Your Mail Mcp

your-mail-mcp

[MCP registry] [Glama score]

Your mail already holds the answers: booking references, gate codes, invoices, warranty periods, promises people made in writing. This server lets your AI assistant find them, and it can only read.

Ask it things like:

• "Find the booking reference for the June ferry."
• "What was the wifi password the hotel sent last summer?"
• "What did the accountant answer about VAT, and when?"
• "Collect everything between me and the builder about the roof, in order, and summarize who promised what."
• "What arrived this morning, across all my accounts, that actually needs me?"

Use it for:

• Search that understands questions. Full-text search over your whole history, every account in one index, phrased the way you think.
• Triage from your phone. A morning summary of what came in overnight, with junk already filtered out, from wherever you are.
• Mail as context for other work. Pull the client's requirements out of the thread and into your coding or writing session.
• Agents you can leave running. The process has no path that sends, deletes or moves a message. A malicious email that reaches your assistant gets read, and that is all that can happen to it. Scheduled digests and always-on agents are a calm thing to run.

Setup is two files and docker compose up -d. See Quick start.

How it works

A self-hosted MCP server. It mirrors one or more IMAP accounts into a local maildir with mbsync, indexes them with notmuch, and answers tool calls from that index. The Claude and ChatGPT apps attach over HTTPS with OAuth; Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and Claude Desktop attach over stdio on the same machine. Any MCP client works, so if you want full privacy you can attach one backed by a local LLM and your mail never leaves your machine.

[How your-mail-mcp works: mail is pulled from IMAP providers into a local mirror, indexed by notmuch, and served to an MCP client through an OAuth gate, with no write path back to the providers]

Mail only ever moves left to right in that picture. The mirror is pull-only by configuration. The one connection the Go code makes toward a provider is an IMAP LIST per account, to learn what that server calls its junk and trash folders; it never selects a mailbox and never fetches a message. Security has the full list of what the process cannot do. The diagram source is docs/diagrams/how-it-works.html.

Quick start

On your machine, for your machine. Docker is the only requirement; the image at ghcr.io/wildsurfer/your-mail-mcp is built by CI for amd64 and arm64.

mkdir your-mail && cd your-mailcurl -fsSLO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wildsurfer/your-mail-mcp/main/compose.yamlcurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wildsurfer/your-mail-mcp/main/accounts.example.json -o accounts.json

Put your accounts in accounts.json. ${WORK_PASS} is replaced from the environment, so the file itself holds no password:

{  "accounts": [    { "name": "work", "host": "imap.gmail.com", "user": "[email protected]", "password": "${WORK_PASS}" },    { "name": "personal", "host": "imap.mail.me.com", "user": "you", "password": "${PERSONAL_PASS}" }  ]}

Put the passwords in .env next to compose.yaml:

# .envWORK_PASS=your-gmail-app-passwordPERSONAL_PASS=your-icloud-app-specific-password

compose.yaml passes WORK_PASS and PERSONAL_PASS into the container. An account with another variable name needs that name added under environment: there as well.

Two provider details cost people the most time. Gmail accepts only an app password over IMAP, and app passwords need 2-step verification turned on first. iCloud wants the short name before @icloud.com as user; the full address fails to log in. Every key of the file is in the reference.

These two files hold your mail passwords. Keep the directory out of version control and out of backups that leave the machine. If you would rather they did not, give an account pass_cmd instead of password: a command that prints the secret, such as cat /run/secrets/work_pass for a Docker secret, or security find-generic-password -s your-mail -a work -w on a Mac. mbsync runs it at connect time and nothing on disk or in the environment holds the password. See the reference.

docker compose up -ddocker compose logs -f     # watch the first sync

Today's INBOX mail is searchable within minutes. The full history follows at whatever pace the provider allows, and the status tool reports how far it has got. A large Gmail account takes days, because Google caps IMAP downloads at about 2.5GB per day; set SYNC_TIMEOUT=8h in .env for that first mirror. Provider notes has the details.

