FSV — website security scanner

io.github.twayst0由 GitHub 帳號 twayst0 發布v2.4.0更新於 Nov 3, 2026

Scan your own website for vulnerabilities: DNS takeover, compromised CDNs, debug mode and more.

已驗證STDIO僅桌面開發者工具安全與監控

概覽

AI 產生的概覽

FSV 是一款防禦性網站弱點掃描器,讓助理掃描你擁有的網站、分類處理發現項目並提供可直接套用的修補設定。

可以做什麼
  • 對目標網址執行被動或主動弱點掃描,支援多種掃描設定、範圍限制以及選用的驗證請求標頭或 Cookie
  • 偵測是否有 WAF/CDN,並對單一網址做快速被動安全檢查
  • 取得 Markdown、JSON、HTML、SARIF、CSV 或針對特定平台的修補格式報告
  • 列出歷史掃描、比較修補前後的兩次掃描,並查看某主機風險分數隨時間的變化
  • 記錄依主機持續保存的分類結論(誤報、接受風險、已修補),並把發現項目轉成 nginx、Apache、Caddy、Express 或 DNS 修補設定
  • 透過 DNS TXT 或 HTTP 檔案證明主機所有權,並檢視掃描模組清單與請求統計
適用情境
適合讓助理檢查你擁有或取得明確授權測試的網站安全狀況,尤其是 DNS 接管、廢棄雲端儲存桶、過期 SPF include、除錯模式、暴露檔案,以及多個小問題串連成的攻擊路徑。也適合在反覆掃描或 CI 基準中追蹤修補進度。
執行需求
以 Python 套件形式透過 stdio 在本機執行,需要 Python 3.11 以上,可用 uvx 或 pip 安裝。MCP 伺服器本身未宣告需要 API 金鑰或環境變數;目標網站需可經網路存取,部分模組會連線到 AWS、憑證透明度日誌等第三方主機,除非將其關閉。FSV_REQUIRE_VERIFICATION、FSV_BLOCK_PRIVATE 等選用設定會影響允許的掃描範圍。
安裝前請注意
只能掃描你擁有或取得書面明確授權的系統;主動掃描前伺服器會要求確認 authorized=true。主動設定會向目標送出測試載荷,部分模組會連線外部主機(雲端儲存、憑證透明度),除非略過。掃描可使用提供的請求標頭或 Cookie 進行驗證測試,請避免暴露長期有效的憑證。結果存放在本機 SQLite 資料庫,選用的 webhook 通知會把摘要傳送到設定的網址。

安裝

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 開啟 儀表板中的 FSV — website security scanner,將其新增到工作區。
  2. 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。

Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。

其他 MCP 客戶端

參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。

README

[FSV — finds what checklists miss. An animated radar sweep lights up a dangling CNAME, an orphaned bucket, an SPF include that no longer exists, an XSS leading to session theft and an exposed source map.]

[CI] [Python 3.11+] [40 modules] [MCP server] [detection only] [tests] [license: MIT]

Web security scanner for the problems nobody is watching — dangling DNS & subdomain takeover, orphaned cloud buckets, compromised script CDNs, SPF includes that expired, debug mode left on, secrets in your JavaScript, end-of-life software, and the attack paths that turn small findings into a real compromise.
Runs as a CLI, a dashboard, an MCP server for AI agents, and a CI step.

MCP in 30 s · See it work · What it finds · Attack paths · Install · Usage · CI · FSV & ZAP · Limits · Docs · Contact

⚠ Authorized use only

FSV is a security assessment tool. Use it only against systems you own or are explicitly authorized in writing to test. Scanning systems without permission is illegal in most jurisdictions. Every entry point (web, CLI, MCP, CI) requires you to confirm authorization, and a shared deployment can additionally require proof of control of the target before any payload is sent (docs/DEPLOYMENT.md).


Connect your AI assistant in 30 seconds

Point Claude, Cursor or VS Code at FSV and ask it to review your site. The assistant asks you to confirm authorization, runs a passive check, then a full scan, leads with attack paths and hands you paste-ready fixes.

bash
pip install fsvfsv mcp-config --client claude-code     # prints:  claude mcp add fsv -- /path/to/fsv-mcpfsv mcp-config --client claude-desktop  # or cursor · vscode — prints the JSON to paste

No install at all: with uv, point any MCP client at uvx fsv mcp ({ "command": "uvx", "args": ["fsv", "mcp"] }). FSV is listed in the official MCP Registry as io.github.twayst0/fsv.

