Redis Security

作者 redisa84871d065f3MIT收录于 2026年10月8日更新于 2026年10月8日

Redis security guidance covering authentication (requirepass and ACL users), TLS, ACL-based least-privilege access control, restricting network exposure via bind and protected-mode, firewall rules, and disabling dangerous commands. Use when deploying Redis to production, defining ACL users for an application, configuring TLS connections, locking down a Redis instance behind a firewall, or auditing a Redis deployment for security hardening.

仅含说明Security
AI 生成的概览

指导通过身份验证、ACL 最小权限、TLS 和网络限制来加固 Redis 部署。

功能
该技能为 Redis 生产环境加固提供指导,涵盖使用 requirepass 和 ACL 用户进行身份验证、TLS 配置、基于 ACL 的最小权限访问控制、通过 bind 和 protected-mode 限制网络暴露、防火墙规则以及禁用危险命令。它会给出 redis.conf、ACL SETUSER、iptables 和客户端连接设置的配置片段与命令示例。它还指向三个参考文件,分别涉及身份验证、ACL 和网络暴露。
适用场景
适用于将 Redis 实例部署或审查用于生产环境、为应用程序定义 ACL 用户、配置 TLS 连接、在防火墙后锁定 Redis 实例,或根据安全发现审计 Redis 部署的场景。
运行要求
无脚本,仅为指导说明。应用这些指导需要已有 Redis 部署;示例还需要 Redis 客户端库(如 redis-py),以及访问 redis.conf、ACL 命令和防火墙工具的能力。

Redis Security

Production hardening for Redis: authentication, ACL-based access control, and network exposure. Cover all three together — any one of them on its own leaves an exploitable gap.

When to apply

  • Deploying or reviewing a Redis instance destined for production.
  • Setting up application credentials beyond a shared password.
  • Auditing a Redis deployment against a security checklist.
  • Receiving "Redis exposed to the internet" findings from a scanner.

1. Always authenticate (and use TLS)

Never run a production Redis without a password. Pair authentication with TLS so credentials and data aren't sent in clear text.

# redis.confrequirepass your-strong-passwordtls-port 6380tls-cert-file /path/to/redis.crttls-key-file  /path/to/redis.key
python
r = redis.Redis(    host="localhost",    port=6380,    password="your-strong-password",    ssl=True,    ssl_cert_reqs="required",)

If you can use ACL users (next section) instead of the single requirepass, do — requirepass is effectively the legacy "default user" shortcut.

See references/auth.md [blocked].

2. ACLs for least-privilege access

The default user with a shared password is fine for development. For production, give each application a dedicated ACL user with only the commands and key patterns it actually needs.

# Cache-only readerACL SETUSER app_readonly on >password ~cache:* +get +mget +scan
# Writer that can't run dangerous opsACL SETUSER app_writer   on >password ~*        +@all -@dangerous
# Admin (use sparingly, never for application traffic)ACL SETUSER admin        on >strong-password ~* +@all

Useful command categories:

CategoryWhat it covers
@readRead commands (GET, MGET, HGET, ...)
@writeWrite commands (SET, DEL, XADD, ...)
@dangerousFLUSHALL, DEBUG, KEYS, etc.
@adminAdministrative commands

If app credentials leak, a tight ACL bounds the blast radius — the attacker can't FLUSHALL your DB just because they grabbed a cache reader's password.

See references/acls.md [blocked].

3. Restrict network access

The most common Redis breach is a public-internet Redis with no auth. Avoid that with three layers:

# redis.conf — bind to specific interfaces, keep protected-mode onbind 127.0.0.1 192.168.1.100protected-mode yes
bash
# Firewall — allow only application subnetsiptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -s 192.168.1.0/24 -j ACCEPTiptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -j DROP

Anti-pattern: bind 0.0.0.0 + protected-mode no — exposes Redis to the whole network without protection.

Optional but recommended: rename or disable destructive commands so a compromised client can't trash the DB:

rename-command FLUSHALL ""rename-command DEBUG ""rename-command CONFIG ""

See references/network.md [blocked].

References

来源与署名

来源:redis/agent-skills位于plugins/redis-development/skills/redis-security提交a84871d

许可证: MIT

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