Aidp Roles Access

aidp-roles-access — roles, permissions, access (RBAC)

Inspect and manage AIDP RBAC.

CLI (preferred): aidp role <command> --instance-id <DATALAKE_OCID> --auth api_key --profile DEFAULT --region <r>

• Roles: aidp role list | get | create | update | delete | add-member | remove-member | list-permissions
• Per-resource grants: aidp <catalog|cluster|volume|schema|workspace|workspace-object> list-permissions | manage-permission

Fallback (no CLI): same Role REST API via oci raw-request (identical endpoint + auth). Permission writes (workspace/cluster/volume grants) can also use the gated MCP admin tools as an optional accelerator when configured.

Verify-first + least privilege: bind to the caller's identity; never escalate beyond what they have. Confirm the working path with a live aidp role list (or GET /roles) before any write. Auth + base URL: references/oci-raw-request.md.

When to use

• "List roles / who has access", "create a role", "add/remove a member", "grant/revoke access to a workspace/cluster/volume".

Read & role CRUD (CLI preferred)

# List roles (smoke test) — CLIaidp role list --instance-id <DATALAKE_OCID> --auth api_key --profile DEFAULT --region us-ashburn-1
# Add a member to a role — CLIaidp role add-member --instance-id <DATALAKE_OCID> --role-key <ROLE_KEY> \  --auth api_key --profile DEFAULT --region us-ashburn-1 \  --principals '["ocid1.user.oc1..xxxx"]'

Mutating ops (create, update, delete, add-member, remove-member, manage-permission): persist the body to .aidp/payloads/ and confirm first (references/payloads.md).

Fallback (no CLI) — REST via oci raw-request

Base: https://aidp.<region>.oci.oraclecloud.com/20240831/dataLakes/<DATALAKE_OCID>/…

• List roles — GET /roles — ✅ LIVE-VERIFIED 200 (api_key DEFAULT profile, 20240831/dataLakes).
• Inspect a role — GET /roles/{k}, GET /roles/{k}/permissions.
• Create / update / delete — POST /roles, PUT /roles/{k}, DELETE /roles/{k} (send if-match: <etag> on PUT/DELETE).
• Membership — POST /roles/{k}/actions/addMember · POST /roles/{k}/actions/removeMember (body e.g. {"principals":["ocid1.user.oc1..xxxx"]}).

oci raw-request --http-method GET \  --target-uri "https://aidp.us-ashburn-1.oci.oraclecloud.com/20240831/dataLakes/<OCID>/roles" \  --profile DEFAULT

On 401/403/"Security Token", follow the auth ladder in oci-raw-request.md (refresh AIDP_SESSION).

Per-resource permission grants (full matrix)

Role CRUD + membership scope who is in a role; per-resource grants scope what a principal can do to one object. Every resource type exposes a list-permissions + manage-permission pair (CLI preferred; REST …/<resource>/<key>/permissions + …/actions/managePermission fallback). Grant body is consistently {"principals":[…], "permission":"<enum>", "action":"GRANT"|"REVOKE"} — confirm the exact permission enum for each resource via aidp help <resource> manage-permission / a live read before writing.

Job/Workflow body shape differs from the generic grant. The CLI README + SDK confirm manage-job-permission does not take {principals,permission,action}. Its grant body is AssignJobPermissionDetails = {"assignees":{"type":"USER|ROLE|GROUP","targets":[…]},"permissions":["READ"|"USE"|"MANAGE"|"ADMIN"]} (permissions is a list aligned 1:1 with assignees.targets); the manage wrapper is {"assignJobPermissionDetails":{…},"revokeJobPermissionDetails":{…}}. Enum names are confirmed-citable (SDK assign_job_permission_details.py lines 18-30 / permission_assignees.py lines 18-26; CLI README workflow manage-job-permission, README lines 7315-7377); still confirm the live enum with aidp help workflow manage-job-permission or a list-job-permissions read before writing.

Optional accelerator: when a gated aidp MCP is configured (AIDP_MCP_ENABLE_ADMIN_TOOLS=true + MCP restart), manage_workspace_permission / manage_cluster_permission / manage_volume_permission / manage_create_workspace_permission wrap the same writes (details_json {"principals":[…],"permission":"WRITE","action":"GRANT"}). Not required — REST verbs above are the source of truth; or apply the grant in the console.

Column masking & classification (honest scope — no data-plane API found)

There is no programmatic masking/classification REST API in the tested tenancy — GET …/maskingPolicies, /dataClassifications, /columnMaskingPolicies, /tags all returned 404 (probed 2026-06-10; recorded in references/rest-endpoint-map.md). Do not fabricate one. What actually exists:

• Restricted / redacting views — the practical column-level control today: CREATE VIEW exposing only permitted columns (or CASE/hashing to redact), then grant on the view, not the base table (aidp-sql-ddl
  • the View row above). This is the recommended pattern when asked to "mask a column".
• Ontology-driven sensitivity — the Ontologies feature tags terms (av:isSensitive / av:requiresRole) for governance, but it is UI-driven with no confirmed REST surface here (see the Ontologies note in aidp-semantic-model). If the user needs policy-based dynamic masking, surface that it's UI/ontology-governed today and offer the restricted-view pattern as the API-driven equivalent — don't claim a masking endpoint.

Workflow

1. Read current state first (GET /roles + the relevant role's /permissions).
2. Show the exact grant/revoke (principal, permission, target) and confirm before applying.
3. Apply via REST (role CRUD/membership), or the gated admin tool if it's available; re-read to confirm.

Guardrails

• Access changes are sensitive — confirm every grant/revoke; never broaden beyond the user's request.
• Don't propose IAM/permission changes that aren't explicitly asked for.

References

• references/aidp-cli-map.md · references/payloads.md · references/oci-raw-request.md · references/no-mcp-rest-map.md · references/rest-endpoint-map.md