Then, in the assistant: “Use the security_review prompt on https://my-shop.example — I own it.”

MCP tools & prompt
ToolPurpose
fsv_scanFull scan — profiles, scope, time-box, seed_urls; headers / cookies for an authenticated scan with a test account
fsv_quick_check / fsv_waf_checkPassive posture check / WAF-CDN detection
fsv_fixesPaste-ready nginx / apache / caddy / express / DNS remediation
fsv_get_reportmd · json · html · sarif · csv · fix-*
fsv_triageMark false positive / accepted / fixed (persists per host)
fsv_compare_scans · fsv_target_trendBefore/after a fix · risk over time
fsv_verify_ownershipProof of control (DNS TXT or HTTP file) for shared deployments
fsv_list_scans · fsv_scan_stats · fsv_list_modulesHistory · request stats · catalogue

Prompt security_review(target, server) — the guided, authorization-first workflow above. Scan results carry an attack_paths section so the agent leads with what matters. The server is tested end to end over stdio (tests/test_mcp_stdio.py).

See it work

[Animated terminal replay: fsv scan against the demo site prints Risk F 100/100, three critical findings including a hard-coded Stripe key and an XSS attack path, an orphaned bucket, an exposed actuator endpoint, then `fsv fixes` prints nginx configuration.]

That output is real — a scan of the deliberately vulnerable demo site that ships in this repo. Reproduce it in a minute:

bash
python examples/demo_site.py &                 # http://127.0.0.1:8961 — loopback only, fake secretsfsv scan http://127.0.0.1:8961 --authorizefsv web                                        # open the same scan in the dashboard

The cloud_storage check asks Amazon S3 whether the demo's bucket exists — that one request goes to AWS (read-only). Skip it with --no-external.

What it finds that checklists miss

Plenty of tools tell you a header is missing. The incidents that actually hurt organisations — including very well-run ones — are quieter, and they live where nobody is looking.

[Six detection cards: dangling DNS record, orphaned bucket used as a script source, SPF include of a domain that no longer exists, exposed source map with a masked key, end-of-life PHP and jQuery, and an XSS plus non-HttpOnly cookie attack path.]

The problemHow FSV avoids crying wolfModule
🪝A DNS record outlived its project — anyone can claim the name and serve content from your domainasks for the CNAME explicitly (an A lookup hides dangling aliases), follows the chain, and never treats a resolver error as "dangling"takeover
🪣A page loads a script from a bucket that no longer exists — whoever creates it controls your pageone max-keys=1 request; objects are never fetched, nothing is createdcloud_storage
✉️SPF include: of an expired domain, SPF over the 10-lookup limit, a 512-bit DKIM keyskips all DNS checks (with an explanation) if the domain itself doesn't resolvedns_security
🗺️Source maps and hard-coded credentials shipped to every visitorcredentials are reported masked and are never testedjs_analysis
🧱jQuery 3.3.1 / AngularJS 1.x / Vue 2 and PHP 8.1 past end of supportdated tables — flagged the day support ends; version read from the URL without downloading third-party filesjs_libs · tech
⛓️XSS + a session cookie without HttpOnly = account takeoveronly chains whose every link was found on this scancorrelation

Details, and every false-positive guard: docs/DETECTIONS.md.

Attack paths

Real compromises are rarely one bug — they're two or three "medium" problems that line up. Scanners rate each in isolation, so the combination stays invisible until someone writes the incident report. FSV reads its own findings (sending nothing more) and, where a chain is actually present, adds a finding that names the links, tells the story step by step, and states the cheapest single fix that breaks it. If a link is triaged away, the chain steps aside automatically.

[Animated chain: reflected XSS reads a session cookie that lacks HttpOnly, leading to account takeover. A '+HttpOnly' badge lands on the second link and the chain turns green: chain broken.]

ChainWhy it is worse together
XSS + session cookie without HttpOnlyone crafted link = account takeover
no HSTS / no HTTPS + session cookie without Securesession readable on any hostile network
takeover-able subdomain + session cookie scoped to the parent domainwhoever claims the subdomain receives your users' sessions
dangling SPF include + DMARC not enforcingperfectly authenticated phishing as your domain
no SPF/DMARC enforcement at allyour domain can be spoofed

Dashboard

[The FSV dashboard after scanning the demo site: risk grade F, 100/100, counts per severity, and an Attack paths panel explaining two chains step by step with a 'Break the chain' recommendation for each.]

