MCP stdio ShellGuard

io.studiomeyer由 studiomeyer.io 發布v0.1.3更新於 Nov 3, 2026

MCP stdio 伺服器的縱深防禦:shell 注入防護、AST 審計 CLI、RCE 攔截。

AI 翻譯由 AI 模型根據下方的原文描述翻譯,可能有誤。

原文描述

Defense-in-depth for MCP stdio servers: shell-injection guard, AST audit CLI, RCE blocking.

發布方自己的服務:StudioMeyer Crew

已驗證STDIO僅桌面開發者工具安全與監控

概覽

MCP stdio ShellGuard 的本機 MCP 服務,由 studiomeyer.io 發布;無需登入;STDIO。

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安裝

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 開啟 儀表板中的 MCP stdio ShellGuard,將其新增到工作區。
  2. 為需要使用其工具的對話啟用該服務。

Desktop only,透過 STDIO。 STDIO 服務會啟動本機處理程序,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面主機。

其他 MCP 客戶端

參照 儲存庫 中的啟動說明。

README

Part of the StudioMeyer MCP Stack — Built in Mallorca 🌴 · ⭐ if you use it

mcp-stdio-shellguard

[npm version] [npm downloads] [License] [Last commit] [GitHub stars]

Defense-in-depth bundle for MCP stdio servers. Wraps `child_process.exec/spawn`

with allowlist + sandbox + replay-detection, plus an AST audit CLI (mcp-shellguard-audit) that scans MCP server sources for unsanitized shell calls. Closes the Ox-Security MCP stdio-RCE class (200k vulnerable servers, May 2026 disclosure).

  • MCP spec: 2025-06-18
  • SDK: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.29.0
  • Node: >= 20
  • License: MIT
  • Author: Matthias Meyer (StudioMeyer)

Install

bash
npm install mcp-stdio-shellguard

Or run the audit CLI directly without installing:

bash
npx -y -p mcp-stdio-shellguard mcp-shellguard-audit scan ./src

Package contents and maintenance

Version 0.1.3 includes the dependency bundle described below.

The package ships @typescript-eslint/typescript-estree plus TypeScript and the required parser dependency closure through bundledDependencies. A root-only npm override does not constrain an installed package's dependency tree; the included closure carries the checked versions to consumers. The bundle preparation checks @typescript-eslint/typescript-estree 8.72.1 and minimatch 11.0.3, then changes only the parser manifest dependency range from minimatch ^10.2.2 to ^11.0.3. Third-party source files and package version numbers are unchanged. The AST audit calls typescript-estree.parse directly, with TypeScript included explicitly to satisfy the parser dependency tree; no ESLint runtime is required.

The measured archive is approximately 4.92 MB compressed and 26.04 MB unpacked (decimal MB). Bundling increases download and disk use; a security update to an included dependency requires an updated package archive.

For maintenance, run npm ci and npm run test:consumer from the repository checkout. npm pack runs prepack automatically: it builds the package and prepares the declared bundle. The consumer check packs twice, verifies identical bytes, installs the actual archive in a fresh project, checks npm ls and both dependency audits, and exercises the installed CLI or runtime. Review dependency updates together with the locked bundle and license proofs before distributing a new archive. The archive's dist/bundled-dependencies.json records the bundle and manifest adjustments.

What it gives you

Three layers, opt-in piecewise:

  1. Library API — drop-in guardExec / guardSpawn you call from your own MCP server. Default-deny allowlist, sandbox profiles, replay window.
  2. Audit CLI — mcp-shellguard-audit scan <path> walks the AST, reports 12 anti-patterns from LOW (no timeout) to CRITICAL (exec(\...${userInput}...`)`).
  3. Reference MCP server — mcp-stdio-shellguard-demo exposes 8 tools so the MCP Inspector / Claude Desktop can drive the bundle directly.

Tools (reference server)

ToolTypePurpose
guard_execdestructiveDefended child_process.exec. Forces args[] vector, allowlist + sandbox + replay. Returns stdout, stderr, exitCode, canonicalHash, isReplay, trustTier.
guard_spawndestructiveDefended child_process.spawn. Returns SHA-256 hashes of stdout/stderr instead of full bodies. Hard-rejects shell:true.
register_allowlistmutatingRegister a tool name with executable + args regex. Without registration the default-deny applies.
audit_sourceread-onlyScan a TS/JS path for shell-injection anti-patterns. Returns AuditFinding[] + summary.
audit_reportread-onlyFormat an audit result as markdown / json / SARIF 2.1.0.
replay_checkread-onlyCompute canonical SHA-256 hash for an invocation and report whether it's already in the replay window.
sandbox_statusread-onlyReport active sandbox profile + concrete limits + cgroup-v2 active flag.
trust_tierread-onlyDerive LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH/CRITICAL tier for a registered tool plus improvement hints.

