, category:…, with negation) against each thread's true labels and drops the index's false positives before any tool sees them. The bulk action then runs on exactly the set you asked for. This is the difference between acting on what Gmail indexed and acting on what's actually in the mailbox right now — and it's why snooze/sweep are safe to hand to an assistant: the sweep resurfaces only threads whose snooze is genuinely due, verified against live labels at run time.

See it yourself — no Gmail account needed. From a clone of the repo (the demo is a repo-only verification script, not part of the npm package):

git clone https://github.com/csitte/mailwarden && cd mailwardennpm install && npm run buildnode scripts/demo-reverify.mjs

There is a second script next to it, node scripts/probe-reverify.mjs, which measures the same thing in your mailbox instead of a fake one — read-only, metadata only (no subject, sender or body is fetched), printing counts and label names. It is how the numbers above were produced, and how you can check whether your mailbox drifts at all.

The demo drives the real search() against a fake Gmail API whose index is deliberately stale (returns a read thread for an is:unread query, exactly as Gmail does) and shows mailwarden dropping the false positive. It asserts the outcome, so it exits non-zero if the behavior ever regresses. The same case is locked by unit tests in test/gmail.test.ts ("drops index false positives via live-label re-verify").

Asking again without asking for everything

A recurring check — what came in since I last looked — is the expensive shape for a live server: the obvious way to answer it is to search the whole slice again and compare. what_changed (read tier) answers it from Gmail's own event log instead. Hand it the historyId a previous call or get_profile returned, and it comes back with what arrived, what left, and which labels went on or came off, plus the next id to keep.

This is not a cache, and the distinction is the whole design. The only thing that persists between calls is one number, and it persists in the caller. mailwarden still stores nothing about the mailbox, keeps no mirror and no index, and every call remains live against the Gmail API — the same rule as everywhere else here.

Two properties worth knowing before relying on it. It reports events, not state: a message marked unread and then read appears under both, and both are true — for how the mailbox looks now, ask search. And Gmail keeps roughly a week of history, after which an id is refused; mailwarden turns that refusal into an error rather than an empty result, because nothing changed and I can no longer tell you what changed call for opposite reactions and only one of them is safe to act on.

Judging a sender — what authentication answers, and what it doesn't

Every message from get_thread carries an authentication object: the SPF, DKIM and DMARC results the receiving server recorded, plus the domains each check actually validated.

{  "spf": "pass",   "mailedBy":   "forwarder.example",        // envelope sender SPF checked  "dkim": "pass",  "signedBy":   "authority.example",         // the signature DMARC can pass on  "alsoSignedBy": ["forwarder.example", "esp.example"],      // further signatures that passed  "dmarc": "pass", "headerFrom": "authority.example",        // the From domain DMARC evaluated  "dkimAligned": true,                                       // a passing signer is the From domain  "authservId": "mx.google.com",                             // who asserts all of the above  "returnPath": "bounces+…@forwarder.example"}

Read dmarc first. It is the only one of the three that ties a passing check to the From address a human sees. spf: "pass" on its own says an envelope sender was authorised to send — something a lookalike domain gets in minutes.

The domains do not have to match, and a mismatch is not a finding. The object above has the shape of a real receipt, forwarded through a custom domain on a mail-routing service before it reached the mailbox. Forwarding rewrites the envelope sender (mailedBy and returnPath become the forwarder) and adds the forwarder's own DKIM signature, while the sender's signature travels on intact behind it — so DMARC still passes, and headerFrom still names the original sender. That is why DMARC, not SPF, is the check that carries meaning here. Treat the domains as the explanation of a result, not as a test of their own.

Several signatures: the one that counts is reported. A message often carries more than one DKIM signature — the sender's, its mail provider's, a forwarder's. signedBy is the passing one aligned with the From domain wherever there is one, because that is the one DMARC passes on; alsoSignedBy names the other domains whose signature also passed, which is where a forwarder shows. Through 0.25.0 the first signature was reported, and a re-signing forwarder puts its own in front: in a mailbox that receives through Cloudflare Email Routing, 156 of 167 received messages read as dkimAligned: false although each carried an aligned, passing signature further down (measured 30 October 2026, see docs/measurements.json).

What a pass does not mean. That the mail really came from that domain — not that the domain deserves anything. A phisher holds perfect SPF, DKIM and DMARC on the lookalike domain he registered this morning; authentication tells you who sent it, and the answer can be "exactly who it claims to be, and that is the problem".

dkimAligned answers the question a signature raises. Anyone can sign mail with a key for a domain they own, so dkim: "pass" alone says only that someone signed. dkimAligned says whether that someone is the From domain, or a parent or child of it. For two sibling subdomains it says nothing: news.bank.example and mail.bank.example are aligned, a.co.uk and b.co.uk are not, and without a public-suffix list the two cases look the same — so the field is absent rather than wrong. false means that no passing signature belongs to the From domain — a forwarder that altered the message (a mailing list adding a footer breaks the sender's signature) leaves only its own. It is absent when DKIM did not pass. As with the domains, false is an explanation, not a verdict — dmarc remains the check to read first.

What unchecked: true means. The message carried no Authentication-Results header from Gmail — nobody looked. It is not a failure, and it is not a pass. The header is written by a server that receives a message, so anything that never arrived from outside — your own sent mail, for instance — should be expected to have none.

