Eset Mcp

io.github.maciekaz由 GitHub 帳號 maciekaz 發布v2.0.0更新於 Nov 4, 2026

MCP server for the ESET ecosystem - Connect cloud + PROTECT On-Prem, multi-tenant, RO/RW

概覽

AI 產生的概覽

讓助理透過 101 個工具與組合工具查詢及管理 ESET 安全主控台(雲端 ESET Connect、PROTECT On-Prem、Inspect、Cloud Office)的 MCP 伺服器。

可以做什麼
  • 搜尋、讀取與檢視裝置、使用者、原則、群組、事件、偵測與弱點資訊
  • 執行高階組合工具:跨實體搜尋、裝置完整剖析、事件脈絡與最新偵測
  • 管理應用程式、資產、裝置、身分、安裝程式、行動裝置、網路存取、修補程式、原則、隔離區、使用者、弱點與網頁存取防護物件(僅 RW 模式提供寫入工具)
  • 以資源形式讀取伺服器設定與工具目錄,並執行內建提示詞進行閒置裝置稽核、弱點報告與事件分流
  • 透過請求標頭將每次呼叫導向雲端區域或地端主控台,並自動處理分頁、重試與回應大小上限
適用情境
當助理需要處理 ESET 端點安全資料時適用,例如事件分流、裝置與弱點稽核、原則管理,並可在單一伺服器上同時涵蓋多個雲端與地端租戶。
執行需求
以本機 Docker 映像透過 stdio 執行,或作為 Streamable HTTP 服務執行。需要 ESET API 憑證:env 模式使用 ESET_USER 與 ESET_PASSWORD,basic 模式則每次請求攜帶 Authorization Basic 標頭。選用設定包括區域、部署類型、地端伺服器位址、Cloudflare Access 服務權杖、CA 憑證包及日誌與指標選項。建議使用專用 ESET API 使用者。
安裝前請注意
憑證敏感:basic 模式透過 Authorization 標頭傳送密碼,必須置於 TLS 之後,伺服器本身不強制加密。RW 模式會暴露修改或刪除 ESET 物件的工具,除非確需寫入,否則保持 ESET_MODE=RO。關閉地端 SSL 驗證會使連線面臨中間人風險。本專案為社群專案,與 ESET 無隸屬或背書關係。

安裝

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 開啟 儀表板中的 Eset Mcp,將其新增到工作區。
  2. 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。

Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。

其他 MCP 客戶端

參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。

README

ESET-MCP

[Tests] [License: MIT] [MCP spec]

A Model Context Protocol server for the entire ESET management surface: ESET Connect (cloud, all regions), ESET PROTECT On-Prem, ESET Inspect, and ESET Cloud Office. Drive any of them from any MCP host (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, or a custom agent) through tools, resources, and prompts.

Built as a single hub for any number of ESET deployments. One process fronts cloud and on-prem consoles at the same time; clients pick the target per request via headers; non-default on-prem origins require an operator allowlist. MCP receives credentials (Basic auth, plus an optional URL override and optional Cloudflare Access service token), routes the call to the right backend, mints its own tokens, and keeps tenants isolated in the pool.

⚠️ Just to be clear, fellas
This is an independent, community-driven open-source project and is not affiliated with, officially supported by, or endorsed by ESET, spol. s r.o. ESET and its product names are registered trademarks of their respective owners.

While every effort has been made to ensure this software is safe and robust (including the strict Read-Only mode gate), this code is provided "AS IS", without any warranty of any kind. You are solely responsible for how you use this tool and any changes made to your ESET environment.

2.0.0 — breaking security update: See the v1 → v2 migration guide. Authentication endpoints are private to the adapter and never exposed as tools. The 101 business tools, their input schemas and four composites retain their existing contracts. Read the required upgrade settings before updating an HTTP or On-Prem deployment. MCP 2026 base protocol and transports are supported; the existing custom Basic profile is retained, not advertised as MCP OAuth 2.1 authorization.

Table of contents


Features

Complete API coverage

  • 101 business tools auto-generated from 16 official ESET Connect OpenAPI 3.0.1 specs, covering application-management, asset-management, automation, device-management, identity, incident-management, installer-management, mobile-device-management, network-access-protection, patch-management, policy-management, quarantine-management, user-management, vulnerability-management, and web-access-protection.
  • 4 high-level composites that fold 3-6 raw calls into one: eset_search, device_full_profile, incident_full_context, latest_detections.