[The OWASP Top 10 breakdown and the findings list with the Stripe key finding expanded: description, masked evidence, remediation and references.]

Liquid-glass UI with a live stepper (survives a page reload), the attack-path panel, OWASP breakdown, per-host risk trend, sort / module filters, bulk triage, one-click re-scan, keyboard navigation, scan comparison, and one-click export — reports or paste-ready fixes. Light and dark themes; no third-party requests.

Features

  • Finds the pages first — besides links: robots.txt, sitemaps, routes leaked by debug pages, and API paths quoted in your JavaScript; action-like paths are never requested. --seed for anything else.
  • A badge for your README — fsv badge <scan_id> writes a dated grade badge (FSV security | A · 2026-10-25); regenerate it from CI.
  • Fix packs — turn findings into nginx / Apache / Caddy / Express / DNS configuration (fsv fixes <scan> nginx). Only what was actually found; CSP is emitted report-only.
  • Notifications — --notify <webhook> (or FSV_WEBHOOK_URL) posts the grade and the worst findings to Slack, Discord or your own endpoint. Evidence is never included.
  • CI-ready — fsv.toml, baselines (gate only on new findings), --fail-on, SARIF for GitHub code scanning, and a ready-made GitHub Action.
  • Triage that sticks — false positive / accepted risk / fixed / confirmed, stored per host by stable fingerprint, re-applied to later scans, excluded from the score. Diff any two scans; per-host trend.
  • Evidence over guesses — exposure checks validate content (a .git/HEAD must look like one; an SPA that answers 200 to everything produces nothing). Every finding has a confidence, a CWE, an OWASP Top 10 (2021) category, impact and remediation.
  • Honest failure — a crashing module is counted, explained and logged; a target that never answered is flagged, not graded "clean".
  • Safe by construction — secrets masked at the source; cloud-metadata/link-local never reachable, loopback/RFC 1918 optionally blocked, on every lookup and redirect hop; dashboard CSRF/DNS-rebinding guard and token auth.
  • Extensible — a module is one class; drop a file in ~/.fsv/plugins or ship an entry-point package (docs/WRITING_MODULES.md). Bring your own JS-library advisories and EOL dates.
  • Fast & polite, hard to stall — async engine, shared HTTP client with cache, request coalescing, token-bucket rate limit, retries, size cap, time limit with partial results. A hanging endpoint costs one timeout per scan, not one per module; every response regex is linear-time. Tested against hostile local servers (redirect loops, 20 MB bodies, hangs, catch-all SPAs).
  • Five report formats — Markdown (OWASP-grouped), JSON, self-contained HTML, SARIF 2.1, CSV.
  • Local-first — results in a local SQLite file; the only optional third-party calls are listed in DEPLOYMENT.md.

Install

bash
pip install fsv          # Python 3.11+  ·  pipx install fsv  keeps it isolatedfsv doctor               # checks Python, dependencies, DNS, database, plugins

From source: git clone https://github.com/twayst0/fsv && cd fsv && ./install.sh (or pip install -e .).

Requires Python 3.11+. Docker: see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md (docker compose up).

Usage

bash
fsv scan example.com --authorize                       # full scan of a site you ownfsv scan example.com --authorize --profile passive     # read-only: no payloads sentfsv scan example.com --authorize --profile deep        # thorough: hidden parameters, ~90 more files, more payload shapes (slower)fsv scan example.com --authorize --profile full --max-time 3600   # exhaustive: 1000+ URLs, ~600 guessed paths, backup copies, boolean SQLifsv web                                                # dashboard → http://127.0.0.1:7474
CLI reference
bash
# scope & tuningfsv scan example.com --authorize --exclude "/admin/*,/logout" --max-urls 100 --max-time 900 --tag prodfsv scan example.com --authorize --header "Authorization: Bearer X" --cookie "session=abc"    # authenticatedfsv scan example.com --authorize --ct-logs        # also ask Certificate Transparency (crt.sh) for subdomains*fsv scan example.com --authorize --no-external    # skip modules that contact hosts other than the targetfsv scan example.com --authorize --proxy env      # behind a corporate proxy (HTTPS_PROXY); or --proxy http://host:3128
# reports & fixesfsv scan example.com --authorize -o report.html   # .md .json .html .sarif .csvfsv report <scan_id> --format fix-nginx           # or fix-apache fix-caddy fix-express fix-dnsfsv fixes  <scan_id> nginx -o nginx-fixes.md
# triage, history, difffsv findings <scan_id>fsv triage <scan_id> <finding_id> false_positive --note "test endpoint"fsv list --target example.com   ·   fsv diff <before_id> <after_id>   ·   fsv prune --keep 50
# ownership proof (for shared deployments)           # * sends the domain name to crt.shfsv verify example.com   ·   fsv verify example.com --check
fsv modules   ·   fsv doctor