Then connect a client. Claude Code:

claude mcp add your-mail -- docker exec -i your-mail-mcp your-mail-mcp stdio

Cursor and VS Code add it in one click, once the stack is up:

[Add to Cursor] [Install in VS Code]

{ "command": "docker", "args": ["exec", "-i", "your-mail-mcp", "your-mail-mcp", "stdio"] }

/plugin marketplace add wildsurfer/your-mail-mcp/plugin install your-mail@your-mail-mcp

Use it from your phone

The Claude and ChatGPT smartphone apps reach a connector through the vendor's servers, so the server needs a public HTTPS address. A tunnel gives it one: the tunnel dials out, nothing listens on your home network, and the mail stays on your machine.

With Tailscale installed, one command, the same on macOS and Linux:

tailscale funnel --bg 8080

It prints a hostname like https://your-machine.your-tailnet.ts.net, and --bg keeps it running across reboots. Put that hostname in .env together with a passphrase, then restart:

# .envPUBLIC_URL=https://your-machine.your-tailnet.ts.netOAUTH_PASSPHRASE=pick-a-long-one-you-can-type-on-a-smartphone

docker compose up -d

OAUTH_PASSPHRASE is the only credential between the internet and your mail. A wrong guess costs one second and guesses are serialised, and neither of those saves a short passphrase. Use a long one you can still type on a phone.

Funnel needs HTTPS certificates and the Funnel node attribute enabled for your tailnet; the CLI offers to add the policy line the first time. tailscale funnel status shows what is exposed, and tailscale funnel --https=443 off takes it down.

Now add the connector. Neither the Claude nor the ChatGPT smartphone app can add one, so you do it once on the web, and it then appears on the phone.

1. On claude.ai or in Claude Desktop, open Settings → Connectors and add a custom connector.
2. Give it a name and the URL <PUBLIC_URL>/mcp. Leave the advanced OAuth fields empty; the server registers clients itself.
3. Claude opens the consent page. Enter your OAUTH_PASSPHRASE.
4. Open the Claude app on your phone. The connector is already there; turn it on for a conversation from the tools menu in the composer.

PUBLIC_URL has to match what you type into the client exactly. The server publishes PUBLIC_URL + /mcp as the resource in its OAuth metadata, and a mismatch there is the most common reason a connector refuses to add.

cloudflared tunnel logincloudflared tunnel create your-mail

cloudflared tunnel route dns your-mail mail.example.com

tunnel: your-mailcredentials-file: /Users/you/.cloudflared/f9e2….json   # the path create printedurl: http://localhost:8080

cloudflared tunnel run your-mail

claude mcp add --transport http your-mail https://your-host/mcp

codex mcp add your-mail --url https://your-host/mcpcodex mcp login your-mail

Run it on a server

Pick this when the mirror should stay up whether or not your machine is on. It costs a few dollars a month and one real trade-off: a full plaintext copy of your mail moves onto a rented disk, with the app passwords next to it. The install is the quick start plus a tunnel, on someone else's computer, and the box needs hardening before it holds your mail. Both are in docs/server.md.

The tools

Eleven tools, all read-only:

search, ids, files and count take a notmuch query (from:, to:, subject:, tag:, folder:, date:2026-01-01..2026-06-30, combined with and/or/not), an optional account to scope to one account, and can include junk and trash with include_excluded. Junk and trash are discovered per account over RFC 6154 SPECIAL-USE, so the exclusion works whatever those folders are named and in whatever language. While an account's mirror is still filling, these four tools prepend a note naming the account and how many messages are indexed so far.

Attachments are listed in show and thread and served by the attachment tool one part at a time: images inline up to 5MB, textual parts as marked text, and other binaries as a short-lived signed link to GET /attachment/{id}/{part} (a bearer token works there too). Without an HTTP listener, an oversized binary is saved under /index/attachments/ and the tool returns the path to docker cp. That directory is capped at 1GB; the oldest files go first.