Read-only / read-write modes

  • ESET_MODE=RO → catalog exposes only read-only tools (51 total). Write tools are hidden from list_tools entirely.
  • ESET_MODE=RW → all 105 tools advertised; mutating tools carry destructiveHint: true in their MCP annotations.
  • Independent of the ESET account's underlying permissions.
  • A defence-in-depth in-memory gate rejects RW tool names in RO mode before any HTTP request is sent.

Authentication

  • ESET_AUTH_MODE=env - single tenant, credentials from .env.
  • ESET_AUTH_MODE=basic - multi tenant, clients pass Authorization: Basic <base64(user:password)> per request (plus optional X-ESET-Region for a different cloud region, or X-ESET-Server-URL to route the request to an on-prem PROTECT console). One server fronts many ESET accounts and can mix cloud + on-prem in the same process.
  • Per-tenant OAuth tokens, pooled and isolated by (user, password_hash, deployment, region-or-server-url, cf_secret_hash). Rotating a password or Cloudflare Access service token mints a fresh client; cloud and on-prem clients for the same user never share a pool entry.

Transports

  • stdio - JSON-RPC over stdin/stdout for local hosts.
  • Streamable HTTP - MCP 2026-07-28, with legacy 2025-11-25 compatibility.

Multi-region

eu / de / us / ca / jpn. Fixed via ESET_REGION in env mode; per-request via X-ESET-Region in basic mode.

Cloud + on-prem in one process

In addition to the cloud regions, a single MCP server can front customer-hosted ESET PROTECT On-Prem consoles. The on-prem auth wire format (POST /GetTokens with a camelCase response) and per-host URL structure are handled transparently; clients pick the target per request via the X-ESET-Server-URL header. See On-prem ESET PROTECT support.

Cloudflare Access (optional)

When the on-prem console sits behind a Cloudflare Access tunnel, MCP authenticates as a service token (env-default or per-request X-ESET-CF-Access-Client-Id / X-ESET-CF-Access-Client-Secret) and rides through to the origin. The CF token is an extra ingress layer in front of - not a replacement for - the ESET account credentials. Cloud requests never carry these headers.

Resilience

  • OAuth2 with proactive refresh ~5 min before token expiry and a forced refresh + retry on 401.
  • 429 retries with exponential backoff (up to 3 attempts, honours Retry-After).
  • Pagination (nextPageToken) walked transparently.
  • 202 long-polling with the response-id header, up to 10 minutes.

Response shaping (context-window protection)

A single uncapped list_* call can return hundreds of KB - enough to overflow a model's context. Two transformations are applied to every tool response:

  • fields projection - every GET tool exposes an optional fields: [string] parameter that filters each list-item down to the requested keys (e.g. ["uuid", "displayName"]). Applied server-side after fetch.
  • Byte cap (ESET_MCP_RESPONSE_BYTES_MAX, default 100 KB) - if a payload still exceeds the budget, the longest list is trimmed while every top-level field (nextPageToken, totalSize, …) is preserved, and a _capped metadata block is attached with an actionable hint on how to continue. Agents retain full access to the data through pagination.

Agent-friendly errors

HTTP errors are mapped to readable hints: 403 → check Permission Sets in ESET PROTECT Hub; 401 → server refreshes the token automatically; 429 → back off; 5xx → retry shortly.

Observability (logs + Prometheus)

  • Structured logs to stderr. Text (default) for dev, JSON Lines for prod log shippers via ESET_MCP_LOG_FORMAT=json. Every tool call, token refresh, HTTP retry and pool eviction emits a typed event record with low-cardinality fields (tool, deployment, status, duration_ms, response_bytes, ...).
  • Prometheus metrics at an opt-in /metrics endpoint (ESET_MCP_METRICS_ENABLED=true, requires pip install eset-mcp[metrics]). Counters for tool calls, token refreshes, HTTP retries, cap hits; histograms for tool duration and response sizes; gauge for client pool size.
  • What never enters logs or metrics: passwords, Authorization headers, CF Access secrets, request/response bodies, query strings, substituted path parameters (which can leak UUIDs). A defensive deny-list in the logger strips known-sensitive keys before any formatter sees them.
  • Failure isolation: telemetry emission is wrapped in a try/except so a broken metrics registry or formatter can never turn a successful tool call into an error to the agent. /metrics returns 500 (not 503) if exposition ever raises - the worker stays up.
  • Quieting in production: set ESET_LOG_LEVEL=WARNING to mute the per-call INFO events but keep retries / errors visible; set ESET_LOG_LEVEL=ERROR to silence everything but hard failures. Disable metrics entirely with ESET_MCP_METRICS_ENABLED=false (default). The three knobs are independent.

