
Eset Mcp
io.github.maciekaz由 GitHub 帳號 maciekaz 發布v2.0.0更新於 Nov 4, 2026
MCP server for the ESET ecosystem - Connect cloud + PROTECT On-Prem, multi-tenant, RO/RW
概覽
讓助理透過 101 個工具與組合工具查詢及管理 ESET 安全主控台(雲端 ESET Connect、PROTECT On-Prem、Inspect、Cloud Office)的 MCP 伺服器。
- 可以做什麼
- 搜尋、讀取與檢視裝置、使用者、原則、群組、事件、偵測與弱點資訊
- 執行高階組合工具:跨實體搜尋、裝置完整剖析、事件脈絡與最新偵測
- 管理應用程式、資產、裝置、身分、安裝程式、行動裝置、網路存取、修補程式、原則、隔離區、使用者、弱點與網頁存取防護物件(僅 RW 模式提供寫入工具)
- 以資源形式讀取伺服器設定與工具目錄,並執行內建提示詞進行閒置裝置稽核、弱點報告與事件分流
- 透過請求標頭將每次呼叫導向雲端區域或地端主控台,並自動處理分頁、重試與回應大小上限
- 適用情境
- 當助理需要處理 ESET 端點安全資料時適用,例如事件分流、裝置與弱點稽核、原則管理,並可在單一伺服器上同時涵蓋多個雲端與地端租戶。
- 執行需求
- 以本機 Docker 映像透過 stdio 執行,或作為 Streamable HTTP 服務執行。需要 ESET API 憑證:env 模式使用 ESET_USER 與 ESET_PASSWORD,basic 模式則每次請求攜帶 Authorization Basic 標頭。選用設定包括區域、部署類型、地端伺服器位址、Cloudflare Access 服務權杖、CA 憑證包及日誌與指標選項。建議使用專用 ESET API 使用者。
安裝
在 SourceWeft 中
- 開啟 儀表板中的 Eset Mcp,將其新增到工作區。
- 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。
Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。
其他 MCP 客戶端
參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。
README
ESET-MCP
[Tests] [License: MIT] [MCP spec]
A Model Context Protocol server for the entire ESET management surface: ESET Connect (cloud, all regions), ESET PROTECT On-Prem, ESET Inspect, and ESET Cloud Office. Drive any of them from any MCP host (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, or a custom agent) through tools, resources, and prompts.
Built as a single hub for any number of ESET deployments. One process fronts cloud and on-prem consoles at the same time; clients pick the target per request via headers; non-default on-prem origins require an operator allowlist. MCP receives credentials (Basic auth, plus an optional URL override and optional Cloudflare Access service token), routes the call to the right backend, mints its own tokens, and keeps tenants isolated in the pool.
⚠️ Just to be clear, fellas
This is an independent, community-driven open-source project and is not affiliated with, officially supported by, or endorsed by ESET, spol. s r.o. ESET and its product names are registered trademarks of their respective owners.While every effort has been made to ensure this software is safe and robust (including the strict Read-Only mode gate), this code is provided "AS IS", without any warranty of any kind. You are solely responsible for how you use this tool and any changes made to your ESET environment.
2.0.0 — breaking security update: See the v1 → v2 migration guide. Authentication endpoints are private to the adapter and never exposed as tools. The 101 business tools, their input schemas and four composites retain their existing contracts. Read the required upgrade settings before updating an HTTP or On-Prem deployment. MCP 2026 base protocol and transports are supported; the existing custom Basic profile is retained, not advertised as MCP OAuth 2.1 authorization.
Table of contents
- Features
- Architecture at a glance
- Security
- Quick start
- Configuration
- Multi-tenant deployment (basic-auth mode)
- On-prem ESET PROTECT support
- Production deployment (HTTPS via Caddy)
- Tools, resources & prompts
- Architecture
- Tests
- Refreshing the OpenAPI specs
- License
Features
Complete API coverage
- 101 business tools auto-generated from 16 official ESET Connect OpenAPI 3.0.1 specs, covering application-management, asset-management, automation, device-management, identity, incident-management, installer-management, mobile-device-management, network-access-protection, patch-management, policy-management, quarantine-management, user-management, vulnerability-management, and web-access-protection.
