
hush
io.github.omarei-omoto由 GitHub 帳號 omarei-omoto 發布v0.13.2更新於 Oct 24, 2026
Team secrets your AI agent can use but never read: encrypted in the repo, value-blind tools.
概覽
一個本機 MCP 伺服器,讓 AI 程式設計助理以「看不到值」的方式使用加密存放在儲存庫內的團隊密鑰,可用而不可讀。
- 可以做什麼
- 提供工具,讓助理使用儲存庫保險庫中的加密密鑰執行需要密鑰的指令與流程,而不暴露密鑰值。管理保險庫:初始化、把現有 .env 密鑰匯入為具名集合,並提交到儲存庫。管理團隊存取:新增或移除成員,移除時會重新加密保險庫並重新封裝所有值。執行程序時僅向該程序注入密鑰,不寫入磁碟或 shell。掃描助理設定檔與已儲存對話中的明文密鑰,並可將發現的密鑰移入保險庫。
- 適用情境
- 適合把 API 密鑰放在 .env 檔案的個人開發者或小團隊,希望程式設計助理能使用這些密鑰,而密鑰值不進入其上下文或對話紀錄。也適合希望把加密密鑰提交到 git、依人授權且無需帳號、伺服器或訂閱的情境。不適合需要動態憑證、租約、到期或不可竄改稽核日誌的情境。
- 執行需求
- 以本機程序在使用者桌面執行;Windows 支援處於測試階段。可從 npm 安裝(需 Node 22.6 或更新版本),或使用 macOS、Linux、Windows 的單一檔案二進位。無需帳號、伺服器或共用密碼,以 git 儲存庫作為後端。
安裝
在 SourceWeft 中
- 開啟 儀表板中的 hush,將其新增到工作區。
- 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。
Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。
其他 MCP 客戶端
參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。
README
Envelope-encrypted team secrets your AI agent can use but never read.
[CI] [npm] [node] [license] [runtime deps] [OpenSSF Best Practices]
You keep your API keys in a .env file. It is plaintext, every process you
launch can read it, and the day you pointed an AI coding agent at the repo it
went into the agent's context window — and from there, wherever transcripts go.
hush fixes that without a server, an account, or a shared password. Your
secrets live encrypted inside the repo itself. hush npm run dev puts them
in that one process and nowhere else. Your coding agent gets tools that can
use a key but never read one. A teammate gets access with one command, and
removing them re-encrypts everything. Zero dependencies; one npm install.
[!IMPORTANT] Status: early. This works and is heavily tested, but it is pre-1.0, it has one author, and it has not had an external security review. The crypto is a standard construction (age's, rebuilt on
node:crypto) rather than anything invented here, and there is a differential test suite against an independent reimplementation — but that is not the same as someone qualified having looked at it. docs/REVIEW-SCOPE.md is the brief for the review it needs.Development happens on macOS; Linux is covered by CI. Windows is in beta: your key is kept with DPAPI, approvals are a native Windows dialog,
hush run npm …works throughnpm.cmd, secret files get owner-only ACLs, and there is a PowerShell hook — a Windows CI job checks those paths, but it has not had much real use yet. Fingerprint approval (Windows Hello) is not there yet. Tell me what broke if you try it somewhere unusual.Found a way to read a vault you should not? Please report it privately rather than opening an issue.
Install
One file, no Node needed — macOS, Linux (glibc and musl), and Windows (beta):
The installer refuses a binary whose sha256 is not the one in the release's
SHA256SUMS, checks its build-provenance attestation too when the GitHub CLI is
signed in, and installs to ~/.local/bin without sudo. To check a download by
hand: gh attestation verify hush-darwin-arm64 --repo omarei-omoto/hush.
