Android Intent Security

This skill provides guidelines and patterns to secure Android components (Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers, Content Providers) and handle Intents safely, preventing privilege escalation and unauthorized access.

Glossary

• Intent: An asynchronous messaging object used to request an action from another app component.
• Exported component: A component (android:exported="true") that can be launched by other apps on the device.
• Sticky intent: A broadcast intent that remains in the system cache after it's sent, allowing any app to retrieve its contents.
• Signature permission: A permission whose protection level is set to signature, granted only to apps signed with the same developer key.
• onNewIntent: An activity lifecycle callback invoked when an activity is launched with FLAG_ACTIVITY_SINGLE_TOP and is already running at the top of the history stack.
• PendingIntent: A token granted to a foreign application (for example, system services) allowing it to execute a predefined Intent with the creator's permissions.
• Mutable PendingIntent: A PendingIntent whose underlying Intent parameters can be modified by the receiving application.
• ContentProvider: A component that encapsulates data and provides it to other applications via standard query/insert interfaces.
• IntentSanitizer: A utility class in AndroidX Core used to build a safe, sanitized copy of an incoming Intent by filtering out unauthorized components, actions, or extras.
• Intent redirection (forwarding): A vulnerability where an application receives an intent from an untrusted source and uses it to launch a private, non-exported component.

Prerequisites

• The agent MUST be able to describe the function and security implications of onCreate, onNewIntent, and the singleTop launch mode.
• The agent MUST be able to declare <activity>, <service>, <receiver>, and <provider> tags in AndroidManifest.xml and define their android:exported and android:permission attributes.
• The agent MUST be able to implement signature verification checks using PackageManager.

Limitations

• This skill focuses on local inter-component and inter-app communication security on the Android platform.
• This skill doesn't cover network security, web integration, or host-to-server security.

Setup and dependencies

• Android SDK: Minimum API Level 23 (Android 6.0) is required for standard hardware-backed keystore operations and component validation.
• AndroidX Core Library: androidx.core:core:1.9.0 or higher is mandatory to leverage IntentSanitizer.
• Standard API access: Standard Android PackageManager APIs are required for runtime component verification.

Intent security logic and decisions

1. Intent routing comparison

Evaluate the security features of different intent delivery methods:

2. PendingIntent mutability flag options

Evaluate the security implications of PendingIntent mutability flags:

3. Intent handling and redirection logic

IF (the component receives a nested Intent as an extra) { IF (AndroidX Core 1.9.0+ and higher is available) { MUST construct an IntentSanitizer to explicitly allowlist components, actions, data, and extras. MUST call sanitizeByThrowing() or sanitizeByFiltering() before launching. } ELSE { MUST verify that the nested Intent's target package matches the current application package. MUST verify that the target component of the nested Intent is publicly exported. } NEVER launch the nested Intent directly without validation. } ELSE IF (the component handles broadcasts) { MUST rely on the system's Protected Broadcast mechanism for system events (which guarantees the sender is the system framework). MUST protect custom receivers with signature-level permissions or use RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED for dynamic receivers to restrict the sender. IF (using ContextCompat.registerReceiver with RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED AND minSdk < 33) { MUST verify <permission android:name="${applicationId}.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION" android:protectionLevel="signature" /> and <uses-permission android:name="${applicationId}.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION" /> are declared in AndroidManifest.xml. } }

4. PendingIntent security logic

IF (a PendingIntent is created for delivery to another application) { MUST use PendingIntent.FLAG_IMMUTABLE by default. IF (the PendingIntent must be mutable) { MUST set the explicit target component or package name on the base Intent. NEVER create an implicit, mutable PendingIntent. } }

5. ContentProvider security logic

IF (the ContentProvider is only for internal app use) { MUST set android:exported="false". } ELSE { MUST protect it with android:readPermission and android:writePermission. MUST set android:grantUriPermissions="false" unless temporary URL access is strictly required. }

6. Service caller verification logic

IF (an exported service communicates with trusted sister/partner apps) { MUST retrieve the calling UID using Binder.getCallingUid() and resolve it to package names using PackageManager.getPackagesForUid(). MUST verify that the calling package signature fingerprint matches your trusted certificate hash. }

Code and configuration patterns

1. Safe intent redirection (manual verification)

Validate the target of a nested intent before launching it when modern sanitization libraries are unavailable.