Sandbox profiles

ProfileTimeoutMax stdoutMax stderrFD budgetcgroup-v2
strict5 s1 MB256 KB32yes (cpu/memory)
standard (default)30 s10 MB1 MB256yes
permissive5 min100 MB10 MB1024no

Caller can tighten via timeoutMs / fdBudget per call. Caller cannot widen beyond the profile.

Trust tiers

TierCondition
LOWtool not registered (default-deny)
MEDIUMregistered but argsPatterns empty (any args allowed)
HIGHargsPatterns set but sandbox or replay tracker inactive
CRITICALargsPatterns + sandbox + replay all active

Lift LOW → CRITICAL by registering the tool + setting argsPatterns + running through guardExec/guardSpawn (which always activate sandbox + replay).

Library quickstart

ts
import {  AllowlistRegistry,  ReplayWindow,  guardExec,} from "mcp-stdio-shellguard";
const registry = new AllowlistRegistry();const replay = new ReplayWindow();
registry.register({  toolName: "git-log",  executable: "/usr/bin/git",  argsPatterns: ["^log$", "^--oneline$", "^-n$", "^\\d+$"],  sandboxProfile: "strict",});
const result = await guardExec(  {    toolName: "git-log",    command: "/usr/bin/git",    args: ["log", "--oneline", "-n", "10"],  },  { registry, replay },);
console.log(result.stdout); // → commit linesconsole.log(result.trustTier); // → "CRITICAL"console.log(result.canonicalHash); // → 64-char SHA-256

Audit CLI

bash
mcp-shellguard-audit scan ./srcmcp-shellguard-audit scan ./src --format sarif --output audit.sarifmcp-shellguard-audit scan ./src --severity-floor HIGH    # CI gate

Exit codes:

  • 0 clean (no findings at-or-above floor)
  • 1 findings present
  • 2 parse / IO errors

Custom ignoreGlobs passed to scanPath or the audit_source MCP tool accept at most 128 strings. Each string is limited to 1024 UTF-16 code units and 16 unescaped opening grouping characters ((, {, [). Inputs above these budgets raise a controlled error before matching.

Anti-pattern library (12 rules)

IDSeverityTriggers on
exec_template_literal_with_inputCRITICALchild_process.exec(\ls ${x}`)`
exec_dynamic_stringCRITICALchild_process.exec(cmd)
exec_sync_dynamic_stringCRITICALchild_process.execSync(cmd)
eval_near_child_processCRITICALeval(...)
function_constructor_near_child_processCRITICALnew Function(...)
spawn_dynamic_file_argsHIGHspawn(bin, userArgs)
exec_file_dynamicHIGHexecFile(bin, ...)
shell_true_optionHIGH{ shell: true }
os_system_equivalentHIGHDeno.run / Bun.spawn
spawn_literal_dynamic_argsMEDIUMspawn('git', userArgs)
unbounded_bufferLOWexec without maxBuffer
missing_timeoutLOWexec/spawn without timeout

The scanner resolves renamed child_process bindings before matching, so the dangerous shapes below are caught even when the call goes through an alias rather than a literal child_process.exec:

  • const execAsync = promisify(exec); execAsync(...${x})
  • import cp from "node:child_process"; cp.exec(...${x})
  • const { exec: sh } = require("child_process"); sh(...${x})
  • import { exec as run } from "node:child_process"; run(...)

Synchronous variants (spawnSync, execFileSync) share their async rules, and shell_true_option also fires on a string shell ({ shell: "/bin/sh" }) or a dynamic shell value — not just the literal { shell: true }. A promisify of a non-child_process function, a destructure off another module, and { shell: false } stay clean (no false positives).

Pragmas

  • // shellguard:ignore-next-line — suppress one finding
  • // shellguard:ignore-file — suppress whole file (rare; prefer per-line)

Why this exists

Ox-Security disclosed (2026-05) that 200k+ MCP stdio servers wrap child_process.exec with template literals carrying user input straight from LLM tool args. LiteLLM v1.83.6 was the canonical example (CVE patched in 1.83.7). This bundle is the defensive-security counterpart: a drop-in guard + scanner that closes the class. Inspired by AWS Linux seccomp + Chromium sandbox tiers.

See also

License

MIT — Copyright (c) 2026 Matthias Meyer (StudioMeyer)

Bundled dependencies retain their complete upstream license texts in the archive. The package license applies to this project's own code; bundled third-party packages retain their respective terms. The consumer check verifies each approved package version's full license file, or its complete README license section, against pinned content hashes from integrity-verified official npm artifacts. Whitespace and line-ending differences are accepted; missing, empty or partial legal text is rejected.

來源:README.md,提交 35b97f8

工具

0
SourceWeft 曾在隔離沙箱中以無憑證方式啟動該軟體包一次,以列出其工具,但未能完成:伺服器未能啟動。

版本歷史

2
  1. v0.1.3最新Nov 3, 2026
  2. v0.1.2Sep 16, 2026

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