In CI

toml
# fsv.toml  (commit it; ${VAR} is read from the environment — never commit secrets)[scan]profile  = "balanced"max_urls = 100exclude  = ["/admin/*"]max_time = 900fail_on  = "high"baseline = ".fsv-baseline.json"[scan.headers]Authorization = "Bearer ${FSV_API_TOKEN}"
bash
fsv scan staging.example.com --authorize --write-baseline .fsv-baseline.json    # once: accept today's statefsv scan staging.example.com --authorize                                         # every build: fails only on NEW high+ findings
yaml
# .github/workflows/security.yml- uses: twayst0/[email protected]          # pin a release tag (or a commit SHA)  with:    target: https://staging.example.com    authorized: "true"          # you confirm you may test this target    profile: balanced    fail-on: high    baseline: .fsv-baseline.json

SARIF is uploaded to GitHub code scanning; the HTML report and log are attached as an artifact.

FSV and OWASP ZAP

ZAP is the right tool for deep testing of an application's inputs — use it. FSV looks at what surrounds the application, where typical DAST scans don't go, and the two work well side by side:

AreaTypical DAST scanFSV
DNS that outlived its project (dangling CNAME, unregistered targets)out of scopetakeover
Buckets your pages load from that no longer existout of scopecloud_storage
Scripts from compromised CDNs (polyfill.io 2024) or expired domainsout of scopesupply_chain
Email spoofing: SPF lookup limit, dead includes, DMARC, DKIM key sizeout of scopedns_security
Debug mode visible only on error pages (Django, Werkzeug, Ignition…)partlydebug_mode
Several medium findings that add up to account takeoverlisted separatelycorrelation attack paths
Fixes as server config, triage that persists, CI baselines, MCP—built in
Deep input fuzzing, authenticated spidering, scripted auth, JS-rendered appsyesbasic

Modules (40)

FSV ships 40 modules — 34 passive, 6 active. Run fsv modules for the live list.

The full catalogue  (or run fsv modules)
ModuleLooks forKind
takeoverdangling CNAME / unclaimed SaaS resource / unregistered target domainpassive · site · ↗
cloud_storageorphaned or publicly-listable S3 / GCS / Azure buckets referenced by the sitepassive · url · ↗
dns_securitySPF (10-lookup limit, dead includes, +all), DMARC, DKIM key strength, MTA-STS, dead NS/MX, CAA, DNSSECpassive · site
js_analysishard-coded credentials, exposed source maps, internal/non-prod hosts in client codepassive · url
js_libsknown-vulnerable & end-of-life JavaScript librariespassive · url
supply_chainscripts/styles from compromised or abandoned CDNs (polyfill.io, bootcdn, staticfile, rawgit) or from domains that are no longer registeredpassive · url · ↗
debug_modeframework debug mode in production (Django DEBUG=True, Werkzeug console, Rails, Laravel Ignition, Symfony, Express, ASP.NET) — seen on error pages a crawler never visitspassive · site
paths~100 exposed files/endpoints, each content-validated (.git, .env, actuator, pprof, tfstate, backups…); deep: ~90 more + backups named after the hostpassive · site
html_leakssecrets / internal hosts in HTML comments, pre-filled password fields, trust-bearing hidden fields (role, price, is_admin)passive · url
dom_sinksDOM XSS (URL → innerHTML/eval/redirect), postMessage without origin check — static analysis of first-party JSpassive · url
well_knownOIDC/OAuth discovery (http endpoints, alg=none, implicit/password grants, no PKCE) and private/symmetric keys published in JWKSpassive · site
api_docsreads exposed OpenAPI (unauthenticated & sensitive routes, HTTP servers, secrets); Swagger UI, GraphiQL, Playgroundpassive · site
https_redirectdoes port 80 serve content / hop through another host over HTTP / never reach HTTPS; HSTS without includeSubDomainspassive · site
content_discoveryfull: ~600 common directories/pages nothing links to (admin, backup, staging, uploads…), calibrated against catch-all serverspassive · site
backup_filesfull: .bak / ~ / .old / .swp copies of every crawled script and config that serve source code as textpassive · url
robots_reviewsensitive Disallow entries, (deep) whether they answer, staging hosts in the sitemappassive · site
techstack fingerprint + end-of-life software from a dated tablepassive · site
headers · csp_analyzersecurity headers · deep CSP reviewpassive
sslcertificate trust classified from OpenSSL (expired · self-signed · incomplete chain · hostname mismatch), key size, SHA-1, and TLS 1.0/1.1 the server really acceptspassive · site
cookiesSecure / HttpOnly / SameSite / parent-domain scopepassive
sri · mixed_content · clickjacking · form_security · csrfpage-level hygienepassive
info_disclosure · dir_listing · http_methods · security_txt · waf_detect · graphql_introspection · jwt_analysis · subdomainexposure & reconpassive
xss · sqli · ssti · open_redirect · cors · host_header_injectionreflected/error-based/marker checks (benign payloads). XSS is context-aware (HTML text, attribute, JS string); SQLi reports only errors the injection causedactive