Forged reports. A message can carry Authentication-Results headers of its own — an attacker writes whatever he likes into the mail he sends. Only Gmail's own report is read: the topmost one whose authserv-id is mx.google.com, the trust boundary RFC 8601 tells a reader to rely on. A report under any other id is never read, however convincing it looks, and a message that has none from Gmail is unchecked even if it carries a forged one under another id. The limit: mail that reached the mailbox without passing Gmail's inbound mail server — fetched from another account over POP, or inserted by an app — may carry no Gmail report at all, and a forged one that claims mx.google.com is then indistinguishable from the real thing. Mail Gmail received itself always carries its own report on top, so there a forgery is never read; otherReports counts every report that was not read. (Through 0.22.1 the first report was read whatever its id — right wherever Gmail had written one, and wrong exactly where it had not.) Values are validated as tokens rather than passed through, so a field that reads like a verdict cannot carry a sentence. If two results for the same method disagree — a second DKIM signature that failed — the disagreement shows up in alsoReported instead of being swallowed.

Tools

All tools declare an outputSchema and return structured content (validated, machine-readable) alongside the same JSON as fenced text — clients never have to parse prose.

A failure is structured too: isError plus a fenced JSON body with a code (not_authorized, needs_reauth, insufficient_scope, forbidden_operation, not_found, rate_limited, upstream_unavailable, network_error, invalid_input, declined_by_user, internal_error) and a retryable flag, alongside the sentence a human reads. So "wait and try again" versus "re-run mailwarden --auth" is something a client can decide, not something it has to infer from wording that may be reworded next release. (No structuredContent on errors: that is validated against the tool's outputSchema, which describes a success.) A rate_limited failure also carries retryAfterSeconds, because there the wait is the remedy. An insufficient_scope failure names the gap rather than the possibilities — which scope is missing, what it covers, and what the saved authorization grants instead — by reading the token's own scopes when it lands, and the server prints the same line on stderr at startup. It explains the refusal rather than preventing it: the call still goes to Google, and Google is what turns it down. That matters most with a passphrase-encrypted token: the tier gate at registration cannot decrypt it, so the surface is advertised in full and the gap would otherwise surface as a bare 403 mid-task. A token encrypted with a keystore key keeps its scopes readable and is gated like a plaintext one.

Quotas: the one failure that fixes itself

Gmail bills each call against a per-user budget of 6,000 units per minute, and the units are not uniform — fetching a thread is the expensive part, in whatever format it is fetched:

mark_unread costs what mark_read does.

Two consequences worth knowing before you build on this. Parallel agents share one budget — they reach Gmail through a single server process as a single user, so four of them reading threads at once spend four times as fast. And bulk_modify is cheaper than looping from six threads on: up to 500 matching messages it costs 55 units, the price of five and a half archive calls, and it grows by the thousand messages, not by the thread. verify: true reverses that — reading the labels back costs 40 per thread, more than the loop it replaced.

If you do exceed it, mailwarden fails the call with rate_limited and retryAfterSeconds: 60. That failure is temporary and waiting genuinely fixes it — the budget is counted per minute. mailwarden absorbs one such wait (about 20 seconds) itself before reporting; past that it hands the decision back rather than holding your tool call open. That holds for the tools that fetch many threads in one call too: search fails with rate_limited rather than returning a list the quota cut short, and bulk_modify with verify and list_subscriptions stop fetching and report what they did not reach as unverifiable and unknown (for bulk_modify the change is already made, and failing would hide it). Note that Gmail reports this as a 403 as readily as a 429, so a client keying on the status alone will mistake it for a permission problem — key on the code.

How snooze works (no Gmail API snooze exists — we build it)

snooze removes INBOX and applies a dated label MCP/Snoozed/<key>, where the key is either YYYY-MM-DD (due all day) or YYYY-MM-DDTHHMM (due at that local minute). The until argument takes an explicit date, a date+time (2026-06-20 9am, …T17:00), or a preset resolved server-side — today, tomorrow, weekend (next Saturday), next week (next Monday), a weekday name (monday–sunday, next occurrence), in N days, or in N hours — and a date preset may carry a trailing time (tomorrow 9am, monday 8:30), so the caller never has to compute the moment itself. sweep_snoozed finds due labels and returns those threads to the inbox (marked unread); a timed snooze wakes at the first sweep on/after its minute, so wake latency equals your sweep interval. Run the sweep:

• on demand (sweep_snoozed tool),
• via cron: mailwarden --sweep,
• or automatically: set MAILWARDEN_AUTO_SWEEP=1 (hourly sweep while the server runs).

Filters (persistent auto-triage rules)

create_filter sets up a Gmail server-side rule: mail matching the criteria automatically gets the given label actions — the mailbox keeps triaging itself with no assistant in the loop.