- 4 high-level composites that fold 3-6 raw calls into one:
eset_search,device_full_profile,incident_full_context,latest_detections.
Read-only / read-write modes
ESET_MODE=RO→ catalog exposes only read-only tools (51 total). Write tools are hidden fromlist_toolsentirely.ESET_MODE=RW→ all 105 tools advertised; mutating tools carrydestructiveHint: truein their MCP annotations.- Independent of the ESET account's underlying permissions.
- A defence-in-depth in-memory gate rejects RW tool names in RO mode before any HTTP request is sent.
Authentication
ESET_AUTH_MODE=env- single tenant, credentials from.env.ESET_AUTH_MODE=basic- multi tenant, clients passAuthorization: Basic <base64(user:password)>per request (plus optionalX-ESET-Regionfor a different cloud region, orX-ESET-Server-URLto route the request to an on-prem PROTECT console). One server fronts many ESET accounts and can mix cloud + on-prem in the same process.- Per-tenant OAuth tokens, pooled and isolated by
(user, password_hash, deployment, region-or-server-url, cf_secret_hash). Rotating a password or Cloudflare Access service token mints a fresh client; cloud and on-prem clients for the same user never share a pool entry.
Transports
- stdio - JSON-RPC over stdin/stdout for local hosts.
- Streamable HTTP - MCP 2026-07-28, with legacy 2025-11-25 compatibility.
Multi-region
eu / de / us / ca / jpn. Fixed via ESET_REGION in env mode;
per-request via X-ESET-Region in basic mode.
Cloud + on-prem in one process
In addition to the cloud regions, a single MCP server can front
customer-hosted ESET PROTECT On-Prem consoles. The on-prem auth wire
format (POST /GetTokens with a camelCase response) and per-host URL
structure are handled transparently; clients pick the target per request
via the X-ESET-Server-URL header. See
On-prem ESET PROTECT support.
Cloudflare Access (optional)
When the on-prem console sits behind a Cloudflare Access tunnel, MCP
authenticates as a service token
(env-default or per-request X-ESET-CF-Access-Client-Id /
X-ESET-CF-Access-Client-Secret) and rides through to the origin. The
CF token is an extra ingress layer in front of - not a replacement for -
the ESET account credentials. Cloud requests never carry these headers.
Resilience
- OAuth2 with proactive refresh ~5 min before token expiry and a forced refresh + retry on 401.
- 429 retries with exponential backoff (up to 3 attempts, honours
Retry-After). - Pagination (
nextPageToken) walked transparently. - 202 long-polling with the
response-idheader, up to 10 minutes.
Response shaping (context-window protection)
A single uncapped list_* call can return hundreds of KB - enough to
overflow a model's context. Two transformations are applied to every
tool response:
fieldsprojection - every GET tool exposes an optionalfields: [string]parameter that filters each list-item down to the requested keys (e.g.["uuid", "displayName"]). Applied server-side after fetch.- Byte cap (
ESET_MCP_RESPONSE_BYTES_MAX, default 100 KB) - if a payload still exceeds the budget, the longest list is trimmed while every top-level field (nextPageToken,totalSize, …) is preserved, and a_cappedmetadata block is attached with an actionable hint on how to continue. Agents retain full access to the data through pagination.
Agent-friendly errors
HTTP errors are mapped to readable hints: 403 → check Permission Sets in ESET PROTECT Hub; 401 → server refreshes the token automatically; 429 → back off; 5xx → retry shortly.
