
Tend Mcp
io.github.nries1由 GitHub 帳號 nries1 發布v0.1.2更新於 Oct 24, 2026
Unofficial MCP server for Tend Dental appointment booking. Not affiliated with Tend.
概覽
非官方 MCP 伺服器,讓助理透過 Tend 網站的內部介面查看並預約單一 Tend 帳戶的牙科門診。
- 可以做什麼
- 從固定的參考快照列出 Tend 診所與服務類型,並列出該帳戶既有的預約。依診所與服務搜尋可預約時段。預約門診,會在帳戶上建立真實預約。自動維持登入狀態,更新權杖或在必要時改用密碼登入。
- 適用情境
- 適合想讓助理不必開網站就能查看自己的 Tend 牙科可約時段、預約或檢視預約的人。只有在你接受使用未公開介面的非官方整合時才值得加入。
- 執行需求
- 以 Node.js 本機程序執行(npm 套件 tend-mcp,stdio)。需要 TEND_EMAIL,以及 TEND_PASSWORD 或從瀏覽器 DevTools Cookie 手動複製的 TEND_REFRESH_TOKEN 其中之一。需要能連線至 Tend 的身分與 API 介面。
安裝
在 SourceWeft 中
- 開啟 儀表板中的 Tend Mcp,將其新增到工作區。
- 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。
Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。
其他 MCP 客戶端
參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。
README
tend-mcp
An unofficial MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for Tend dental — not affiliated with, endorsed by, or supported by Tend. It talks to internal API endpoints their own web app calls, discovered via browser devtools, not a published/documented API. Expect it to break without notice if Tend changes their frontend.
Use at your own risk. This has not been reviewed against Tend's Terms of Service — read them yourself before running this, and be ready to stop if Tend objects. Each instance authenticates as one Tend account and only ever accesses that account's own data; it is not designed or intended to access any other patient's records.
Status
Real, verified against a live HAR capture (2026-08-01) of an actual login → pick studio → pick service → pick time → book flow, plus live-tested auth: list_studios, list_service_types (static reference data — see below), list_appointments, search_available_slots, book_appointment (confirmed live — the capture includes a real booking that got a real Dentrix external_id).
Auth is fully real now — two ways in. Tend authenticates via AWS Cognito behind their own thin proxy at identity.hellotend.com. You can use either:
TEND_PASSWORD— real email+password login (POST identity.hellotend.com/login, confirmed live), the same call the actual web app makes. No Cognito SRP dance needed client-side; Tend's backend handles that.TEND_REFRESH_TOKEN— skips login, obtained by hand once from DevTools (see below).
Either way, TendClient keeps itself signed in automatically: sessions renew via Cognito's REFRESH_TOKEN_AUTH (Authorization: Bearer <idToken>, ~24h tokens — confirmed live), falling back to a fresh password login if a refresh token expires/gets revoked and TEND_PASSWORD is set.
Setup
Point an MCP client (Claude Desktop, etc.) at it by adding to its MCP config, e.g. Claude Desktop's claude_desktop_config.json:
Getting a refresh token (if not using TEND_PASSWORD)
- Log into hellotend.com in Chrome.
- Open DevTools → Application → Cookies →
hellotend.com. - Copy the value of the
refreshTokencookie intoTEND_REFRESH_TOKEN.
Both TEND_PASSWORD and TEND_REFRESH_TOKEN are standing credentials — treat them like a password, not an API key. A refresh token in particular can mint fresh sessions for a long time without re-entering anything. Never commit either, never paste either anywhere it might get logged — including into an AI chat. This isn't hypothetical: building this integration involved two real accidental exposures of live tokens into a chat session (once from a raw cookie paste, once from an incomplete redaction script missing token as a sensitive field name) — HAR "sanitization" and ad-hoc redaction scripts are not something to rely on. If you ever suspect either has leaked, log out of Tend everywhere / rotate your password.
Adding another endpoint
Log into hellotend.com, open DevTools → Network → Fetch/XHR, perform the action, and note the request. Then add a method to TendClient following the existing ones' shape (raw snake_case API fields mapped to a camelCase TS interface) and a corresponding tool in tools.ts.
If you export a HAR to work from: response bodies (not just headers) still contain real PII — redact personal fields (name, email, phone, insurance, DOB) out of them before sharing, and never share cookie/token values regardless of what the export tool does or doesn't strip automatically. .gitignore here already excludes *.har so it won't land in git.
Design constraints (please keep these)
- One account per instance. No multi-tenant credential store, no server-side proxy holding multiple users' logins.
- No anti-bot evasion. If Tend's login has MFA or bot-detection, surface it to the user (or fail loudly) rather than trying to automate around it.
- No endpoints beyond what a real patient portal already exposes to that patient. Don't add anything that reaches into other patients' data.
STUDIOS/SERVICE_TYPESintendClient.tsare a frozen snapshot, not live data. No stable API for them was found (see the comment aboveSTUDIOS) — they'll silently go stale as Tend adds/closes studios or changes services. Worth periodically re-checking against a fresh capture rather than assuming they're current.
來源:README.md,提交 ad05ca6
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0版本歷史
1- v0.1.2最新Sep 16, 2026
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