Architecture at a glance

The simplest setup: credentials in .env, one MCP host, one ESET cloud region. Good for personal use, a single team, or a desktop AI client like Claude Desktop or Claude Code.

[Single-tenant: one ESET account, one deployment]

For real multi-tenant or enterprise deployments, put a credentials manager in front of ESET-MCP. The diagram below shows one such pattern using IBM mcp-context-forge as the "creds management" layer - any equivalent MCP gateway (or your own auth proxy) works the same way:

[Multi-tenant: many clients, one MCP, many backends]

The forge holds per-tenant secrets and injects Authorization: Basic, X-ESET-Region, X-ESET-Server-URL, and X-ESET-CF-Access-* headers per request. ESET-MCP routes each request to the right backend (cloud region, on-prem PROTECT console, or on-prem behind Cloudflare Access) and the per-tenant LRU client pool keeps OAuth tokens fully isolated between tenants. This is a working pattern, not aspirational - the headers, pool keys, and routing rules described here are all in the test suite under tests/test_concurrency.py and tests/test_onprem.py.


Security

Credentials

  • In env mode the password is read once at startup and kept in memory.
  • In basic mode the password is on the wire only for the duration of the request, and in memory only while the per-tenant client is hot in the LRU pool. It is never logged.
  • The pool key uses a SHA-256 hash of the password rather than the password itself.
  • OAuth access/refresh tokens are held per-tenant; tokens never cross tenant boundaries within a single session.

Authentication modes & transport

ModeTransport allowedCredentials source
envstdio or http.env (ESET_USER / ESET_PASSWORD)
basichttp onlyAuthorization: Basic header per request

basic mode over plain HTTP would leak passwords. The server enforces HTTP transport for basic mode at startup but does not enforce TLS - that is the deployment's job. The prod docker-compose profile fronts the server with Caddy + Let's Encrypt.

Missing / malformed Authorization in basic mode → HTTP 401 with a WWW-Authenticate: Basic challenge. Unknown region in X-ESET-Region → HTTP 400. An unapproved on-prem origin is rejected with HTTP 403.

RO / RW isolation

Two independent layers:

  1. Catalog hiding - list_tools filters out every non-GET tool in RO mode. The agent never sees write tools.
  2. Defence-in-depth gate - call_tool validates the tool's declared mode against ESET_MODE before any HTTP request goes out. Hard-coded clients, prompt-injection attempts, and stale agent snapshots all hit the gate and receive a structured ModeForbiddenError text response (no exception, no network call).

In RW mode, mutating tools carry destructiveHint: true so MCP hosts that respect annotations can require a per-call confirmation.

Per-tenant isolation (basic-auth mode)

  • Auth headers are parsed in dedicated ASGI middleware and stashed in a request scope. Handlers use the SDK's explicit HTTP request, so legacy session tasks cannot retain another request's identity. Legacy sessions are bound to credentials, region/origin, CF pair and TLS/network policy.
  • Each request resolves to a Credentials instance keyed by the complete connection identity. Passwords and CF values are hashed in the index; hashes must not be logged.
  • An LRU bound on the client pool prevents unbounded memory growth from random-credential spraying.

Network surface

  • The explicit http/dev profiles publish only 127.0.0.1:8765 and require Basic credentials.
  • In the prod profile the MCP container has no published port - Caddy joins the same docker bridge network and proxies HTTPS in. The only host ports are 80 (HTTP-01 ACME) and 443 (HTTPS).
  • Cloud traffic goes to fixed ESET regional domains. On-prem traffic goes to the configured default or an explicitly allowed origin. DNS is checked at connection time; redirects and implicit environment proxies are disabled.

Dependency & code audit

  • Ruff: clean (select = E F W I B UP RUF).
  • Runtime dependencies include mcp, httpx, httpcore, jsonschema, pydantic and python-dotenv; exact versions are in requirements.lock. Plus starlette + uvicorn when running HTTP.