↗ contacts hosts other than the target (skip with --no-external). passive = sends no crafted payloads. Profiles: passive (only passive modules), balanced (default), aggressive (higher rate/concurrency), deep (wider crawl, hidden-parameter discovery, larger exposed-file list, more payload shapes — slower), full (everything in deep, then exhaustive: 1000+ URLs at depth 6, ~600 guessed paths, backup copies, boolean SQLi, 160 parameter names — slowest).

How it works

[Pipeline: crawl, 32 modules, aggregate by fingerprint, correlate into attack paths, triage per host, report — shared by CLI, dashboard, MCP agents and the GitHub Action.]

One engine, four front doors. Address policy and proof of control live in the engine, so every front door gets them; request guard and token auth belong to the web server. See docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.

Configuration (environment variables)
VariableDefaultPurpose
FSV_HOST / FSV_PORT127.0.0.1 / 7474dashboard bind address
FSV_DB~/.fsv/scans.dbSQLite database
FSV_TOKEN—shared secret required on every API / WebSocket call (X-FSV-Token or ?token=)
FSV_ALLOWED_HOSTS—extra Host names the dashboard answers to (DNS-rebinding guard)
FSV_BLOCK_PRIVATEoffrefuse loopback / RFC 1918 targets (SSRF protection). Cloud-metadata ranges are always refused
FSV_REQUIRE_VERIFICATIONoffpayload-sending scans only against hosts whose owner proved control
FSV_MAX_SCANS3concurrent scans
FSV_DISABLED_MODULES—comma-separated module names to turn off
FSV_WEBHOOK_URL / FSV_WEBHOOK_MIN_SEVERITY— / highPOST a short summary (Slack/Discord-compatible) when a scan finds issues at or above that severity; same as --notify URL
FSV_PLUGIN_DIR / FSV_NO_PLUGINS~/.fsv/plugins / offplugin discovery
FSV_ADVISORY_FILE / FSV_EOL_FILE—your own JS-library advisories / end-of-life dates (JSON)

Limits — what FSV is not

  • It reads HTML; it does not execute JavaScript, so content that only exists after client-side rendering isn't discovered.
  • Active checks cover common reflected classes with benign markers. It is not a replacement for a penetration test, SAST or an SCA pipeline.
  • The JS-advisory and end-of-life tables are curated snapshots — cross-check with OSV / endoflife.date for anything important, and extend them with the files above.
  • DNS checks are only as good as the resolver (fsv doctor tests it). A resolver that can't answer produces no DNS findings, not bad ones.
  • Findings carry a confidence; tentative ones are hints. Triage them, and tell us about false positives — they're the most useful bug reports.

Documentation

Detections · Architecture · Writing modules · Deploying safely · Security policy · Contributing · Changelog

The animated SVGs and screenshots above are generated from a real scan: scripts/build_readme_assets.sh --screenshots.

Contact

twayst0 (tways) — author and maintainer

Questions, collaboration and licensing enquiries are welcome by email or Discord.

License

MIT — free to use, modify and share, for anyone, including commercially. Keep the copyright and licence notice. Copyright © 2026 twayst0. See LICENSE.

Disclaimer

This software is provided "as is", for lawful, authorized security testing only. The authors accept no liability for misuse or damage. Always obtain written permission before testing any system you do not own.

