ClawPay MCP — Non-Custodial x402 Payments for AI Agents

io.github.up2itnow0822由 GitHub 帳號 up2itnow0822 發布v1.2.0更新於 Oct 24, 2026

Non-custodial x402 payments for AI agents. Sign locally, spend limits, Base network.

發布方自己的服務:Payments Ai Mcp

已驗證STDIO僅桌面金融AI 與機器學習

概覽

AI 產生的概覽

讓 AI 助理透過本機 MCP 工具簽署並送出 x402 付款,並管理非託管的 Base 錢包。

可以做什麼
這是一個本機 stdio MCP 伺服器,把 Agent Wallet SDK 的功能公開為工具。工具群組涵蓋錢包部署與資訊、付款(send_payment、x402_pay)、支出政策與預算檢查、代幣查詢與轉帳、兌換、USDC 跨鏈橋與託管、ERC-8004 身分與信譽,以及交易歷史。簽章在本機 Node.js 行程中使用 AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY 完成。
適用情境
當助理需要為受 x402 保護的資源付費,或從代理控制的錢包在 Base 上移動資金,並需要本機支出上限與審批佇列時使用。適合簽章金鑰留在使用者本機而非託管方的代理付款情境。
執行需求
以 npm 套件(agentpay-mcp)透過 stdio 在本機執行,需要 Node.js。錢包工具需要 AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY 與 AGENT_WALLET_ADDRESS;選用變數包括 CHAIN_ID、RPC_URL、FACTORY_ADDRESS、NFT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS 與 SESSION_TTL_SECONDS。僅支援 Base 主網與 Base Sepolia,並需要連線至 Base RPC 端點的網路存取。
安裝前請注意
AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY 是熱錢包簽章金鑰,會被讀入本機行程;請保護行程、環境變數與 MCP 用戶端設定,切勿提交真實金鑰。付款、兌換、跨鏈橋與託管工具會移動資金並消耗 gas。set_spend_policy 僅在行程內生效,同一代理可再次呼叫修改,且不會寫入鏈上限制;只有擁有者金鑰與代理金鑰分離時,超限交易才構成人工關卡。x402 收據僅存於記憶體,有上限且重新啟動後遺失。

安裝

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 開啟 儀表板中的 ClawPay MCP — Non-Custodial x402 Payments for AI Agents,將其新增到工作區。
  2. 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。

Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。

其他 MCP 客戶端

參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。

README

AgentPay MCP

[npm] [CI] [License: MIT]

AgentPay MCP is a stdio Model Context Protocol server for x402 payments and wallet operations. It exposes Agent Wallet SDK functions as MCP tools and loads a caller-controlled signing key from the local process environment.

The current npm package is agentpay-mcp v5.0.0.

Start without funds

Check the installed command without loading wallet credentials:

bash
npx -y agentpay-mcp --versionnpx -y agentpay-mcp --help

Use the AgentPay Wallet Starter for a no-funds verification of allowed, approval-required, and blocked policy outcomes.

MCP client configuration

Wallet tools read the following environment variables:

VariableRequired for wallet toolsMeaning
AGENT_PRIVATE_KEYYesLocal hot-wallet signing key
AGENT_WALLET_ADDRESSYesDeployed AgentAccountV2 address
CHAIN_IDNo8453 or 84532; defaults to Base mainnet
RPC_URLNoCaller-selected Base RPC endpoint
FACTORY_ADDRESSFor deploymentWallet factory address
NFT_CONTRACT_ADDRESSFor deploymentToken contract bound to a wallet
SESSION_TTL_SECONDSNoLocal session lifetime in seconds

Operator safety variables. They are read from the server environment only and cannot be changed through MCP:

VariableDefaultMeaning
AGENTPAY_POLICY_DAILY_LIMIT_ETHunsetOperator 24-hour rolling limit (ETH-equivalent)
AGENTPAY_POLICY_PER_TX_CAP_ETHunsetOperator per-transaction cap (ETH-equivalent)
AGENTPAY_POLICY_ALLOWED_RECIPIENTSunsetComma-separated operator recipient allowlist
AGENTPAY_ALLOW_UNPOLICED_SPENDoff1 permits value movement with no operator policy, relying only on on-chain limits
AGENTPAY_X402_MAX_PAYMENTunsetUSDC ceiling applied on top of every per-call x402 cap; non-USDC x402 payments are refused while set
AGENTPAY_STATE_DIRunsetDirectory for the fsync'd spend-intent journal; locks and keyed settlements survive restarts, and the journal is compacted to its live state automatically. One process owns the directory at a time (spend-intents.lock). If the journal cannot be read or fsync'd, or another live process owns the directory, value movement is refused
AGENTPAY_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_HOSTSunsetComma-separated hosts whose private address may be reached by outbound requests
AGENTPAY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORKoffDevelopment only: permit private destinations and plain http

Without at least one AGENTPAY_POLICY_* variable, or AGENTPAY_ALLOW_UNPOLICED_SPEND=1, every value-moving tool refuses to spend.

Example MCP configuration:

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "agentpay": {      "command": "npx",      "args": ["-y", "agentpay-mcp"],      "env": {        "AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY": "<secret-reference-or-local-key>",        "AGENT_WALLET_ADDRESS": "0x<deployed-wallet-address>",        "CHAIN_ID": "84532",        "AGENTPAY_POLICY_PER_TX_CAP_ETH": "0.01",        "AGENTPAY_POLICY_DAILY_LIMIT_ETH": "0.1",        "AGENTPAY_X402_MAX_PAYMENT": "1",        "AGENTPAY_STATE_DIR": "<writable-private-directory>"      }    }  }}

Do not commit a real signing key. Use the client or operating system's secret mechanism where one exists. Start on Base Sepolia before using Base mainnet.

Tool groups

The tool registry in src/index.ts exposes these groups:

GroupExamples
Walletdeploy_wallet, get_wallet_info, queue_approval
Paymentssend_payment, x402_quote, x402_pay, x402 session tools
Policyset_spend_policy, check_budget, OTel budget tools
TokensLookup, custom-token registration, balances, and transfers
ExecutionSwap, USDC bridge, and mutual-stake escrow
TrustERC-8004 identity, reputation, and UAID verification
Historyget_transaction_history for wallet contract events

Tool schemas and handlers live under src/tools/.

Security boundaries

These boundaries matter more than the feature list:

