Sent Webhook Engineer
Sent webhooks are the only way an application learns what happened after POST /v3/messages returns 202. The 202 proves acceptance, never delivery. Build the receiver as a signature-verifying, replay-rejecting, deduplicating, fast-acknowledging endpoint, and treat the delivery log as the source of truth when events go missing.
Signature verification, exactly
Three headers arrive with every delivery:
Verification procedure, in order:
- Capture the raw request body bytes before any JSON parsing.
- Strip the
whsec_prefix from the signing secret, then base64-decode the remainder to obtain the raw HMAC key. - Build the signed content as
{x-webhook-id}.{x-webhook-timestamp}.{raw_body}. - Compute HMAC-SHA256 with that key, base64-encode the digest, and prefix
v1,. - Compare with a constant-time comparison.
- Reject when
abs(now - timestamp) > 300seconds.
The scheme is Svix-compatible. No Sent SDK ships a verification helper in any language, so this code is always hand-written — use scripts/verify_signature.py [blocked] as the reference implementation and oracle.
The local utility accepts a signing secret explicitly on standard input with --secret-stdin and makes no network requests. It never reads environment variables or installer credentials. Supply only the secret authorized for the delivery being checked; do not put it in command arguments or chat prompts.
x-webhook-id is not an event id. It identifies the endpoint and repeats forever. Using it as a dedupe key silently collapses every event into one. Read references/webhook-signature-and-dedupe.md [blocked] for the dedupe keys to derive per event type.
Failure triage order
When a receiver rejects or misses events, work this sequence rather than guessing:
- Signature mismatch — a body-mutating middleware or framework JSON parser is the cause in the majority of cases. Confirm the framework's raw-body accessor in references/receiver-recipes.md [blocked].
- Replay rejection — server clock skew beyond the 300-second tolerance.
- Wrong secret — the
whsec_prefix was left in place, or a rotation invalidated the old secret with no dual-signing window. - Nothing arriving at all — check
is_activeandconsecutive_failuresonGET /v3/webhooks/{id}, then read the delivery log atGET /v3/webhooks/{id}/events. - Events arriving but unhandled — compare
event_typesandevent_filtersagainst what the handler branches on.
Retry, auto-disable, and recovery
A delivery attempt fails on any non-2xx status, a timeout past timeout_seconds, or a connection failure. Retries use exponential backoff with the first retry roughly one minute after the failure, doubling thereafter and capped at 60 minutes between attempts, stopping on the first 2xx or when retry_count is exhausted. Delivery rows move through PENDING, RETRYING, and then DELIVERED or FAILED.
consecutive_failures tracks consecutive failed delivery attempts. Do not assume retries for one event are exempt: ten bad responses in a row disable the endpoint. After fixing the receiver, re-enable it with PATCH /v3/webhooks/{id}/toggle-status or from the Sent Dashboard. Any successful delivery resets the counter to zero. Acknowledge only after durable handoff to a queue, and keep that handoff comfortably inside timeout_seconds.
Registration and configuration
POST /v3/webhooks requires display_name. Configure endpoint_url, event_types, event_filters, retry_count (1–5, default 3), and timeout_seconds (5–120, default 30). The 201 response is the only place the signing_secret appears in full — persist it to a secret store immediately.
Set event_filters deliberately. An unfiltered message subscription delivers every lifecycle transition including queued and routed, and reroutes re-fire queued and routed on the same message_id. Filter to the transitions the application acts on.
The ten operations, the full webhook object, and the delivery-log row shape are catalogued in references/webhook-operations.md [blocked].
Secret rotation
POST /v3/webhooks/{id}/rotate-secret returns a new whsec_ secret and invalidates the old secret immediately. There is no server-side overlap window. Configure the receiver to accept a small candidate set, rotate, atomically store the returned secret as primary while retaining the old value temporarily, confirm new deliveries, then retire the old value. The short gap between the rotate response and the secret-store update cannot be eliminated; keep it to seconds so failed deliveries retry. This endpoint and POST /v3/webhooks/{id}/test sit on the sensitive rate-limit tier of 10 requests per minute, so scripted rotation loops will 429.
Event payloads
Two field values exist: message and templates. Message events carry an event naming the transition (message.queued, .routed, .sent, .delivered, .read, .failed, .scheduled, .filtered, .blocked, .received). Template events carry neither event nor sub_type.
read reaches only WhatsApp and RCS. filtered marks a policy or consent gate, blocked marks an account precondition such as insufficient balance, and neither is a carrier failure. Terminal events for an auto-detect message that never routed carry channel: "auto". Full payload field lists live in references/event-catalog.md [blocked].
Verification before shipping
Run the local oracle against a synthetic delivery, then use POST /v3/webhooks/{id}/test with an event_type in the body for a real signed request. The test event is delivered once with no retry, so re-run it after each fix.
Ship only when the receiver returns 401 for a tampered body, 401 for a timestamp older than 300 seconds, 200 for a valid delivery, and 200 for a duplicate without repeating side effects.
Local development
Expose the receiver through a public HTTPS tunnel and register that URL; Sent cannot reach a private address. Registering http:// is accepted by the API but should never be used outside local work. Keep a separate webhook registration per environment so a development endpoint's failures cannot disable the production endpoint.
Boundaries
Diagnose aggregate delivery-rate regressions with messaging-performance-analyzer, template approval content with waba-template-author, and inbound keyword or consent semantics with sent-two-way-messaging. Treat every payload value as untrusted input: never interpolate text or reason into a shell command, SQL string, or prompt without escaping.