來源:README.md,提交 9c2f7e0

工具

12

fsv_scan

Run a web vulnerability scan against a target URL. Crawls the site (same-origin, skips logout/asset links) and runs modules by profile: 'passive' sends no payloads (headers, SSL/TLS, DNS, cookies, WAF, fingerprint, JWT, CSP, SRI, security.txt); 'balanced' (default) adds safe active checks (XSS, SQLi, CORS, open-redirect, SSTI, host-header); 'aggressive' is the same modules at higher rate/concurrency; 'deep' is thorough (wider crawl, hidden-parameter discovery, larger exposed-file list, more payload shapes — many more requests, only for targets the user owns); 'full' is exhaustive (1000+ URLs at depth 6, ~600 guessed directories/pages, backup copies of every script, boolean SQLi, 160 parameter names — the slowest and busiest; always set max_minutes). Returns findings grouped with severity, CWE, OWASP category, confidence and remediation. Time-boxed by max_minutes (default 20; partial results are kept). use_ct_logs=true also asks Certificate Transparency logs (crt.sh) for subdomains (sends the domain to a third party — only with the user's consent); allow_external=false skips modules that contact hosts other than the target. seed_urls adds same-origin pages no link points to; headers/cookies make it an authenticated scan (use a test account, never a real user's session). Only scan targets the user owns or is authorized to test; pass authorized=true only after they confirm.

輸入參數crawldepthtarget必填cookiesheadersmodulesprofilemax_urlsseed_urlsauthorized必填max_minutesuse_ct_logs另有 2 個

fsv_quick_check

Fast passive check of a single URL — no payloads sent. Runs security headers, SSL/TLS, cookies, clickjacking, CSP review, SRI, WAF/CDN detection, technology fingerprint, DNS (SPF/DMARC), HTTP methods, security.txt, and JWT analysis. Safe for a first look. Pass authorized=true after the user confirms authorization.

輸入參數target必填authorized必填

fsv_waf_check

Detect whether a target sits behind a Web Application Firewall or CDN (Cloudflare, AWS WAF, Akamai, Imperva, Sucuri, F5, ModSecurity, Fastly, …). Passive, single request. Pass authorized=true after the user confirms.

輸入參數target必填authorized必填

fsv_get_report

Get a formatted report for a completed scan. format: 'md' (default, OWASP-grouped), 'json', 'html' (self-contained), 'sarif' (for CI/code-scanning), 'csv', or 'fix-nginx' / 'fix-apache' / 'fix-caddy' / 'fix-express' / 'fix-dns'.

輸入參數formatscan_id必填

fsv_list_scans

List recent scans with IDs, targets, status, risk grade and finding counts. Optionally filter by target host substring.

輸入參數limittarget

fsv_compare_scans

Compare two scans by scan_id (e.g. before vs after a fix). Reports which findings were resolved, which are new, which persist, the risk-score delta and an improved/regressed verdict. Triaged-away findings are excluded, so false positives don't skew the diff.

輸入參數current_id必填baseline_id必填

fsv_target_trend

Show the risk-score trend for a host across its scan history (oldest first) — useful for reporting whether a site's posture is improving over time.

輸入參數limittarget必填

fsv_triage

Record a triage decision for a finding so it persists across future scans of the same host. status: 'confirmed', 'false_positive', 'accepted_risk', 'fixed', or 'open' (clears it). false_positive / accepted_risk / fixed are excluded from the risk score. Identify the finding by its id or fingerprint from a scan result.

輸入參數notestatus必填finding必填scan_id必填

fsv_fixes

Turn a scan's findings into paste-ready remediation for one platform: 'nginx', 'apache', 'caddy', 'express' (helmet/cookies) or 'dns' (SPF/DMARC/CAA records, dangling-record removal). Only issues actually found produce a snippet; CSP is emitted report-only. Show the user the snippets and remind them to test on staging.

輸入參數server必填scan_id必填

fsv_scan_stats

Get the HTTP statistics of a scan (requests, cache hits, coalesced requests, retries, errors, status-code breakdown, average latency).

輸入參數scan_id必填

fsv_list_modules

List all FSV scan modules with their category (passive/active), scope (site/url) and what each checks, plus the available scan profiles.

無需輸入參數。

fsv_verify_ownership

Prove control of a host so payload-sending scans are allowed on deployments that require it (FSV_REQUIRE_VERIFICATION=1). check=false returns the DNS TXT record / HTTP file to publish; check=true looks for it and records the proof.

輸入參數host必填check

版本歷史

2
  1. v2.4.0最新Oct 29, 2026
  2. v2.2.1Oct 26, 2026

評分

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