Out of scope (by design)

  • No webhook receivers.
  • No persistent token storage; application logs go to stderr. Caddy error logs remove request headers and URI.
  • No on-disk caching of OAuth tokens.
  • No write-back of basic-mode credentials to disk.

Responsible disclosure

Please open a private security advisory rather than a public issue: https://github.com/maciekaz/ESET-MCP/security/advisories/new.


Quick start

Use the signed 2.0.0 image. Upgrading from v1 requires the configuration changes below; the :1 tag stays on the v1 line.

bash
cp .env.example .env          # fill in ESET_USER / ESET_PASSWORD / ESET_REGIONdocker run --rm -i --env-file .env ghcr.io/maciekaz/eset-mcp:2.0.0

Published-image pin policy:

  • :2 - latest 2.x.x (updates within the major)
  • :2.0 - latest 2.0.x (updates within the minor)
  • :2.0.0 - exact version
  • :latest - most recent stable release; may cross major versions
  • :main / :sha-<short> - edge builds from main (not for production)

Wire up to Claude Desktop / Claude Code (stdio)

jsonc
// claude_desktop_config.json{  "mcpServers": {    "eset": {      "command": "docker",      "args": ["run", "--rm", "-i", "--env-file", "/absolute/path/to/.env",               "ghcr.io/maciekaz/eset-mcp:2.0.0"]    }  }}

HTTP transport (local Basic authentication)

bash
docker run -d --name eset-mcp \  --env-file .env -p 127.0.0.1:8765:8765 \  -e ESET_MCP_TRANSPORT=http -e ESET_MCP_HTTP_HOST=0.0.0.0 \  -e ESET_AUTH_MODE=basic \  ghcr.io/maciekaz/eset-mcp:2.0.0# MCP endpoint: http://localhost:8765/mcp

Send the ESET credentials in the Basic header as shown below. For remote access, use the production HTTPS profile and configure its public host.

Verify the image (cosign keyless)

Verify the release workflow identity and pin the resolved image digest for deployments:

bash
cosign verify \  --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/maciekaz/ESET-MCP/.github/workflows/publish-image.yml@refs/tags/v2.0.0' \  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \  ghcr.io/maciekaz/eset-mcp:2.0.0

From source (contributors / local hacking)

bash
git clone https://github.com/maciekaz/ESET-MCP.gitcd ESET-MCPcp .env.example .envpython -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activatepip install --require-hashes -r requirements-dev.lockpip install --no-deps --no-build-isolation -e .eset-mcp

Docker Compose (builds this checkout)

bash
docker compose --profile http up --build -d eset-mcp-http# MCP endpoint: http://localhost:8765/mcp

The compose file builds this checkout as eset-mcp:2.0.0-local. HTTP profiles use Basic authentication. Published images described above are release artifacts; this working tree does not publish or update them.

One-off stdio via compose:

bash
docker compose --profile stdio run --build --rm eset-mcp-stdio

Hacking on the source? Use the dev profile to build from your local checkout instead of pulling:

bash
docker compose --profile dev up --build eset-mcp-http-dev

Configuration

All settings live in .env. Required fields are marked in .env.example.