Or from npm, with Node ≥ 22.6:
From a clone there is no build step — Node ≥ 22.18 runs the TypeScript directly
(on 22.6–22.17, run npm run build first):
Why the published package ships compiled output
Node will not strip TypeScript types for anything under node_modules, so an
installed copy cannot run src/. The tarball ships JavaScript in dist/ (built
by npm run build, run automatically by prepack). The hush command decides
by where it lives, not by what exists: under node_modules it runs dist/; in
a checkout (including one npm linked) it runs src/, so a stale build can
never shadow your edits. Still zero runtime dependencies.
Quick start
That is the whole thing. It looks for your keys, gets them in, asks whether an
AI assistant will be near them, and offers to run your project. A few questions,
nothing you have to know already. Run it again any time: it picks up whatever
is left, and hush setup shows where you are.
Or let your coding agent set it up. Paste this into Claude Code, Codex or Cursor:
Set up hush in this project. Run
hush setup --jsonand follow it: run each step's command as written, ask me in the chat for anything marked "choice", and for anything marked "person", run it and wait for me. Never open a.envfile or ask me for a key in the chat.
Anything that needs you, such as a new key or deleting a .env, asks you on
your own screen, not in the chat. More in
Setting up.
Prefer to see every step yourself? The same thing, by hand:
From now on, put hush in front of whatever you run:
Secrets exist in that process's environment and nowhere else. Not on disk, not in your shell, not in your scrollback.
Then a quick checkup of what is already out there:
Agents on other machines (a server, a devcontainer) can use keys that stay on yours: hush on a tailnet.
Why this exists
.env files have quietly become the worst artifact in your repo. They are
plaintext, they are readable by every process you launch, and they are now
routinely slurped into an LLM's context — researchers caught a coding agent
uploading whole repos with .env credentials verbatim and
unredacted.
The existing tools each cover part of this:
hush is the local, free, no-account option, not a replacement for the last two. If your team already pays for 1Password or Doppler, their MCP servers do what hush does with better hardware and a real audit trail — use them. hush is for the solo developer and the small team who want age's security model and an agent that cannot read a value, with nothing to sign up for and nothing to deploy: the git repo is the backend.
Where the line is: the moment you need dynamic credentials, leasing, expiry, or an audit log someone else cannot edit, you have outgrown a file in git. hush will not get you there and does not pretend to. Full comparison in RESEARCH.md.
Documentation
Everything else is in the guide — on GitHub under docs/guide, or as a site at tryhush.dev.
- Using it — Sets · Coming from another tool · Several keys for one service · Running things · Credentials that are a file · The app · The shell hook (including Nushell)
- Checking config — What a value should look like · Finding what a codebase needs
- Agents — Connecting your agent · What your agent gets · Adding a key off-transcript · Approvals · Policy
- Your team — Adding someone · Only some sets · Removing someone · Membership changes · Merging · CI · After someone leaves
- Hardening — The security ladder · Touch ID · Hardware keys
- Reference — Commands · How the crypto works · What hush does not do · The approval relay · Architecture · Hardware unlock
- Trust — SECURITY.md (threat model, reporting) · Review scope · Red team · Every defect found · RESEARCH.md
Contributing
Very welcome, especially: running it somewhere I cannot (Linux, Windows, a YubiKey I do not own), finding a way to get a value out that should not come out, or telling me where it confused you.
- CONTRIBUTING.md — how to set up, and the bar for a change
- docs/ARCHITECTURE.md — how it fits together, and the tests that hold it
- Development — running the suite, the fuzzers and the binary
- CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md — Contributor Covenant 2.1
- SECURITY.md — threat model, and how to report a vulnerability
- docs/AUDIT.md — every defect found so far, and what changed
Security problems do not go in issues. Open a private advisory instead.
License
MIT — see LICENSE.
來源:README.md,提交 47b1c22
工具
0版本歷史
6- v0.13.2最新Oct 18, 2026
- v0.13.1Oct 14, 2026
- v0.12.0Oct 5, 2026
- v0.11.1Oct 4, 2026
- v0.10.0Oct 1, 2026
- v0.9.0Sep 30, 2026
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