• Criteria: from, to, subject, query (full Gmail search syntax), negatedQuery, hasAttachment, excludeChats, and size + sizeComparison (smaller/larger, given together). At least one is required.
• Actions (label only): addLabels / removeLabels, by name or id (an unknown name in addLabels is auto-created, nested via /). Common recipes: skip the inbox → removeLabels: ["INBOX"]; auto-mark-read → removeLabels: ["UNREAD"]; auto-trash → addLabels: ["TRASH"]; star → addLabels: ["STARRED"]; never-spam → removeLabels: ["SPAM"]; file under a label → addLabels: ["Receipts"].
• Existing mail: a filter only runs on messages arriving after it's created. Pass applyToExisting: true to also apply the same actions once to mail already in the mailbox — mailwarden builds a Gmail search from the criteria and runs a bulk modify (up to maxMessages, default 1000; same unverified-index caveat as bulk_modify, and the one-off pass excludes Spam/Trash). This requires at least one positive criterion (from/to/subject/query/hasAttachment:true/size): an exclusion-only rule (negatedQuery or hasAttachment:false) is refused for applyToExisting because it would match almost the whole mailbox — create such a filter without the flag. The outcome comes back under applied (the query used, matchedMessages/submittedMessages/submittedThreadCount counts, capped when the match set hit maxMessages, per-chunk failed, and an error string if the whole pass failed); it's null when applyToExisting was not set. submittedMessages is what was handed to the API, not what changed — pass verify: true alongside applyToExisting to read the labels back and get applied.verified {applied, notApplied, unverifiable}, the same check as bulk_modify's verify (one extra read per affected thread, so off by default). The filter is created first, so a partial or failed backlog pass is reported in applied, never raised — the rule still stands.
• No forwarding — see Security & privacy.
• Requires the gmail.settings.basic scope; re-run --auth once if you authorized an older version. Not available in read-only mode.

Unsubscribing — the one outbound request

list_unsubscribe (read tier) reports what the sender offers, without contacting anyone. It reads the newest message that actually carries a List-Unsubscribe header — a reply threaded onto a newsletter sits at the end and advertises nothing, which would otherwise read as "this list has no opt-out". When a thread advertises no opt-out header at all, list_unsubscribe looks in the message body and reports the unsubscribe links it finds there as bodyCandidates — plenty of senders put the link only in the footer, and answering "no opt-out options" for them is true about the headers and wrong about the mail. Those links are reported, never fetched, they cannot be handed to unsubscribe, and hasUnsubscribe stays false for them, because that flag has always described the headers. The search costs one full thread fetch and happens only in that case. list_subscriptions (read tier) does the same across a whole slice, grouped by sender, so you can see who keeps writing and which of them can actually be left — one header fetch per sender rather than per thread. unsubscribe and bulk_unsubscribe (manage tier) act on it — and that is the only place mailwarden ever talks to a host that isn't Google, so the rules are tight:

• There is no URL parameter. The endpoint comes from the message's own header and nowhere else. A URL argument would let a prompt-injected mail turn the tool into an exfiltration channel (mailbox content in a query string); the header cannot carry data the model chose. This is also why a body link is only ever reported: it is a URL the sender wrote into the text, and fetching one would reintroduce exactly the request this rule exists to prevent — by a path that never passes the guard. Another Gmail server, navbuildz/gmail-mcp-server, does fetch them, following redirects, when the header is missing.
• Only RFC 8058 one-click is performed — the sender must have opted in via List-Unsubscribe-Post. A plain https: link is meant for a human in a browser and is handed back, not fetched.
• mailto: opt-outs are never performed. They would require sending mail, which mailwarden cannot do. The address is reported so you can act on it yourself.
• Fixed request, discarded response. The POST body is always List-Unsubscribe=One-Click and is never derived from anything; the response body is cancelled unread. What returns to the model is the status code and the URL actually called — no content from the endpoint, so it cannot answer with instructions. (A 301/302/303 redirect is followed as a GET, i.e. with no body at all.)
• One request per sender, sequentially, inside one budget. bulk_unsubscribe takes thread ids (never a query — a query-driven bulk would fire off a request per matched sender before anyone had looked). Threads from a sender whose request already went out are reported with duplicateOf and cost no second request: two threads from one list share an opt-out, and calling it twice only confirms your address twice. A sender is only recorded once a request actually reached an endpoint, so a refusal or a dropped connection still leaves the next thread its own try — and if the skipped thread advertises a different endpoint, the reason says so, since one sender can run several lists. That memory spans calls for as long as the server runs, and unsubscribe shares it: a call that times out is safe to repeat, and asking twice for the same newsletter contacts the sender once. Pass force: true to unsubscribe for a deliberate second attempt — after an endpoint answered 500, say. It is kept in memory only: persisting it would mean a second kind of local state beside the token, which this server deliberately does not keep, so a restart forgets. Capped at 25 threads and 60 seconds per call; whatever the budget doesn't cover comes back as skippedOutOfTime rather than silently undone. None of it can be reversed, which is why all three limits exist.
• SSRF guards. https only, default port only, no credentials in the URL, and every hop — including redirects, followed at most 3 times — must resolve exclusively to globally reachable addresses. The check parses each address to its bytes and matches it against the IANA special-purpose registry, so every spelling of the same address gets the same verdict (::1 and 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 alike); an address that does not parse is refused. DNS resolution and all hops share one 10-second budget. Not rebinding-proof (fetch resolves again when it connects) — see SECURITY.md; what survives that gap is a blind POST whose response is never read.