• Expected Inputs:
  • An incoming Intent containing a nested Intent extra named EXTRA_NESTED_INTENT.
• Expected Outputs:
  • Launches the target component if safe; throws SecurityException if validation fails.

fun safeIntentRedirectionManual() {    val nestedIntent = IntentCompat.getParcelableExtra(intent, "EXTRA_NESTED_INTENT", Intent::class.java)    if (nestedIntent != null) {        // 1. Check for URI permission grants to prevent URI permission bypass        val hasUriPermissionGrants = (            nestedIntent.flags and (                Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION or                    Intent.FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION or                    Intent.FLAG_GRANT_PERSISTABLE_URI_PERMISSION or                    Intent.FLAG_GRANT_PREFIX_URI_PERMISSION                )            ) != 0        if (hasUriPermissionGrants) {            throw SecurityException("Nested intent contains forbidden URI permission grant flags!")        }
        val pm = packageManager        val target = nestedIntent.resolveActivity(pm)        if (target != null) {            // 2. Verify target is within the same package            if (target.packageName != packageName) {                throw SecurityException("Cross-app intent redirection is forbidden!")            }            try {                // 3. Verify target activity is exported                val info = pm.getActivityInfo(target, 0)                if (!info.exported) {                    throw SecurityException("Target activity is private: ${target.className}")                }                // 4. Explicitly set the component to prevent intent interception                nestedIntent.component = target                // Safe to launch                startActivity(nestedIntent)            } catch (e: PackageManager.NameNotFoundException) {                Log.e("Security", "Failed to resolve target activity", e)            }        }    }}

2. Safe intent redirection using IntentSanitizer

Filter or reject dynamic intents using AndroidX IntentSanitizer (AndroidX Core 1.9.0+).

• Expected Inputs:
  • An untrusted incoming Intent.
• Expected Outputs:
  • Intent: A sanitized copy containing only allowlisted components, categories, and actions. Throws SecurityException on violations if using sanitizeByThrowing().

fun safeIntentRedirectionSanitizer() {    val untrustedIntent = IntentCompat.getParcelableExtra(intent, "EXTRA_NESTED_INTENT", Intent::class.java)    if (untrustedIntent != null) {        // Define the strict boundaries for allowed redirection target        val sanitizer = IntentSanitizer.Builder()            .allowComponent(ComponentName("com.example.app", "com.example.app.SafeTargetActivity")) // Explicitly allowed target            .allowAction(Intent.ACTION_VIEW) // Explicitly allowed actions            .allowDataWithAuthority("com.example.app.provider") // Allowed URI authority            .allowType("text/plain") // Allowed mime type            .allowExtra("user_display_name", String::class.java) // Safe type-enforced extras            // Note: URI permission flags are NOT allowed, so the sanitizer will automatically strip or throw on them            .build()
        try {            // Option A: Throws SecurityException if the intent violates policies            val safeIntent = sanitizer.sanitizeByThrowing(untrustedIntent)            startActivity(safeIntent)        } catch (e: SecurityException) {            Log.e("SECURITY_ALERT", "Attempted launch of non-allowlisted intent blocked", e)        }
        // Option B: Silently filter and launch only the authorized parts (no exception thrown)        // val filteredIntent = sanitizer.sanitizeByFiltering(untrustedIntent)        // startActivity(filteredIntent)    }}

3. Custom signature permission protection

Declare a custom signature-level permission in the manifest to secure family app communication.

• Expected Inputs: Manifest configuration.
• Expected Outputs: An activity that can only be launched by apps signed with the same developer certificate.

<permission    android:name="com.example.snippets.permission.INTERNAL_COMMUNICATION"    android:protectionLevel="signature" />

<activity    android:name=".intents.InternalSharingActivity"    android:exported="true"    android:permission="com.example.snippets.permission.INTERNAL_COMMUNICATION">    <intent-filter>        <action android:name="com.example.snippets.ACTION_SHARE" />        <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />    </intent-filter></activity>

4. Safe onNewIntent lifecycle verification (warm boot protection)

Ensure that activities reusing dynamic intents (for example, in background launch paths) apply the same strict security filters inside onNewIntent.

• Expected Inputs:
  • newIntent (Intent): The newly delivered intent.
• Expected Outputs:
  • Executes processing logic only if the new intent passes security validation.

override fun onNewIntent(newIntent: Intent) {    super.onNewIntent(newIntent)
    // Set the intent to ensure intent returns the new one    intent = newIntent
    // Validate the intent payload    if (validateIntent(newIntent)) {        processIntentPayload(newIntent)    } else {        Log.w("SECURITY_ALERT", "Received invalid or insecure intent during warm boot")    }}
private fun validateIntent(intent: Intent): Boolean {    return intent.hasExtra("VALID_PAYLOAD_MARKER")}

5. Secure PendingIntent creation

Enforce immutability unless mutability is explicitly required.