Observability (logs + Prometheus)
- Structured logs to stderr. Text (default) for dev, JSON Lines for
prod log shippers via
ESET_MCP_LOG_FORMAT=json. Every tool call, token refresh, HTTP retry and pool eviction emits a typedeventrecord with low-cardinality fields (tool, deployment, status, duration_ms, response_bytes, ...). - Prometheus metrics at an opt-in
/metricsendpoint (ESET_MCP_METRICS_ENABLED=true, requirespip install eset-mcp[metrics]). Counters for tool calls, token refreshes, HTTP retries, cap hits; histograms for tool duration and response sizes; gauge for client pool size. - What never enters logs or metrics: passwords,
Authorizationheaders, CF Access secrets, request/response bodies, query strings, substituted path parameters (which can leak UUIDs). A defensive deny-list in the logger strips known-sensitive keys before any formatter sees them. - Failure isolation: telemetry emission is wrapped in a try/except so
a broken metrics registry or formatter can never turn a successful
tool call into an error to the agent.
/metricsreturns 500 (not 503) if exposition ever raises - the worker stays up. - Quieting in production: set
ESET_LOG_LEVEL=WARNINGto mute the per-call INFO events but keep retries / errors visible; setESET_LOG_LEVEL=ERRORto silence everything but hard failures. Disable metrics entirely withESET_MCP_METRICS_ENABLED=false(default). The three knobs are independent.
Architecture at a glance
The simplest setup: credentials in .env, one MCP host, one ESET cloud
region. Good for personal use, a single team, or a desktop AI client like
Claude Desktop or Claude Code.
[Single-tenant: one ESET account, one deployment]
For real multi-tenant or enterprise deployments, put a credentials manager in front of ESET-MCP. The diagram below shows one such pattern using IBM mcp-context-forge as the "creds management" layer - any equivalent MCP gateway (or your own auth proxy) works the same way:
[Multi-tenant: many clients, one MCP, many backends]
The forge holds per-tenant secrets and injects Authorization: Basic,
X-ESET-Region, X-ESET-Server-URL, and X-ESET-CF-Access-* headers per
request. ESET-MCP routes each request to the right backend (cloud region,
on-prem PROTECT console, or on-prem behind Cloudflare Access) and the
per-tenant LRU client pool keeps OAuth tokens fully isolated between
tenants. This is a working pattern, not aspirational - the headers, pool
keys, and routing rules described here are all in the test suite under
tests/test_concurrency.py and tests/test_onprem.py.
Security
Credentials
- In
envmode the password is read once at startup and kept in memory. - In
basicmode the password is on the wire only for the duration of the request, and in memory only while the per-tenant client is hot in the LRU pool. It is never logged. - The pool key uses a SHA-256 hash of the password rather than the password itself.
- OAuth access/refresh tokens are held per-tenant; tokens never cross tenant boundaries within a single session.
Authentication modes & transport
basic mode over plain HTTP would leak passwords. The server enforces
HTTP transport for basic mode at startup but does not enforce TLS -
that is the deployment's job. The prod docker-compose profile fronts
the server with Caddy + Let's Encrypt.
Missing / malformed Authorization in basic mode → HTTP 401 with a
WWW-Authenticate: Basic challenge. Unknown region in X-ESET-Region
→ HTTP 400. An unapproved on-prem origin is rejected with HTTP 403.
RO / RW isolation
Two independent layers:
- Catalog hiding -
list_toolsfilters out every non-GET tool in RO mode. The agent never sees write tools. - Defence-in-depth gate -
call_toolvalidates the tool's declared mode againstESET_MODEbefore any HTTP request goes out. Hard-coded clients, prompt-injection attempts, and stale agent snapshots all hit the gate and receive a structuredModeForbiddenErrortext response (no exception, no network call).
In RW mode, mutating tools carry destructiveHint: true so MCP hosts
that respect annotations can require a per-call confirmation.
Per-tenant isolation (basic-auth mode)
- Auth headers are parsed in dedicated ASGI middleware and stashed in a request scope. Handlers use the SDK's explicit HTTP request, so legacy session tasks cannot retain another request's identity. Legacy sessions are bound to credentials, region/origin, CF pair and TLS/network policy.
- Each request resolves to a
Credentialsinstance keyed by the complete connection identity. Passwords and CF values are hashed in the index; hashes must not be logged. - An LRU bound on the client pool prevents unbounded memory growth from random-credential spraying.