Check it against your own mail before you trust it. From a repo clone (repo-only, not in the npm package), after npm run build and mailwarden --auth:

node scripts/probe-unsubscribe.mjs --vet          # category:promotions, 25 threadsnode scripts/probe-unsubscribe.mjs "from:substack.com" --max 50 --vet

It prints each real List-Unsubscribe header next to what the parser made of it, and --vet also runs the endpoint through the URL vetting and the address guard — so you see both whether the parser understood the header and whether the guards would have let that opt-out through. Strictly read-only: no request is ever made to a sender, and nothing in the mailbox changes.

What it can't undo: the request tells the sender your address is live. A sender that ignores its own opt-out is beyond any client's reach — pair unsubscribe with create_filter or trash for those. Not offering an automatable option is reported as unsubscribed:false with the alternatives, not as an error. A read-only deployment gets list_unsubscribe and list_subscriptions, and never makes the request at all.

Drafts (opt-in) — written here, sent by you

The drafts tier saves mail as Gmail drafts and does nothing else with it: the draft waits in Gmail's Drafts until you open it and press Send. It is off unless you name it — MAILWARDEN_TOOLS=read,manage,filters,drafts, or read,drafts for a deployment that only reads and drafts — and with it off the server has no tool that writes a message and the egress guard refuses every draft endpoint, exactly as before. It needs gmail.modify, so read,drafts gives up the gmail.readonly token of a read deployment; re-run --auth with the tier enabled.

• create_draft, reply: pass a threadId. The recipients come from the message being answered (Reply-To, else From; the original To when that message is yours; replyAll adds the other To and Cc), the subject becomes Re: …, and In-Reply-To/References keep it in the thread. cc/bcc add people.
• Quote (quote: true, replies only, both tools): the answered message goes below the text, the way a mail client quotes it — a line such as "On Thu, 5 Nov 2026 at 9:56 Ann [email protected] wrote:" and the message. The draft then carries the content twice, as multipart/alternative: as plain text with every line prefixed > , and as HTML in the markup Gmail itself writes for a quote (gmail_quote), so Gmail's editor and the reader see a quote block like one of Gmail's own. What the markup does not do is fold the quote behind "...": in two tests (sent and received in Gmail, a text quote and the HTML quote of the same Outlook mail) Gmail folded only the lines that repeated an earlier mail of the thread, both times from the signature on, so a quote may stay partly open. Quoting the mail's own HTML, images included, might fold more; it is exactly what is kept out: the HTML holds nothing but that text, escaped — no markup, image, link or style of the quoted mail is carried over. Runs of spaces and indentation stay as the text has them. The line names the sender as the mail's From does, and its language and time come from the computer mailwarden runs on (German there gives "Am Do., 5. Nov. 2026 um 09:56 Uhr schrieb …"; any language other than German and English gets the English wording). A mail with only HTML is reduced to text first; Outlook's placeholders for inline images ([cid:…]) are left out. A mail with no readable text is answered without the quote, and the result says so (quoted: false). update_draft replaces the whole text, quote included, so it takes quote: true again. Off by default: a reply without it is what it was, plain text only.
• create_draft, new message: omit threadId, pass to and subject.
• update_draft: replaces the text of a draft create_draft wrote. Such drafts carry the label MCP/Composed (MCP/Drafts before 0.31.0; a draft still carrying that name is accepted and comes out under the new one); a draft without either is refused, and no label tool can add either label, so a draft you wrote yourself cannot be handed to it. It also takes the draft's messageId from the last create_draft or update_draft: every save gives a draft a new one, Gmail's editor too, and Gmail keeps the label when you edit the draft there — so a draft you changed in Gmail since is refused, with its current messageId, instead of overwritten.
• Sender (from, both tools): your main address or one of the account's verified Gmail send-as addresses, such as a band's or a firm's; any other is refused, and a new one is added and verified in Gmail's settings, not here. Without from a new draft goes from your main address and update_draft keeps the sender the draft has. The result always names from; a reply to a mail that was sent to one of your aliases offers that alias as suggestedFrom, which is only used when it is passed as from. The list is read live from Gmail on each call, with the permission the tier already has: no new grant, no new sign-in. A reply-all leaves every one of your send-as addresses out, so a band does not write to itself.
• Attachments (attachments, at most 10 files and 25 MB together) come from exactly two places. A file only from the folder named in MAILWARDEN_ATTACH_DIR — a path relative to it or an absolute path inside it; .., symlinks and junctions that lead out, hard links and (on Windows) file streams are refused, and without the setting no file can be attached at all. Point it at a folder of its own that holds only what may go out; a drive root, the home directory or a folder that contains it — also when reached through a link — and on Windows any path that does not start with a drive letter are refused at startup. mailwarden never writes into that folder — download_attachment and export_thread refuse it — so only you put files there. An attachment of a mail only from a message in the reply's own thread — not a draft, not in the trash or spam — and without the dialog only to people that message went between (a sent forward sits in the same thread, so the thread alone says too little), named by fromMessage and filename (Gmail issues a new attachmentId on every read, so the id cannot name it), and never for a new message. In update_draft, leaving attachments out keeps every file the draft carries, a list replaces them ({ "kept": "<filename>" } keeps one), [] removes them. The result lists every attachment of the saved draft with name, type, size and where it came from; the dialog names a file by its real path in the folder, also when filename gives it another name in the mail. The draft is saved through the same drafts.create/drafts.update calls as before — Gmail took drafts with up to 35 MB of attachments that way when measured on 4 November 2026 — so the egress guard gained no endpoint; the upload endpoint stays refused. Large files take time: a 24 MB attachment took about 40 seconds to save. Gmail's 25 MB limit counts the files, not the encoded message: a draft with 24 MB of attachment (33 MB as a message) was sent and delivered in a test the same day. A server outside Gmail may still refuse a message that large, since some count its encoded size; above about 18 MB of files, expect that a recipient might not take it.
• Who is asked. Any address the thread did not already contain — every recipient of a new message, a cc on a reply that names a stranger, an address added in an update — is confirmed in the client's own dialog (MCP elicitation), whatever MAILWARDEN_CONFIRM says, and refused on a client that cannot show one. A reply that stays within its thread follows MAILWARDEN_CONFIRM. A narrow opt-in relaxes this for clients that have no usable dialog: MAILWARDEN_DRAFT_SELF_WITHOUT_DIALOG=1 saves a draft without asking when every new recipient is your own address (the one the signed-in account reports, compared case-insensitively; no aliases, no +tag, no dot folding). Nobody is asked, even on a client that advertises dialogs: some, such as the Grok Bot app, advertise MCP elicitation and silently decline it, which would leave the switch without effect. An explicit MAILWARDEN_CONFIRM=require is still honoured, and one other address in to, cc or bcc puts the draft back under the rule above. A draft to yourself cannot reach anyone else, so an injected mail gains nothing by steering one there. A Reply-To address counts as part of the thread only if it is also in From, To or Cc — the sender alone picks it, so a reply to a different Reply-To is confirmed too. A file from the disk is confirmed like a new address, also in a reply to someone already in the thread: it reaches a place it was not before, and the sender of an injected mail is always a known recipient of their own thread. MAILWARDEN_DRAFT_SELF_WITHOUT_DIALOG=1 covers a file only when every recipient is your own address. An attachment taken from the thread follows the rule for its recipients only when every recipient of the draft is someone that mail went between; otherwise it is confirmed like a file. One already in the draft is not asked about again. A sender other than your main address is confirmed the same way, in a reply to the thread's own people too, so an injected mail cannot get a draft prepared in a band's or a firm's name unseen; MAILWARDEN_DRAFT_SELF_WITHOUT_DIALOG=1 covers it only when every recipient is your main address. A sender the draft already had is not asked about again. All of this can be turned off: MAILWARDEN_DRAFT_CONFIRM=off saves every draft without a dialog — new recipients, files, a mail's attachments and an alias sender alike — for an operator who reads each draft in Gmail before pressing Send and wants that review to be the check. Nothing is sent either way, but the protection against an injected mail steering a draft is then that review alone (see SECURITY.md, threat 10). The tool descriptions tell the model so, and to name the recipients, sender and files of every draft. MAILWARDEN_CONFIRM=require still asks. A dialog nobody answers gives up after ten minutes with a retryable declined_by_user that says it timed out; nothing is written. The dialog shows an alias sender first, then lists the recipients and marks the new ones, then each attachment with its size and origin.
• What it does not do. No sending, no files from anywhere but MAILWARDEN_ATTACH_DIR, no attachment of a mail outside the reply's thread, no display names (addresses are saved bare), no HTML of your own — the body is plain text; only a quote adds an HTML rendering of that same text, so Gmail shows it as a quote block. Drafts are not deleted: Gmail's drafts.delete deletes for good and stays refused. The label MCP/Composed stays on the message after you send it (seen in Gmail), which is why it is named for what holds in both states: the label tools can remove it, and nothing else reads it on a sent mail.