  • The server reads AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY into its local Node.js process and uses viem for signing. Protect the process, environment, and MCP client config.
  • Spend policy is default-deny. The operator policy comes from AGENTPAY_POLICY_* environment variables, is loaded once, and cannot be changed or cleared through MCP. Without it, value movement is refused unless the operator sets AGENTPAY_ALLOW_UNPOLICED_SPEND=1.
  • set_spend_policy can only tighten. Each call adds a layer to its scope; a request that raises a limit, drops a constraint, or widens an allowlist is refused, and earlier layers keep their rolling-window accounting. Loosening requires an operator restart. All policy state is still in-process and is reset by a restart.
  • x402_pay and x402_session_start require max_payment_eth and pay_to. The asset is always bound: it defaults to the chain's USDC unless asset names another; network can be bound too. A 402 that names another payee, asset, or network, the zero address, or a debit (principal plus the 0.77% protocol fee) above the cap is refused before any wallet write. AGENTPAY_X402_MAX_PAYMENT is a USDC ceiling; with it set, non-USDC payments are refused. Use x402_quote to read the offered terms first.
  • If a payment settles but its response is not delivered — the response fails, or the paid request is answered with any non-2xx status — every new x402 payment to that host (any path, port or spelling of the name) and to that payee (behind any host) is locked until an operator reconciles it. The lock is written before the wallet call, so a crash cannot lose it.
  • Caller-selected outbound requests (x402, quote, sessions, OTel kill callback) use a safe transport: https only (a kill callback may use http only for a host in AGENTPAY_KILL_CALLBACK_ALLOWED_HOSTS), private, loopback, link-local and metadata destinations refused, DNS resolved once with the socket pinned to the validated address, no automatic redirects, and response bodies capped at 2 MiB (1 MiB rendered).
  • send_payment, send_token, swap_tokens, bridge_usdc, create_escrow, x402_pay, and x402_session_start run inside a spend intent. Identical retries replay; idempotencyKey distinguishes equal payments; an unclear post-broadcast outcome locks the intent with no timer. Locks are process-local unless AGENTPAY_STATE_DIR journals them. Reconcile with agentpay-mcp spend-intents list and resolve <id> settled|unsettled, which is a local CLI, never an MCP tool. <id> is the shell-safe id: handle list prints for each intent. settled (the value moved) clears the lock and retires a keyed intent's idempotencyKey for good; a keyless intent has no key to retire, so an identical new request is a new payment (use idempotencyKey for retry safety). unsettled (nothing moved) clears the lock so a retry may pay. Only one process may use a state directory at a time: stop the server before resolve (list shows a read-only snapshot while it runs), and give each server its own AGENTPAY_STATE_DIR.
  • idempotencyKey may not contain control, invisible formatting, or line-separator characters; keys are printed escaped and shell-inert.
  • send_payment takes decimals from the token registry or the token contract; a differing token_decimals is refused before signing.
  • On-chain limits exist only when the wallet owner configures them directly on AgentAccountV2. The application policy does not write those contract limits, and an over-limit transaction is a human gate only when the owner key is kept separate from the agent key.
  • get_transaction_history reads on-chain wallet events and, for unscoped all queries, also lists x402 settlements made by this server process (final URL of the paid response, which may differ from the 402 issuer under redirects, method, amount, token, payee, tx hash, replay count). Those x402 receipts mean the payment was broadcast (a tx hash was returned), not that a receipt was confirmed. They are kept in memory only, capped at 256, and lost on restart. They are omitted from block-scoped queries. This is not an MCP request log: it does not record rejected pre-chain attempts or read-only calls.
  • Runtime wallet configuration currently supports Base mainnet and Base Sepolia. Unsupported chain IDs fail closed in src/utils/client.ts.
  • Swap, bridge, escrow, and payment tools can move funds and consume gas. Test with bounded values and independent wallet limits.

Read docs/security-posture.md for the detailed control map and known limitations.

Upgrading from 4.x

v5.0.0 is a breaking security release. Before upgrading:

  • Set an operator policy (AGENTPAY_POLICY_*) or explicitly opt out with AGENTPAY_ALLOW_UNPOLICED_SPEND=1; otherwise every spend is refused.
  • Pass max_payment_eth and pay_to to every x402_pay and x402_session_start call. Use x402_quote to read the terms first.
  • Stop relying on set_spend_policy to raise or clear limits.
  • Move any http or private-network x402 endpoint to https, or allow it with AGENTPAY_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_HOSTS (production) or AGENTPAY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=1 (development only).
  • Set AGENTPAY_STATE_DIR on long-lived servers.

docs/security-remediation-2026-10.md maps every finding to its fix and test.

Technical proof index

The repository keeps deeper interoperability and buyer-safety evidence in versioned documents:

AgentPay pins viem exactly at 2.57.4.

The directory comparison was captured against [email protected]; the package version at the top of this README is the current release.

Verify a clean checkout

bash
npm cinpm run buildnpm run typechecknpm testnpm run lintnpm run securitynpm run smoke:clean-install

The CI workflow is separate from scheduled daily review and repair workflows. A scheduled-review failure is not a product-test result, and a repair success does not replace CI.

Related repositories

Support and disclosure

License

MIT. See LICENSE.

來源:README.md,提交 e9bba91

工具

0
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版本歷史

1
  1. v1.2.0最新Sep 16, 2026

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