• Expected Inputs (Immutable): An intent target.
• Expected Outputs (Immutable): A PendingIntent that cannot be altered by the receiver.
• Expected Inputs (Mutable): An intent with an explicit component set.
• Expected Outputs (Mutable): A mutable PendingIntent locked to a specific receiver component to prevent hijacking.

fun createPendingIntents(context: Context) {    // 1. Secure Immutable PendingIntent (Default)    val intent = Intent(context, TargetActivity::class.java)    val pendingIntent = PendingIntent.getActivity(        context,        0,        intent,        PendingIntent.FLAG_IMMUTABLE or PendingIntent.FLAG_UPDATE_CURRENT    )
    // 2. Secure Mutable PendingIntent (e.g., Notification Direct Reply)    val mutableIntent = Intent().apply {        // MUST set explicit target component to prevent redirection hijacking        component = ComponentName(context, ReplyReceiver::class.java)    }    val mutablePendingIntent = PendingIntent.getBroadcast(        context,        0,        mutableIntent,        PendingIntent.FLAG_MUTABLE or PendingIntent.FLAG_UPDATE_CURRENT    )}

6. Secure ContentProvider configuration and queries

Expose a ContentProvider securely and parameterize queries to prevent SQL injection.

• Expected Inputs:
  • uri (Uri): The query URI.
  • projection (String[]): Columns to retrieve.
  • selection (String): Query criteria.
  • selectionArgs (String[]): Values mapping to selection placeholders (?).
• Expected Outputs:
  • Cursor: Filtered query results, strictly bound to projection maps.

<provider    android:name=".intents.SecureDataProvider"    android:authorities="com.example.snippets.provider"    android:exported="true"    android:readPermission="com.example.snippets.permission.READ_DATA"    android:writePermission="com.example.snippets.permission.WRITE_DATA"    android:grantUriPermissions="false" />

override fun query(    uri: Uri,    projection: Array<String>?,    selection: String?,    selectionArgs: Array<String>?,    sortOrder: String?): Cursor? {    val queryBuilder = SQLiteQueryBuilder()    queryBuilder.tables = tableName    // Strict projection map to prevent querying unauthorized columns    queryBuilder.projectionMap = mapOf(        "_id" to "_id",        "display_name" to "display_name"    )    // Enable strict validation (always available since minSdk is 36)    queryBuilder.setStrict(true)    queryBuilder.setStrictColumns(true)    queryBuilder.setStrictGrammar(true)
    // MUST parameterize selection criteria; NEVER append selection strings directly    val db = dbHelper.readableDatabase    return queryBuilder.query(db, projection, selection, selectionArgs, null, null, sortOrder)}

7. Service caller signature verification

Verify the calling application's signature before binding to a service.

• Expected Inputs:
  • intent (Intent): The binding request intent.
• Expected Outputs:
  • IBinder: Local binder instance if caller signature matches trusted partner; throws SecurityException otherwise.

class SecureBoundService : Service() {    companion object {        // Expected SHA-256 hash of the trusted app's signing certificate (Base64 encoded)        private const val TRUSTED_PARTNER_SHA256 = "A1B2C3D4E5F6G7H8I9J0K1L2M3N4O5P6Q7R8S9T0U1V="    }
    override fun onBind(intent: Intent): IBinder {        // Return the binder. Do NOT perform signature verification in onBind() because        // the binder connection is cached by Android, which can bypass checks on subsequent binds.        return LocalBinder()    }
    private fun enforceTrustedCaller() {        val callingUid = Binder.getCallingUid()        // Allow calls from the same application        if (callingUid == Process.myUid()) {            return        }        val pm = packageManager        val packages = pm.getPackagesForUid(callingUid)
        if (packages.isNullOrEmpty() || !verifySignature(pm, packages[0])) {            throw SecurityException("Access Denied: Caller signature is untrusted.")        }    }
    private fun verifySignature(pm: PackageManager, packageName: String): Boolean {        try {            val trustedSha256Raw = Base64.decode(TRUSTED_PARTNER_SHA256, Base64.DEFAULT)            // API 28+ handles rotated certificates and avoids manual hashing.            // Since minSdk is 36, this is always available.            return pm.hasSigningCertificate(packageName, trustedSha256Raw, PackageManager.CERT_INPUT_SHA256)        } catch (e: Exception) {            Log.e("SECURITY_ERROR", "Verification failed for package: $packageName", e)        }        return false    }
    inner class LocalBinder : Binder() {        fun doSecureWork() {            // Verify caller identity on every transaction method call            enforceTrustedCaller()            // Safe to proceed with sensitive operations        }    }}

Error handling

Handle component binding, database queries, and intent redirection failures securely to avoid exposing internal structures.

