system_status
Report host, CPU, memory, and uptime for this machine.
無需輸入參數。

io.github.fitzyracing1由 GitHub 帳號 fitzyracing1 發布v0.1.0更新於 Oct 30, 2026
Permission-gated superuser (sysadmin) MCP agent with enterprise guardrails and audit.
具權限閘控的系統管理 MCP 伺服器,讓助理執行 shell 指令、檢視系統狀態並操作 GitHub,並附有審批與稽核日誌。
Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。
參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。
A permission-gated superuser agent exposed over the Model Context Protocol (MCP). It gives an AI agent real system-administration powers on this machine — running shell commands, checking system state, and acting on GitHub — while wrapping every action in guardrails: a dangerous-command denylist, a human-approval gate for risky operations, least-privilege GitHub access, an append-only audit log, and Cisco AI Defense runtime inspection of every tool call and response.
The design goal is the version of a "superuser agent" you can actually ship: powerful, but safe, auditable, and compatible with enterprise guardrails.
Landing site: https://fitzyracing1.github.io/super-landing/ (source: fitzyracing1/super-landing). The previous Pages site in this repo is preserved at tag
site-v1/ branchsite-archive.
An agent that can do anything as root is a liability, not a product. Buyers
(and marketplace security reviews) expect scoping, approvals, and an audit
trail. So capabilities here always pass through a single choke point — the
Guard — which enforces, in order:
approval_required_at (default
MEDIUM) needs an explicit confirm=true from a human.human owner -> agent -> tool -> action -> outcome.This mirrors the enterprise model: your app owns scoping + approvals + local audit; Cisco AI Defense provides runtime threat inspection at the MCP layer; Cisco Duo Agentic Identity provides per-tool-call authorization tied to an accountable human owner; and Stripe turns metered tool calls into revenue.
Duo follows a "Duo decides, the gateway enforces" model. This agent registers as
a non-human identity, authenticates via the OAuth 2.1 client-credentials
grant (with an RFC 8707 resource indicator), and authorizes every tool call
either by matching the tool's required scope against what Duo granted, or by
calling an explicit Duo decision endpoint. Set DUO_ENABLED=true plus
DUO_TOKEN_URL / DUO_CLIENT_ID / DUO_CLIENT_SECRET (see .env.example). When
Duo is not configured, calls are allowed but flagged governed: false; in
enforce mode authorization errors fail closed.
Each authorized, successful tool call emits a Stripe meter event
(v2 billing meter events API), so the agent can be sold per-action. Configure a
meter in Stripe, then set STRIPE_ENABLED=true, STRIPE_API_KEY,
STRIPE_CUSTOMER_ID, and STRIPE_METER_EVENT_NAME. Per-tool weights let
higher-risk actions cost more. Billing is best-effort: metering failures are
logged and never block or fail the tool call (results are annotated
billed: true|false).
* run_command is LOW risk only when its base command is in
command_allowlist; otherwise HIGH (requires confirm=true).
Not yet on PyPI. Install straight from git:
From a clone:
Requires Python 3.10+.
Copy .env.example to .env (or use a YAML file — see superuser.example.yaml)
and set values. Key settings:
SUPERUSER_HUMAN_OWNER — the human accountable for the agent's actions.SUPERUSER_APPROVAL_AT — risk threshold for the approval gate (LOW…CRITICAL).AI_DEFENSE_* — Cisco AI Defense credentials/mode (see below).DUO_* — Cisco Duo Agentic Identity authorization (see below).STRIPE_* — Stripe usage-based billing (see below).GITHUB_TOKEN, GITHUB_ALLOWED_REPOS, GITHUB_ALLOW_WRITES — least-privilege GitHub.For a full console-value → env-var mapping for all three services, see
docs/INTEGRATIONS.md.
Install the SDK (pip install 'superuser[security]') and provide credentials:
AI_DEFENSE_INSPECTION_API_KEY.agentsec.protect() auto-patches LLM + MCP clients):
set AI_DEFENSE_API_MODE_LLM_ENDPOINT + AI_DEFENSE_API_MODE_LLM_API_KEY,
or point AI_DEFENSE_AGENTSEC_CONFIG at an agentsec.yaml
(see agentsec.example.yaml).AI_DEFENSE_MODE: enforce (block), monitor (log only), or off.If the SDK is not installed or no credentials are set, the agent still runs but
every result is annotated protected: false / UNPROTECTED — the gap is never
silent. In enforce mode, inspection errors fail closed (the call is
blocked); in monitor mode they fail open (logged, allowed).
With no keys set the server still runs: Duo and Stripe are off by default, and Cisco AI Defense runs unprotected (clearly flagged) if the SDK/keys are missing.
Example client config (stdio):
.env / *.yaml config files out
of version control (already in .gitignore).Apache-2.0.
This project is free, and its license stays as is. Support it through GitHub Sponsors:
來源:README.md,提交 b223270
Report host, CPU, memory, and uptime for this machine.
無需輸入參數。
Report disk usage per mounted partition.
無需輸入參數。
List top processes. sort_by is 'memory' or 'cpu'.
limitsort_byRun a shell command on this machine. Non-allowlisted commands are HIGH risk and require confirm=true. Commands matching the dangerous-command denylist are always rejected, and every call is inspected by Cisco AI Defense and written to the audit log.
command必填confirmtimeoutGet metadata for an allowlisted repo (e.g. 'owner/name').
repo必填List issues for an allowlisted repo.
repo必填limitstateComment on an issue/PR. Write action: requires confirm=true and GITHUB_ALLOW_WRITES.
body必填repo必填confirmissue_number必填Report the agent's guardrail configuration and Cisco AI Defense status.
無需輸入參數。
已滿足適用檢查項的 80%
該評分衡量此收錄條目的完整程度,依據註冊中心條目、端點與公開來源計算得出。它不是對伺服器本身的評價,也不表示伺服器安全或目前可用:可連通性是帶日期的檢查結果,評分也不包含安裝量或使用者評價。
請在註冊中心條目中宣告憑證請求標頭,或保持端點能夠回應探測,以便判定其認證方式。
請在儲存庫或註冊中心條目中宣告授權條款。
pip install "superuser @ git+https://github.com/fitzyracing1/Super.git"pip install "superuser[all] @ git+https://github.com/fitzyracing1/Super.git" # + Cisco AI Defense + Stripe SDKspip install -e . # core agent (Duo authz uses requests; no extra dep)pip install -e '.[security]' # + Cisco AI Defense SDK (cisco-aidefense-sdk)pip install -e '.[billing]' # + Stripe SDK (usage-based billing)pip install -e '.[all]' # security + billingpip install -e '.[dev]' # + pytest / ruff# Validate configuration and print guardrail/Cisco status, then exit:superuser --check
# Start the MCP server (stdio transport, for MCP clients like Cursor/Claude):superuser# or: python -m superuser{ "mcpServers": { "superuser": { "command": "superuser", "env": { "SUPERUSER_HUMAN_OWNER": "[email protected]", "AI_DEFENSE_MODE": "enforce", "AI_DEFENSE_INSPECTION_API_KEY": "..." } } }}pytest