VariableDefaultPurpose
ESET_AUTH_MODEenvenv (single tenant) or basic (multi tenant)
ESET_USER-API user (required in env mode)
ESET_PASSWORD-API password (required in env mode)
ESET_MODERORO (read-only catalog) or RW
ESET_REGIONeueu / de / us / ca / jpn
ESET_MCP_TRANSPORTstdiostdio or http
ESET_MCP_HTTP_HOST127.0.0.1HTTP bind address
ESET_MCP_HTTP_PORT8765HTTP port
ESET_MCP_RESPONSE_BYTES_MAX100000Per-call response byte cap; 0 disables
ESET_LOG_LEVELINFODEBUG / INFO / WARNING / ERROR
ESET_MCP_LOG_FORMATtexttext (dev, human-readable) or json (prod log shippers)
ESET_MCP_METRICS_ENABLEDfalseMount Prometheus /metrics; requires eset-mcp[metrics]
ESET_MCP_METRICS_PATH/metricsWhere to mount the metrics endpoint
ESET_DEPLOYMENTcloudcloud (ESET Connect) or onprem (customer-hosted PROTECT)
ESET_ONPREM_SERVER_URL-https://host[:port] of the on-prem console (req. in env+onprem)
ESET_ONPREM_VERIFY_SSLtrueSet false for on-prem consoles with self-signed certs
ESET_ONPREM_AUTH_STYLElegacyPreserve historical JSON login; v13 explicitly enables documented camelCase grants
ESET_ONPREM_ORIGINS{}JSON mapping ESET usernames to allowed non-default HTTPS origins
ESET_ONPREM_NETWORKSemptyOptional comma-separated CIDRs; default allows private networks, rejects loopback/link-local/special addresses
ESET_CA_BUNDLEemptyExplicit PEM CA file for Cloud/On-Prem; use instead of disabling verification
ESET_MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTSloopback hostsComma-separated HTTP Host values, optional :* port suffix; configure public domain behind a proxy
ESET_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINSemptyExplicit browser origins; an absent Origin is accepted
ESET_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTPfalseExplicit override for env-auth on non-loopback listeners behind an authenticated gateway
ESET_ONPREM_CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_ID-Cloudflare Access Service Token client-id (on-prem behind CF)
ESET_ONPREM_CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_SECRET-Cloudflare Access Service Token client-secret (paired with the above)
ESET_PUBLIC_DOMAIN-Domain Caddy issues a TLS cert for (prod profile only)
ESET_ACME_EMAIL-Email Let's Encrypt uses for renewals (prod profile only)

Use a dedicated API user - not your console login. Create one in ESET PROTECT Hub / ESET Business Account → API users.


Multi-tenant deployment (basic-auth mode)

bash
# .envESET_AUTH_MODE=basicESET_MCP_TRANSPORT=httpESET_REGION=eu   # default region; clients can override per request

Every HTTP request must carry:

HeaderRequiredNotes
AuthorizationyesBasic <base64(user:password)>
X-ESET-RegionnoOverride default region (eu/de/us/ca/jpn)
X-ESET-Server-URLnoRoute this request to an on-prem PROTECT console (e.g. https://protect.example.com:9443) - see On-prem support
X-ESET-CF-Access-Client-IdnoCloudflare Access Service Token client-id (on-prem behind CF Access)
X-ESET-CF-Access-Client-SecretnoPaired with the above - both must be sent together

Example Python client:

python
import base64from mcp import ClientSessionfrom mcp.client.streamable_http import streamablehttp_client
token = base64.b64encode(b"[email protected]:secret").decode()headers = {"Authorization": f"Basic {token}", "X-ESET-Region": "us"}
async with streamablehttp_client(    "https://eset-mcp.example.com/mcp/", headers=headers) as (r, w, _):    async with ClientSession(r, w) as session:        await session.initialize()        tools = await session.list_tools()

⚠️ Basic auth without TLS leaks credentials. Always run basic mode behind HTTPS.


On-prem ESET PROTECT support

ESET ships PROTECT as both a cloud service (the ESET Connect API at *.eset.systems) and an on-prem console customers self-host. The on-prem REST API lives on a single host (default port 9443) and uses a different authentication endpoint - POST /GetTokens with a JSON body and a camelCase response - but otherwise shares the URL structure of the cloud API. ESET-MCP supports both, in the same process.

How the server decides cloud vs on-prem

ESET_AUTH_MODEWhat controls the deployment per request
envStatic: ESET_DEPLOYMENT (cloud) or ESET_DEPLOYMENT=onprem + ESET_ONPREM_SERVER_URL
basicPer request: presence of X-ESET-Server-URL switches that single request to on-prem; absence falls back to the env default (cloud or on-prem)

So a single MCP server can front the cloud for most clients and route specific requests to one or more on-prem consoles - keyed entirely by which URL each client sends in X-ESET-Server-URL.

Single-tenant on-prem (env mode)

bash
# .envESET_AUTH_MODE=envESET_DEPLOYMENT=onpremESET_ONPREM_SERVER_URL=https://protect.company.local:9443ESET_ONPREM_VERIFY_SSL=true     # set to false only for self-signed certs you trust[email protected]ESET_PASSWORD=...

Multi-tenant on-prem (basic auth, per-request URL)

bash
# .envESET_AUTH_MODE=basicESET_MCP_TRANSPORT=httpESET_DEPLOYMENT=cloud            # default; clients opt into on-prem per-request# ESET_ONPREM_SERVER_URL is optional - if set it becomes the on-prem defaultESET_ONPREM_ORIGINS='{"[email protected]":["https://protect.client-a.local:9443"]}'

Client targeting on-prem:

python
headers = {    "Authorization": f"Basic {token}",    "X-ESET-Server-URL": "https://protect.client-a.local:9443",}

Same MCP server, different request - same headers minus X-ESET-Server-URL

  • stays on cloud.