Why not one of the others

There are around forty email MCP servers on GitHub. Nearly all of them talk live IMAP and ship a send path, which is the opposite of both choices this server rests on. Two are close enough to name.

igor47/notmuchproxy is the nearest thing that already existed, and a large part of why this one has the shape it does. It reads a notmuch archive you keep up to date yourself, has no write path, and takes a bearer token or full OIDC. Its query validation, which rejects an unknown prefix with an explanation, is reimplemented here as validateQuery. Two things differ: it assumes you already run mbsync and notmuch, where this server generates the mbsync configuration, syncs every account in parallel and discovers junk and trash over IMAP; and it has no account parameter. If you already run a notmuch setup you are happy with, notmuchproxy is the smaller thing to deploy and you should use it instead of this.

hgn/mcp-server-notmuch is stdio only, so one client on one machine, and its handling of untrusted content is the best in the survey. The single render() chokepoint here, which marks every byte of mail text in one place so that no individual tool can forget to, comes from its render.py.

The full survey, including which claims were read in source and which were taken from a README, is in docs/research/email-mcp-landscape.md.

Security

Read this before you point it at a mailbox you care about.

It cannot write. The generated mbsync configuration for every account carries Sync Pull, Create Near, Remove Near and Expunge None (or, for an account with expunge_local set, Expunge Near, which deletes local files only), and the program writes that file itself, so nothing in it can be edited into a push. Remove Near acts on the local side only: when a folder is deleted or renamed on the server, its local copy stays with all its mail, and only an empty local folder is removed. The only IMAP operation in the Go code is LIST, issued per account at startup and hourly to find the junk and trash folders; an account with exclude_folders set by hand skips even that. The process has no path that sends, deletes, moves or tags a message, and nothing in it holds write access to any account.

Deleted mail stays in the mirror. Mail you delete on the server is kept on disk and hidden from search through notmuch's deleted tag. Set expunge_local: true on an account to physically remove those local copies instead. The account is still never written to, but the mirror then stops being a backup: whatever disappears remotely disappears locally on the next pass.

How proven this is. One author, one operator, three real accounts: one iCloud and two Gmail. No third-party security review, and nobody else has deployed it. notmuchproxy has zero stars and a more convincing production story than this does.

Passwords are plain text inside the container. Account passwords come from the environment and are written at startup into a generated mbsync configuration at file mode 0600. That file is not encrypted. Anything that can read the container's environment, or that file, can read them. An account configured with pass_cmd instead keeps the secret in whatever the command reads — a Docker secret, a keychain — and the environment and the generated file hold only the command; the process still receives the password in memory for the one IMAP LIST it performs itself. Disk encryption, who can exec into the container and access to the host are the operator's responsibility; the server makes no claim of encrypting credentials at rest.

One passphrase, one consent. OAUTH_PASSPHRASE is checked in constant time and gates the whole server with a single shared secret. It is not a per-user credential system, and everyone holding the passphrase sees the whole mailbox. It does not encrypt anything at rest. Treat it and the mail passwords with the same care.

A mailbox is a secret store. Password resets, sign-in codes and magic links all arrive by mail, so read access alone is enough to take over accounts if it lands in the wrong hands or the wrong AI session. The read-only design and the untrusted-content markers remove the write path and the instruction channel; they do not make mail contents harmless. Connect clients you trust. Agent workflows that need their own inboxes need their own addresses, which is a different tool.

A known gap. search's thread summaries include a display name for every message in a matching thread, which the sender controls. A message in a folder excluded by default (junk, trash) can still put its own attacker-chosen name in front of you this way, even though its body never does. thread and show are not subject to this. It is not fixed in this release.

For a server that faces the internet, docs/server.md lists the hardening steps in the order of how much each buys you.

Reference

• The accounts file: every key, with defaults.
• Environment variables: sync interval and timeout, listener address, INIT_MIRROR.
• Provider notes: iCloud, Gmail, Dovecot.
• Troubleshooting: the startup refusals, and why junk is sometimes not excluded.
• Without Docker: release binaries and what they shell out to.
• Running it on a server: install script, hardening, your own domain with Caddy.
• Upgrading from 0.4.x.
• Design spec and the survey of email MCP servers.