Network surface
- The explicit
http/devprofiles publish only127.0.0.1:8765and require Basic credentials. - In the
prodprofile the MCP container has no published port - Caddy joins the same docker bridge network and proxies HTTPS in. The only host ports are 80 (HTTP-01 ACME) and 443 (HTTPS). - Cloud traffic goes to fixed ESET regional domains. On-prem traffic goes to the configured default or an explicitly allowed origin. DNS is checked at connection time; redirects and implicit environment proxies are disabled.
Dependency & code audit
- Ruff: clean (
select = E F W I B UP RUF). - Runtime dependencies include
mcp,httpx,httpcore,jsonschema,pydanticandpython-dotenv; exact versions are inrequirements.lock. Plusstarlette+uvicornwhen running HTTP.
Out of scope (by design)
- No webhook receivers.
- No persistent token storage; application logs go to stderr. Caddy error logs remove request headers and URI.
- No on-disk caching of OAuth tokens.
- No write-back of
basic-mode credentials to disk.
Responsible disclosure
Please open a private security advisory rather than a public issue: https://github.com/maciekaz/ESET-MCP/security/advisories/new.
Quick start
Use the signed 2.0.0 image. Upgrading from v1 requires the
configuration changes below; the :1 tag stays on the v1 line.
Published-image pin policy:
:2- latest 2.x.x (updates within the major):2.0- latest 2.0.x (updates within the minor):2.0.0- exact version:latest- most recent stable release; may cross major versions:main/:sha-<short>- edge builds from main (not for production)
Wire up to Claude Desktop / Claude Code (stdio)
HTTP transport (local Basic authentication)
Send the ESET credentials in the Basic header as shown below. For remote access, use the production HTTPS profile and configure its public host.
Verify the image (cosign keyless)
Verify the release workflow identity and pin the resolved image digest for deployments:
From source (contributors / local hacking)
Docker Compose (builds this checkout)
The compose file builds this checkout as eset-mcp:2.0.0-local. HTTP
profiles use Basic authentication. Published images described above are
release artifacts; this working tree does not publish or update them.
One-off stdio via compose:
Hacking on the source? Use the dev profile to build from your local checkout instead of pulling:
Configuration
All settings live in .env. Required fields are marked in
.env.example.
Use a dedicated API user - not your console login. Create one in ESET PROTECT Hub / ESET Business Account → API users.
Multi-tenant deployment (basic-auth mode)
Every HTTP request must carry:
Example Python client:
⚠️ Basic auth without TLS leaks credentials. Always run
basicmode behind HTTPS.
On-prem ESET PROTECT support
ESET ships PROTECT as both a cloud service (the ESET Connect API at
*.eset.systems) and an on-prem console customers self-host. The on-prem
REST API lives on a single host (default port 9443) and uses a different
authentication endpoint - POST /GetTokens with a JSON body and a
camelCase response - but otherwise shares the URL structure of the cloud
API. ESET-MCP supports both, in the same process.
How the server decides cloud vs on-prem
So a single MCP server can front the cloud for most clients and route
specific requests to one or more on-prem consoles - keyed entirely by which
URL each client sends in X-ESET-Server-URL.
Single-tenant on-prem (env mode)
Multi-tenant on-prem (basic auth, per-request URL)
Client targeting on-prem:
Same MCP server, different request - same headers minus X-ESET-Server-URL
- stays on cloud.
What works on on-prem vs cloud
The tool catalog is identical for both deployments (all 101 OpenAPI-derived tools plus the 4 composites). At call time the server uses cloud paths for cloud credentials and on-prem paths for on-prem credentials.
- Historical mappings retained:
device_*,asset_groups_*,policy_*andtask_*retain their existing paths and overrides. Endpoint availability depends on the PROTECT version and installed modules. - Cloud-only modules:
incident_*,mobile_*,wap_*,nap_*,quarantine_*and most ofvuln_*correspond to separate ESET products (ESET Inspect, Cloud Office Security, MDM) that are not part of the on-prem PROTECT installation. Calling them against an on-prem console may return an ESET error; failures are sanitized and returned withisError=true. The historical catalog is preserved for compatibility. - Path overrides: a few endpoints have a different URL on-prem - e.g.