What works on on-prem vs cloud

The tool catalog is identical for both deployments (all 101 OpenAPI-derived tools plus the 4 composites). At call time the server uses cloud paths for cloud credentials and on-prem paths for on-prem credentials.

  • Historical mappings retained: device_*, asset_groups_*, policy_* and task_* retain their existing paths and overrides. Endpoint availability depends on the PROTECT version and installed modules.
  • Cloud-only modules: incident_*, mobile_*, wap_*, nap_*, quarantine_* and most of vuln_* correspond to separate ESET products (ESET Inspect, Cloud Office Security, MDM) that are not part of the on-prem PROTECT installation. Calling them against an on-prem console may return an ESET error; failures are sanitized and returned with isError=true. The historical catalog is preserved for compatibility.
  • Path overrides: a few endpoints have a different URL on-prem - e.g. POST /v1/devices/{uuid}:rename is :renameDevice on-prem. These are declared in eset_mcp/openapi/onprem-path-overrides.json and applied automatically when the request targets on-prem.

Cloudflare Access in front of the on-prem console

When the on-prem PROTECT console is exposed via a Cloudflare tunnel and gated by Cloudflare Access, MCP can authenticate as a service token. The chain becomes MCP → Cloudflare Access → ESET on-prem.

Two values per token pair, supplied either via .env:

bash
ESET_ONPREM_CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_ID=abc1234567890.accessESET_ONPREM_CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_SECRET=<long-secret>

…or per-request in basic-auth mode (overrides the env defaults - handy when each tenant has its own tunnel and its own service token):

python
headers = {    "Authorization": f"Basic {token}",    "X-ESET-Server-URL": "https://protect.client-a.local:9443",    "X-ESET-CF-Access-Client-Id": "abc1234567890.access",    "X-ESET-CF-Access-Client-Secret": "<long-secret>",}

MCP translates the X-ESET-CF-* input headers into the actual CF-Access-Client-Id / CF-Access-Client-Secret headers that Cloudflare Access expects, and attaches them to every outbound call - both the POST /GetTokens auth handshake and every subsequent ESET API request.

The CF secret is treated like the password: never logged, only its SHA-256 hash enters the client pool key. Rotating the secret mints a fresh client

  • fresh ESET token. Cloud requests never carry CF Access headers regardless of env defaults - ESET Connect is a public SaaS.

Security notes for on-prem

  • X-ESET-Server-URL accepts only https:// URLs with no path, query or fragment. Trailing slashes are stripped. Anything else → HTTP 400.
  • ESET_ONPREM_VERIFY_SSL=false disables TLS certificate verification and exposes the connection to MITM. The server logs a single WARNING per client construction when it's disabled. Use only on trusted intranets with self-signed certs you cannot replace.
  • On-prem tokens are held in memory per (user, password_hash, server_url, cf_secret_hash) - same isolation rules as cloud tokens. The pool keys them separately so cloud and on-prem clients never collide, and two clients hitting the same on-prem URL with different CF service tokens get separate pool entries.
  • Sending only one of the two X-ESET-CF-* headers returns HTTP 400 rather than silently falling back to the env default (almost certain operator typo).

Production deployment (HTTPS via Caddy)

The prod docker-compose profile launches Caddy in front of the MCP server. Caddy fetches a Let's Encrypt cert on first start (HTTP-01 challenge - ports 80 / 443 must be reachable from the public internet) and proxies HTTPS to the internal MCP container.

bash
# .envESET_AUTH_MODE=basicESET_PUBLIC_DOMAIN=eset-mcp.example.com[email protected]
docker compose --profile prod up --build -d# MCP endpoint: https://eset-mcp.example.com/mcp

You get:

  • HTTPS on 443 with auto-renewing Let's Encrypt cert.
  • HTTP-01 challenge on 80.
  • MCP container bound only to the docker bridge network - no published port.
  • gzip / zstd compression; raw access logs disabled and error-log headers removed.
  • Only /mcp is public; metrics stay on the private container network.

