Security Threat Model

openai/skills/skills/.curated/security-threat-model

作者 openai49f948faa925无许可证28K 个星标收录于 2026年11月20日更新于 2026年11月20日仓库3周前更新

Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Trigger only when the user explicitly asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats/abuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do not trigger for general architecture summaries, code review, or non-security design work.

精选仅含说明安全
AI 生成的概览

基于代码仓库生成应用安全威胁模型,涵盖信任边界、资产、攻击者能力、滥用路径与缓解措施,输出 Markdown 文档。

功能
引导代理按结构化流程进行威胁建模:从仓库或指定路径提取系统模型,梳理信任边界、资产与入口点,评估攻击者能力,并以滥用路径形式枚举威胁。随后按定性可能性与影响排序,给出与具体组件或边界绑定的缓解建议,并执行质量检查。最终按参考模板中的输出契约,生成以仓库或目录命名的简洁 Markdown 威胁模型文件。
适用场景
适用于用户明确要求对代码库或路径做威胁建模、枚举威胁或滥用路径,或开展应用安全威胁建模的场景。不适用于一般架构总结、常规代码审查或非安全类设计工作。
运行要求
仅为说明文档,不含脚本。需要访问目标仓库或路径,并依赖随附的两个参考文件(提示词/输出模板,以及可选的控制措施与资产清单)。最终报告前可能需要用户确认关键假设。

Threat Model Source Code Repo

Deliver an actionable AppSec-grade threat model that is specific to the repository or a project path, not a generic checklist. Anchor every architectural claim to evidence in the repo and keep assumptions explicit. Prioritizing realistic attacker goals and concrete impacts over generic checklists.

Quick start

  1. Collect (or infer) inputs:
  • Repo root path and any in-scope paths.
  • Intended usage, deployment model, internet exposure, and auth expectations (if known).
  • Any existing repository summary or architecture spec.
  • Use prompts in references/prompt-template.md to generate a repository summary.
  • Follow the required output contract in references/prompt-template.md. Use it verbatim when possible.

Workflow

1) Scope and extract the system model

  • Identify primary components, data stores, and external integrations from the repo summary.
  • Identify how the system runs (server, CLI, library, worker) and its entrypoints.
  • Separate runtime behavior from CI/build/dev tooling and from tests/examples.
  • Map the in-scope locations to those components and exclude out-of-scope items explicitly.
  • Do not claim components, flows, or controls without evidence.

2) Derive boundaries, assets, and entry points

  • Enumerate trust boundaries as concrete edges between components, noting protocol, auth, encryption, validation, and rate limiting.
  • List assets that drive risk (data, credentials, models, config, compute resources, audit logs).
  • Identify entry points (endpoints, upload surfaces, parsers/decoders, job triggers, admin tooling, logging/error sinks).

3) Calibrate assets and attacker capabilities

  • List the assets that drive risk (credentials, PII, integrity-critical state, availability-critical components, build artifacts).
  • Describe realistic attacker capabilities based on exposure and intended usage.
  • Explicitly note non-capabilities to avoid inflated severity.

4) Enumerate threats as abuse paths

  • Prefer attacker goals that map to assets and boundaries (exfiltration, privilege escalation, integrity compromise, denial of service).
  • Classify each threat and tie it to impacted assets.
  • Keep the number of threats small but high quality.

5) Prioritize with explicit likelihood and impact reasoning

  • Use qualitative likelihood and impact (low/medium/high) with short justifications.
  • Set overall priority (critical/high/medium/low) using likelihood x impact, adjusted for existing controls.
  • State which assumptions most influence the ranking.

6) Validate service context and assumptions with the user

  • Summarize key assumptions that materially affect threat ranking or scope, then ask the user to confirm or correct them.
  • Ask 1–3 targeted questions to resolve missing context (service owner and environment, scale/users, deployment model, authn/authz, internet exposure, data sensitivity, multi-tenancy).
  • Pause and wait for user feedback before producing the final report.
  • If the user declines or can’t answer, state which assumptions remain and how they influence priority.

7) Recommend mitigations and focus paths

  • Distinguish existing mitigations (with evidence) from recommended mitigations.
  • Tie mitigations to concrete locations (component, boundary, or entry point) and control types (authZ checks, input validation, schema enforcement, sandboxing, rate limits, secrets isolation, audit logging).
  • Prefer specific implementation hints over generic advice (e.g., "enforce schema at gateway for upload payloads" vs "validate inputs").
  • Base recommendations on validated user context; if assumptions remain unresolved, mark recommendations as conditional.

8) Run a quality check before finalizing

  • Confirm all discovered entrypoints are covered.
  • Confirm each trust boundary is represented in threats.
  • Confirm runtime vs CI/dev separation.
  • Confirm user clarifications (or explicit non-responses) are reflected.
  • Confirm assumptions and open questions are explicit.
  • Confirm that the format of the report matches closely the required output format defined in prompt template: references/prompt-template.md
  • Write the final Markdown to a file named <repo-or-dir-name>-threat-model.md (use the basename of the repo root, or the in-scope directory if you were asked to model a subpath).

Risk prioritization guidance (illustrative, not exhaustive)

  • High: pre-auth RCE, auth bypass, cross-tenant access, sensitive data exfiltration, key or token theft, model or config integrity compromise, sandbox escape.
  • Medium: targeted DoS of critical components, partial data exposure, rate-limit bypass with measurable impact, log/metrics poisoning that affects detection.
  • Low: low-sensitivity info leaks, noisy DoS with easy mitigation, issues requiring unlikely preconditions.

References

  • Output contract and full prompt template: references/prompt-template.md
  • Optional controls/asset list: references/security-controls-and-assets.md

Only load the reference files you need. Keep the final result concise, grounded, and reviewable.

来源与署名

来源:openai/skills位于skills/.curated/security-threat-model提交49f948f

许可证: 无许可证

内容归原作者所有。SourceWeft 从公开仓库中收录这些内容。

在 README 中添加徽章

向读者展示该技能已收录于 SourceWeft,徽章链接到本页。

“Listed on SourceWeft”徽章预览
[![Listed on SourceWeft](https://sourceweft.com/badge/skills/gh-openai-skills-security-threat-model.svg)](https://sourceweft.com/skills/gh-openai-skills-security-threat-model?utm_source=readme&utm_medium=badge)

举报或申请下架