POST /v1/devices/{uuid}:renameis:renameDeviceon-prem. These are declared ineset_mcp/openapi/onprem-path-overrides.jsonand applied automatically when the request targets on-prem.
Cloudflare Access in front of the on-prem console
When the on-prem PROTECT console is exposed via a Cloudflare tunnel and gated by Cloudflare Access, MCP can authenticate as a service token. The chain becomes MCP → Cloudflare Access → ESET on-prem.
Two values per token pair, supplied either via .env:
…or per-request in basic-auth mode (overrides the env defaults - handy when each tenant has its own tunnel and its own service token):
MCP translates the X-ESET-CF-* input headers into the actual
CF-Access-Client-Id / CF-Access-Client-Secret headers that Cloudflare
Access expects, and attaches them to every outbound call - both the
POST /GetTokens auth handshake and every subsequent ESET API request.
The CF secret is treated like the password: never logged, only its SHA-256 hash enters the client pool key. Rotating the secret mints a fresh client
- fresh ESET token. Cloud requests never carry CF Access headers regardless of env defaults - ESET Connect is a public SaaS.
Security notes for on-prem
X-ESET-Server-URLaccepts onlyhttps://URLs with no path, query or fragment. Trailing slashes are stripped. Anything else → HTTP 400.ESET_ONPREM_VERIFY_SSL=falsedisables TLS certificate verification and exposes the connection to MITM. The server logs a single WARNING per client construction when it's disabled. Use only on trusted intranets with self-signed certs you cannot replace.- On-prem tokens are held in memory per
(user, password_hash, server_url, cf_secret_hash)- same isolation rules as cloud tokens. The pool keys them separately so cloud and on-prem clients never collide, and two clients hitting the same on-prem URL with different CF service tokens get separate pool entries. - Sending only one of the two
X-ESET-CF-*headers returns HTTP 400 rather than silently falling back to the env default (almost certain operator typo).
Production deployment (HTTPS via Caddy)
The prod docker-compose profile launches Caddy in front of the MCP
server. Caddy fetches a Let's Encrypt cert on first start (HTTP-01
challenge - ports 80 / 443 must be reachable from the public internet)
and proxies HTTPS to the internal MCP container.
You get:
- HTTPS on 443 with auto-renewing Let's Encrypt cert.
- HTTP-01 challenge on 80.
- MCP container bound only to the docker bridge network - no published port.
- gzip / zstd compression; raw access logs disabled and error-log headers removed.
- Only
/mcpis public; metrics stay on the private container network.
Tools, resources & prompts
Composite high-level tools
Each composite degrades gracefully when a sub-call returns 403/404
(e.g. on tenants missing a module). The shape carries skipped /
truncated flags where applicable.
Resources
eset://config/mode-ROorRW.eset://config/region- current region (per-request in basic-auth mode).eset://config/deployment-cloudoronprem (<server-url>)for this request.eset://config/tools-catalog- JSON catalog of mode-allowed raw business tools (name, mode, method, path, service, description).eset://docs/rate-limits- quick reminder about the 10 req/s ceiling.
Prompts
audit_inactive_devices(days=30)- offboarding candidates.vulnerability_report- per-device CVE report.incident_triage- open incidents + related detections.
Architecture
Tests
The default suite covers API contracts, synthetic failures, MCP HTTP and stdio,
and loopback TLS. It blocks external connections and does not load .env.
To run integration tests with configured ESET credentials, explicitly set
ESET_RUN_LIVE_TESTS=1. See the test instructions for baseline
fixture maintenance and container probes.
Refreshing the OpenAPI specs
tests/test_catalog_vs_openapi.py flags any new or changed operations
after a refresh.
License
MIT
來源:README.md,提交 627ed39
工具
0版本歷史
2- v2.0.0最新Nov 4, 2026
- v1.0.3Sep 16, 2026
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