fun safeErrorHandling(callingPackage: String?) {    try {        val payload = intent.getStringExtra("DATA_EXTRA") ?: throw IllegalArgumentException("Payload parameter missing.")        // Create a specific target intent using the validated payload        val targetIntent = Intent(this, TargetActivity::class.java).apply {            putExtra("SECURE_PAYLOAD", payload)        }        startActivity(targetIntent)    } catch (e: SecurityException) {        // MUST log security violations for audit, but NEVER expose exception details to the user.        Log.e("SECURITY_ERROR", "Unauthorized component transition blocked. Calling Package: ${callingPackage ?: "Unknown"}", e)        // MUST provide generic user feedback.        showFeedbackToUser("Process request failed: Access Denied.")    } catch (e: IllegalArgumentException) {        Log.w("INTEGRITY_WARNING", "Missing intent parameter", e)    }}

// Secure handling of ContentProvider queries on the client side:try {    val cursor = contentResolver.query(providerUri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, null)} catch (e: SQLiteException) {    Log.e("PROVIDER_ERROR", "ContentProvider database query failed", e)    // Secure handling: prevent raw query syntax details from leaking to UI}

Reporting guidelines

When this skill is executed to apply security hardening updates to a codebase, the agent MUST generate a structured "Best Practices and Security Alignment Update" report for the developer. The report must be written to the session artifact folder (or printed in the final response) and include:

1. Security alignment area: The category of improvement applied (for example, Safe Intent Redirection, Secure PendingIntent Configuration, ContentProvider Data Guarding).
2. Impact and priority: The potential safety risk addressed by the update (for example, Component Hijacking Prevention, Private Data Isolation).
3. Scope of changes: A list of all modified classes, XML files, and dependencies.
4. Implementation summary: Concrete details of the solution (for example, "Updated nested intent parsing to use the IntentSanitizer API with a strict component allowlist").
5. Code diff: Standard unified diffs showing the exact modifications.

Best practices and security alignment update template

Use the following markdown template when reporting changes to developers:

### Best practices and security alignment update: [Security Alignment Area]
*   **Improvement Description:** [Brief description of the hardening update and why it's recommended]*   **Priority Level:** [High / Medium / Low]*   **Alignment Action:** [Summary of updates, for example, converted to FLAG_IMMUTABLE]
#### Files modified*   `[Relative path to File 1]`*   `[Relative path to File 2]`
#### Implementation diff```diff// Insert Unified Diff here

Testing and verification

1. [Step 1 to verify the component behaves correctly, for example, run component unit test]
2. [Step 2 to verify regression safety] ```

Antipatterns

• NEVER launch a nested Intent received from an untrusted source without verifying its target package and exported status.
• NEVER use sticky broadcasts (sendStickyBroadcast).
• NEVER assume an exported component is safe because it runs in a background thread or performs internal checks.
• NEVER expose sensitive functionalities (like SSO authentication or payment processors) to components without signature-level permission restrictions.
• NEVER process incoming intents in onNewIntent without applying the same security controls as onCreate.
• NEVER create a mutable PendingIntent without setting an explicit target component in the base Intent.
• NEVER use dynamic string concatenation to construct selection blocks inside a ContentProvider query.
• NEVER use Binder.getCallingUid inside a BroadcastReceiver.onReceive to identify the sender of a broadcast, as it returns the receiver's own UID, not the sender's.

Best Practices

• MUST explicitly set android:exported="false" for all components that don't need external communication.
• MUST protect all exported components with custom permissions utilizing android:protectionLevel="signature" when communicating between family apps.
• MUST validate all incoming intent extras and handle missing parameters gracefully to prevent crashes.
• MUST rely on the system's Protected Broadcast mechanism for system events (for example, boot completed, package changes), as the system prevents untrusted apps from spoofing these actions.
• MUST protect custom broadcasts with signature-level permissions or use RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED for dynamic receivers to restrict the sender identity (and when minSdk < 33, MUST verify that <permission android:name="${applicationId}.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION" android:protectionLevel="signature" /> and <uses-permission android:name="${applicationId}.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION" /> are present in AndroidManifest.xml when using ContextCompat.registerReceiver).
• MUST call setIntent(newIntent) inside onNewIntent() before processing payloads to keep active references updated.
• MUST use PendingIntent.FLAG_IMMUTABLE by default when constructing PendingIntent instances.
• MUST protect exported ContentProviders with readPermission and writePermission.
• MUST enforce parameterized selection structures in ContentProvider query/update methods.
• MUST verify the package signature fingerprint of binding applications at runtime inside exported services.
• MUST use androidx.core.content.IntentSanitizer to sanitize incoming dynamic intents before redirection, if AndroidX Core 1.9.0+ is imported in the project.