Tools, resources & prompts

Composite high-level tools

ToolReturns
eset_search(query, kinds?, limit_per_kind?)Case-insensitive substring matches across devices / users / policies / groups
device_full_profile(deviceUuid)Device record + recent detections + vulnerabilities + recent scans
incident_full_context(incidentUuid)Incident + comments + related detections + affected devices
latest_detections(hours=24, limit=10, severity_min?)Newest detections in a time window, sorted by occurTime desc; v2 → v1 fallback

Each composite degrades gracefully when a sub-call returns 403/404 (e.g. on tenants missing a module). The shape carries skipped / truncated flags where applicable.

Resources

  • eset://config/mode - RO or RW.
  • eset://config/region - current region (per-request in basic-auth mode).
  • eset://config/deployment - cloud or onprem (<server-url>) for this request.
  • eset://config/tools-catalog - JSON catalog of mode-allowed raw business tools (name, mode, method, path, service, description).
  • eset://docs/rate-limits - quick reminder about the 10 req/s ceiling.

Prompts

  • audit_inactive_devices(days=30) - offboarding candidates.
  • vulnerability_report - per-device CVE report.
  • incident_triage - open incidents + related detections.

Architecture

eset_mcp/├── __main__.py         # entrypoint - stdio or HTTP, wires resolver + pool├── server.py           # MCP server (tools / resources / prompts) + telemetry├── credentials.py      # Credentials + explicit per-request resolution├── middleware.py       # ASGI Basic-auth middleware (basic mode only)├── client_pool.py      # LRU pool of EsetHttpClient keyed by (user, region, ...)├── http_client.py      # async httpx + 202 polling + 429 retry + 401 refresh├── auth.py             # CloudTokenManager (OAuth2) + OnPremTokenManager (/GetTokens)├── regions.py          # cloud region → per-service domains + on-prem URL resolver├── modes.py            # RO/RW gate├── errors.py           # HTTP error → agent-friendly text├── config.py           # .env loading├── response_shaping.py # fields projection + byte cap├── composite_tools.py  # hand-written high-level tools├── tools_loader.py     # generator: tools from OpenAPI specs + on-prem path overrides├── observability/      # JSON/text structured logging + Prometheus metrics└── openapi/            # 16 ESET Connect OpenAPI 3.0.1 specs + onprem path overrides

Tests

bash
PYTHON_DOTENV_DISABLED=1 ESET_RUN_LIVE_TESTS=0 python -m pytest tests audits -qruff check eset_mcp tests audits

The default suite covers API contracts, synthetic failures, MCP HTTP and stdio, and loopback TLS. It blocks external connections and does not load .env. To run integration tests with configured ESET credentials, explicitly set ESET_RUN_LIVE_TESTS=1. See the test instructions for baseline fixture maintenance and container probes.


Refreshing the OpenAPI specs

bash
cd eset_mcp/openapifor name in business-account application-management asset-management automation \            device-management iam incident-management installer-management \            mobile-device-management network-access-protection patch-management \            policy-management quarantine-management user-management \            vulnerability-management web-access-protection; do  curl -sO "https://eu.esetconnect.eset.systems/swagger/api/${name}.json"done

tests/test_catalog_vs_openapi.py flags any new or changed operations after a refresh.


License

MIT

來源:README.md,提交 627ed39

工具

0
SourceWeft 曾在隔離沙箱中以無憑證方式啟動該軟體包一次,以列出其工具,但未能完成:該軟體包類型無法在沙箱中執行。

版本歷史

2
  1. v2.0.0最新Nov 4, 2026
  2. v1.0.3Sep 16, 2026

評分

已滿足適用檢查項的 50%

該評分衡量此收錄條目的完整程度,依據註冊中心條目、端點與公開來源計算得出。它不是對伺服器本身的評價,也不表示伺服器安全或目前可用:可連通性是帶日期的檢查結果,評分也不包含安裝量或使用者評價。

  • 近 30 天內可連通25 分

    請保持端點能夠回應 MCP 握手;SourceWeft 每 30 天探測一次。

  • 已宣告認證方式10 分

    請在註冊中心條目中宣告憑證請求標頭,或保持端點能夠回應探測,以便判定其認證方式。

  • 已列出工具15 分

    請讓伺服器在無憑證時回應 tools/list,或發布可在沙箱中無憑證啟動的軟體包。

  • 描述必需15 分
  • 圖示10 分
  • 文件15 分
  • 授權條款10 分