What it leaves to you is stated plainly in SECURITY.md (threats 10 and 11): a draft can carry what an injected mail asked for — the protection is you reading it before you press Send.

Looking in spam

A query that does not name a place never sees spam or trash. Gmail excludes both from any search that does not say in:spam / in:trash, so from:someone returns nothing for a mail that is sitting in the spam folder — and nothing in the answer says so. Measured against a live mailbox: the same from: query returned 0 hits by default and 1 with spam included.

This matters because of why mail gets misfiled. A spam filter judges a message on its own; it cannot know that you signed up for something a minute ago, requested a password reset, or placed an order — so the confirmation you are waiting for is exactly the kind of mail that lands there. You know what you just did. The filter does not.

So when mail someone expects is missing, ask again with the place named:

search("in:spam newer_than:2d")          # what got filed as spam recentlysearch("in:spam from:example.com")       # the confirmation that never arrived

A thread returns to the inbox with modify_labels (remove SPAM, add INBOX), and a sender that keeps being misjudged is best fixed for good with a never-spam rule — create_filter with removeLabels: ["SPAM"] (see Filters).

Two things this server deliberately does not do. It does not scan the spam folder and judge what belongs there: measured over one real spam folder, 89% of it carries no mailing-list machinery at all, so "looks unlike bulk mail" flags nearly the whole folder and filters nothing. And it does not act on that judgement by itself — releasing mail from spam is a decision, and the context that makes it obvious ("I just registered there") lives in the conversation, not in the mailbox.

Security & privacy

For the full threat model — trust boundary, per-threat mitigations, explicit non-goals, and how to report a vulnerability — see SECURITY.md. The highlights:

• No telemetry. Nothing phones home — no analytics, no crash reporting, no tracking.
• No open ports by default. stdio only. The optional --http listener binds to 127.0.0.1 (not the LAN) and refuses to start without a MAILWARDEN_TOKEN bearer token — set MAILWARDEN_ALLOW_NO_TOKEN=1 to override on a trusted, isolated network. On a loopback bind it also validates the Host header (DNS-rebinding defense). For remote hosting, set MAILWARDEN_HOST and front it with TLS.
• No send tools — by design. mailwarden cannot send, reply, or forward, and by default it cannot compose either; only the opt-in drafts tier writes drafts, which you send yourself. A prompt-injected instruction inside an email has no exfiltration path through this server. create_filter follows the same rule: it can label, archive, trash, star or mark mail, but never creates a forwarding filter (which would be an exfiltration path). list_filters still surfaces any forwarding filter already on the account, so you can spot one. The drafts tier has no way to send what it saves — see Drafts. This holds because no such tool exists and none can be registered at runtime; for the stronger variant, where Google refuses to send rather than mailwarden declining to, see Read-only mode below. Read the promise as narrow, because it is: it closes the route out through this server, not the assistant's other routes — a client that can fetch a URL, write to a synced folder or run code still has everything an injected message needs, and this server is what puts that message in front of it. See non-goals.
• One outbound host, no model-chosen URL. The unsubscribe tool is the only code path that contacts a non-Google host. Its endpoint is read from the message's List-Unsubscribe header — never from a tool argument — the request body is fixed and the response body is discarded, so it cannot become a data channel. https/default-port only, redirects re-validated, and any hop resolving to a private, loopback, link-local or metadata address is refused. See Unsubscribing.
• Tool tiers (progressive disclosure + least scope). MAILWARDEN_TOOLS advertises only the tiers you name — read (the read tools), manage (mailbox mutations, snooze, downloads), filters (server-side filter CRUD, the only tier whose tools need gmail.settings.basic), and drafts (save and revise drafts, never send). Default is read,manage,filters; drafts is on only when named. E.g. read,manage gives a full triage surface without filter management. The OAuth scopes requested at --auth are derived from the enabled tiers — a read deployment asks only for gmail.readonly, and gmail.settings.basic is requested only when the filters tier is on. And the filter tools are hidden automatically when the stored token doesn't carry gmail.settings.basic (e.g. a token authorized before you enabled the tier) — re-run --auth to grant it. Older tokens without a recorded scope are advertised as before, with the runtime insufficient-scope message as the fallback.
• Read-only mode. Set MAILWARDEN_READONLY=1 (shorthand for MAILWARDEN_TOOLS=read) and only the read tools (search, get_thread, read_attachment, list_labels, list_snoozed, get_profile, what_changed, triage_digest, follow_ups, list_unsubscribe, list_subscriptions) are registered — nothing that can change the mailbox or write files is even advertised to clients (the filter tools, which need the broader gmail.settings.basic scope, are excluded too). Recommended for shared/HTTP deployments that only triage. It is also the only tier whose no-send property Google enforces: it holds a gmail.readonly token, which Gmail's send endpoints reject outright. manage needs gmail.modify, and Gmail does accept that scope for sending — mailwarden simply exposes no tool that would. So a read deployment could not send even if this binary were replaced; a manage one cannot send because there is nothing to call. (There is no send-free write scope to switch to — see SECURITY.md, threat 1.)
• Egress guard. "Nothing to call" is no longer only a statement about the tool list. Every authenticated Gmail request passes one checkpoint that allows exactly the endpoints mailwarden uses and refuses the rest — with messages.send, drafts.send, every other draft endpoint (unless the drafts tier opens exactly drafts.create, drafts.update and drafts.get), messages.import/insert, permanent deletion and every non-filter settings endpoint (the drafts tier reads one: the send-as list, nothing that changes it) named in a deny list checked first, so a later edit to the allowlist cannot reopen them by accident — including through the /upload/gmail/v1/... route Google's client takes when a method is handed media. A request whose host was rewritten (GOOGLE_CLOUD_UNIVERSE_DOMAIN, a rootUrl option) is refused before the token leaves the process. Every method in Gmail's discovery document is tested against the guard. It guards this server, not the token: a stolen gmail.modify token can still send from elsewhere.
• Fenced downloads. With MAILWARDEN_DOWNLOAD_DIR set, file writes — attachments and thread exports — are confined to that directory (realpath-canonicalized, symlink-aware) and never overwrite an existing file. Without it there is nothing to resolve the client-supplied path against, so download_attachment and export_thread can write anywhere this process can — which matters for --http, where the client is remote. Starting --http without the fence therefore prints a warning naming the exposure (it stays a warning, not a refusal: unlike a missing bearer token this needs an authorized client, and existing deployments depend on the current behaviour). A read-tier deployment is silent — it never registers the tool.
• Untrusted-content fencing. Every tool result is wrapped in <untrusted-tool-output> markers and stripped of invisible/BiDi-override characters, so clients can tell quoted mail content from instructions. The strip also covers Unicode tag characters and the variation selectors supplement (invisible ASCII smuggling), and it applies to structuredContent as well as the text copy — a client reading the machine-readable half gets the same sanitized content.
• Live API, no copy. No mailbox mirror or search index is stored anywhere. The only local state is your OAuth token in ~/.mailwarden/.
• Token encryption at rest, by default. token.json holds a refresh token; on disk it is protected only by mode 0o600 (a no-op on Windows). mailwarden --auth therefore stores it AES-256-GCM-encrypted under a random key it keeps in the OS keystore — Windows Credential Manager, the macOS Keychain, the Secret Service (GNOME Keyring, KWallet) on Linux — so a copy of the file (a backup, a synced folder, another machine) is useless on its own. Where no keystore is reachable (a Linux host without a desktop session, a platform without a prebuilt binding), set MAILWARDEN_TOKEN_PASSPHRASE and the key is derived from that passphrase instead (scrypt); without either, the token is stored in plaintext as before, and --auth and --check say so. A passphrase, once set, takes precedence over the keystore. An existing plaintext token keeps working and is encrypted at the next --auth — never rewritten behind your back. Note the boundary: this defends against file theft, not against malware running as your user, which can ask the keystore for the key, or read the passphrase from the environment, exactly as mailwarden does.

Quick start

claude mcp add mailwarden -- npx -y mailwarden

That's the whole install — npx fetches and runs the published package, no clone or build step. You only need Google OAuth credentials once (below).

Setup

First time setting up a Google OAuth app? Follow the step-by-step setup guide — it walks through the Google Cloud Console with exact click paths, explains the "unverified app" screen, and covers the trap that makes tokens die after 7 days. The short version:

1. Google Cloud: create a project → enable the Gmail API → configure the OAuth consent screen and publish it to Production (in Testing status, Google expires refresh tokens after 7 days) → create an OAuth client ID of type Desktop app → download it as credentials.json.
2. Put credentials.json in ~/.mailwarden/ (or set MAILWARDEN_CREDENTIALS=/path/to/credentials.json).
3. Authorize once — opens a browser, stores a refresh token in ~/.mailwarden/token.json:
   bash

   npx -y mailwarden --auth

   Scopes requested: gmail.modify (read + label/archive/trash) and gmail.settings.basic (filter management only). If you authorized a version before filters existed, re-run --auth once to grant the added scope. To hold a token that Gmail itself refuses to send with, authorize with MAILWARDEN_TOOLS=read — see Read-only mode above.
4. Verify the setup any time with the built-in doctor:
   bash

   npx -y mailwarden --check

   It checks credentials.json, whether a token exists (and if it's encrypted), whether the granted scopes cover your enabled tiers, and makes one live Gmail call to prove the token still works — printing a concrete fix for anything that's wrong, and exiting non-zero if so (handy in CI/health checks). Diagnoses the common traps: no/wrong credentials file, never authorized, an encrypted token with no MAILWARDEN_TOKEN_PASSPHRASE or whose key is not in this machine's keystore, a missing scope, or the 7-day "Testing"-consent token expiry.

Connect

Claude Code (local stdio):

claude mcp add mailwarden -- npx -y mailwarden

Claude Code plugin — the same server plus two skills: /mailwarden:setup walks you through the OAuth setup and diagnoses a broken one, and /mailwarden:triage carries the operating rules an assistant needs while working a mailbox — above all that search re-verifies and bulk_modify does not, so a non-empty unverifiedPredicates means resolving the set with search before acting on it. That rule protects the user only if the assistant follows it, and a tool description is read once per call while a skill is read before the plan. The repo root is the plugin (.claude-plugin/plugin.json), so from a clone:

claude --plugin-dir /path/to/mailwarden

It is submitted to Anthropic's community marketplace; once listed, /plugin marketplace add anthropics/claude-plugins-community then /plugin install mailwarden@claude-community does the same without a clone. The plugin starts the exact published version (npx -y mailwarden@<version>, bumped by the release script together with server.json), because the directory reviews one revision and refuses a launcher that would run whatever npm serves later. The plugin runs the full tool surface — for a narrower tier (MAILWARDEN_TOOLS=read) or a second account, use claude mcp add with the env you want instead (see Config and Multiple accounts). That route gets the server without the skills: the npm package ships the server alone, and the skills live in this repo's skills/ folder — to keep triage with a claude mcp add setup, copy skills/triage from a clone into ~/.claude/skills/.

Claude Desktop — add to claude_desktop_config.json:

{  "mcpServers": {    "mailwarden": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mailwarden"] }  }}

Or install the MCPB bundle (mailwarden-<version>.mcpb, attached to GitHub releases from 0.10.0 on) as a Desktop extension — Settings → Extensions → Install extension… — the same server, self-contained at run time (no npx; Claude Desktop brings the Node runtime), with the tool tiers as a setting. The bundle is built from the packed npm package (same file set as published; npm run mcpb, verified in CI: validated, unpacked and booted), plus the OS-keystore binding for each platform it declares, pinned and hash-checked by the lockfile. The one-time npx -y mailwarden --auth still applies (Node needed once for that) — the bundle reads the same ~/.mailwarden/ token.

Smithery — listed in the directory as csitte/mailwarden. Smithery shut down its CLI, toolbox, gateway and accounts on 31 October 2026 and stays on only as a public directory (announcement), so there is no Smithery install path any more: install with npx or the .mcpb above. 0.23.0 was the last version published there.

Remote (Streamable HTTP) — for a VPS / claude.ai custom connector:

# Loopback + token required by default. For real hosting, bind outward and keep the token:MAILWARDEN_TOKEN=<secret> MAILWARDEN_HOST=0.0.0.0 npx -y mailwarden --http   # :8787/mcp

Then in claude.ai: Settings → Connectors → Add custom connector → your https://your-host/mcp URL. In Claude Code: claude mcp add --transport http mailwarden https://your-host/mcp.

Multiple accounts

One OAuth app (one credentials.json) can authorize several Gmail accounts. Each account keeps its own refresh token in a separate file, selected by MAILWARDEN_ACCOUNT:

mailwarden --auth --account work        # stores token.work.jsonmailwarden --auth --account personal    # stores token.personal.json

Run them side by side by registering the server once per account, each with its own MAILWARDEN_ACCOUNT. Every instance carries its own token, its own granted scopes and its own tool surface, and a tool call acts on the account of the entry that carries it and on no other:

{  "mcpServers": {    "gmail-work":     { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mailwarden"], "env": { "MAILWARDEN_ACCOUNT": "work" } },    "gmail-personal": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mailwarden"], "env": { "MAILWARDEN_ACCOUNT": "personal" } }  }}

Account names are case-insensitive — they become filenames, so Work and work would be the same file on Windows/macOS. mailwarden lower-cases them (--account Work → token.work.json) so a name always maps to exactly one mailbox.

Which file --auth writes depends only on --account / MAILWARDEN_ACCOUNT — never on the account you pick in the browser. Authorizing a second mailbox without --account would therefore aim straight at the first one's token file, so --auth checks first and refuses rather than replacing another mailbox's token; --force overrides it deliberately. The two knobs are not interchangeable: MAILWARDEN_ACCOUNT is the one for several mailboxes out of one config directory (it picks token.<name>.json), while MAILWARDEN_DIR moves the whole directory — useful to keep setups apart entirely, but it does not give you a second account inside one. npm run auth from a repo clone passes neither, i.e. it always serves the default account.

mailwarden --check shows the active account and lists the others it finds. With no MAILWARDEN_ACCOUNT set, everything uses the default token.json exactly as before — this is fully backward compatible.

More than two accounts

Two entries are the easy case. Past that, two properties of this design start to matter.

Each instance brings its own tools. The tier split is 11 read + 16 manage + 4 filters (+ 2 drafts, opt-in), so a default instance advertises 31 tools and four of them advertise 124. Clients that search their tool surface on demand absorb that; clients that hold every definition in context do not.

Several accounts in one client share one model context. The account boundary binds a call to one mailbox — it does not stop text read from one mailbox from prompting a call against another, because all of those tool surfaces are in front of the same model. That is a limit of the boundary, not a defect in it; see threat 8 in SECURITY.md.

One move answers both: give exactly one mailbox write tools and leave the rest on read.

{  "mcpServers": {    "gmail-main":   { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mailwarden"], "env": { "MAILWARDEN_ACCOUNT": "main" } },    "gmail-work":   { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mailwarden"], "env": { "MAILWARDEN_ACCOUNT": "work",   "MAILWARDEN_TOOLS": "read" } },    "gmail-club":   { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mailwarden"], "env": { "MAILWARDEN_ACCOUNT": "club",   "MAILWARDEN_TOOLS": "read" } },    "gmail-archive":{ "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mailwarden"], "env": { "MAILWARDEN_ACCOUNT": "archive","MAILWARDEN_TOOLS": "read" } }  }}

Three things follow at once: the read entries only ever ask for gmail.readonly, the one scope in which no-send is enforced by Google rather than by mailwarden's tool surface; the four instances add up to 64 tools rather than 124; and an instruction injected into any of them finds no write tool for another mailbox to reach for. When one of the read-only mailboxes does need cleaning up, hand that entry manage for as long as the work takes instead of permanently.

Separate clients — or separate sessions — remove the shared context entirely, at the price of never having two mailboxes in view at once. Worth it when several mailboxes genuinely need write tools; otherwise the tier split is the cheaper boundary.

No tool reads across mailboxes. search, triage_digest and list_subscriptions each serve the one account their instance was configured with, so a question like "which newsletter writes to all four" is four calls whose answers the caller combines. In a setup this size it is worth calling get_profile before the first action that changes anything — it names the mailbox actually on the other end.

From source

git clone https://github.com/csitte/mailwarden && cd mailwardennpm install && npm run buildnode dist/index.js --auth

A clone deliberately arrives without a CLAUDE.md: the working instructions for this repository are an internal document and are not tracked here. Nothing in the build, the tests or npm run smoke needs them. The rules a contributor — or a coding agent — actually has to know are in CONTRIBUTING.md (design rules that are not up for grabs, the build/test loop) and SECURITY.md (the threat model those rules come from).

Config (env)

Status

Working and used in daily mailbox automation. Core Gmail tools + snooze implemented against @googleapis/gmail, covered by a vitest suite (2210 tests — npm run coverage). Current version: see the npm badge above, the changelog, or releases. PRs welcome — CONTRIBUTING.md covers the build/test loop and the design rules that are not up for grabs.

License

MIT © C.Sitte Softwaretechnik